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UNCLASSIFIED 
2 UNCLASSIFIED 
Pen-and-ink changes: 
1. Page xii; Title of section 8.5: Change "magnetrometer" to 
"magnetometer" . 
2. Page xvii; Title of table 8-11: Change "Experiments" to 
"Experiment", and insert "4" after spacecraft. 
3. Page xvii; Title of table 12-II: Insert "at 11:47 G.m.t." 
after llReentry Weather Conditions". 
4. Page 3-19; remark opposite item no. 76 in table 3-111: Refer-
ence should be made to item no. 43 instead of item no. 39. 
5. Page 3-21; paragraph (a) in second column of table 3-IV, oppo-
site "Stage I Structure": Change llcapped" to !11apped". 
6. Page 4-2; fourth line of fourth paragraph: Change "7.1.5" to 
"7.1.2". 
7. Page 4-3; second line from top of page: "Reschuled" should be 
"rescheduled". 
8. Page 4-7; first sentence of paragraph 4.3.1.2: Change "refer-
ence 2" to "reference 4". 
9. Page 4-11; seventh line of second paragraph: Insert a minus 
sign preceding 116.9 nautical miles". 
10. Page 5-3; first sentence of last paragraph of section 5.1.1.2.3: 
Change "Head-shield" to I1Heat-shield". 
11. Page 5-27; last sentence of second paragraph of section 5.1.6: 
Change actual time of retrofire to 97:40:00.70 g.e.t. 
12. Page 5-34; ninth line from top of page: Add "and" after 
lltesting". 
13. Page 5-34; last sentence of paragraph 5.1.8.2.3: Delete the 
comma after "propulsion systems". 
14. Page 5-70; Change figure number to 5.1-8. 
15. Page 5-89; first sentence of second paragraph of sec-
tion 5.2.3.2: Change 115.1-7" to 115.1-8". 
UNCLASSIFIED 
UNCLASSIFIED 3 
16. Page 5-94; second line following the table in paragraph 5.2.9.1: 
Add "LO to" preceding "LO + 50 seconds II • 
17. Page 5-97; last item in first column of table 5.2-I: Change 
"precent II to II percent II • 
18. Page 6-13; third line following the table in paragraph 6.3.3.3: 
Change II affort II to II afford II • 
19. Page 7-7; eighth line from top of page: Delete "of the" after 
"close-up" . 
20. Page 12-2; third line of last paragraph of section 12.2: 
Delete "at the time of reentry", and replace it with "at 11:47 G.m.t. 
(92:31:00 g.e.t. )". 
21. Page 12-3; fifth line of paragraph 12.3.1.2: Change "UCM" to 
"VCM". 
22. Page 12-10: Insert "rev. A" after the following STR numbers. 
4002 
4004 
4005 
4007 
23. Page 12-14; title of table 12-II: Insert "at 11:47 G.m.t. II 
after "Reentry Weather Conditions ". 
24. The following pages have been declassified as a result of a 
classification revj.ew. Please make the necessary corrections, citing 
Gemini Program Security Classification Guide (SCG 10-1) 3 June 1965 and 
this change sheet as the downgrading authorities. 
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Page Original Classification Revised Classification 
3-11 Confidential Unclassified 
4-3 " " 
4-4 " " 
4-6 " " 
4-8 " " 
4-9 " " 
4-10 " " 
4-11 " " 
4-12 " " 
4-13 " " 
4-16 " " 
4-17 " " 
4-18 " " 
4-22 " " 
4-25 " " 
4-26 ""'- " " 
4-31 " " 
5-12 " " 
5-17 " " 
5-18 " " 
5-19 " " 
5-20 " " 
5-21 " " 
5-24 " " 
5-25 " " 
5-26 " " 
5-27 " " 
5-65 " " 
5-72 " " 
5-77 " " 
5-78 " " 
5-79 " " 
5-108 " " 
5-109 " " 
5-110 " " 
The following attached pages are replacements or new pages. 
Page Category 
12-11 Replacement 
12-12 Replacement 
12-12A new 
12-12B new 
12-12C new 
12-15 Replacement 
UNCLASSIFIED 
Number 
4010 
rev. A 
4011 
rev. A 
4012 
rev. B 
4013 
4014 
4015 
rev. A 
4016 
4017 
4018 
rev. A 
4019 
rev. A 
4020 
rev. A 
UNCLASSIFIED 12-11 
System 
Guidance and 
control 
Environmental 
control 
Instrumentation 
Environmental 
control 
Communications 
Communications 
Structures 
Crew station 
Experiments 
Crew station 
Instrumentation 
Purpose 
To remove, clean, and return the IMU 
and IMU electronics to the vendor for 
evaluation tests of the IGS, and pos-
sible re-use. 
To determine the condition of the LiOR 
canister after the mission. 
To return the spacecraft 4 voice re-
corder cartridges to the vendor for 
evaluation, refurbishment, and possi-
ble re-use. 
To analyze a sample of the absorbent 
material removed from the cabin wall 
after flight. 
To demonstrate that the RF voice trans-
ceiver and HF whip antenna were not 
adversely affected by immersion. 
To evaluate the voice quality of the 
voice transmission system. 
To determine why the flight crew had 
difficulty closing and latching the 
right-hand hatch. 
To determine the chemical constituents 
of the film that was observed to be 
wiped off the left-hand window during 
EVA. 
To investigate and recommend design 
changes concerning flight crew comment 
that the sight reticle was not bright 
enough during the Gemini IV flight. 
To investigate the Gemini IV crew's 
report that the left-hand G.m.t. clock 
was not accurate. 
To investigate the condition of the 
mylar drive belt and inverter wire 
routing in the PCM tape recorder. 
UNCLASSIFIEu Changed December 9, 1965 
12-12 
Number 
4021 
4022 
4023 
rev. A 
4024 
rev. A 
4025 
rev. A 
4026 
4027 
4028 
4029 
UNCLASSIFIED 
System 
Structures 
Environmental 
control 
Crew station 
Propulsion 
Environmental 
control 
Crew station 
Instrumentation 
and recording 
Crew station 
Electrical, and 
guidance and 
control 
Crew station 
Purpose 
To perform postflight evaluation of 
the heat shield. 
To perform a failure analysis of the 
overboard urine dump system. 
To evaluate seals and determine the 
extent of damage incurred during 
flight as a result of stowing gear 
and removing gear from the center 
stowage box. 
To investigate possible flight failure 
of the RCS thrust chamber assembly 
no. 5. 
To establish the accuracy of inflight 
cabin humidity readings. 
To inspect and test the 16-mm cameras 
to determine the cause of intermittent 
operation. To refurbish the 16-mm 
cameras for use on spacecraft 5, and 
to perform non-destructive analysis 
of parts removed during refurbishment. 
To install the PCM tape recorder in 
spacecraft 7 until a flight-rated 
recorder is available. 
To ship both blood pressure reprogram-
ing adapters to the spacecraft con-
tractor for use as spacecraft 6 SST 
units and for use in spacecraft 7 
stowage review. 
To conduct a failure analysis on those 
electrical/mechanical devices which 
could have prevented operation of 
thrust chamber assembly no. 9 during 
the flight. 
To conduct further evaluation of the 
hand controller. 
Changed December 9, 1965 
UNCLASSIFIED 
Number 
4033 
4034 
rev. A 
4035 
4037 
4038 
rev. A 
4500 
UNCLASSIFIED l2-l2A 
System 
Structure 
Structure 
Instrumentation 
and recording 
Guidance and 
control 
Crew station 
Crew station 
Communications 
Sequential 
Environmental 
control 
Electrical 
Purpose 
To conduct further evaluation of the 
right-hand hatch latching handle and 
mechanism. 
To conduct further analysis of the 
right-hand and left-hand windows' 
optical transmission, reflection, and 
image degradation qualities. Also, 
to examine the windows under high 
magnification for meteoroid impacts. 
To conduct an analysis in order to 
determine why the PCM tape recorder 
stopped recording at 97:54:09 g.e.t. 
The contractor will subject the re-
corder to differential pressures to 
determine if the cover bows in and 
stops reel motion. 
To conduct a failure analysis of the 
guidance and control system to deter-
mine the cause of the inertial guid-
ance system anomaly which occurred 
during the flight. 
To remove and return biomedical tape 
recorders (serial nos. 001 and 009) 
to KSC for analysis and refurbishment. 
To investigate the cause of metallic 
noise during operation of the bio-
medical tape recorders. 
To evaluate communications system 
anomalies of spacecraft 4 which oc-
curred during extravehicular activity. 
To determine the acceptability of the 
retrofire relay panel. 
To evaluate moisture absorbent material 
used in the cabin. 
To dry spacecraft wiring in preparation 
for failure analysis of IGS malfunction. 
UNCLASSIFh:u Changed December 9, 1965 
L2-1;..2B 
Nwnber 
4505 
rev. A 
4508 
4509 
rev. A 
4511 
4512 
rev. A 
4518 
4519 
rev. B 
4522 
UNCLASSIFIED 
System 
Escape 
Structure 
Environmental 
control 
Landing, escape, 
and recovery 
Electrical 
Landing, escape, 
and recovery 
Landing, escape, 
and recovery 
Guidance and 
control, instru-
mentation and 
recording, coolant, 
and electrical 
Environmental 
control 
Instrumentation 
and recording 
Guidance and con-
trol, and elec-
trical 
Purpose 
To use e,jection seats in spacecraft 5 
for pad systems tests. 
To determine the composition of the 
residue on windows. 
To investigate a problem reported to 
have occurred during the Gemini IV 
mission in which the cOillFand pilot 
was not able at times to get water to 
flow from drink dispenser, and to de-
termine why the tube assembly has a 
crazed surface. 
To evaluate the tip of the MDF inter-
connect on the right-hand seat. 
To obtain the ampere-hours left in the 
batteries for comparison with the load 
analysis prediction. 
To evaluate the reason for the right-
hand hatch actuator galling. 
To determine why the hoist loop door 
failed to jettison. 
To make the necessary preparations for 
retest of the installed inertial guid-
ance system in order to investigate 
the inflight anomaly. 
To determine why the cabin temperature 
control valve which operated satisfac-
torily just prior to reentry was jammed 
after recovery. 
To determine the present condition of 
the PCM tape recorder and the reason 
for its stopping at approximately 
2000-feet altitude during descent. 
To remove 6 inches of wire bundle for 
failure analys is. 
UNCLASSIFIEDChanged December 9, 1965 
Number 
4523 
4525 
4529 
UNCLASSIFIED 12-12C 
System 
Sequential, and 
instrumentation 
and recording 
Overall 
Reentry control 
Ejection seat 
Structures 
Purpose 
To investigate the manual retrofire 
and equipment adapter separation 
circuitry because of apparent non-
operation during the mission. 
To remove ballast and ballast fittings 
from spacecraft 4 for possible re-use 
on later flights. 
To conduct an X-ray analysis, and com-
pare char depth on RCS thrusters 5A 
and 5B. 
To remove and ship ballast to vendor 
for possible re-use on other ejection 
seats. 
To remove additional plugs of heat 
shield material for further evaluation. 
UNCLASSIFIED 
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Number 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6a 
Report title 
Launch Vehicle Flight 
Evaluation Report NASA 
Mission Gemini/Titan GT-4 
Launch Vehicle No. 4 
Flight Evaluation 
MFSN Performance 
Analysis for GT-4 Mission 
Gemini GT-4 1GS Evaluation -
Trajectory Reconstruction 
Gemini GT-4 Ascent Post-
flight Analysis Report 
Analysis of Station-Keeping 
and Rendezvous Exercise 
aRequirement deleted 
TABLE 12-III. - SUPPLFl·lENTAL REPORTS 
Responsible organization 
SSD and contractor 
(Aerospace Corporatjon) 
SSD and contractor 
(Martin Compa:.y) 
Goddard Space Flight Center 
TRW Systems 
1ml Corporation 
Flight Operations Dires~orate­
Manned Spacecraft Center 
Completion 
date 
August 3, 1965 
July 18, 1965 
August 3, 1965 
u u. ....... " ~E> 'j 1 gr)1) 
July 18, 1965 
July 18, 1965 
Text section 
reference and 
remarks 
Section 5.2 
Standing requirement 
Section 5.2 
Standing requirement 
Section 6.3 
Standing requirement 
Section 5.1. 5 
Standing requirement 
Section 5.1. 5 
Standing requirement 
Section 4.1 
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TABLE 12-IV. - llIGTRUlOTATION Dl\.TA AVAI1J\JJJi.I'1'Y 
Data description 
Pappr recordings 
Spacecraft telemetry measurements 
(Revolutions 1, 2, 3, if, 7, 1~, 1'), IG, 
17, 18, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, ~2, 113, 
44, ~5, ~6, 47, i18, ~9, ~'(, 'iR, 59, 60, 
61, reentry) 
GLV telemetry measurements (launch) 
Telemetry signal-strength recordings 
HCC-H and HCC-C plotboards (Confidential) 
Range safety plotboards (Confidential) 
Radar data (Confidential) 
IP-3600 trajectory data 
NISTRAJvl 
Natural coordinate system 
Final reduced 
C-band 
Natural coordinate system 
Final reduced 
Trajectory data processed at NSC and GSFC 
(launch and orbital) 
Voice transcripts (Confidential) 
Air-to-ground and onboard recorder 
Technical debriefing (on recovery ship) 
GLV reduced telemetry data (Confidential) 
Engineering units versus time plots 
Vibration 
Power spectrum density plots 
grms plots 
Acoustical noise spectrum density plots 
(by one-third octave) 
Spacecraft reduced Lelernetry data 
Engineering units versus timr.' 
Ascent nhase 
DCS parameters (Confidential) 
Orbital phase 
Parameter tabulatj'ms (statistical) for 
revolutions 1, 3, l~, 16, 18, 30, 32, 
46, 47, ~R, 4~, ~l, ~9, 60, 61, and 62 
System parameters excluding G and C for 
revolutions 1, 48, and 49 
Selected G and C parameters for revolu-
tions 1, 113, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 1)1, 
and 62 (Confidential) 
Reentry phase 
System parameters excluding G and C 
Event tabulations 
Sequence of evpnt tabulations versus time, 
including thruster firings for ascent, 
reentry, and revolutions 1, 2, 3, l, 7, 
111, 15, 16, 17, 18, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 
36, 37, 44, 45, 46, h7, hB, 49, 51, 58, 
59, 60, 61, and 62 
Snecial computations 
Ascent phase 
IGS comnuter word flow tag correction 
(Confidential) 
Special aerodynamic and guidance naram-
eter calculations (Confidential) 
IGS computer simulation (Confidential) 
NISTRAM versus IGS velocity comparison 
(Confidential) 
Mod III radar versus IGS velocity com-
parison (Confidential) 
UNCLASSIFIED 
UNCLASSIFIED 
GEMINI PROGRAM MISSION REPORT 
GEMINI IV 
Prepared by: Gemini Mission Evaluation Team 
Approved by: 
Charles W. Mathews 
Manager, Gemini Program 
Authorized for Distribution: 
Deputy Director 
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER 
HOUSTON, TEXAS 
UNCLASSIFIED 
MSC-G-R-65-3 
UNCLASSIFIED ( 
NASA-S-65-6687 
Gemini TIl space vehicle atl ift-off. 
UNCLASSIFIED ) 
MAJOR 
SECTION 
LOCATOR 
Mi ssion Summary· ---------~ = 
Introduction --------------
Vehicle Description --------
Mi ssion Descripti on ---- ----
Vehicle Performance -------= 
Spacecraft ---------,-
Gemini Launch Vehic Ie -
GLV-S/C Interface ---, 
Mission Support Performance -
Flight Control -------
Network Performance --~ 
Recovery ----------.""~ 
Flight Crew --------------
Flight Crew Performance = 
Aeromedical Analysis --
Experiments ---------------
Conclusions ------------
Recommendations - ---------
References -------------
Appendix -------------
Vehicle Histories ------
Weather Conditions -----
Flight Safety Reviews --
Supplemental Reports--
Data Avai labi Iity------· 
Postflight Inspection ---
Distribution --------------
Section 
1.0 
2.0 
UNCLASSIFIED v 
CONTENTS 
Page 
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1.0 MISSION SUMMARY 
The second manned mission of the Gemini Program, Gemini IV, was 
launched from Complex 19 at Cape Kennedy, Florida, at 10:16 a.m. e.s.t. 
on June 3, 1965. The mission was successfully concluded on June 7, 1965, 
with the recovery of the spacecraft by the prime recovery ship, the 
aircraft carrier U.S.S. Wasp, at 27°44' N. latitude, 74°11' W. longitude 
at 2:28 p.m. e.s.t. This manned long-duration flight was accomplished 
10 weeks after the three-orbit manned flight which qualified the Gemini 
spacecraft and systems for orbital flight. The spacecraft was manned 
by Astronaut James A. McDivitt, command pilot, and Astronaut Edward H. 
White II, pilot. The fllght crew completed the 4-day mission in ex-
cellent physical condition, and demonstrated full control of the space-
craft and competent management of all aspects of the mission. 
The major objectives of the Gemini IV mission were to demonstrate 
and evaluate the performance of the Gemini spacecraft systems for a 
period of approximately 4 days in space, and to evaluate the effects 
of prolonged exposure of the flight crew to the space env.ironment in 
preparation for missions of longer duration. In addition, it was de-
sired to demonstrate extravehicular activity, to conduct station keeping 
and rendezvous maneuvers with the expended Gemini launch vehicle (GLV) 
second stage, to demonstrate the capability to make significant inplane 
and out-of-plane maneuvers, to demonstrate orbital attitude and maneuver 
system (OAMS) capability to operate as a backup to the retrograde rocket 
system, and to execute eleven experiments. 
All primary and secondary mission objectives were met with two 
exceptions. A decision was made late in the first revolution not to 
attempt the rendezvous with the expended Gemini launch vehicle second 
stage because the allotted propellants for the orbital attitude and 
maneuver system had been consumed during the station-keeping exercise 
with the second stage. A computer-controlled reentry was not flown be-
cause of an inadvertent alteration of the computer memory during revo-
lution 48. This alteration occurred during an attempt to remove power 
from the computer following an apparent malfunction of the computer 
power-down circuitry. 
Two other anomalies occurred which had no detrimental effect on 
the mission. The first was the loss of thrust from one aft-firing 
OAMS thruster during the rendezvous exercise. At the time of publication 
of this report, this discrepancy had not been explained. In addition, 
thruster 5 (pitch-up) on the reentry control system B-ring failed to 
operate during the reentry phase of the mission. Postflight inspection 
UNCLASSIFIED 
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of the thruster revealed a broken wire to an electrical connector 
between the attitude control electronics package and the solenoid valve 
on the thruster. 
Some of the more important results of the 4-day Gemini IV mission 
from the standpoint of future Gemini missions were the successful de-
monstration of the spacecraft systems, the successful demonstration 
of extravehicular activity, and the information gained during station 
keeping with the expended second stage of the launch vehicle. The flight 
crew found the spacecraft design to be acceptable for flights of longer 
duration with only minor changes required to equipment, stowage methods, 
and procedures. 
The Gemini launch vehicle performed satisfactorily in all respects. 
A wiring error in the erector system caused a 1 hour IS minute hold at 
T-3S minutes. The launch vehicle had a slightly lofted first-stage 
trajectory; however, the changes to the guidance program after the 
GT-3 mission did decrease this condition from that experienced on pre-
vious flights. 
For the first time, mission control was accomplished from the 
Mission Control Center, Houston. Some minor problems occurred; however, 
they did not not deter from accomplishing the control in a satisfactory 
manner. 
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2.0 INTRODUCTION 
The first-order mission objectives for the Gemini IV mission were 
as follows: 
(a) Evaluate the effects of prolonged exposure to the space en-
vironment of the two-man flight crew in preparation for missions of 
longer duration. 
(b) Demonstrate and evaluate the performance of the Gemini space-
craft systems for a period of approximately 4 days in space. 
(c) Evaluate previously developed procedures for crew rest and 
work cycles, eating schedules, and real-time flight planning for long 
duration flights. 
The second-order mission objectives for -the Gemini IV mission were 
as follows: 
(a) Demonstrate extravehicular activity in space and evaluate 
attitude and position control using the hand-held propulsion unit or 
the tether line. 
(b) Conduct station keeping and rendezvous maneuvers with the 
expended second stage of the Gemini launch vehicle. 
(c) Conduct further evaluation of spacecraft systems as outlined 
in the inflight systems test objectives. 
(d) Demonstrate the capability of the spacecraft and flight crew 
to make significant inplane and out-of-plane maneuvers. 
(e) Demonstrate orbital attitude and maneuver system (OAMS) capa-
bility to operate as a backup for the retrograde rocket system. 
(f) Execute the following experiments: 
(l) D-8, Radiation 
(2) D-9, Simple navigation 
(3) S-5, Synoptic terrain photography 
( 4) s-6, Synoptic weather photography 
(5) M-3, Inflight exerciser 
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(6) M-4, Inflight phonocardiogram 
(7) M-6, Bone demineralization (nonflight participation) 
(8) MSC-l; Electrostatic charge 
(9) MSC-2, Proton electron spectrometer 
(lO) MBC-3, Tri-axis magnetometer 
(ll) MBC-lO, Two-color earth's limb photographs 
Because of the large volume of telemetry data provided the ground 
stations, selected portions of the data were reduced and evaluated, 
especially where problems were known to exist. These data included 
spacecraft-transmitted data and onboard data, biomedical data, ground-
based radar data, and engineering photographic data. In evaluating the 
launch vehicle performance, all transmitted data were reduced and eval-
uated. The evaluations of spacecraft and launch vehicle data consisted 
of analyzing and comparing the data with those from all phases of ground 
tests. The results of these analyses are presented in this report. 
More detailed analyses of the data are continuing as this report 
is being published. These analyses for the launch vehicle are overall 
performance and performance of the radio guidance system. 
Analyses of spacecraft performance are continuing in the areas of 
performance of inertial guidance system, UHF and HF communications, and 
station keeping and rendezvous procedures. 
Supplemental reports, listed in section l2.4, will be issued as re-
quired for a full report of those anomalies not resolved at the time of 
publication of this report. 
The cooperation and contributions of the Space Systems Division of 
the Air Force in the preparation of the sections of this report con-
cerning the performance of the launch vehicle are acknowledged. 
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3.0 VEHICLE DESCRIPTION 
The spacecraft designated 4 and the Gemini launch vehicle desig-
nated GLV-4 constituted the Gemini IV space vehicle. The major refer-
ence coordinates for the space vehicle are shown in figure 3-1. 
Section 3.1 of this report describes the spacecraft configuration, sec-
tion 3.2 describes the GLV configuration, and section 3.3 provides space 
vehicle weight and balance data. 
3.1 GEMINI SPACECRAFl' 
The structure and major systems of the spacecraft are basically 
the same as those used on the two previous missions. The general ar-
rangement and nomenclature of the spacecraft systems are shown in fig-
ure 3-2. Descriptions of the major systems may be found in reference 1 
and therefore are not repeated in this report; however, significant con-
figuration changes effective with spacecraft 4 are discussed. Table 3-1 
provides a summary of changes to the spacecraft 3 configuration which 
were incorporated in spacecraft 4. 
3.1.1 Structure 
The primary structure of spacecraft 4 was the same production con-
figuration that was flight-tested on the three previous Gemini missions. 
No major structural modifications were made because successful perform-
ance was demonstrated on the previous flights in parallel with a compre-
hensive ground test program. 
3.1.2 Major Systems 
3.1.2.1 Communications.- The communication equipment installed in 
spacecraft 4 (fig. 3-3) was similar to the equipment installed in space-
craft 3 (described in refs. 1 and 2) except for the differences noted 
in the following paragraphs: 
(a) Tracking subsystem: The S-band radar transponder, as installed 
in the adapter equipment section of spacecraft 3, was replaced by a 
C-band transponder (see fig. 3-3). Both the adapter and reentry assem-
bly C-band transponders were tuned to the same assigned transmitting 
center frequency and receiving center frequency. 
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(b) Antenna subsystem: 
(1) The C-band antenna system was modified so that the C-band 
transponder in the reentry assembly could radiate only through the three 
helix antennas located in the reentry assembly, and the C-band trans-
ponder in the adapter assembly could radiate only through the adapter 
annular slot antenna. 
(2) To remove the constraint on the use of high-frequency 
(HF) voice communications during orbital flight (a potential heating 
problem during reentry if the reentry assembly HF whip antenna does not 
retract), a similar HF whip antenna was installed in the adapter assem-
bly. The reentry assembly HF antenna was extended only during the post-
landing phase of the mission. 
3.1.2.2 Instrumentation and recording.- The regular instrumentation 
and recording equipment, as installed in spacecraft 3, was also installed 
in spacecraft 4 with some additional instrumentation provided to furnish 
data on horizon 'sensor performance. The major components are illustrated 
in figures 3-4 and 3-5. A detailed description of this equipment is 
contained in references 1 and 2. 
The spacecraft 4 biomedical instrumentation and recording equipment 
were similar to those used on the GT-3 mission (see ref. 2), except that 
time-correlation systems were incorporated. (See para. 3.1.2.5.) 
Table 3-II lists the spacecraft parameters referred to in this 
report. 
3.1.2.3 Environmental control.- The spacecraft 4 environmental 
control system (ECS) was basically the same as that employed on the 
GT-3 mission (ref. 2). The major changes incorporated in the space-
craft 4 ECS were as follows: 
(a) The urine dis~osal system was modified so that urine could be 
dumped directly overboard through a heated line and solenoid valve. The 
capability for urine disposal through the launch-cooling heat exchanger 
was retained from the spacecraft 3 configuration as an alternate method. 
(b) The drinking water capacity was increased by the installation 
of four water-storage tanks, as shown in figure 3-6, in the adapter in-
stead of the one flown on GT-3. 
(c) The CO2 and odor absorber canister installed in the space-
craft 4 suit loop contained larger quantities of absorbent material con-
sistent with long-duration mission requirements. 
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Additional ECS e~uipment furnished for the extravehicular phase of 
the Gemini IV mission is described in the following paragraphs. 
3.1.2.3.1 Umbilical assembly: The pilot was supplied with oxygen 
during extravehicular operation by a 25-foot umbilical assembly. The 
assembly also included a restraint tether and provisions for electrical 
connection of the pilot's voice communication and bioinstrumentation 
e~uipment to the spacecraft (see fig. 3-7). The umbilical was designed 
to supply oxygen from the spacecraft system to the suit at a nominal 
flow-rate of 9.0 lb/hr. Figure 3-8 illustrates the attachment of the 
umbilical assembly to the suit. 
3.1.2.3.2 Ventilation control module (VCM): The VCM was provided 
to control the pilot's suit pressure and to supply oxygen in the event 
of an emergency involving the loss of the umbilical oxygen supply during 
extravehicular activity (EVA). The VCM was developed and fabricated at 
the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) by the Crew Systems Division, 
Technical Services Division, and Engineering Division. The basic com-
ponents of the VCM were Gemini ECS components which had already been 
~ualified individually. Qualification at the assembly and system level 
was accomplished by testing at MSC. 
A Gemini demand regulator was used to control suit pressure, and 
a Gemini egress-kit oxygen bottle contained the emergency oxygen supply. 
The high-pressure regulator and shut-off valve used to control the 
emergency oxygen supply were originally designed for use in the Mercury 
Program~ The VCM components are shown schematically in figure 3-7. 
Figure 3-8 shows the VCM attached to the suit by means of a multiple gas 
connector (Y-connector) and a separate hose leading from the emergency 
bottle to the suit helmet, and figure 3-9 illustrates the configuration 
of the VCM. 
3.1.2.3.3 Maneuvering unit: The maneuvering unit, shown in fig-
ure 3-10, was a simple hand-held cold-gas reaction jet device which 
employed two I-pound tractor jets and one 2-pound pusher jet to provide 
the pilot with maneuvering capability during extravehicular operation. 
The unit consisted of two sections which were assembled by the pilot 
prior to egress. One section-consisted of the propulsion unit assembly, 
while the other section consisted of two Gemini egress-kit oxygen bottles 
to provide propellant to the reaction jets. This unit was developed by 
the MBC Flight Crew Support Division and was fabricated by MBC Engineer-
ing Division and Technical Services Division. 
3.1.2.4 Guidance and control.- Except for the following minor 
changes made as a result of anomalies evidenced in the analysis of GT-3 
flight data, the guidance and control systems were identical to those 
installed in the GT-3 spacecraft (see refs. 1 and 2). 
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(a) Three electronic modules in the inertial measuring unit (IMU) 
were redesigned. 
(b) One module in the attitude control electronics (ACE) was re-
designed. 
In addition to these changes, a different computer operational pro-
gram was incorporated (M:l.th flow III Mod II - IBM no. 6444868 Revision B, 
issued March 10, 1965). 
3.1.2.5 Time reference.- The time reference system installed in 
spacecraft 4 was unchanged from the configuration used on the previous 
flight (ref. 1), except for the inclusion of a time-correlation buffer 
which functioned as a conditioner for time-correlation signals supplied 
to the voice tape recorder (VTR) and the two biomedical tape recorders, 
and an additional G.m.t. clock installed on the command pilot's instru-
ment panel. 
3.1.2.6 Electrical.- The spacecraft 4 adapter equipment section 
contained a battery module rather than the fuel-cell module planned for 
use on future Gemini flights. The adapter battery module (fig. 3-11) 
contained six silver-zinc batteries to provide primary power until 
adapter equipment section separation; whereas, the spacecraft 3 adapter 
battery module contained three batteries for this purpose. Except for 
these changes and removal of the ZIOO separation sensor switches, the 
spacecraft 4 electrical system configuration was the same as that of 
spacecraft 3. 
3.1.2.7 Propulsion.- The spacecraft 4 propulsion systems (figs. 3-
12 and 3-13) were essentially the same as those of spacecraft 3. Refer-
ence 1 provides a basic description of the system and reference 2 contains 
a description of changes incorporated in spacecraft 3. The significant 
differences between the configurations were as follows: 
(a) The dummy orbital attitude and maneuver system (OAMS) thrust 
chamber assemblies (TeA's) 13, 14, 15, and 16 installed in spacecraft 3 
were replaced with operational TeA's in spacecraft 4. \(See fig. 3-13.) 
(b) The B-package burst diaphragms which were not installed in the 
spacecraft 3 reentry control system (ReS) and OANS were installed in 
spacecraft 4. 
(c) Boundary-layer-cooled (long-life) TeA's were installed in 
spacecraft 4. 
3.1.2.8 Pyrotechnic.- Spacecraft 4 contained the regular pyrotechnic 
devices as installed in spacecraft 3, along with the following additional 
devices or modifications: 
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(a) A pyrotechnic-actuated door was installed to provide protection 
for the MSC-l experiment sensor unit during launch. 
(b) A pyrotechnic guillotine was provided to sever the magnetometer-
boom locking-cable included in the MSC-3 experiment installation. 
(c) Keyways were machined into the electrical connectors of the 
pyrotechnic cartridges to eliminate the possibility of improper instal-
lation. 
(d) An aluminum breech and CTI cartridges were ins-tailed in the 
high-altitude drogue parachute mortar, whereas a steel breech and ORDO 
cartridge were installed in the spacecraft 3 drogue mortar. 
(e) The unused pins on the electrical connectors to initiators 
were removed. 
3.1.2.9 Crew station furnishings and equipment.-
3.1.2.9.1 Instrument panels and controls (fig. 3-14): The controls 
and displays of spacecraft 4 were the same as those of spacecraft 3 (see 
ref. 2) with the following exceptions: 
(a) The attitude control and maneuver electronics (ACME) logic 
switches were relocated from the pedestal panel to the overhead switch/ 
circuit breaker panel. 
(b) The control switches for the RCS propellant shutoff valves 
were relocated f.rom the pilot's panel to the pedestal panel. 
(c) The fuel-cell purge switches and the reactant supply system 
(RSS) crossover switch were installed in the pilot's instrument panel, 
but were not operational because the fuel cell was not used. 
(d) other minor changes were made to switch positions and nomen-
clature. 
3.1.2.9.2 Space suit: The space suits furnished for the Gemini IV 
mission were of the G4c configuration. The design of the G4c space suit 
is similar to that of the G3C suit used on the previous flight. The 
significant changes are as follows: 
(a) Redundant entrance closures were provided instead of the single 
closures previously used. A redundant closure incorporates a pressure-
sealing external zipper with a standard internal zipper. 
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(b) The helmets were modified to accommodate a thicker pressure-
sealing visor, and to accept the extravehicular overvisor (see fig. 3-8). 
The overvisor was used only by the pilot during extravehicular operation. 
(c) A cover layer for thermal and micro~eteoroid protection was 
provided for the pilot. A single layer cover layer for anti-snag pro-
tection was incorporated in the command pilot's suit. 
(d) Thermal over-gloves were provided for the pilot. These gloves 
were designed to protect against conductive heat transfer during contact 
with the spacecraft or equipment. 
3.1.2.9.3 Water and waste management systems: The drinking water 
and the urine disposal provisions in the crew station were similar to 
those of spacecraft 3 (ref. 2). However, the controls for the urine 
disposal system were modified to provide for direct overboard urine 
dumping as well as dumping through the launchoocooling heat exchanger. 
In addition, a light was installed on the water management panel to in-
dicate "heater on" for the direct overboard urine dump system (see 
fig 3-14). 
3.1.2.9.4 Ejection seat: The seat assemblies were essentially the 
same as those used on the GT-3 mission (ref. 2). Minor modifications 
to the seat were as follows: 
(a) The retracting mechanism on the parachute risers was redesigned 
as a result of an anomaly on the previous flight; 
(b) A safety pin was added to the ejection control handle to in-
sure against inadvertent actuation. 
(c) The egress-kit configuration was modified to a lower profile 
to provide more room for the crew members. 
3.1.2.9.5 stowage provisions: Containers for the stowage of flight 
crew equipment were installed as shown in figure 3~15. Table 3-111 lists 
the equipment that was stowed in the containers. 
3.1.2.10 Landing.- The landing equipment installed in spacecraft 4 
was of the same configuration as that of spacecraft 3 with the exception 
of the pyrotechnic equipment which was changed as noted in para-
graph 3.1.2.8. A description of the landing equipment is given in refer-
ences 1 and 2. The spacecraft 4 landing-system deployment sequence was 
the same as that described in reference 2. 
3.1.2.11 Postlanding and recovery.- No significant changes to the 
spacecraft 3 postlanding and recovery equipment were incorporated in the 
spacecraft 4 equipment other than modification of the recovery flashing 
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light w~r~g. On-off control of the light was provided by redesigning 
the recovery beacon control switch. Both the recovery beacon and flash-
ing light operated with the switch in the upper position; only the re-
covery beacon operated with the switch in the lower position; and both 
the recovery beacon and flashing light were turned off with the switch 
in the center position. A general description of the postlanding and 
recovery e~uipment is given in references l and 2. 
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3.2 GEMINI LAUNCH VEHICLE 
The configuration of GLV-4 was basically the same as that of the 
launch vehicles used on previous Gemini flights. A description of the 
GLV structure and major systems is given in reference 1, and minor 
changes incorporated for the GT-2 and GT-3 missions are given in refer-
ences 1 and 2, respectively. Only the significant differences between 
GLV-3 and GLV-4 are discussed in this report. These differences are 
summarized in table 3-IV. 
3.2.1 Structure 
3.2.1.1 Stage I.- The follOwing minor structural modifications 
were incorporated in stage I: 
(a) The oxidizer feed line conduit was fabricated with butt-welded, 
circumferential joints instead of the lapped joints used on GLV-3. 
(b) The stage I fuel tank aft skirt was modified to provide for 
remote charging of the oxidizer standpipe. 
3.2.1.2 Stage II.- Insulation previously installed to reduce ex-
ternal protuberance heating on Gemini launch vehicles was removed from 
the stage II oxidizer tank forward skirt of GLV-4. 
3.2.2 Major Systems 
3.2.2.1 Propulsion.- The following modifications were incorporated 
in the GLV-4 propulsion system: 
(a) The modification previously incorporated to suppress longitu-
dinal oscillation instabilities (POGO) was revised in the following 
respects: 
(1) A heat shield was added to the fuel-dampener assembly to 
protect the rotary potentiometer and bearing. 
(2) The fuel-dampener-piston-shaft bearing material was 
changed from teflon to ceramic-filled teflon. 
(3) The capability for automatic remote tuning of the oxidizer 
standpipe was added. 
(b) Shields were added to all fuel-tank-level sensors to protect 
the prisms from autogenous gas contamination. 
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3.2.2.2 Flight control.- The three-axis reference system (TARS) 
pitch program was changed to make it compatible with the Gemini IV mis-
sion re~uirements. 
3.2.2.3 Radio guidance.- No modifications were re~uired. 
3.2.2.4 Hydraulic.- No modifications were re~uired. 
3.2.2.5 Electrical.- The following modifications were incorporated 
in the GLV-4 electrical system: 
(a) Provisions for remote control of oxidizer standpipe charging 
or bleeding were added. 
(b) A flashing beacon light system was added to stage II. 
3.2.2.6 Malfunction detection.- Other than additional insulation 
applied to the stage I malfunction detection system and control harnesses 
in compartment 5, no modifications were re~uired. 
3.2.2.7 Instrumentation.- The following changes were incorporated 
in the instrumentation system: 
(a) Instrumentation which provided 16 structural integrity meas-
urements on GLV-3 was not installed on GLV-4. 
(b) Instrumentation was installed in compartments 1 and 2 to pro-
vide sound pressure-level data. 
(c) Provisions for monitoring radio guidance system (RGS) decoder 
discretes 2, 4, and 8 were added. 
3.2.2.8 Range safety.- The destruct system circuitry was modified 
to prevent switch cycling in the event that both "set" and "reset" sig-
nals were inadvertently applied ~uring testing. Otherwise, no additional 
modifications were re~uired. 
3.2.2.9 Ordnance separation.- No modifications were re~uired. 
UNCLASSIFIED 
3-10 
3.3 GEMINI IV WEIGHT AND BALANCE DATA 
Weight data for the Gemini IV space vehicle are as follows: 
Weight Center-of-gravity 
Condition (including spacecraft), 
. b 
Iba 
location, ln 
Y Z X 
Ignition 340 000 -.11 60.0 775 
Lift-off 336 000 -.13 60.0 776 
Stage I burnout 
(BECO) 85 000 -.60 60.0 440 
Stage II start of 
steady-state 
combustion 73 400 -.40 60.05 344 
Stage II burnout 
(SEC0+20 sec) 13 300 -.21 60.10 296 
~eights obtained from Aerospace Corporation. 
bX_axis reference in GLV station 0.000 (see fig. 3-1). Y-axis 
is referenced to the centerline of the vehicle. Z-axis is referenced 
to the waterline (60 in. below centerline) of the vehicle. 
Spacecraft weight and balance data are as follows: 
Weight, Center-of-gravity Condition location, in. lb (a) 
X Y Z 
Lailllch, gr os s weight 7879.05 -1.29 -1.43 105.32 
Retrograde 5432.44 0.05 -1.65 129.49 
Reentry (0.05g) 4725.71 0.02 -1.58 135.21 
Main parachute deploy- 4415.30 0.02 -1.74 129.94 
ment 
Touchdown (no para- 4305.05 0.02 -1.80 127.87 
chute) 
aZ-axis reference was located 13.44 inches aft of the 
launch-vehicle-spacecraft mating plane (GLV station 290.265). 
The X- and Y-axes were referenced to the centerline of the 
vehicle. 
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System 
Reentry 
assembly 
structure 
Adapter 
assembly 
structure 
Communi-
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TABLE 3-1.- GEMINI IV SPACECRAFT MODIFICATIONS 
Significant changes incorporated in spacecraft 4 
from the spacecraft 3 configuration 
No significant change 
No significant change 
(a) The S-band radar transponder was replaced by C-band 
cations transponder 
Instru-
mentation 
Environ-
mental 
control 
Guidance 
and control 
Time 
reference 
(b) The C-band antenna system was modified 
(c) A second HF whip antenna was installed (in the adapter 
assembly) 
Additional instrumentation was installed to provide data on 
horizon sensor performance 
(a) A direct overboard urine dump system was installed 
(b) Four drinking water storage tanks were installed in the 
adapter 
(c) The CO2 and odor absorber cannister contained increased 
quantities of LiaR and charcoal. 
(a) Math flow III Mod II was incorporated 
(b) Modules were redesigned in the IMU and ACE (minor circuit 
changes) 
(a) A time-correlation buffer was added to provide correlation 
time Signals to VTR and biomedical tape recorders. 
(b) A G.m.t. clock was added to the command pilot's instrument 
panel. 
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TABLE 3-1.- GEMINI IV SPACECRAFT MODIFICATIONS - Concluded 
System 
Electrical 
Propulsion 
Pyro-
technics 
Crew 
station 
furnishing 
and e<luip-
ment 
Landing 
Post-
landing 
and 
recovery 
Significant changes incorporated in spacecraft 4 
from the spacecraft 3 configuration 
The adapter battery module contained six silver-zinc batteries 
The ZIOO separation sensor switches were removed 
(a) The lateral thrusting OAMS TCA's were operational 
(b) B-package burst diaphragms were installed in the RCS and OAMS 
(c) Long-life TCA's were used 
(a) Pyrotechnic devices were included with the MSC-l and MSC-3 
experiment e<luipment 
(b) An aluminum breech and CTI cartridges were installed in 
the high altitude drogue mortar 
(c) The unused pins on electrical connectors to initiators were 
removed 
(a) The instrument panels were modified 
(b) A G4c space suit was worn by each crew member 
(c) The urine disposal system controls were modified 
(d) Additional stowage containers were provided for food, 
operational e<luipment, experiment e<luipment, and waste 
(e) Minor modifications were made to the ejection seat system. 
No significant change 
On-off control of the recovery flashing light was provided. 
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Measurement 
ADOI 
AD08 
AD09 
PB05 
PC03 
pc04 
PD03 
PD04 
PD06 
PD07 
PD08 
FEll 
PE12 
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TABLE 3-II. - SPACECRAFr INSTRUMENTATION MEASUREMENTS 
Description 
Adapter shaped charge 
ignition 
E~uipment adapter 
separation 
Manuel retrofire initiate 
Retrorocket no. 3 fire 
Retrorocket no. 2 fire 
Retrorocket no. 4 fire 
Parachute jettison 
Outer skin temperature -
R&R section 
Outer skin temperature -
RCS section 
Outer skin temperature -
RCS section 
Outer skin temperature -
cabin section 
Outer skin temperature -
cabin section 
Outer skin temperature -
cabin section 
Outer skin temperature -
cabin section 
Outer skin temperature -
cabin section 
Heat-shield ablation 
material bondline 
temperature 
Heat-shield ablation 
material bondline 
temperature 
Instrumentation Range 
1 = fire 
1 = separation 
1 = fire 
1 = fire 
1 = fire 
1 = fire 
1 = jettison 
70 to 190CPF 
70 to 190CPF 
70 to 190CPF 
70 to 190CPF 
70 to 190CPF 
70 to 19000 F 
b -459 to 85° F 
b -459 to 85° F 
-55 to 1055°F 
~ot received 
bEffective range 
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Type of data 
Delayed time 
Delayed time 
Delayed time 
Delayed time 
Delayed time 
Delayed time 
Delayed time 
Delayed time 
Delayed time 
Delayed time 
Delayed time 
Delayed time 
Delayed time 
Delayed time 
Delayed time 
Delayed time 
Delayed time 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
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TABLE 3-111.- CREW STATION STOWAGE LIST 
Operational E~uipment 
Item 
Flight plan filmstrip 
Flight booklets 
Orbital path display 
assembly 
Plastic bags 
( CF55056-1) 
Plastic bags 
( CF 55056- 2 ) 
Plastic bags 
(CF55056- 3) 
16-mm se~uence camera 
16-mm se~uence camera (for 
EVA photography) 
16-mm film magazines (for 
item no. 7) 
16-mm film magazine (for 
item no. 8) 
Mounting bracket (for 
item no. 8) 
5-mm lens assembly (for 
item no. 8) 
Insulation pouch (for 
item no. 8) 
25-mm lens assembly (for 
item no. 7) 
18-mm lens assembly (for 
item no. 7) 
75-mm lens assembly (for 
item no. 7) 
Quantity 
1 
2 
1 
6 
14 
10 
1 
1 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Remarks 
Installed on flight 
plan display located 
on center instrument 
panel 
Stowed with item no. 54 
Stowed with item no. 54 
Stowed in pouch in 
right-hand aft food box 
Stowed in pouch in 
right-hand aft food box 
Stowed in pouch in 
right-hand aft food box 
Stowed in fiber-
glass container in 
center stowage box 
Stowed in right-hand 
aft food box 
Two stowed in right-
hand side food box. 
One stowed on camera 
(item no. 7) 
Stowed on camera 
(item no. 8) 
Stowed on camera 
(item no. 8) 
Stowed in pouch in 
right-hand aft food box 
Stowed on camera 
(item no. 8) 
Stowed with item no. 7 
Stowed with item no. 7 
Stowed with item no. 7 
aContainer locations are indicated in figure 3-15 
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Container 
(a) 
6 
6 
6 
7 
6 
3 
7 & 10 
6 
6 
6 
6 
7 
7 
7 
No. 
l7 
l8 
19 
20 
2l 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
3l 
32 
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TABLE 3-III. - CREW STATION STOWAGE LIST - Continued 
Item 
Mirror mounting bracket 
assembly (for item no. 7) 
l6-rum camera bracket 
(for item no. 7) 
70-= Hasselblad camera 
with lens 
70-= film magazines 
( CF55026-l) 
70-rum film magazine 
( CF55009-l) 
Camera ring sight assembly 
Photographic event indicator 
35-rum Zeiss Contrarex camera 
35-rum camera film backs 
Right-hand window bracket 
200-= lens with built-in 
filter 
50-rum lens 
Right-hand window bracket 
adapter 
Right-hand window bracket 
adapter clamp 
Tape 
Sextant and filter 
Quantity 
l 
l 
l 
5 
l 
l 
l 
l 
3 
l 
l 
l 
l 
l 
lO 
feet 
l 
Remarks 
Stowed with item no. 7 
Stowed on support mounted 
outboard of seat on left-
hand sidewall 
Stowed in center 
stowage box 
One stowed with camera. 
Four stowed in left-
hand side food box. (Two 
for experiments S-5 and 
s-6) . 
Stowed in right-hand 
side food box (Experi-
ment MSC-lO) 
Stowed with item no. 19 
Stowed in right-hand 
circuit breaker fairing 
Stowed in container in 
center stowage box 
Film backs, containing 
cassettes, stowed in 
center stowage box 
Stowed on center food 
box door 
Stowed in pouch in 
right-hand aft food box 
Stowed in pouch in 
right-hand aft food box 
Stmred on center food 
box door 
Stowed in center 
stowage box 
Stowed in post landing 
kit pouch (item no. 66) 
Stowed in container 
in center stowage 
box (Experiment D-9) 
aContainer locations are indicated in figure 3-l 5 
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Container 
(a) 
7 
7 
7 
lO 
3 
7 
l 
7 
7 
5 
6 
6 
5 
7 
l2 
7 
No. 
33 
34 
35 
37 
39 
40 
42 
44 
46 
UNCLASSIFIED 
TABLE 3-III.- CREW STATION STOWAGE LIST - Continued 
Item 
Maneuvering unit 
Splash curtain clips 
Defecation bags 
Waste containers 
Personal hygiene towels 
Inflight medical kit 
Ventilation control module 
(VCM) restraint straps 
CO2 tapes 
Food 
Inflator assembly (blood 
pressure) 
Urine receiver and hose 
Hose interconnects 
Ventilation control module 
UCD clamps 
Finger-tip-light batteries 
Quantity 
1 
2 
14 
4 
2 
1 
2 
18 
8 
man "days 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
4 
Remarks 
Stowed in item no. 64 
Stowed in item no. 66 
Six stowed in soft 
pouch in right-hand 
aft food box. Four 
stowed in each aft 
sidewall container. 
Two stowed in left-
hand side food box. Two 
stowed in right-hand 
side food box. 
Qne stowed in each 
tissue dispenser 
Stowed in container mount-
ed outboard of seat on 
left-hand sidewall 
Stowed in pouch in 
right-hand aft food box 
Nine stowed in each 
tissue dispenser 
Stowed in left-hand 
aft food box 
Bulb, hose and two 
adapters stowed in 
right-hand side food box 
Stowed in pouch in 
right-hand aft food box 
One stowed in right-
hand aft food box and 
one in each aft side-
wall container 
Stowed in left-hand side 
of right-hand footwell 
Stowed in urine 
receiver pouch 
Stowed in suit repair 
kit in right-hand aft 
food box (item no. 71) 
aContainer locations are indicated in figure 3-15 
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Container 
(a) 
7 
6 
4 & 9 
10 
3 
'7 
11 
6 
7 
8 
3 
6 
6 
4 & 9 
6 
6 
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No. 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
55 
57 
59 
60 
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TABLE 3-111.- CREW STATION STOWAGE LIST - Continued 
Item 
Biomedical fitting removal 
wrench 
Blood pressure reprograming 
adapter cables 
Inflight exerciser 
Voice tape recorder cart-
ridges 
"y" co=ectors 
Swizzle stick 
Plot board 
Lightweight headset 
Optical sight 
Hatch closing lanyard 
Humidity sensor 
Utility dual electrical cord 
Umbilical hose 
Quantity 
1 
2 
1 
15 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Remarks 
Stowed in item no. 66 
One stowed in peri-
scope container. 
One stowed in right-
hand aft food box. 
Stowed in pouch in 
right-hand aft food 
box during launch 
(Experiment M-3) 
One stowed in recorder 
Fourteen stowed in 
right-hand side food 
box in three belts 
Stowed in pouch in 
right-hand aft food box 
Stowed on overhead 
switch/circuit breaker 
panel switch guard 
Stowed in collapsible 
cloth container on out-
board side of instru-
ment panel pedestal in 
left-hand footwell 
Stowed in right-hand 
aft sidewall container 
Stowed under command 
pilot's instrument panel, 
forward of maneuver 
controller 
Stowed in cloth pouch 
under pilot's instrument 
panel 
Stowed in pouch in 
right-hand aft food box 
Stowed in right-hand 
circuit breaker fairing 
Stowed in pouch in 
right-hand aft food box 
aContainer locations are indi~ated in figure 3-15 
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Container 
(a) 
12 
2 
6 
3 
6 
4 
6 
1 
6 
No. 
61 
62 
63 
64 
66 
67 
68 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
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TABLE 3- III. - CREW STATION STOWAGE LIST - Continued 
Item 
Umbilical hose pouch 
Tissue dispenser 
Dry stowage bags 
Fiberglass container 
Postlanding kit assembly 
Postlanding kit pouch 
Screw driver 
Umbilical guide 
Wire, Belden, 20 AWG 
Celestial display star chart 
Suit repair kit assembly 
Suit repair kit pouch 
"0" ring, small 
"0" ring, large 
Lubricant 
Water transfer adapter 
Quantity 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
10 
feet 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
tube 
1 
Remarks 
Stowed in right-
hand aft food box 
Stowed on top of center 
stowage container 
Stowed in left-hand 
side food box 
Stowed in center 
stowage container 
Stowed in item no. 6E 
(Includes items no. 31, 
34,48,67,69, and 78) 
Stowed in left-hand 
circuit breaker 
fairing 
Stowed in item no. 66 
Stowed in pouch in 
right-hand aft food box 
Stowed in item no. 66 
Stowed with item no. 54 
Stowed in item no. 72 (in-
cludes items no. 73, 74, 
and 75) 
Stowed in right-hand 
aft food box 
Stowed in item no. 72 
Stowed in item no. 72 
Stowed in item no. 72 
Stowed with urine 
receiver and hose 
(item no. ~'i ') 
aContainer locations are indicated in figure 3-15 
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Container 
(a) 
6 
7 
10 
7 
12 
12 
12 
6 
12 
6 
6 
6 
"i 
6 
6 
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TABLE 3- III. - CREW STATION STOWAGE LIST - Continued 
No. Item Quantity Remarks Container (a) 
77 Utility electrical exten- l 
sion cord 
78 Allen key l Stowed in item no. 66 l2 
Equipment Stowed on Space Suits 
l Knife 2 One per crew member 
2 Surgical scissors 2 One per crew member 
3 Flight data display straps 2 One per crew member 
4 launch day urine bags 2 One per crew member 
5 Wrist darns 2 sets One set per crew member 
6 Visor cover l Stowed on pilot's helmet 
7 Flight booklet l 
aContainer locations are indicated in figure 3-l5 
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System 
Stage I Structure 
Stage II Structure 
Propulsion 
Flight Controls 
Guidance 
Hydraulics 
Electrical 
TABLE 3-IV.- GLV-4 MODIFICATIONS 
Significant Changes Incorporated in GLV-4 From GLV-3 Configuration 
( a) The Stage I oxidizer feed line conduit circumferential joints 
were changed from~pped joints to butt-welded joints. 
(b) Provisions were added to Stage I fuel tank aft skirt for remote 
charging of oxidizer standpipe. 
External protuberance heating insulation was removed from the Stage II 
oxidizer tank forward skirt. 
(a) The POGO installation was revised as follows: 
(1) A heat shield was added to the fuel dampener assembly to 
protect the potentiometer and bearing from heat. 
(2) The fuel dampener piston shaft bearing material was changed 
from teflon to ceramic-filled teflon. 
(3) The capability for remote charging of the oxidizer stand-
pipe was added. 
(b) Shields were added to all fuel-tank-level sensors to protect 
prisms from autogenous gas contamination. 
(a) The TARS pitch program was revised to make it compatible with 
Gemini IV mission requirements. 
No significant change. 
No significant change. 
(a) Provisions were added for remotely controlling charging or bleeding 
of the oxidizer standpipe. 
(b) A flashing beacon light system was added to Stage II. 
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System 
Malfunction Detection System 
Instrumentation 
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TABLE 3-IV.- GLV-4 MODIFICATIONS - Concluded 
----- ~--
Significant Changes Incorporated in GLV-4 from GLV-3 Configurations 
No significant change. 
( a) Sixteen structural integrity measurements were removed. 
(b) Two sound pressure measurements were added (compartments 1 and 2). 
(c) Measurements were provided for monitoring ROS decoder discretes 
2, 4, and 8. 
No significant change. 
------ ------------ ---------
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NASA-S-65-5992 
Spacecraft stations Launch-vehicle stations 
Z239.28 ..... ·-:;=;::====;======rn===="'·>---X 50.985 
Z233. 97 "-X 56. 295 
Spacecraft 
Zl03.44 
Reentry 
assembly 
Adapter 
assembly 
Z13. 44-1------'---- ~=--I---,..~.----- X 276.825 
Launch 
vehicle 
Oxidizer X 299.151 
X 319.522 
384.522 
Fuel ---.,. 
Engine 
gimbal 
station 
'~r' 
Oxidizer 
I 'I 
II 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
424.522 
430. 000 
4990 130 
500. 000 
583.200 
6210 727 
649. 727 
~ Iii : I . I.I-+_----X 887.826 II 
'" L..J ... 1 
.".,..;;:.:- .... 
,. ri' 
I.I:-+_----X 982.326 
, 
, 
I 
, 
, 
Fuel: 
I 
Engine Y~f---,J':I.r-l-----X 1224.311 
gimbal \, , ,: 
station ---ti.' ,"Jit: X 1274.21 
. __ 8 I WI .... ----X 1342.31 
• I 
(a) Launch configuration 
Figure 3-1. - GLV-4 - Spacecraft 4 relationships. 
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Spacecraft 
coordinate system 
Spacecraft Z-axis 
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plane of figure at 
this point --_./ 
These axes perpendicular 
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Dimensional axes 
True 
North 
ZS/C 
G Launch vehicle quadrant system 
I 
1 
Launch vehicle yaw axis 
Z Spacec raft pitch axi s 
o 
~ Launch vehicle 
X-axis perpendicular 
to plane of figure at this 
point 
,...---Launch vehicle 
+Y coordinate system 
to page at vehicle centerline 
(sign indicated is t<IN,rd v~ 
8 - Programed roll angle 
Xp' X 
XLV, XS/C, -V, Zp 
---+--+-f----!+----'----+-"""-H--t-t'--f--- ZL V, Y S IC 
YLV 
Guidance coordinates 
XLV' YLV, ZLV - launch vehicle 
roll, pitch, yaw body axes, respectively 
XS/C' YS/C' ZS/C - spacecraft 
roll, yaw, pitch axes, respectively 
Xp' Yp' Zp - IGS platform inertial 
coordinates referenced to launch stand 
X, y, Z - IGS computer 
,computational coordinates 
(b) Dimensional axes and guidance coordinates 
Figu re 3-10 - Concluded. 
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NASA-S-65-3481 
Equipment section 
Electronic module 
DAMS 
ECS coolant module 
ECS primary ~ module 
Battery module 
Retrograde secti on 
Retrograde rocket system 
DAMS 
Reentry assembly 
Figure 3-2. - Spacecraft arrangement and nomenclature. 
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Figure 3-3. - Communication system. 
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n---Biomedical recorder 
~"V~i1'---Biomedical power supply 
-"-----.... , M data tape recorder 
Right-hand equipment bay 
Low-level multiplexer 
High-level multiplexer 
Temperature reference 
junction box 
dc-to-dcconver~te:r~-7N--------""'~==::~==:::====!J 
and regulator (2 reqd) 
Figure 3-4. - Major instrumentation components (reentry section). 
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transm itter 
3-28 
NASA-S-65-3484 
Low-level 
mu Iti pi exer 
UNCLASSIFIED 
Delayed-time 
telemetry trans-
mitter 
Instrument 
package 1 
Figure 3-:5. - Major instrumentation components (adapter section). 
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NASA-S-65-5990 /--~ 
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I / 
: Direct urine 
\ dump line and 
\ sOlerid valve 
"~-~:---t 
-~~ 
Water management system 
Cabin water storage tank 
Suit loop 
Suit package 
Coolant loop 
.-ECS coolant module 
n supply system 
. imary oxygen tank 
_AoapLt:r water 
tanks 
pressurant tank 
Secondary and 
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supply 
Manual vent 
outflow valve 
norkel inflow valve 
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fan 
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Cabin pressure relief 
and manual shutoff 
Figure 3-6. - Environmental control system 
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NASA- S-65-6532 
,-----
I Emergency 02 hose 
I ' 
I Manual emergency I °2 valve · 
I 
I 
I Emergency oxygen 
I supply bottle 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Suit pressure 
control valve 
Shutoff valve 
Pressure 
regulator 
L fl.,,_e __ J 
Ventilation control module 
r------- -l I Bio-instrumentation Electrical 
and communications-- connector 
To spacecraft 
I Bio-instrumen-tation and 
I communications systems 
I I To spacecraft 
I 
I Quick 
"Y" connectors disconnect~ To spacecraft J primary '-__ ____ _________ 02 supply 
Umbilical assembly 
Figure 3-7. - Umbilical assembly and ventillation control module. 
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NASA-S-65-6027 
Figure 3-8. - G4C suit and extravehicular equipment. 
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Figure 3-9. - Ventilation control module • 
-c 
0 
0 
.... 
\>I 
I 
\>I 
f\) 
C 
Z 
() 
r-
» 
en 
en 
"'T1 
-m 
0 
c 
Z 
() 
r-
» 
(J) 
CJ) 
-n 
-m 
o 
NASA-S-65-6020 
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Figure 3-10. - Maneuvering unit. 
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00 
o DO 
connection 
(reentry assembly) Squib silver-zinc 
Silver-zinc batteries 
(6 reqd) 
batteries 
Main silver-zinc batteries 
Umbi I ical connection (adapter assembly) 
Figure 3-11. - Electrical power system. 
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Thrust chamber 
arrangement 
5 6 Pitch up 
1 2 P itch down 
3 4 Yaw right 
7 8 Yaw left 
3 7 Roll right 
4 8 Roll left 
3-35 
Component package "Oil 
Oxidizer tank 
Component 
package liB" 
Component package "A" 
Component package "C II 
Figure 3-12. - Reentry control system 
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B-package 
valve----' 
Fuel shutoff valve 
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Pressure regulator 
E-package 
A-package 
Pressure transducer 
D-package 
Figure 3-13, - Orbital attitude and maneuver system, 
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Figure 3-14. - Spacecraft controls and displays. 
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Figure 3-14. - Spacecraft controls and displays. 
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VENT 
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1 - Right sidewall fairing container (on walJ below R-H switch/circuit breaker pane/). 
2 - Container (for periscope viewer>. 
3 - Forward sidewall container (on wall below hatch sill). 
4 - Aft sidewall container (on wall below hatch sill), 
5 - Center stowage box door mount. 
6 - Right aft food box. 
7 - Center stowage box. 
8 - Left aft food box. 
9 - Aft sidewall container (on wall below hatch sill), 
10 - Forward sidewall container (on wall below hatch sill). 
11 - Pouch (on wall, adjacent armrest>. 
12 - Left sidewall fairing container (on wall below L-H switch/circuit breaker panel), 
Figure 3-15. - Equipment stowage containers. 
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4.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION 
The comparison 01' the planned and actual mission is shown in block 
diagram form in figure 4-1; this diagram also includes planned alter-
nates for the major mission phases. The detailed discussion of the 
mission is divided into the actual mission, sequence of events, and 
flight trajectories. 
4.1 ACTUAL MISSION 
Lift-off of Gemini IV occurred at 15:15:59.562 G.m.t., approx-
imately 1.24 hours later than planned. The delay was due to faulty 
electrical wiring in the vehicle erector which prevented erector lower-
ing (see sect. 5.2). 
Telemetry data indicated that the vehicle rolled at the desired 
rate and to the desired flight azimuth. The first-stage flight was 
lofted because of slightly low pitch programer rates and the first-
stage thrust being higher than expected. However, the flight profile 
was within the 3cr trajectory boundary. 
Staging was initiated at LO+152.43 seconds, and separation had 
begun by LO+153.14 seconds, approximately 1 second earlier than pre-
dicted. The stage II thrust was higher than nominal, and, as in 
stage I, engine shut-down occurred early. The lofted trajectory was 
corrected during radio guidance system (RGS) steering. Vehicle steer-
ing rates experienced a slight oscillation in pitch, yaw, and roll due 
to propellant sloshing. This oscillation damped out near SECO (see 
sect. 5.2). 
The spacecraft separation occurred 31.8 seconds after SECO. The 
spacecraft aft-firing thrusters operated for 5 seconds. The elapsed 
time at completion of this maneuver was 369.7 seconds, and the inertial 
velocity was 25 746 ft/sec, which resulted in an elliptical orbit with 
a perigee of 87.6 nautical miles and an ~pogee of 152.2 nautical miles 
as compared with the planned nominal of 87 nautical mile perigee and 
159 nautical mile apogee. 
The GLV second stage was inserted into an orbit with a perigee 
altitude of 87.6 nautical miles and an apogee altitude of 150.1 nautical 
miles. Immediately follOWing spacecraft separation, the command pilot 
initiated the station-keeping exercise. During station keeping, the 
flight crew made a total of 74 maneuvers within 'approximately 80 minutes 
and used 115 pounds of propellant. This amounted to a total velocity 
UNCLASSIFIED 
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increment change of approximately 102 ft/sec. During the station-
keeping exercise, the minimum separation distance between the two 
vehicles was approximately 0.3 nautical mile and the maximum separation 
distance was approximately 5.1 nautical miles. 
At the end of the first revolution, the crew was instructed not 
to attempt any more station_keeping maneuvers. The decision to termi-
nate the exercise was based on the fact that most of the propellant 
budget allocated to the exercise had been expended and the desired close-
up station keeping had not been achieved. It was obvious that further 
attempts would seriously jeopardize the primary mission objective and 
could require cancellation of a number of secondary objectives. Maneu-
vers performed up to this time had resulted in a 90.4 by 159.9 nautical-
mile orbit which was higher than planned both in perigee and apogee. 
The flight crew then began preparations for the extravehicular 
activity (EVA) at approximately 01:40:00 g.e.t. which was about as 
scheduled. Preparations went smoothly, but the command pilot decided 
that due to the high level of activity required, the EVA should be de-
layed one revolution because the rendezvous attempt had been deleted 
and there was no need to maintain the close schedule as originally 
planned. This decision was approved by ground controlling personnel. 
The egress checklist was completely reverified during the next re-
volution with final checks occurring just prior to Carnarvon. Approval 
for depressurization and hatch opening was given over Carnarvon. Final 
egress preparations were made and the final approval for egress was 
transmitted during the pass over Hawaii. 
The pilot egressed from the spacecraft at approximately 04:23:00 g.e.t. 
The egress was made using only the maneuvering gun and occurred without 
difficulty. Maneuvers with the gun were very successful (see 
section 7.1.~or a detailed account of the EVA). The command pilot 
controlled attitude with the pulse mode during EVA. This mode was used 
primarily to insure that no thruster firings occurred while the pilot 
was in close proximity to an attitude thruster. 
Pilot ingress started at about 04:46:00 g.e.t. which was nearly 
10 minutes later than planned, and final hatch closure and repressuri-
zation were not completed until 05:06 g.e.t. The primary reason for this 
delay was the difficulty experienced with the hatch closure. As a re-
sult, the crew decided not to reopen the hatch to discard equipment as 
planned. 
After EVA, the crew was instructed to assume drifting flight in 
order to conserve propellants. This mode of flight was maintained for 
1 
approximately the next 22 days. During this period, the flight plan 
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was contin~ally updated as various operational checks and experiments 
were resc~~ed, as required. The crew adjusted the planned sleep 
cycles to suit their needs, which also required a continual replanning 
of activities around these sleep periods. The ability to perform those 
experiments and checks which required the crew!s monitoring of ground 
or terrestrial objects ~epended on the attitude that the spacecraft 
happened to be in at that time; consequently, many of the planned experi-
ments and checks were rescheduled to a later period when fuel consumption 
was again allowed. At about 21 hours g.e.t., the first successful or-
bital navigation sighting was performed. The spacecraft was in a drift-
ing mode of flight at that time. The crew was instructed to return to 
the normal flight plan at 22 hours g.e.t. 
MSC experiments 2 and 3 were performed at 33 hours g.e.t. These 
were the first experiments or operational checks that were performed 
on this flight in a controlled attitude mode. 
The orbital lifetime adjustment maneuver, planned for the 30th 
apogee, was deleted since orbital decay was only 72 percent of the ex-
pected decay. The orbit at this time was 88.5 by 151.3 nautical miles 
which provided an adequate orbital lifetime margin. A D-9 experiment 
run was substituted for the orbital lifetime adjustment maneuver. This 
run was accomplished with attitude control and marked the first time 
the experiment was performed with the aid of a controlled attitude. 
Another orbital adjustment maneuver was planned for the 45th apogee, 
but again evaluation showed that the necessary orbital lifetime re-
quirements existed; therefore, the maneuver was deleted. The space-
craft was in an 87.2 by 145.6 nautical mile orbit at this time. 
During the next 24-hour period, the crew performed various horizon 
sensor checks" Apollo orientation checks, and attitude thruster checks 
of simulated failures. At an elapsed time of 72 hours, the attitude 
control and maneuver electronics (ACME) was placed in the horizon scan 
mode; this mode was maintained for the next 15 hours. During this period, 
the MSC 2 and 3 experiments were run with the spacecraft in the small-
end-forward (SEF) attitude, D-8 and D-9 runs were performed, and thruster 
plume photographs were attempted. 
At approximately 75:45:43 g.e.t., the command pilot had trouble 
turning off the computer and the computer malfunction light came on. 
During the next several revolutions, various attempts were made to 
restore proper operation of the computer but none were successful. 
(See sect. 5.1.5.4 for details of the problem. ) 
Preretrograde preparations were started some 3 hours early, pri-
marily because of the large amount of equipment and refuse that had to 
be stowed. Instructions were sent up from the MCC-H for an alternate 
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retrograde sequence; this alternate became necessary as a result of the 
malfunction in the inertial guidance system (IGS) which precluded use 
of the computer. 
In revolution 62 at 97:28:02 g.e.t., a preretrograde orbital atti-
tude and maneuvers system (OAME) maneuver was initiated. The aft-firing 
thrusters were used and the maneuver lasted 2 minutes 41 seconds. The 
resulting velocity increment was 6 ft/sec greater than the planned value, 
and a theoretical perigee of 42.3 nautical miles resulted instead of the 
45 nautical miles which had been planned. 
Equipment adapter separation was commanded by the crew at 
97:39:14 g.e.t. followed by automatic retrorocket firing at 97:40:01 g.e.t. 
Automatic retrofire was initiated by the sequential system about 1 second 
early and, in an attempt to correct for this early initiation, the com-
mand pilot held full-lift attitude for 21 seconds beyond the 400 OOO-foot 
altitude where the rolling reentry had been planned to begin. Space-
craft entry into communication blackout began at 97:44:59 g.e.t. and 
ended at 97:49:14 g.e.t. 
The drogue parachute was deployed at 97:50:53 g.e.t., followed by 
pilot and main parachute deployment at 97:52:11 g.e.t. (See sect. 5.1.11 
for detailed sequence. ) 
Landing occurred at 97:56:12 g.e.t. at 27:44 North latitude and 
74:14 West longitude, as reported by the recovery ship. Recovery was 
prompt, and all phases occurred without difficulty (see sect. 6.3 for 
details). 
UNCLASSIFIED 
4.2 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 
The times at which major events were planned and executed are 
presented in table 4-I. All events were completed as scheduled or 
within the expected tolerances, indicating a satisfactory flight. 
UNCLASSIFIED 
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4.3 FLIGHT TRAJECTORIES 
The planned launch and orbital trajectories are preflight calculated 
nominal trajectories from references 3 and 4, respectively. The pre-
liminary actual trajectories are based on nominal outputs from the Real 
Time Computer Complex (RTCC) and attitudes and sequences as determined 
in the auxiliary computer room (ACR). The final actual trajectories 
are based on the Manned Space Flight Network tracking data and actual 
attitudes and sequences as determined by airborne instrumentation. The 
Patrick Air Force Base and 1959 ARDC model atmospheres were used for 
all trajectories except the final actual launch phase which used the 
atmosphere at the time of launch up to 25 nautical miles. The earth 
model for all trajectories contained geodetic and gravitational con-
stants representing the Fischer Ellipsoid. A ground track of the first 
four and the last three revolutions is shown in figure 4-2. The launch, 
orbit, station_keeping exercise, and reentry curveS are presented in 
figures 4-3 to 4-11. 
4.3.1 Spacecraft 
4.3.1.1 Launch.- The launch trajectory data shown in figure 4-3 
are based on the output of the range safety impact prediction computer 
(IP 3600) and the Guided Missile Computer Facility (GMCF). The IP 3600 
used data from the missile trajectory measurement system (MISTRAM), 
FPS-16, and FPQ-6 radars. The GMCF used data from the GE Mod III radar, 
Data from these tracking facilities were used during the time periods 
listed in the following table: 
Facility Time from lift-off, sec 
IP 3600 (FPQ-6) o to 35 
GMCF (GE Mod III) 35 to 358 
The actual launch trajectory, as compared with the planned launch 
trajectory in figure 4-3, was slightly high in altitude and flight-path 
angle during stage I powered flight. After BECO the RGS corrected the 
trajectory and guided the second stage to a near-nominal insertion. 
The final actual conditions as compared with the preliminary actual so-
lution are presented in table 4-II. The preliminary actual solution is 
based on integrating the GE Mod III guidance vec~or to spacecraft separ-
ation, and the final actual condition is based on integrating the Bermuda 
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vector backward through the orbital attitude maneuvering system (OAME) 
activity and attitudes to separation. The preliminary velocity was 
within 1 ft/sec of the final, and the velocity as determined by the 
MISTRAM tracking radars was within 6 ft/sec of the final. See sec-
tion 5.1.5.2.1 for a comparison of the IGS insertion parameters. 
4. 3.1f Orbit.- A comparison of the planned orbital lifetime in 
reference is shown with the actual lifetime in figure 4-4. The actual 
lifetime w s obtained by integrating the Antigua vector in revolution 18 
back to the end of the station-keeping maneuvers in the first revolution, 
and forward to revolution 50. Lifetime after revolution 50 was obtained 
by integrating the Bermuda vector in revolution 61. Apparently, accum-
ulated thruster activity during the third day raised perigee 1.2 nau-
tical miles. Apogees obtained with the Antigua vector agreed throughout 
the 62 revolutions with the tracking data. Perigees, however, did not 
agree past revolution 50, and the Bermuda vector had to be used for the 
remainder of the flight to obtain tracking agreement. 
The planned orbital decay required three lifetime adjustments to 
maintain the mission capability; however, the ballistic parameter 
(W/CnA) and atmosphere density combination was less than expected and 
no maneuvers were required to maintain the mission lifetime. By keeping 
the W/CnA constant, an atmospheric K factor of 0.72 was required to sim-
ulate the actual lifetime. 
A comparison of the orbital elements for each day is presented in 
table 4-III. The final actual orbital elements at insertion were based 
on the Bermuda vector before the station-keeping maneuvers. Preliminary 
actual orbital elements were measured over a spherical earth, whereas the 
final actual and planned elements were measured over an oblate earth. 
The spherical earth elements are approximately 0.8 nautical mile less. 
4.3.1.3 Station keeping.- Time histories of separation range, 
azimuth, and elevation during the first revolution between the space-
craft and the second stage of the launch vehicle are shown in figure 4-5. 
Relative motion between the spacecraft and stage II is shawn in figure 4-6. 
These parameters were calculated by simulating each vehicle's trajectory, 
utilizing the corrected IGS insertion vector as shown in section 5.1.5.2.1. 
An initial spacecraft - launch-vehicle separation velocity of 6 to 
7 ft/sec was established through simulations during postflight evaluation. 
A 4.1-ft/sec velocity increment was applied to the spacecraft using the 
aft-firing thrusters, and a 2 to 3 ft/sec velocity increment was applied 
to the launch vehicle which may have been a result of the shaped-charge 
firing or the effect of the OAME aft-firing thrusters impinging on the 
launch vehicle or a combination of both. If uncompensated, this velocity 
difference would build up to give a separation of approximately 17 nau-
tical miles at the end of the first revolution. The relative trajectory 
vj;VC 
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for this situation is shown in figure 4-7. The trajectory obtained 
from the simulation appears to be compatible with the following infor-
mation available from the flight crew and from ground orbit determination. 
(a) At Canary Island (22 min g.e.t.), the crew was almost directly 
above stage II. 
(b) Stage II was never above the horizon (as viewed from the space-
craft ). 
(c) Prior to Carnarvon (52 min g.e.t. ) the two vehicles came back 
together within a minimum range of 0.3 nautical mile. 
(d) After darkness, stage II waS well below and in front of the 
spacecraft. 
(e) At the time of the last maneuver, stage II was well below 
and in front of the spacecraft. 
(f) The final orbit obtained from the simulation agreed within 
1.3 nautical miles of the actual orbit determined by ground tracking. 
A detailed list of all thrusts and attitudes is contained in table 4-IV, 
and a summary list of all maneuvers for each thruster is presented in 
table 4-v. 
Two retrograde maneuvers were completed by 00:09:23 g.e.t. using 
the aft-firing thrusters and with the spacecraft in the BEF orientation 
(fig. 4-8). Prior to platform alinement, one additional small thrust 
was made with the aft-firing thrusters and a second with the up-firing 
thrusters, These four thrusts, totaling 5.1 ft/sec, were applied to 
reduce the separation rate and were greater than the separation velocity 
applied by the crew. 
Figure 4-9 shows the principal velocity increments applied during 
the first 60 minutes of the station-keeping exercise. Also shown is 
the spacecraft attitude at the time of these thrusts. 
Figure 4-7 illustrates the effectiveness of the thrusting history 
by showing the relative trajectory that would have resulted if thrusting 
had been terminated after several of the principal thrust periods. The 
range and range-rate time history for this period is shown in figure 4-10. 
Review of these figures shows that the velocity increments applied 
through 00:09:21 g.e.t. succeeded in reducing the separation rate, but 
left a residual rate of 1.5 ft/sec away from the launch vehicle. As a 
result, the range from spacecraft to launch vehicle increased to 
0.84 nautical mile and the rang~-rate increased to 6.5 ft/sec by 
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00:30:25 g.e.t. when corrective action was initiated. From 00:30:25 g.e.t. 
to 00:35:58 g.e.t., thrusts were applied which cancelled the separation 
rate and produc~d a range rate of 2.4 ft/sec towards the launch vehicle. 
The resulting orbit would have passed within 2700 feet of the launch 
vehicle if no further thrusts had been applied. 
Further thrusting was applied at 00:44:30 g.e.t. and at 
00:55:55 g.e.t., which resulted in reducing the closest approach distance 
to 1800 feet. At this point (00:52:00 g.e.t.) a relative velocity of 
8 ft/sec normal to the line of sight existed. This velocity propagated 
into a separation distance of 1.6 nautical miles and a separation rate 
of 17 ft/sec by the time corrective action was initiated at 01:05:30 g.e.t. 
The corrective thrust applied was insufficient and the separation dis-
tance continued to increase throughout the remainder of the first re-
volution as shown by figure 4-6. The application of velocity changes 
was further complicated during this time (01:04:00 g.e.t. through the 
end of revolution 1) because of the apparent failure of an aft-firing 
thruster. It appears that if a procedure had been followed that re-
quired the crew (1-) to initially establish a clearly perceptible closing 
rate with the target at all times and (2) to again establish a per-
ceptible closing rate any time the range became larger than several 
stage II lengths, then the closeup station-keeping goal could perhaps 
have been achieved. If these procedures had been followed for the 
thrusts applied in the first 24 minutes after separation, it appears 
that closeup station keeping would have been achieved using less fuel 
than that actually expended in attempting the task. The values of 
rates needed to be perceptible are very sensitive to the lighting con-
ditions and can cause high propellant consumption if these lighting 
conditions are inadequate. The lighting conditions also limit how close 
to the target station keeping can be maintained with safety. 
Figure 4-9 shows the effect of applying a correction which estab-
lishes a closing rate such that the target is intercepted. This plot 
shows how one thrust correction could theoretically achieve closure; 
however, in a flight case a number of successive thrusts approaching 
the one shown would be required because of the sensitivity of the tra-
jectory to small corrections. This trajectory would irr this case have 
placed the spacecraft below and behind the target which is desirable to 
allow nulling of the translation rates against an inertial background 
and provide effective corrections during closure with the target. 
During the station-keeping exercise, the critical nature of rate 
determination was demonstrated. After separation, following the four 
thrusts back toward the launch vehicle, a rate of 1.5 ft/sec away from 
the stage II existed, whereas, a rate toward it should have been estab-
lished. The range was approximately 1800 feet at this time. Later, at 
the point of closest approach, an 8-ft/sec rate existed, normal to the 
4-10 
() 
t'O~FI1)E~fIA·l: 
line of sight, which should have been removed. The range at this time 
was also 1800 feet; however, both vehicles were in darkness. The ability 
of a flight crew member to determine rates of the target even in daylight 
is considerably impaired without a stable background or familiar objects 
in the foreground. At night, the ability to determine rates depends on 
the relative distance between two reference lights if they are both vis-
ible. If only one light is visible, the flight crew member!s judgement 
depends on his ability to measure the intensity of the light, and, if 
this one light is flashing, the task becomes very difficult. Therefore, 
it appears necessary to follow a procedure which requires that percept-
ible rates be established. In addition, the data from this flight con-
firm that a limit of separation for maintaining a close-up station-keeping 
exercise should be established which provides that relative rates remain 
low, yet perceptible. At the same time, total fuel consumption must stay 
reasonable. Figure 4-7 shows that the maneuvers conducted after 32 min-
utes on this flight were less successful than those before that time in 
maintaining a close-up station with the second stage of the launch vehi-
cle. The data also indicate that any attempt after that time to achieve 
a close-up station would have required a significant period of time and 
a number of thrust periods. 
Referenced to the computer coordinate system, the IVI indicated 
total 6V expenditure from the time of entering the catch-up mode to the 
close of the station-keeping exercise was: 
16Vx l = 44 ft/sec + +4 ft/sec = 48 ft/sec 
16Vy l 75 ft/sec + -9 ft/sec = 66 ft/sec 
1
6V
z I 21 ft/sec + +11 ft/sec = 32 ft/sec 
The first term for each component is the sum of the magnitudes of the 
applied 6V!S along the respective axis. The second term is the ac-
cumulated 6V over 4700 seconds due to accelerometer drift, resulting 
from a difference between input accelerometer bias terms and actual 
accelerometer bias. 
4.3.1.4 Reentry.- The final and preliminary actual reentry phase 
of the trajectory is shown in figure 4-11. After the onboard computer 
was no longer operating, the decision was made to fly a zero lift re-
entry by rolling the spacecraft at 15 deg/sec instead of using the 
closed-loop reentry guidance described in reference 5. 
The preliminary trajectory was determined by integrating the Car-
narvon vector in revolution 62 through the planned pre retrofire and 
retrofire sequences, and a rolling zero lift reentry to 100 000 feet, 
..€ONF1DENf+Al 
4-11 
at which time full lift was applied until drogue parachute deployment. 
The final trajectory was obtained by integrating the Carnarvon vector 
in revolution 62 through the actual preretrofire sequence to retrofire, 
then integrating the California vector through actual retrofire and a 
rolling zero-lift reentry until drogue parachute deployment. Table 4-11 
contains a comparison of the planned, preliminary actual and final actual 
reentry dynamic parameters and landing. 
The final landing point was 50 nautical miles short of the landing 
point predicted with preliminary solution. Dispersions in retrofire 
attitude, retrofire time, and OAME thrust can account for this distance. 
The final actual landing point was achieved by integrating the Cali-
fornia vector through the actual retrofire sequence using a 31° retro-
fire attitude as determined by telemetry rather than the planned 30° 
attitude. This additional 1° in attitude contributed-6.9 nautical miles 
to the landing dispersion. A 1.3-second early retrofire time contri-
buted -3.1 nautical miles. In order to obtain the landing point by 
integrating the Carnarvon vector through the OAME preretrofire maneuver 
and actual retrofire sequence, OAME thrust had to be increased by 
4.5 percent, resulting in an OAME preretrofire maneuver 6V of 134 ft/sec 
instead of 128 ft/sec (98 pounds average thrust from aft thrusters). 
This 4.5 percent increase in thrust contributed the remaining -40 nauti-
cal miles to the landing dispersion, and was verified by the agreement 
between the trajectory using this increase and the California vector 
taken between the OAME preretrofire maneuver and the retrofire maneuver. 
After reconstructing the reentry trajectory utilizing the apparent 
anomalies that caused the landing dispersion, communications blackout 
agreed with the recorded blackout times, and peak reentry deceleration 
agreed within 0.05g of the onboard telemetered deceleration. The alti-
tude of parachute deployment sequences agreed with the actual deployment 
sequences in section 5.1.11, and touchdown was within 1.5 nautical miles 
of actual touchdown based on ship tracking radars and aircraft observers. 
These sequences confirm the validity of the reconstructed trajectory. 
4.3.2 Launch Vehicle Second Stage 
The second stage of the launch vehicle was inserted into an orbit 
with apogee and perigee altitudes of 150.1 and 87.6 nautical miles, 
respectively. The Gemini network tracking radars were able to skin 
track the second stage during its 2-day lifetime. The Merritt Island 
Launch Area (MILA) and Patrick radars tracked the second stage during 
its reentry on revolution 33, and reported multiple objects which indi-
cate that the vehicle broke up during reentry. Estimated impact point 
was 12°24' North latitude and 31°06' West longitude. 
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TABLE 4-1.- SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 
Event 
I 
Planned time, 
g.e.t. 
Launch phase, sec 
Stage I engine ignition signal (87FS1) 
Stage I MDTCPS makes subassembly 1 
Stage I MDTCPS makes subassembly 2 
TCPS subassembly 1 and subassembly 2 make 
Lift-off (pad disconnect separation) 
(15:15:59.562 G.m.t.) 
Roll program start 
Roll program end 
Pitch program rate no. 1 start 
Pitch program rate no. 1 end, no. 2 start 
Control system gain change no. 1 
IGS update sent 
Pitch program rate no. 2 end, no. 3 start 
Stage I engine shutdown circuitry armed 
IGS update sent 
Stage I MDTCPS unmake 
BECO (stage I engine shutdown (87FS2)) 
Staging switches actuate 
Signals from stage I rate gyro package to 
flight control system discontinued 
Hydraulic switchover lockout 
Telemetry ceases, stage I 
Staging nuts detonated 
Stage II engine ignition signal (9lFS1) 
Control system gain change 
Stage separation begin 
Stage II engine MDFJPS make 
Pitch program rate no. 3 ends 
-2.20 
o 
10.16 
20.48 
105.00 
119.04 
144.64 
145.00 
153.29 
153.37 
153.37 
153.37 
153.37 
153.37 
153·37 
153.37 
153.37 
154.07 
154.27 
162.56 
l 
Actual time, 
g.e.t. 
-3.24 
-2.39 
-2.34 
-2.28 
o 
10.10 
20.40 
22·95 
88.21 
104.67 
105.00 
118.66 
144.20 
145.00 
152.40 
152.43 
152.43 
152.43 
152.43 
152.43 
152.43 
152.43 
152.43 
153.14 
153.11 
162.07 
Difference, 
sec 
0.16 
-0.09 
-0.04 
-0.08 
o 
-0.06 
-0.08 
-0.09 
-0.11 
-0.29 
0.00 
-0.38 
-0.44 
0.00 
-loll 
-0.94 
-0.94 
-0.94 
-0.94 
-0.94 
-0·93 
-1.16 
-0.49 
r 
TABLE 4-I.- SEQUENCE OF EVENTS - Concluded 
Event Planned time, g.e.t. 
Launch phase, sec 
Radio guidance enable 
First guidance command signal 
(decoder output) 
Stage II engine shutdown circuitry armed 
SECO (stage II engine shutdown (9lFS2)) 
Redundant stage II shutdown 
Stage II MDFJPS break 
Spacecraft separation (shaped charge fired) 
OAMS on 
OAMS off 
317.44 
335.82 
335.82 
336.12 
365.82a 
365.82a 
372.30a 
Reentry phase, hr:min:sec 
Pre retrofire maneuver initiate 
Retrofire 
Retroadapter separate 
Begin blackout 
End blackout 
Drogue deployment 
Pilot parachute deployment 
Landing 
97: 28:02 
97: 40:02 
97: 40:47 
97:45: 25 
97: 49: 24 
97:50:58 
97:52:40 
97:56:50 
Actual time, 
g.e.t. 
162.03 
168.50 
316.45 
333·75 
333.77 
333.91 
365·55 
364.71 
369.56 
97: 28:02 
97:40:01 
97:40:47 
97:44:59 
97:49:14 
97:50:53 
97:52:11 
97:56: 12 
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Difference, 
sec 
-0.53 
-0.50 
-0.99 
-2.07 
-2.05 
-2.21 
-0.27 
-1.11 
o 
-1 
o 
-26 
-10 
-5 
-29 
-38 
aThese times show the revised planned times which are different from the times shown in 
refs. 3 and 4 (which show spacecraft separation times at SEC0+20 and an OAMS activity to get 
a spacecraft separation velocity of 10 ft/sec). 
c~ 
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TABLE 4-II. - COMPARISON OF PLANNED AND ACTUAL TRAJECTORY PARAMETERS 
Actual 
Condition Planned Preliminary Final (a) (b) ( c) 
SECO 
Time from lift-off, sec 335.8 (d) 333.8 
Geodetic latitude, deg North 30.55 (d) 30.52 
Longitude, deg West 72.07 (d) 72.21 
Altitude, feet 530 838 (d) 531 202 
Altitude, n. mi. 87·3 (d) 87.4 
Range, n. mi. 460.1 (d) 453.2 
Space-fixed velocity, ft/sec 25 668 (d) 25 659 
Space-fixed flight-path angle, deg 0.01 (d) 0.09 
Space-fixed heading angle, deg 
East of North. 77.73 (d) 77.67 
Spacecraft separation 
Time from lift-off, sec 355.8 363 365·6 
Geodetic latitude, deg North 30.83 30.93 30.97 
Longitude, deg West 70.59 70.08 69.88 
Altitude, feet 531 097 532 961 532 349 
Altitude, n. mi. 87.4 87.7 87.6 
Ra~ge, n. mi. 538.5 563.2 573·8 
Space-fixed velocity, ft/sec 25 756 25 742 25 743 
Space-fixed flight-path angle, deg 0.0 0.10 0.07 
Space-fixed heading angle, deg 
East of North . 78.52 78.79 78.90 
Maximum conditions 
Altitude, statute miles 185 184 184 
Altitude, n. mi. 161 160 160 
Space-fixed velocity, ft/sec 25 766 25 748 25 748 
Earth-fixed velocity, ft/sec 24 449 24 433 24 433 
Exit acceleration, g 7.3 (d) 7.6 
Exit dynamic pressure, lb/s,! ft 752 (d) 726 
Reentry deceleration, g 6.8 7.8 7.7 
Reentry dynamic pressure, lb/sq ft 426 498 493 
Landing point 
Latitude, deg:min North 27:29 27:29 27:44 
Longitude, deg:min West 73:25 73:21 74:14 
aThese trajectory parameters reflect the planned spacecraft separation conditions 
for SECOt-20 as shawn in reference 3 (published 1 month before launch date) and not the 
revised planned trajectory parametefs for spacecraft separation at SECOt-30. 
bThese trajectory parameters for spacecraft separation were determined in real time 
(within several seconds of the actual event) by the Real-Time Computer Complex (RTCC). 
cThese trajectory parameters for spacecraft separation were determined by postflight 
evaluation. 
dNot applicable. '-O~4FID~I<lTIAt 
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TABLE 4-111.- COMPARISON OF ORBITAL ELEMENTS 
Actual 
Revolution Condition Planned Preliminary Final (a) "" J<'lt~~ (b) (c) 
Insertion Apogee, n. mi. !-l€>:r.-O' 152·7 152.2 
Perigee, n. mi. 87.(/ 86.9 87.6 
Inclination, deg 32.53 32.55 32.53 
Period, min . 89.09 (d) 88.90 
2 Apogee, n. mi. . 161. 0 159.2 159.9 
(after Perigee, n. mi. 91.0 89.4 90.4 
station- Inclination, deg 32.53 32.58 32.53 keeping) 
Period, min 
· 
89.09 89.05 89.08 
18 Apogee, n. mi. 156.0 154.6 154.9 
Perigee, n. mi. . 
· 
89.5 88.6 89.4 
Inclination, deg 32.53 32.56 32.53 
Period, min 89.03 88.95 88.97 
33 Apogee, n. mi. 134.3 148.0 149.1 
Perigee, n. mi. 
· 
94.2 87.5 88.0 
Inclination, deg 
· 
32.53 32·57 32.53 
Period, min 88.77 88.80 88.83 
52 Apogee, n. mi. 123.0 138.2 141. 0 
Perigee, n. mi. 
· 
93. 0 86.2 87.4 
Inclination, deg 
· 
32.53 32.55 32.53 
Period, min 88.50 88.58 88.62 
61 Apogee, n. mi. 
• 
. 115.5 135.4 136.5 
Perigee, n. mi. 89.5 85.3 86.1 
Inclination, deg 
· 
32.53 32.56 32.53 
Period, min 88.24 (d) 88.53 
~~~. 
~- aThese orbital parameters reflect the planned trajectory and space-
) craft separation velocity of 10 ft/se.c at SEC(}J-20 as shawn in reference 
) 4 (published 1 month before launch date) and not the revised planned tra-jectory and spacecraft separation velocity of 5 ft/sec at SEC(}J-30. 
bThese orbital parameters of the J3pacecraft were determined in real 
time by the Real":Time Computer Comple~ (RTCC). 
cThese orbital parameters of the spacecraft were determined by 
postflight evaluation. 
~ot available. 
4-16 
TABLE 4-IV. - DETAILED LIST OF MANEUVERS DURTI'l"G GEMJJU IV STATION-KEEPING ATTEMPr 
Time, (g. e. t. ) Thruster Length of burn, Pitch gimbal, Yaw gimbal, Roll gimbal 
min: sec sec deg deg deg 
6:04.71 Aft 5 - - -
a6:05.55 
8:47.164 Aft 2.95 - - -
9: 20.989 Aft 3. 25 - - -
13:59. 066 Up .575 - - -
15: 07.966 Up .80 - - -
21:35.344 Aft .457 255.852 18.684 151. 236 
23:59.42 Aft .50 272.988 13.788 138.852 
30:24.923 Up 3. 45 313.39 348.136 359.524 
30:28.873 Up 2.075 313·02 347.364 359.964 
31:30.648 Aft 6.475 285.768 2.664 356.760 
34:13.725 Aft 2.275 312.66 347.624 343.512 
35:58.225 Aft 3.675 324.91 352.78 15.87 
44:26.079 Aft 2.475 332.928 351. 036 7.920 
44:36.604 Aft 1.575 332.30 349.30 9.37 
49:55. 231 Aft 1.20 347.13 351. 01 6.06 
52:09.907 Up 1. 50 331. 86 350.85 19. 03 
52:12.907 Aft 2.175 331. 58 350.58 19·53 
54:23.608 Aft 2·975 315.792 353.916 354·924 
55:53.759 Aft 2.975 302·37 346.26 59·50 
59:46.310 Fwd .80 2ql.56 6.70 83. 19 
64:29·937 Aft 2.40 262.152 2.052 131. 292 
66:15.463 Aft 1.275 281.304 355.896 128.592 
66:23.988 Aft 1.20 280.68 356.01 128.07 
67: 47.889 Aft 3. 475 277·704 .612 116.856 
69: 03.464 Aft 2.275 289.008 358.812 112.932 
70:30.315 Aft 3·475 288.972 349.488 99·180 
71:37.966 Aft 5·35 283.500 354.852 70.956 
72:10.291 Aft 4.875 285.552 353.304 65·304 
72: 25.766 Aft 2.675 285.372 353.700 64.152 
72:41.141 Aft 2.175 285.840 352.548 64.476 
72:46.691 Aft 5.45 287.38 352.90 65·02 
73: 03. 941 Aft 2.875 287.964 349.452 65. 55? 
aAt this time, explosive bolts were actuated. 
l 
4-l7 
TABLE 4-IV. - DETAILED LIST OF MANEUVERS DURING GEMINI IV STATION-KEEPING ATI'EMPT - Concluded 
Time, (g.e. t. ) Thruster Length of burn, Pitch gimbal, Yaw gimbal, Roll gimbal, 
min: sec sec deg deg deg 
73: 16. '741 Aft 4.85 28'7.99 348.63 66.38 
'73:3'7.866 Aft 1. 90 289.188 345.'744 68.9'76 
'73:48.166 Aft 2.20 289.'7 346.'78 69.91 
'74:05.042 Aft 3.1'74 291.43 345.'7'7 '72.83 
\ 
'74: 22.092 Aft 3·5'75 293·83 34'7·99 '73.42 
'74:35.06'7 Aft 2.80 294.228 348.30 '73·008 
'74:50.26'7 Aft 3.6'75 295.884 350. :-00 '72.180 
'74:56.61'7 Aft 5.35 29'7.180 348.804 '71.532 
'75:42.51'7 Aft 5.2'7 291.06 2.628 1.044 
'75:50.06'7 Aft 5· '75 292.644 .504 359.964 
'76:11. 06'7 Aft .80 291. 06 356.04 1.224 
'76:12.'76'7 Aft 4.2'75 291. 04 355.'70 1. 2'7 
'76:44.218 Aft 1.'7'75 291.204 354.6'72 3.024 
'76:53.343 Up 1.1'75 290.'7 354.92 3. 22 
'7'7:1'7.843 Aft .40 293.58 353·412 1. 944 
'7'7:19.018 Up .50 294.59 353.34 2.51 
'7'7:29.543 Up .'7'75 300.41 352.45 3.'70 
'7'7:30.518 Up 1. 30 299.988 351. 900 3.564 
'7'7-51. 043 Aft 4·3'75 298.26 34'7.33 1.908 
'78:14.843 Up 1.10 291.14 350.3'7 348.916 
'78:51. 344 Aft 4.0'75 298.224 349.452 329.580 
78:59.069 Right, up 3· 2'75/3. 3'75 299.05 348.264 328.680 
'79:9.994 Up 4.15 29'7.412 34'7.14 32'7.19 
'79: 10.194 Right 3.85 29'7.412 34'7.14 32'7.19 
'79:30.144 Up 1. 3'75 29'7.'792 349·128 325.'764 
'79:33.894 Up 2·3'75 29'7.05 350.52 326.'73 
'79:45. 491 Up '7.15 296.62 350.83 350.56 
80:29.644 Up 5.15 301. 968 343.836 333. '756 
80:32. 119 Aft 2.'7'75 301. '752 343.4'76 334.152 
81:0'7. 42 Up 1.20 304.03 34'7.12 341.536 
81:08·995 Up 2.1'75 303.984 34'7.9'76 339.336 
81:09.695 Right 1. 3'75 302.'7 348.9 33'7·03 
82:03.145 Aft, up 3· 9'75/3. 8'75 306.22 342.18 336.312 
82:4'7. 2'7 Aft .90 304.056 333.'72 6.408 
83: 21.'796 Aft 4.95 302.88 343. 28 34'7.1'7 
84: 35. 3'71 Up 3.4'75 311.868 344.988 326.3'76 
84:59·3'71 Up 4.2'75 311. 94 345.42 354.'744 
86:41. 222 Right, up 1. 0'75/1. 3 '74 309·'7 348.00 353.36 
86:46.29'7 Up 4.25 306.'7 34'7. 25 350.40 
CO~ 
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TABLE 4 -v. - SUMMARY ON THE MANEUVERS MADE DURING 
GEMINI IV STATION-KEEPING ATI'EMPr 
Thruster Number Total burn time Propellant, lb 
of burns of thruster, sec 
\ 
Aft 46 142.299 
Forward 1 .80 
Left 0 0.00 
Right 4 9·575 
Up 23 57.450 
Dawn 0 0.00 
Total 74 210.124 115 
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5.0 VEHICLE PERFORMANCE 
The second Gemini manned flight provided a large amount of new data 
with which to evaluate the performance of the spacecraft and its systems. 
The capability of equipment components to operate in orbit for periods 
of time up to the full 4-day duration of the mission was demonstrated. 
Several malfunctions of equipment did occur and are discussed in this 
report. These malfunctions did not cause early termination of the flight 
nor expose the crew to danger, thus again confirming the value of either 
redundant systems or suitable alternate equipment or procedures for all 
contingencies. 
The Gemini launch vehicle performed satisfactorily in all respects 
and placed the spacecraft into a near-nominal orbital path. 
Details of spacecraft performance are contained in section 5.1, and 
details of the launch-vehicle performance are contained in section 5.2 
of this report. 
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5.l SPACECRAFT PERFORMANCE 
5.l.l Spacecraft Structure 
5.l.l.l General.- One anomaly in the operation of the spacecraft 
structural and mechanical system was the failure of the drive pawl spring 
return in the hatch operating mechanism to operate properly during extra-
vehicular activity (EVA). The difficulty experienced by the pilot in 
closing the hatch is discussed in section 5.l.l.4. After the water 
landing, the hoist loop failed to deploy properly because of a mechanical 
interference of the cover door (see sec. 5.l.l2 for details). In addi-
tion to these discussions of anomalies, section 5.l.l.2 presents thermal 
conditions, and section 5.l.l.3 presents the reentry aerodynamics. 
5.l.l.2 Thermal environment.- The thermal environment to which the 
Gemini spacecraft 4 was exposed has been examined for the launch, orbital, 
and reentry phases of the mission. This evaluation is based on tempera-
tures measured at the locations described in table 5.l-I. 
5.l.l.2.l Launch environment: The launch trajectory flown on 
Gemini IV was similar to that of previous Gemini flights, and the tem-
peratures measured on these flights are comparable. The maximum measured 
launch temperature of 450P F occurred at l25 seconds after launch at 
station Zll6.0 on the bottom centerline. 
5.l.l.2.2 Orbit environment: The launch azimuth and time of lift-
off resulted in an orbit with a geocentric angle between the sun and the 
spacecraft's orbital plane of 80 at that point in orbit where the space-
craft was nearest the sun. A geocentric angle of oP between the space-
craft's orbital plane and the sun results in orbits of the highest 
temperatures, and the Gemini IV mission approached this condition. 
In an effort to measure minimum temperatures in orbit, the polarity 
of sensors PD07 and PD08, located on the left and top sides of the cabin 
section, respectively, was reversed to enable temperatures below the 
reference value of 850 F to be recorded. The minimum orbital temperature 
of -850 F was recorded by sensor PD07 during revolution 3 While later 
revolutions showed a minimum value of -650 F. Sensor PD08 showed a 
minimum value of -5~ F. Peak temperatures of approximately 2000 F, 
l50P F, and l60P F were recorded from the sensors on the bottom of the 
cabin, reentry control system (RCS), and rendezvous and recovery (R and 
R) sections, respectively. The maximum orbital temperature of 20QP F 
on the cabin section occurred during revolution l7 after temperatures 
had stabilized. 
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5.1.1.2 .. 3 Reentry environment: Because the onboard computer could 
not be used for reentry, Gemini IV followed a zero-lift reentry trajec-
tory with manual guidance. This trajectory resulted in a reentry with 
thermal characteristics less severe than those of GT-2 but with higher 
heating than the lifting reentry of GT-3. 
The maximum zero angle-of-attack stagnation-point heating rate was 
calculated as 57.8 Btu/ft2-sec, nearly midway between the value of 
?l.8 BtU/ft2-sec calculated for GT-2 and 49.8 Btu/ft2-sec calculated for 
GT-3. Total reference stagnation-point heating was calculated as 
8260 BtU/ft2• Total heating for GT-2 was 6670 Btu/ft2, and for GT-3 was 
8650 BtU/ft2• 
During maximum heating, the center-of-gravity offset on space-
craft 4 produced a trim angle of attack of 10° which agreed with pre-
flight predictions. This calculated angle of attack also agrees with 
a visual clue provided by a 19-inch displacement of the apparent stag-
nation point from the center of the heat shield. For comparison, the 
trim angle of attack during maximum heating was 15° to 16° for GT-2 and 
8° to 9° for GT-3· 
Gemini IV temperatures were somewhat higher than those on GT-3 but 
much lower than thDse on GT-2, and no areas of high local heating were 
encountered. The maximum temperature on the cabin section was 1240P F, 
recorded by PD03 located at station zll6 on the bottom centerline. This 
maximum value was expected from the type of reentry that was flown. 
Reentry cabin section temperature histories are shown in figure 5.1-1. 
The peak temperature on the spacecraft beryllium shingles was 
870P F, recorded by PC03 on the RCS section bottom centerline. Reentry 
temperature histories on the beryllium shingles are shown in figure 5.1-2. 
Hea1l-shield bondline temperatures are similar to those measured on 
the GT-3 mission. The maximum bondline temperature of 1200 F was reached 
just before landing for sensor FEll on the leeward edge. Transient heat-
shield bondline temperatures are presented in figure 5.1-3. 
5.1.1.2.4 Overall performance of structure and heat protection: 
Postflight inspection of the spacecraft indicated that all struct1rre and 
heat protection were in excellent condition after the mission. After-
body shingles were clean and undamaged but showed a slight discoloration 
in the area behind the most windward spacecraft-adapter interconnect 
fairing. 
A preliminary examination of the heat shield indicated the char 
depth to be approximately 0.25 inch. This depth is of the order of that 
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measured on GT-3. The weight loss of the heat shield during reentry was 
12.44 pounds, which is similar to that measured after previous flights. 
The surface has a white appearance over the entire shield, as was noted 
on GT-3. The postflight condition of the ablation shield is excellent. 
5.1.1.3 Reentry aerodynamics.- The reentry aerodynamics were ob-
tained from a flight data reduction program which utilized onboard atti-
tude control maneuver electronics angular rate, inertial measurement 
unit synchro gimbal angle, and body-mounted accelerometer data. Earth 
referenced position data were obtained by a point-mass reentry-trajectory 
simulation derived from radar vector data from White Sands, Eglin, and 
Cape Kennedy. The use of position data from the simulation was necessary 
because of the lack of position data from the spacecraft onboard computer. 
The simulation employed the ARDC 1959 Model Atmosphere; whereas, the 
measured atmospheric density deviations at Eglin Air Force Base and at 
Cape Kennedy were those presented in figure 5.1-4. The trim angle of 
attack and lift-to-drag ratio obtained by using the simulated reentry and 
an offset center of gravity of 1.56 inches are presented in figure 5.1-5. 
The spacecraft was ballasted for an intended center-of-gravity (c.g.) 
offset of 1.46 inches prior to the flight; the greater actual c.g. off-
set resulted from the decision not to jettison the extravehicular activ-
ity (EVA) equipment. The 1. 56-inch offset for spacecraft 4 compares with 
1.96 for spacecraft 2 and 1.43 for spacecraft 3. Hence, the Gemini IV 
reentry can be characterized as being between GT-2 and GT-3 in trim atti-
tude, which is also the case with the Mach number and Reynolds number 
environment shown in figure 5.1-6. 
The measured atmospheric densities are being employed to obtain 
refined aerodynamic coefficients. 
5.1.1.4 Hatch closing and latching difficulty.- The flight crew 
reported difficulty in cloSing and latching the hatch after the EVA 
operation. They reported that the latching system!s manual handle moved 
back and forth freely and that the gain pawl spring return mechanism 
failed. After moving the handle back and forth several times an~ manu-
ally working the gain pawl, the handle finally caught and the latch 
mechanism was driven overcenter, locking the hatch to the,sill. 
Postflight analysis of the spacecraft revealed that the drive pawl 
spring return was failing, which accounted for the free motion of the 
handle reported by the pilot. The gain pawl mechanism performed satis-
factorily; however, quantitative measurements indicated that its spring 
return was also marginal :i,n the "lock" position. 
Failure of the pawl spring cartridge to operate properly had been 
experienced on Spacecraft 3 and 6 and corrective action had been taken. 
Figure 5.1-7 is a schematic diagram illustrating this portion of the 
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hatch locking mechanism. In the case of the previous failures, it was 
determined that the spring-driven piston A was sticking in its cylinder 
and thus preventing it from rotating cam B to cause the ratchet pawl C 
to engage the drive gear D. The sticking was caused by excess dry film 
lubricant collecting between the piston and cylinder. The corrective 
action was to clean all excess lubricant from both the piston and the 
cylinder, and extensive testing showed no further tendency for the cor-
rected article to fail. 
This corrective action was taken on spacecraft 4. Also, in order 
to be as safe as possible and to be prepared for any formation of ice in 
the mechanism, the pilot was instructed in a method to manually assist 
the spring piston if necessary. This method consists in manually rota-
ting the external selector handle which is on the same shaft as Band C 
in the direction to cause the pawl to engage the gear. 
The postflight examination showed that the failure mode was not in 
the piston and cylinder which moved freely, but in excessive friction at 
point E where cam B slides on the face of piston A. The piston face was 
found to be rough and there was an accumulation of the dry film lubricant 
adhering to cam B at point E. 
A redesign which completely eliminates sliding friction from the 
operation of the ratchet pawls is being incorporated on all future 
spacecraft. 
In addition to the faulty pawl, the difficulty the Gemini IV flight 
crew experienced with the hatch closure was compounded because the space 
suits were pressurized higher than nominal, and the chest-mounted venti-
lation control module interfered with the motion of the latching.handle. 
Also, the hatch resisted closing because the forces generated by new 
seals in the sill and the redesigned actuator seal were considerably 
higher than those in the zero-g flight tests, to which the flight crew 
were accustomed. 
5.l.2 Communications Systems 
The communications equipment for spacecraft 4 performed as designed 
with no failures evident at the time of preparation of this report; how-
ever, the flight crew reported that the communications performance was 
marginal during the first few revolutions. Data are still being examined, 
and several items of equipment are scheduled for further tests. The 
voice control center (VCC) is among these items. The flight crew reported 
before launch that their volume controls were set near the maximum, and 
there were several reported instances of garbled conversation received by 
the crew during flight. Because of various air-to-ground and ground net-
work problems, voice communications were marginal in support of the 
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mission. Performance of the various spacecraft communications subsystems 
is discussed in the succeeding paragraphs. 
5.1.2.1 Ultra-hi h fre uenc The flight crew 
reported generally poor ultra-high frequency UHF voice communications 
during the first eight or nine revolutions. Later during the mission, 
and from the pre retrograde through the postlanding phases, UHF communi-
cations were satisfactory. Signal-strength charts from Cape Kennedy' 
appear normal during the first few revolutions. Levels were about 
20 microvolts shortly after acquisition, increasing normally to about 
250 microvolts, and dropping again to about 20 microvolts as the station 
pass was completed. Other data will be examined as they become avail-
able. Tests on the recovered flight equipment are not yet complete. 
Communications blackout caused by plasma attenuation during reentry oc-
curred from 97:44:59 g.e.t. to 97:49:14 g.e.t., as determined from signal-
strength data from the Mission Control Center, Cape Kennedy (MCC-C). 
Adequate communications during most of the extravehicular activity 
phase were shown on the signal strength chart from MCC-C Tel II. The 
strength was normal and in the range of 20 to 250 microvolts. There 
were a very few short-duration drop-outs during this ti~e period. This 
situation is indicative of VOX mode continuous conversation between crew 
members, verified from the onboard voice transcripts, and is one which 
precludes reception of ground transmissions. During this period, from 
about 04:29:00 g.e.t. to about 04:40:00 g.e.t., the pilot's mode switch 
apparently was in the RECORD position. When the pilot's mode switch is 
in the RECORD position, his voice should be attenuated sufficiently by 
isolation pads to prevent modulation of the UHF transmitter. However, 
the pilot was heard on the ground, but at a lower volume level than the 
command pilot. The voice control center will be examined to determine 
why the pilot's voice was not attenuated. During the debriefing, the 
flight crew reported that they could not contact the ground during the 
early portion of the extravehicular activity (EVA) exercise. The record 
shows that from about 04:24:40 g.e.t. to 04:29:33 g.e.t., good UHF com-
munications between the command pilot and the spacecraft communicator 
were remoted through Hawaii. From about 04:29:33 g.e.t. to 
04:33:21 g.e.t., the spacecraft communicator could not reach the com-
mand pilot because the spacecraft was not over a station. After 
04:33:21 g.e.t., the spacecraft communicator listened to the flight crew 
during the remainder of the extravehicular exercise. The spacecraft 
communicator tried to break into the conversation several times during 
this period without success because the spacecraft transmitter was 
almost continuously keyed. During this time, air-ground transmissions 
were remoted through MCC-C and Bermuda; the command pilot's voice qual-
ity was good, and the pilot's voice level was low as explained previously. 
The flight crew reported that voice communications interrupted the 
sleeping periods of the crew members even though the volume controls 
were in the minimum position. Present design does not permit completely 
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turning off the voice communications. This situation will be corrected 
for future flights. 
5.1.2.2 High-frequency voice communications.- High-frequency (HF) 
voice communications equipment is included in the Gemini spacecraft for 
emergency purposes. No emergency use of the equipment was attempted 
during this mission; however, it was given special tests in both voice 
and direction finding (HF-DF) modes. Data examination at this time is 
not complete. The flight log indicates that limited results were 
achieved from the daytime tests, and no replies are noted for the night 
tests. A great many cases of radio frequency interference (RFI) were 
noted in the network station reports. Signal strengths were recorded 
intermittently and sometimes continuously on the HF frequency charts 
of most of the stations. These interfering signals were probably 
strong enough to deg~ade line-of-sight communications or even to pre-
clude the weaker reflected transmissions that would be necessary in case 
of an emergency. For example, the chart from Bermuda, during the time 
that one of the HF transmission tests was to be recorded, showed over-
riding signal strengths which were annotated 1!Cape Com Tech1! on the 
charts. This prevented any usable data from being recorded and very 
probably would have prevented emergency communication with the station. 
Further evaluation is dependent on Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) and Department of Defense (DOD) support for signal strengths and 
direction bearing data in support of the HF-DF tests. The data will be 
examined when they become available. 
5.1.2.3 Radar transponders.- Two C-band radar transponders were 
flown on spacecraft 4. A new and improved transponder was mounted in 
the adapter, and the original Gemini transponder was mounted in the 
reentry assembly to be used for the launch and reentry phases. One ele-
ment of this antenna was phase-shifted to provide approximately 27cP of 
roll coverage. The transponders performed satisfactorily throughout the 
mission. Teletypes, verbal reports, and some station logs were examined 
for evidence of abnormal operation. Hawaii and Canary Island stations 
reported intermittent tracking but only during revolutions 7 and 13, 
which indicates a ground-station problem. In several instances, extreme 
modulation appeared on the tracking station signal. This modulation 
did not cause loss of tracking and can be explained by the effect of 
drifting flight on antenna gain patterns. The Eglin Air Force Base 
station reported that it tracked the spacecraft transponder completely 
through reentry blackout. Several stations were programed to skin-track 
the spacecraft at various intervals during the mission. Some stations, 
reporting through the network controller, reported limited success; 
however, a more complete evaluation is awaiting additional data. 
5.1.2.4 Digital command system.- Satisfactory operation of the 
spacecraft digital command system is indicated by preliminary reports 
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from network stations and flight-control personnel. No problems were 
experienced with the uplinking of real-time commands. Updates to the 
time reference system were successful. Stored program commands to the 
computer were repeated on several occasions because of lack of complete 
message verification. Reduced data showing commands transmitted, time, 
and message acceptance pulse will be examined as they become available. 
5.1.2.5 Telemetry transmitters.- Telemetry transmitter operation 
was very satisfactory, as evidenced by the quality of the data received 
on the ground. The stand-by transmitter was not needed. The delayed-
time transmissions of recorded data received at Cape Kennedy contained 
almost lOO-percent usable data, even though many of the dumps were made 
during drifting flight. The real-time transmission of telemetry data 
was satisfactory throughout the mission. At this time, signal strengths 
are still being examined for evidence of antenna orientation fades. 
5.1.2.6 Antenna systems.- There are good indications that all. 
antennas deployed normally. The voice communications and the real-time 
telemetry were switched to the reentry, or UHF stub, antenna near the 
end of revolution 7. It is unfortunate that this switching was not done 
earlier in the flight because the UHF stub antenna would have provided 
better communications during periods in which the spacecraft was in a 
nose-down attitude. It is possible, and this mission appears to confirm, 
that the UHF stub antenna provides more complete coverage than the 
adapter antenna and, therefore, is more suitable for drifting flight. 
The adapter antenna for HF voice apparently deployed properly and the 
HF recovery antenna satisfactorily extended and retracted after landing. 
5.1.2.7 Recovery aids.- With the possible exception of high-
frequency direction finding (HF-DF), the recovery aids operated normally. 
The flashing light extended but was not turned on by the flight crew. 
The-survival pack beacons were not used. The 243-megacycle recovery 
beacon was turned on after two-point parachute suspension. Its opera-
tion is covered more fully in the recovery report, section 6.3.3. The 
flight crew reported that HF-DF was used briefly after landing; however, 
it was not received by recovery forces in the landing area. This is to 
be expected because direct transmissi.on on the water does not normally 
extend beyond 15 miles at this frequency because of ground wave attenua-
tion. There are no reports of skip distance reception at this time. 
Network reports obtained from the Department of Defense describe the 
reception as IIpoor.1I 
5.1.2.8 Voice tape recorder.- The spacecraft voice recorder func-
tioned throughout the mission. Reproduction was good during the early 
and terminal phases of the flight. Excessive background noise, however, 
caused some tapes to be of marginal quality. The recorded level of the 
crew members' voices varied throughout the mission. During EVA, the 
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~ecorded level of the pilot's voice was much higher than that of the 
command pilot. The tapes and the recorder are being returned to the 
vendor for evaluation. 
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The flight crew expressed dissatisfaction with the voice RECORD 
function being controlled by the mode select switch since it prevented 
simultaneous transmit and record by a given crew member and also caused 
confusion because of the need for fre~uent switching between the two 
positions. Also, the end-of-tape indicator light of the voice tape 
recorder is in a position where it cannot be readily seen by the crew. 
The short length of tape in a cartridge (enough for 1 hour of continuous 
recording) re~uired fre~uent reloading, and the crew stated that this 
reloading detracted from more important tasks. 
5.1.3 Instrumentation and Recording System 
An examination of the real-time and delayed-time available data 
revealed only one anomaly during the mission. The pulse code modulation 
(PCM) tape recorder stopped recording during reentry at about 2000 ft 
altitude at 97:54:08 g.e.t. either because of a power interruption to 
the tape recorder or a failure of the PCM signal to the recorder. A 
check of the spacecraft wiring to the recorder will be made on a space-
craft test re~uest (STR). Further investigation into all related areas 
is continuing in an attempt to resolve this problem. 
There was a total of 279 parameters for this miSSion, and only one 
measurement, AD02, e~uipment adapter separation, failed to give an in-
dication. The real-time data received by the Cape Kennedy telemetry 
station number two (Tel II) for various phases of the mission are listed 
in table 5.1-11. From the columns of total losses and valid data, it 
can be seen that the real-time usable data is more than 97 percent of 
that receivable, except for revolutions 19 and 59 and the reentry black-
out period. During the passes for revolutions 19 and 59, the look-angle, 
or tracking-elevation angle, was very low or close to the horizon. 
The delayed-time data received by Tel II, Texas, Hawaii, and Antigua 
telemetry ground stations as well as the data recovered from the onboard 
PCM tape recorder are summarized in table 5.1-111. This represents 
33 data dumps out of the 61 dumps actually made. It can be seen that 
the usable data exceeds 99.7 percent for all stations listed. The on-
board PCM recorder had only 98.44 percent usable data; and this lower 
figure may be the result of bit-jitter caused by reentry vibrations, or 
it may have been the result of intermittent failure leading to the anom-
aly which resulted in no data being recorded during reentry after the 
spacecraft passed through an altitude of approximately 2000 feet. 
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Overall, the instrumentation system performed exceptionally well 
during the Gemini IV mission. 
5.l.4 Environmental Control System 
The environmental control system (ECS) operated throughout the 
flight without any major problems. Only minor anon~lies were experienced 
and are discussed herein. 
The ventilation control module (chest pack) operated nominally 
throughout the extravehicular activity (EVA). Operation of the EVA 
equipment had no detrimental effect on the environmental control system 
(radiator or primary oxygen) even though the activity lasted nearly 
twice the originally planned period. 
The primary oxygen tank pressure decayed from 935 psia to 835 psia 
shortly after spacecraft separation. The decay started 382 seconds after 
lift-off, and the pressure stabilized after an interval of l28 seconds. 
A greater and more rapid decay occurred in the reactant supply system 
(RSS) cryogenic tanks on the GT-2 flight. Ground testing since GT-2 
has shown that this decay could be caused by temperature stratification 
within the tank and can be minimized by proper prelaunch procedures 
which were used on the Gemini IV mission. Oxygen temperature in the 
tank was measured for the first time on spacecraft 4. The temperature 
showed a decline approximately l2 seconds before the start of pressure 
decay, indicating that the condition was caused by stratification. The 
pressure decay caused no problem on spacecraft 4 and is not expected to 
cause problems on any future spacecraft if proper prelaunch procedures 
are continued. 
The pressure in the primary oxygen vessel required venting from 
about 960 psi to 920 psi approximately every 4 hours during the flight. 
The pressure was vented manually through the oxygen high-rate valve or 
cabin-repressurization valve instead of automatically through the primary 
oxygen relief valve. This procedure was followed because the primary 
oxygen pressure transducer and the relief valve both have an upper limit 
of lOOO psi. If the pressure had bee~ allowed to increase to relief 
pressure the gage needle would probably have been against the full-scale 
stop, and the crew could not have ascertained that the relief valve was 
functioning properly. The pressure transducer upper limit is being in-
creased to 1200 psi on future spacecraft. 
The pilot seemed to be slightly warm for most of the mission with 
a tendency toward discomfort during sleep periods, whereas the command 
pilot reported generally comfortable temperatures. This is a result of 
differences in the pressure suits, metabolic heat loads, and individual 
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response to the environment. The pilot's suit had added insulation for 
extravehicular activity, which could reduce the cooling by heat transfer 
through the suit to the cabin. Also, because of the added bulk of the 
suit, the effort required for normal activity was increased, and there-
fore the metabolic heat load of the pilot was increased. The measured 
suit inlet temperature was generally between 5cP and 55° F, which had 
been shown by ground testing to be adequate for normal activity with 
normal suit flow. 
The relative humidity in the cabin varied from a low of 50 percent 
to a high of 63 percent. The humidity varied in different areas of the 
cabin and was highest in the vicinity of the open faceplates as expected. 
Preliminary analysis of the absorbent material located on the cabin walls 
showed negligible moisture absorption. 
The cabin leakage rate was reported to be excessive early in the 
flight. Analysis of the data shows this report was incorrect. Cabin 
leakage was below the specified maximum throughout the flight. 
The overboard urine dump system failed at approximately 92 hours 
g.e.t., during the eleventh dump cycle of the mission. The failure was 
an apparent line blockage. The backup mode of dumping through the launch 
cooling heat exchanger was used for the remainder of the mission (last 
half of the eleventh and the twelfth dumps). Investigation to date has 
revealed that the solenoid valve now opens only a very small amount. 
The system is being disassembled for detailed examination. 
The flight crew reported eye irritation and ammonia odors during 
the flight and a nauseating odor after landing. The flame retardant 
used to treat the water absorbent material installed on the cabin walls 
was known to outgas small amounts of ammonia. This ammonia may have 
caused the eye irritation; however, the charcoal which was used in the 
ECS for odor removal is being analyzed for additional contaminants. The 
flame retardant is being changed for future spacecraft. The acrid odor 
in the spacecraft cabin after landing was later verified by the flight 
crew to be the same as that emanating from the heat shield. 
The cabin coolant control valve was found to be stuck when the 
spacecraft was returned to Cape Kennedy. The flight crew reported that 
they had no problem with the valve. A failure analysis is being made. 
The flight crew reported that gas was mixed with the water from the 
drinking water dispenser. This appears to be the result of inadequate 
prelaunch servicing procedures. 
UNCLASSIFIED 
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5.l.5 Guidance and Control System 
5.l.5.l Summary.- The guidance and control system functioned ade-
quately throughout the flight except for two anomalies which may have 
to be corrected before the next flight. Table 5.l-IV contains a time 
sequence of test and operation events together with an indication of 
the function of each component during the tests. 
The inertial guidance system (IGS) performed well during launch 
and for the first 75 hours of the flight. After the completion of the 
update and subsequent verification at the end of revolution 48, the crew 
reported they were unable to power down the computer using the on-off 
switch although the computer operation was satisfactory in other re-
spects. During the next revolution it was decided to power down the 
computer by removing power from the IGS. The resulting out-of-sequence 
power-down caused several changes in the memory core of the computer. 
Although the computer appears to have been capable of powering down 
normally later in flight, normal computer operation could not be re-
stored because of the memory alterations; therefore, the computer could 
not support the remaining mission phases. 
Although the horizon sensor system functioned well during periods 
of the mission, the sensor dropped track one time while in the horizon 
scan mode because of the sun's being in the field of view. As a result, 
the vehicle tumbled and could not recover attitude control without as-
sistance from the flight crew. 
As a result of comparing IGS measured accelerations to commanded 
accelerations from thrust chamber assembly (TCA) signals, and investi-
gating the effect of TCA firings on the attitude control system, it was 
determined that TCA 9 (top aft-firing OAMS) was apparently intermittent 
in operation. After examining the reasons for the high reentry rolling 
rate and checking the control system behavior during the reentry control 
system (RCS) rate command mode check, it became apparent that TCA 5 
(left pitch-up RCS) was inoperative during checkout of the system and 
during reentry. 
5.l.5.2 IGS performance evaluation.-
5.l.5.2.l Ascent phase: The IGS pitch, yaw, and roll steering 
signals are shown in figure 5.l-8. Superimposed on this figure are the 
steering signals from the primary guidance system along with the upper 
and lower IGS extremes which were generated by assuming nominal opera-
tion of the primary guidance system. The differences in the steering 
commands resulting from IGS gimbal cross coupling are shown in the same 
figure. These differences are not considered an error but are nominal 
deviations resulting from basic differences between the "strap-down" and 
"gimbaled-inertial" references used in the two guidance systems. The 
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following is a brief discussion of the steering signals with respect to 
first- and second-stage flight. The IGS performance during this period 
was excellent and showed no indication of the problems encountered on the 
previous two-flights. 
First stage - As shown in figure 5.l-8(a), the roll steering com-
mands between the two guidance systems were different by 1.4° at BECO. 
About 0.1° of this difference was the result of initial bias between 
the two systems and another 0.1° was the result of the difference be-
tween the two roll programs. The gimbal cross-coupling contributed 
0.1f, leaving 0.5° unexplained. This difference is representative of 
a 10 to 12 deg/hr linear drift which is reasonable for the launch-
vehicle three-axis reference system (TARS) drift. The primary guidance 
roll attitude offset of 0.4° at lift-off and the drift to 1. cP at BECO 
again represent stage I engine misalinement. This was proven after staging 
when the commands were shifted to the stage II roll control nozzle, and 
the roll attitude command immediately shifted from 1.cP to cP. 
Figure 5.l-8(b) shows an initial difference in yaw steering of 
0.1° to O.~ between the two guidance systems. At BECO, the differen~e 
was 0.1f and the gimbal cross-coupling was about 1. cP. This left about 
0.4° to 0.5° unexplained, which corresponds to a linear drift of about 
10 deg/hr. Analysis indicates a 1.0 deg/hr drift and misalinement error 
maximum (discussed later in this section) from the IGS, leaving a TARS 
drift of 9 deg/hr. The 0.6° shift which occurred at BECO was a normal 
reaction to the yaw moment created by the stage II roll nozzle and an 
offset center of gravity. 
At staging, there was a 1.1° difference between the two pitch 
steering commands as shown in figure 5.l-8(c). There was an initial 
bias of 0.1° to O. 'C!?, leaving about 1. cP which was probably a TARS or 
TARS-programer drift. Either a TARS linear drift of 21 deg/hr or a 
TARS-programer error in the torQuing signal could explain the difference. 
The IGS was commanding a nose-down attitude after staging, just prior 
to RGS initiate, to correct for the high stage I trajectory. 
Analysis of the inflight telemetry data indicated that both azimuth 
updates were received. The flight reconstruction simulation resulted 
in the following values of platform misalinement computer bias correc-
tions. 
Platform release, deg 
After first update, deg 
After second,update, deg • 
• . 0.03 
.-0.14 
.-0.13 
This misalinement was within the specified 3cr value of 0.75°. 
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Second stage - Although the difference between the two pitch 
steering commands was quite large (2.4° at L0+300 sec), the IGS command 
was a natural reaction to the high trajectory flown. The IGS was com-
manding the vehicle to a nose-down attitude to correct for its measure-
ment of an excessive radial velocity of 25 ft/sec and an altitude that 
was high by 1000 feet. Postflight trajectory reconstructions have veri-
fied that the radial velocity was 25 ft/sec high and that the altitude 
at SEC0+20 seconds was 1300 feet high. 
The IGS yaw steering appeared to be quite normal until about 
L0+320 seconds. At this time, the command started to deviate until it 
had drifted a total of 1.00 at SECO. This behavior was "probably the 
effect of the IGS misalinement in yaw. The steering command is derived 
by dividing the out-of-plane velocity by an effective time to go to 
SECO. The out-of-plane velocity was in error by 12 to 15 ft/sec; and, 
as the vehicle approached SECO, this ratio diverged as did the steering 
command. 
After the gimbal cross-coupling was subtracted from the roll steer-
ing commands in stage II, the remainder of the difference between the 
two guidance systems was representative of a TARS linear drift of 
10 deg/hr. This agreed well with the drift observed during stage I 
flight. 
Postflight simulations of the ascent trajectory, using the actual 
accelerometer and gimbal angle data as inputs, show agreement in veloc-
ity to within less than ~ ft/sec which indicates that "the computer 
operated properly during the launch phase. 
If switchover to IGS had occurred early in the stage II operation, 
the SECO conditions would have shown about the following differences 
from nominal: +4.6 ft/sec in velocity, +0.009° in flight-path angle, 
and +550 feet in altitude. With IGS steering, these insertion conditions 
would have resulted in a lower perigee and a higher apogee. The perigee 
would have been about 3600 feet lower and the apogee about 70 000 feet 
higher (approximately an 87 by 163.9 nautical-mile orbit). 
The incremental velocity indicator (IVI) display, as actually com-
puted by the onboard incremental velocity adjust routine (IVAR), was 
reconstructed by using IGS navigational and gimbal-angle data. The 
IVAR was programed to include a desired insertion velocity based on an 
incremental velocity addition of 10 ft/sec at separation. However, the 
flight plan for this mission called for only 5 ft/sec. The crew reported 
readings of 20 ft/sec forward, 11 ft/sec right, and 2 ft/sec down, which 
were the approximate readings calculated near the end of the roll maneu-
ver. The final values for the time to apogee (T ) and for the velocity 
ap 
-CO t<l ~IO Er<4TIAb 
-EOt~FIDE~~TIAl 5-15 
to be applied at apogee (V ) as obtained through the data acquisition gp 
system (DAS) prelaunch mode were: (1) the T reading at SECO+20 sec-
ap 
onds was 2945.2 seconds which was the correct value, and (2) the V gp 
at L0+512 seconds, when the computer was switched out of the ascent mode, 
was -0.8 ft/sec which was also the correct velocity change required to 
lower perigee to nominal. These comparisons validate the orbit inser-
tion equations and the computer IVI interface. 
If the IVAR had been followed on this flight and the correction had 
been made at SEC0+20 seconds, a 25-ft/sec forward and a 12-ft/sec out-
of-plane velocity would have been displayed in component form. Follow-
ing a lO-ft/sec separation maneuver and nulling the pitch and roll atti-
tude errors, the lVI's would have displayed 15 ft/sec forward and 
7 ft/sec right. The out-of-plane velocity was 19 ft/sec; however, the 
IVAR limits the out-of-plane correction to one-half the in-plane cor-
rection. In this case, with the yaw attitude error nulled, the space-
craft would have been yawed 26.5° right, and the resultant correction 
of 17 ft/sec forward would have appeared on the fore and aft window. 
After driving this 17 ft/sec reading to zero, a 7-ft/sec correction to 
the out-of-plane velocity would have resulted. Assuming no other man-
euvers, the resultant apogee would have been 164.3 nautical miles, in-
cluding the effect of IGS navigational errors. At the time the IVI's 
are normally zeroed, V would have read -0.5 ft/sec, and relatively gp 
no change would have been required at apogee to reach the desired 
perigee of 87 nautical miles. 
Guidance error analysis -
Data quality - Telemetry data for the inertial measuring unit (IMU) 
evaluation were of excellent quality and were continuous throughout 
powered flight, except for a few single-point dropouts. 
GE Mod III data were adequate for quick-look analysis; however, 
the data became very noisy at approximately L0+300 seconds because of 
the lower elevation look-angles on this flight. The quick-look missile 
trajectory measurement (MISTRAM) system data agree relatively well with 
the GE data in X and Z computer coordinates. The MISTRAM calibrate 
(p leg) channel was not functioning for the flight. Rate data, however, 
were available on all legs, and by using MISTRAM 10 K legs for zero 
setting, smooth MISTRAM data were obtained. 
The IMU evaluation was based on velocity comparisons between the 
telemetered accumulated accelerometer count data, which were properly 
scaled and biased, and GE Mod III tracking data. 
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The preliminary data aCQuired during ascent indicate that the ac-
celerometer and pitch gyro malfunctions that occurred during GT-2 and 
GT-3 missions, respectively, did not occur on Gemini IV. The computer 
operation during ascent was normal. 
The azimuth misalinement of -0.l3° on Gemini IV was considerably 
less than the misalinements on GT-2 and GT-3, which were -0.29° and 
-0.5~, respectively. 
Error analysis - Preliminary analysis of the indicated guidance 
system errors follows. 
The major component of velocity error in the X -direction (down-p 
range) appears to have been caused by a scale-factor shift. A good fit 
of the data (see fig. 5.l-9) is obtained using X scale-factor error of p 
-l4l ppm which caused a -3.5 ft/sec error. A bias of -37 ppm (computed 
from free-flight data) and the Y -gyro input axis unbalance accounted p 
for the remainder of the velocity error. 
The velocity error data in the Y (vertical axis) were noisy after p 
LO+280 seconds. However, the trend of the data indicates that the 
dominant error source was a gyro drift (see fig. 5.l-l0). A g-sensitive-
drift Y -gyro mass unbalance along the input axis is assumed to be the p . 
primary error source. A Z -gyro mass unbalance along the input axis of p 
0.45 deg/hr/g and an azimuth misalinement of -0.56 minute were assumed 
to be the major sources of the Z -velocity error (see fig. 5.l-l0). p 
The indicated guidance-system errors at SECO, which were obtained 
from position and velocity comparisons using GE Mod III as a reference, 
are shown in table 5.l-V. In this table, the IMU error represents the 
error contributed by the accelerometer and gyro sources. The naviga-
tion error is the error resulting from various approximations within 
the airborne computer. The total guidance error represents total IGS 
error. 
Estimates of indicated accelerometer and gyro error sources which 
account for the velocity error at SECO are given in table 5.l-VI. Pre-
liminary estimates of sensors and tracker error coefficients obtained 
from an error coefficient recovery program are also shown in the table. 
This program is very sensitive to low-freQuency noise, and the error 
s9urces and values must be reviewed to be consistent with engineering 
judgment and preflight data. The two mass unbalance terms which are 
the main velocity error contributors agree relatively well. An esti-
mate of orbital injection parameters, total inertial velocity, inertial 
velocity components, and flight-path angles obtained from different 
sources are shown in table 5.1-V11. 
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The data presently available indicate that the 1GS performed satis-
factorily during ascent. 
5.1.5.2.2 Orbital phase: 
Platform alinements - The platform was caged blunt-end-forward 
(BEF) following the yaw turnaround after separation. At the initiation 
of BEF alinement, the platform axes were within 1° of the spacecraft 
axes. The spacecraft, in turn, had a 12° pitch-down and l.er roll-right 
orientation with respect to the local horizontal. Sensor and gimbal-
angle data indicate essentially no pitch and roll errors at the termi-
nation of alinement. In addition, because the initial roll and yaw 
errors were small, good yaw alinement was achieved even though the 
alinement period was relatively short (6 min 29 sec). This good yaw 
alinement was substantiated by examining the data at 9QP of orbital 
travel from alinement termination where a yaw error (if it had existed) 
would have propagated into a roll error. No appreciable roll error was 
observed. A pitch error of approximately O.~ did exist at this time; 
however, this amount agrees with the predicted value which resulted 
from the difference in the platform orbital rate bias (246.4 deg/hr) 
and the actual orbital rate. Small-end-forward (SEF) alinement was 
initiated early in revolution 3 after the spacecraft had been in the 
orbit rate mode since the last alinement period. Each platform axis 
was again alined accurately. 
SEF alinement was again initiated early in revolution 44 following 
a 25-minute warmup and 18-minute cage period. The platform had been 
off since early in revolution 5. At alinement initiation, the space-
craft had a l~ pitch-down and 14.3° roll-right orientation with respect 
to the local horizontal. At the end of the 16-minute 18-second aline-
ment period, the pitch and roll alinement errors were less than 0.5°. 
However, examination of the data at approximately 9QP of orbit travel 
from alinement termination indicates that there was a 6.3° roll platform 
misalinement with respect to the local horizontal. This would indicate 
that a 6.3° yaw misalinement existed at termination of alinement. 
The platform was alined in the BEF mode for a 33-minute period 
prior to the OAMS preretrofire maneuver. Initial errors were already 
small from the alinement performed in the previous revolution. Since 
the flight crew held the spacecraft to small attitude limit cycles (±l0) with respect to platform nulls, the alinement accuracy was excel-
lent. Alinement was again performed for a 6-minute period prior to 
retrofire. Again alinement was excellent. 
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Computer operation - The computer was operated continuously from 
30 minutes prior to lift-off until 02:52:00 g.e.t., and from that time 
until 75:46:00 g.e.t. it was turned on and off 12 more times. This 
accumulated a total of 6 hours 18 minutes of running time after launch. 
Updates were sent and verified during each "on" time. After completion 
of the 12th update at 75:46:00 g.e.t., the computer power switch was 
placed in the "off" position, but the computer failed to power-down. 
This anomaly is discussed in detail in section 5.1.5.4. 
The catch-up mode was entered at 00:08:30 g.e.t. and the "start 
comp" button was pushed at 00:08:50 g.e.t. The computer was left in 
catch-up mode throughout the first revolution and provided information 
regarding platform alinement, spacecraft attitudes, and maneuvers used 
in station keeping. 
With the spacecraft remalnlng in BEF, platform alinement began at 
00:13:30 g.e.t. and ended at 00:20:00 g.e.t. There was a small up-
firing thrust at the beginning of alinement and, about two-thirds of 
the way through, the spacecraft was pitched down lcP, yawed right 5°, 
and then returned to BEF for the final 80 seconds of alinement. 
At the completion of alinement, the attitude control and maneuver 
electronics (ACME) was switched between rate command, direct, and pulse 
as required. Rate command was used during thrusting. 
5.1.5.2.3 Reentry phase: The spacecraft attitudes during the 
preretrofire OAMS maneuver were held within an average of less than 
1° in yaw, 1° in pitch, and 5° in roll. 
Examination of inertial platform data indicates that the spacecraft 
attitudes were held to within 1° in pitch and roll with negligible vari-
ation in yaw during retrofire maneuver. 
Because of the IGS anomaly and subsequent action which disabled 
the computer, no evaluation of the IGS during reentry is possible. 
Closed-loop guidance was not performed, and an open-loop zero-lift re-
entry technique was used. After retrofire a full-lift attitude was 
held until 97:42:52.5 g.e.t. at an approximate altitude of 400 000 feet, 
at which time a roll rate was established. 
5.1.5.3 Control system performance evaluation.- The control system 
operated properly during all phases of the mission. Attitude and trans-
lation hand-controller commands and automatic mode commands were prop-
erly generated and transmitted to the thrusters. Rate deadbands were 
proper throughout. Control authority was adequate in the face of all 
disturbances encountered including those that resulted from attitude 
thruster failures and was marginal for apparent failure of the aft 
maneuver thruster. 
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5.l.5.3.l Separation: The separation maneuver was performed as 
planned with the firing of aft thrusters 9 and lO for 4.9 seconds (see 
fig. 5.l-ll). The separation shaped charge was fired 0.5 second after 
thrust initiate with attitude control in "direct. It No attitude thrusters 
fired until the system was switched to Itrate command lt after 2.5 seconds. 
At this point the rates had increased to -0.84, -0.53, and -l.39 deg/sec 
in pitch, roll, and yaw, respectively. Rate command immediately damped 
and held the rates to near zero. The separation attitudes were _4°, 
89°, and 2.5° in pitch, roll, and yaw, respectively. The Itskewedlt 
separation as reported by the flight crew was not apparent in the data; 
therefore, this effect must have been small, yet it was detectable by 
the crew. 
5.l.5.3.2 Control mode checks: Two attitude-thruster checks were 
performed on this flight: one to determine control capability with an 
OAMB attitude thrust~r inoperative and the other to check RCS perform-
ance prior to retrofire. Both checks demonstrated adequate control 
with either actual or simulated thruster failures. 
Attitude-thruster failure check - The attitude-thruster failure 
check, initiated at 70:05:00 g.e.t. was to determine the crew's ability 
to control the spacecraft attitudes with one attitude thruster failed. 
The direct mode was utilized and adequate control authority was demon-
strated. 
RCS operational check - Each RCS ring was exercised by firing pairs 
of thrusters for approximately 0.2 second using t4e rate-command mode. 
Abnormal operation was suspected by the flight crew when roll thruster 
activity was observed while testing in the pitch axis. The same phe-
nomenon was reported in both rings; yet no roll motion was observed by 
the crew in subsequent direct mode tests. The body accelerations shown' 
in table 5.l-VIII indicate that TCA 5B was not operating at this time. 
This can be seen in the almost 2 to l difference in pitch acceleration 
in rings A and B when thrusters 5 and 6 were fired. The failed thruster 
was also evidenced in the difference in roll coupling when pitch-up com-
mands were initiated on ring A and then on ring B. 
5.l.5.3.3 Horizon sensor operation: The horizon sensors were 
operated for approximately 33 hours during the flight. All but a few 
minutes of this time was on the primary system. In an attempt to pro-
vide information concerning the excessive loss of track anomaly reported 
during the GT-3 mission, extensive flight tests with special instrumen-
tation were included in the Gemini IV flight plan. Proper operation was 
indicated during most of this time. Fifty-nine losses of track (scanner 
ignore light) were recorded in the 20 hours of data processed. Forty-
eight of these losses were caused by maneuvers which exceeded the atti-
tude limits, one by excessive body rates, seven by the sun entering the 
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field of view, and three during warmuF and initial lock-on. Eight of 
the attitude losses and one sun loss were intentional. The number of 
losses of track when in the horizon scan mode is deFendent on the yaw 
orientation which can Flace the sun in the field of view of the horizon 
sensor. In one loss because of the sun, the flight crew, by Frearrange-
ment, allowed the spacecraft to maneuver under control of the horizon 
scan mode to determine if control would be regained after it was lost. 
This occurrence, shown in figure 5.1-12(a), was Freceeded by a 22-minute 
period of long limit-cycle 0Feration indicating excellent Ferformance. 
As seen, the sensor lost track for 17 seconds (4 minutes after crossing 
from sunlight into umbra), regained track for 21 seconds, and then lost 
it again. At this time, the Fitch thruster began firing intermittently 
causing the sFacecraft to Fitch down through 36cP and tumble comFletely. 
Toward the end of the maneuver, the roll thrusters began firing which 
caused the sFacecraft to exceed the roll limits before it reentered the 
Fitch band Freventing acquisition after one revolution. At this Foint 
the flight crew assumed control. The horizon scan mode was then again 
energized and FroFer 0Feration was resumed. Figure 5.1-12(b) and (c) 
show the two other Feriods of 0Feration with sun interference Fresent. 
In the first period, the sensor tlloss-of-tracktl light did not illuminate 
although sFurious thruster firings occurred indicating intermittent 
loss of track. In the second Feriod, track was lost and reacquired 
without flight crew assistance. The horizon scan mode operated satis-
factorily for long Feriods exhibiting long limit-cycle Feriods (greater 
than 6 minutes), demonstrated low FroFellant consumFtion, and required 
insignificant electrical Fower. 
The effects of the sun, moon, and OAME thruster Flumes on horizon 
sensor 0Feration were determined. All checks were made utilizing the 
Frimary sensor with the Flatform in orbit rate and alined. These checks 
were carried out in a manner that achieved the comFlete results desired· 
in all but the thruster Flume check. The checks were Frimarily Ferformed 
in the Fulse mode with the horizon sensor Fowered uF exceFt for the 
thruster Flume check which was Ferformed in the rate command mode. In-
termittent use of the direct mode occurred when rate reversals were 
required to establish the desired attitude limits. 
Sunset check - The sFacecraft was oriented to the r~quested atti-
tudes of or Fitch, cP roll, and yaw alined to the sun. Initial aline-
ment was accomFlished utilizing the direct mode of control. The check 
was initiated with low rates in all axes although the attitudes had 
drifted slightly from the desired angles. A negative rate was estab-
lished in yaw which was close to that desired. The first loss of track 
occurred at 68:41:52 g.e.t. and was the result of the sun, or, Fossibly, 
a combination of attitude and sun. No other loss of track was noted 
even though the sun was in the sensor field of view three times. The 
sFacecraft attitudes and rates were maintained at the desired values. 
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MOonrise check - The spacecraft was oriented to the proper attitudes 
to conduct the check at 68: 59,: 27 g. e. t. The direct mode was used to stop 
and start the spacecraft yaw rates at the end of each 180° sweep. The 
moon should have been in or near the field of view four times during the 
6 minutes 50 seconds re~uired for this check. The spacecraft attitudes 
were maintained near the desired values. No loss of tracks was observed 
during this check. 
Thruster plume check - The spacecraft was oriented to an attitude 
of -1°,11°, and 7~ in pitch, roll, and yaw, respectively. The desired 
attitude was -100, -100, and 900 in pitch, roll, and yaw, respectively. 
The plume check was initiated at 69:43:21 g.e.t. and terminated at 
69:44:01 g.e.t. OAMS thruster number 11 was fired for 1.1 seconds at 
69:43:35 g.e.t. The rates at the start of this test were very close to 
zero and changed to 0.3, 0.1, and 0.25 deg/sec in pitch, roll, and yaw, 
respectively. The observed rate changes in yaw and pitch were verified 
to be very close to the theoretical values for one maneuver thruster 
firing. The horizon sensor angles were observed to be 'Z? and 1 ~ for 
roll and pitch, respectively. Because of the positive roll angle, the 
sensor was scanning the lower part of its field of view; therefore it 
is doubtful that the plume was in view of the sensor. Although no loss 
of track was observed, the test was probably inconclusive. 
Horizon sensor track check - The horizon sensor track check was 
designed to determine the spacecraft attitude limits for operation of 
the horizon sensors. The horizon sensor track check was initiated at 
69:43:00 g.e.t. and terminated at 70:06:00 g.e.t. The track check was 
not completed in accordance with the flight plan; however, the portion 
of the track check completed was ade~uate for the purpose intended. 
The attitudes were maintained very well throughout the track check 
period; however, the rates for the most part, exceeded the desired 
~ deg/sec. The relatively high rates presented minor problems in ana-
lyzing the data because of lag in the horizon sensor system. The loss-
of-track angle (unlock) and the track (lock) angles for both the telem-
etry data and the angles as observed by the flight crew are presented 
in table 5.1-IX. The angles at which the horizon sensor lost track 
indicated a much wider band of operation than expected (approximately 
3(0). The difference between the unlock and lock data supports the 
3° to 5° difference between unlock and lock angles. The rather high 
rates at which some of the maneuvers were carried out made the unlock-
lock angle band difficult to determine because of the inherent lag in 
the instrument. 
5.1.5.3.4 Reentry phase: The performance of the control-system 
during the preretrofire OAMS maneuver and the retrofire maneuver was 
nominal with the control system operating in rate command and with all 
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three rate gyros turned on. The control system had adequate control 
authority even though one B-ring thruster was not functioning, and, by 
not functioning, had introduced additional roll disturbances and de-
creased the yaw authority slightly. The system experienced duty cycles 
during retrofire as high as 30, 20, and 30 percent in pitch, roll, and 
yaw, respectively. The retrofire attitude was held accurately without 
difficulty. The procedure of operating the rate command system in all 
three axes during thrusting maneuvers results in more accurate attitude 
control, and, with monitoring, introduces minimum risk. 
After retrofire, a full lift attitude was held until 
97:42:52.5 g.e.t. when a 6.5 deg/sec roll rate was established. Fig-
ure 5.1-13 is a time history of gimbal roll rate and indicates that the 
roll rate gyro was turned off before the roll rate was established 
(44 sec). Figure 5.1-14 shows spacecraft attitudes, rates, and thrust 
activities for a 2-minute period during reentry. Figure 5.1-13 also 
shows the high ReS fuel usage during the high roll rate. The altitude 
reference curve on the figure was obtained from a zero lift reentry 
simulation using Eglin Air Force Base tracking station information. 
A study of the propellant consumption curve reveals four distinct regions 
of consumption rate. 
During reentry an unexpected large roll rate was developed by means 
other than the roll thrusters. Ring A and ring B thruster commands in-
dicate that the last roll commanded thruster activity occurred at 
97:43:15 g.e.t. These roll rate commands entered were to establish the 
reentry roll rate and commanded thrusters 4 and 8 on both A-ring and 
B-ring which induced a negative roll rate of 6.5 deg/sec. Observation 
of figure 5.1-13 indicates that a roll acceleration existed throughout 
the remainder of the reentry even though no change in roll rate was 
commanded by the flight crew. 
During the time period of 97:43:15 g.e.t. to 97:46:05 g.e.t., the 
roll rate increased from 6.5 deg/sec to 11.5 deg/sec. Pitch thrusters 5 
and 6 were being used to null the pitch rate as the spacecraft was ap-
proaching the aerodynamic trim condition. Failure of pitch thruster 5 
on the B-ring had the effect of inducing a roll acceleration of 
-2.4 deg/sec2. The pitch thrusters 5 and 6 were on for 2.6 ± 1.5 sec-
onds during this time period. The time tolerance corresponds to a 
thruster off-on time uncertainty of ±O.l second (O.l-second data sample 
rate). With this pitch thruster "on" time and the roll acceleration 
associated with thruster 5 failure, the resulting increase in roll rate 
would have been 6.24 ± 3.6 deg/sec as compared to the actual observed 
increase of 5.0 deg/sec. Thrusters 5 and 6 were exercised from 
97:40:56.0 g.e.t. to 97:40:56.3 g.e.t. and the pitch rate increased 
positively and the roll rate increased negatively. During the time 
from 97:40:57.9 g.e.t. to 97:40:58.3 g.e.t. only pitch thrusters 1 and 2 
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were being exercised. The pitch rate increased negatively and the roll 
rate remained unchanged. This confirms that thruster 5 was still in-
operative because a coupling effect was introduced between pitch and 
roll axes only when pitch thrusters 5 and 6 were commanded to fire. 
During the time period of 97:46:05 g.e.t. to 97:48:00 g.e.t. the 
roll rate increased from 11.5 deg/sec to 17.5 deg/sec. Because the 
roll-rate gyro was turned off at approximately 97:42:18 g.e.t., no 
roll-rate information was introduced into the yaw-rate channel by means 
of the cross-over network. Therefore, the effect of off-setting the 
yaw-rate deadband as the roll rate increased was not present. The yaw 
rate intermittently exceeded the yaw deadband of 4 deg/sec, which had 
the effect of exercising yaw thrusters 7 and 8 to restore the yaw rate 
to within the yaw-rate deadband. The vertical center-of-gravity offset 
was approximately 1.56 inches with the extravehicular activity (EVA) 
"-gear stored. Because the yaw thrusters were mounted symmetrically about 
the geometrical center, and because the center of gravity did not coin-
cide with the geometrical center, the firing of yaw thrusters 7 and 8 
introduced a roll acceleratiuu of approximately -1.07 deg/sec2. 
A -2.25 ± 2.03 deg/sec increase in roll rate should have occurred dur-
ing the measured thruster tlontl time of 2.1 ± 1.9 seconds. Pitch 
thrusters 5 and 6 also contributed 1.2 ± 0.48 deg/sec because of the 
0.5 ± 0.5 seconds tlontl time during the same time period. 
Between 97:48:00 g.e.t. and 97:50:52 g.e.t. the roll rate increased 
from 17.5 deg/sec to a maximum value of 65.4 deg/sec after which it de-
creased slowly to 57.0 deg/sec at drogue 'parachute deployment. The yaw 
rate was negative and exceeded the yaw-rate deadband of 4 deg/sec. The 
roll rate was reduced (fig. 5.1-13) because of increased aerodynamic 
damping when maximum dynamic pressure occurred between 97:49:05 g.e.t. 
and 97:49:25 g.e.t. 
5.1.5.3.5 Control characteristics affecting the RCS propellant 
consumption: Because of the extensive operation of the RCS in various 
control modes during reentry, propellant supplies had been nearly de-
pleted at the time of operating the motorized shut-off valves in both 
systems. The reasons for propellant consumption are discussed for each 
region of RCS use. It should be noted that fuel consumption, indicated 
by computations based on measured pressure and temperature, is not pre-
cise because of measurement and calibration inaccuracies, and fuel 
consumption measured by using TCA Ilontl times is inaccurate as a result 
of the estimation of weight and TCA DAB sample time; however, trends 
can be determined even though absolute values cannot be established. 
At 97:34:00 g.e.t., the amount of propellant remaining for each of 
the RCS rings varied by approximately 1.5 pounds. This was probably 
caused by the single ring testing performed by the crew approximately 
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1 hour prior to that time, in which the B-ring was tested at greater 
length than the A-ring. 
The relatively high consumption rate during the period between 
91:35:00 g.e.t. and 91:41:00 g.e.t. was a direct result of the efforts 
of the flight crew in obtaining and holding the -3cP retrofire pitch 
attitude. The TCA on-off indicators show a large amount of activity in 
the 4 minutes preceding retrofire as do the PCM gimbal angle and body 
rate data. The command pilot was apparently testing the response of 
the RCS and its ability to hold the retrofire pitch attitude. 
The spacecraft descended from 450 000 feet to 180 000 feet from 
91:41:00 g.e.t. to 91:48:18 g.e.t. The rate of propellant consumption 
decreased during this period, thus indicating a reduced amount of 
attitude-control activity. The spacecraft was in the heads-down posi-
tion with little thruster activity necessary to maintain this attitude. 
At 91:43:15 g.e.t. two short bursts from thrusters 4 and 8 imparted a 
roll rate of -6.5 deg/sec to the spacecraft. After this initial rol~ 
was established, there was little thruster activity until 91:45:00 g.e.t. 
when the spacecraft began to trim in pitch and yaw because of its aero-
dynamic characteristics. At this time the command pilot began attempt-
ing to null the pitch rate, which the trimming moment was inducing, by 
firing thrusters 5 and 6. At 91:46:06 g.e.t. he ended his attempt to 
null this pitch rate and allowed the spacecraft to establish trim. 
Starting at 91:46:18 g.e.t., thruster activity was limited almost solely 
to the intermittent firing of yaw thrusters 1 and 8. There was a small 
amount of thruster activity in this region, thus verifying the observed 
reduction in propellant consumption rate. 
Figure 5.1-13 indicates that a large roll rate of -23 deg/sec ex-· 
isted at 91:48:18 g.e.t. and aerodynamic coupling had caused a large . 
yaw rate to build up corresponding to the high roll rate. The deadbands 
on the yaw-rate channel while in the reentry rate-command mode remained 
at ±4 deg/sec instead of being displaced by an amount proportional to 
the roll rate because the roll rate gyro had been shut off. Because of 
the vertical center-of-gravity offset, firing of the yaw thrusters in-
duced roll in the spacecraft's attitude. This roll was positive for 
yaw thrusters 3 and 4 and negative for yaw thrusters 1 and 8. 
In the period from 91:46:00 g.e.t. to 91:48:18 g.e.t. the spacecraft 
roll rate began a slow increase, as did the yaw rate. The positive yaw 
rate deadband was occasionally reached in this area, causing a firing of 
yaw thrusters 7 and 8 to null the rate. These firings caused an increase 
in the roll rate. As the roll rate further increased, the yaw rate did 
likewise, thus decreasing the intervals between the firing of thrusters 7 
and 8. The situation was finally reached at 97:48:18 g.e.t. when the roll 
rate became so large that the corresponding yaw rate exceeded its dead-
band, thus causing thrusters 7 and 8 to be fired continuously. The 
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extremely high RCS fuel consumption rate after this time was a result 
of this continual firing of yaw thrusters 7 and 8 in attempting to damp 
the yaw rate, caused by the high roll rate, to within the ±4 deg/sec 
deadband. 
Figure 5.1-15 shows the effect of the roll-to-yaw coordination 
term (K ) and roll rate on fuel consumption, with K = 0 and roll pr pr 
rate =,20 deg/sec. Figure 5.1-13 shows that the high consumption is 
coincident with combined high aerodynamic total pressure and rolling 
rate above 20 deg/sec. Figure 5.1-14 shows that the control system 
activity was low with low roll rate. 
At 97:50:00 g.e.t. the propellant consumption rate decreased con-
siderably. Yaw thrusters 7 and 8 were still firing at this time and 
continued firing until 97:50:35 g.e.t. Since the trim angle of attack 
varies with Mach number near drogue parachute deployment, oscillations 
were introduced even while on rate command or reentry rate-command 
mode. Because thruster firing was audible to the crew while the space-
craft was on the drogue parachute and the oscillations did not indicat~ 
any loss in control prior to and while the spacecraft was on the reefed 
drogue parachute, it is assumed that propellant depletion occurred while 
on the disreefed drogue parachute. 
5.1.5.4 Anomalies.-
5.1.5.4.1 Computer-1GS power sequence anomaly: At the end of 
revolution 48, after verification of the computer digital command sys-
tem (DCS) reentry quantities by Cape Kennedy, the command pilot en-
countered difficulty in turning off the computer. This was the first 
indication of a problem in the 1GS. Figure 5.1-16 shows the elements 
of the 1GS associated with the power sequencing. Figure 5.1-17 shows 
a time history for revolation 49 of quantities pertinent to this 
problem. 
At 75:45:30 g.e.t. the spacecraft communicator requested that the 
computer be turned off. The telemetry data show no indication of com-
puter turn off, although the flight crew cycled the computer on-off 
switch several times. At 75:45:35 g.e.t., the power switch was turned 
from 1GS to ACME, whereupon the auxiliary computer power unit (ACPU) did 
not turn the computer off as it would normally do. Instead, the ACPU 
continued to supply power to the computer. Telemetry data show that the 
computer dc voltages assumed a new regulation level for 36 seconds then 
began to decay (see fig. 5.1-17). During this period the computer con-
tinued to operate properly as indicated by the digital acquisition sys-
tem (DAS) data. The computer malfunction light was seen on the space-
craft but not on telemetry, indicating that the malfunction light was 
activated by the ACPU. 
5-26 L 
At 75:46:57 g.e.t., the power switch was returned to IGS, and the 
computer dc voltages returned to normal. From this time until 
75:48:18 g.e.t. cycling of the computer on-off switch was requested by 
the spacecraft communicator and was indicated by short duration level 
shifts on the computer attitude error signals. This cycling had no 
effect on the computer dc voltages levels, and the computer words con-
tinued to appear satisfactory on telemetry. Prelaunch and catch-up 
mode switch positions were tried and the computer functioned normally 
in all modes tested. 
At 76:34:42 g.e.t., the power switch was again turned to ACME in 
an attempt to power down the computer and prevent spacecraft power 
drain. As before, the ACPU did not turn off the computer, and the com-
puter dc voltages went to a new regulation level, held for 10 seconds, 
then began to decay. During the decay interval, the computer continued 
to operate normally until the 27.2 volt dc reached 20 volts and the 
9.6 volt dc reached 7 volts. At that time (76:35:18 g.e.t.), the com-
puter running light turned off, the computer malfunction light came on, 
and the computer telemetry data terminated. The computer dc voltage 
levels observed at that time were well below the permissible low limits 
of 25.84 and 8.83 volts dc, and a memory modification ~as suspected. 
During the period from 77:09:22 g.e.t. to 77:10:50 g.e.t., the 
computer on-off sequence operated normally. The power switch was turned 
to IGS at 77:09:30 g.e.t. At 77:10:33 g.e.t. the computer was cycled 
down and a power up was then initiated using the computer on-off switch 
(77:10:37 g.e.t.). During these operations, all sequencing appeared 
normal. A memory modification was observed in the computer DAS data 
for this period evidenced by (1) improper flow tags were observed, and 
(2) time did not return to zero after the second turn on. An inter-
mittent connection is believed present in the IGS elements related to 
the computer on-off circuit. This includes the computer, the IGS power 
supply, the ACPU, and spacecraft switches and wiring. Intensive test-
ing is being performed on these elements. A verification of the com-
puter memory after recovery indicated a number of modified memory 
locations. It is concluded that this modification probably occurred at 
the second ACPU drain (76:35:18 g.e.t.) because of the low dc voltages. 
Modification of the memory during the first ACPU drain cannot be de-
finitely ruled out, although no modifications were revealed by examina-
tion of computer data in the interim p'eriod. 
Approximately 0.4 second after drogue parachute deployment and 
5 minutes 22 seconds prior to landing, a 12-amp current demand was 
placed on the spacecraft main dc power and lasted about 3 seconds 
(97:50:47.5 g.e.t. to 97:50:50.5 g.e.t.). At the start of this surge, 
the computer dc voltages dropped and the computer malfunction light 
went out. Testing of the IGS power supply ~s since isolated a short 
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circuit which would account for this shutdown. This malfunction does 
not resemble the one experienced in revolution 49, and is not believed 
to be related, although this possibility is not being overlooked. 
Failure analysis of the IGS power supply has revealed two transistors 
and a fuse that failed in the computer voltage section. All of these 
could have caused a large current drain on the power supply such as the 
one indicated. 
5.1.5.4.2 Horizon scan mode loss of control: During the mission, 
the horizon sensor system exhibited a number of loss of tracks due to 
the sun when a sunrise or sunset was within the field of view. 
This loss in track results in the control system pulsing the 
attitude control thrusters which may move the horizon from the field 
of view and result in loss of control. The likelihood of this occur-
rence depends on the attitudes of the vehicle at the time of the loss 
of track. 
5.1.6 Time Reference System 
Data indicate that the electronic timer started approximately 
16 milliseconds after lift-off and exhibited an elapsed time slow 
error of 1.162 seconds over the 4-day mission, which is well within 
specifications. 
The flight crew reported that retrofire time (TR) initiated by 
the electronic timer occurred 1 to 2 seconds early. This was based 
on observance of the TR-5 minute and TR-30 second lights and the ground 
countdown compared with the event timer and wrist watches. The flight 
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controller reported that TR was known to be at least 2 second early, but 
no correction was necessary. Postflight evaluation of the initiation of 
retrofire indic~tes that retrofire occurred approximately 1.3 seconds 
early. The planned time was 97:40:02 g.e.t. and the actual time was 
97:4~:0~70 g.e.t. 
Data received from the Landing and Recovery Division, MSC, indi-
cated that the right-hand G.m.t. and the left-hand g.e.t. clocks were 
indicating the same time when read on the carrier. The flight crew 
reported that the left-hand g.e.t. clock lost 4 to 5 seconds per day. 
The time-correlation buffer operated normally as indicated by the 
time track on the onboard voice tapes. 
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5.l.7 Electrical System 
The electrical power and sequential system performance was satis-
factory during the mission. The main bus voltages and currents were 
within the limits of specification and predictions. Real-time account-
ing of electrical power showed that throughout the mission there was 
sufficient power to meet the remaining mission requirements with a mar-
gin of approximately 300 to 400 ampere hours. During the mission, the 
reentry batteries tested low in several battery tests. Performance of 
these batteries was nominal from the time they were placed on the main 
bus (TR-5 minutes) until power shut-down after landing, which tends to 
confirm the supposition that the low test performance was due to the low 
battery temperatures (530 to 540 F). 
The major electrical-sequential spacecraft events and times of 
occurrences are tabulated in table 5.l-X. Three event parameters were 
not received via telemetry: equipment adapter separation (AD02), manual 
retrofire (AD06), and parachute jettison (AEl3). Sensor AD02 indicates 
a physical separation of l.5 inches at any two of the three sensor loca-
tions. At the same time, and by another set of contacts on the same 
relay, power is sent to light the ttadapter separation tt green telelight. 
Although the telemetry signal was not received, the telelight did light 
green verifying the action of the separation sensors. Reviewing the 
telemetry shows that several synchronization drop-outs at the ground 
station were occurring during the period from 97:39:54.3 to 
97:40:07.55 g.e.t. Event AD02 is just outside this region; therefore, 
its loss cannot be explained in this manner, but event AD06 does occur 
during this period and could have been part of the loss of data due to 
the synchronization problems. AEl3 was not recorded because it is an 
on-the-water function, and the telemetry system had been turned off prior 
to the reported AEl3 event time. 
In GT-3, during the equipment-adapter separation sequence, several 
fusistors were blown as a result of slag formation in the cartridges 
during firing, which caused an electrical short circuit to the case of 
the pyro. A similar reaction occurred in Gemini IV during the equipment-
adapter separation sequence, the retroadapter separation sequence, drogue 
parachute deployment, and parachute jettison. Table 5.l-XI identifies 
the blown fusistors. The squib batteries handled the added current very 
well with a transient minimum bus voltage of 20.75 volts. 
The inertial guidance system (IGS) fuse block was recorded as dry 
during the postmission inspection. A special effort was made to insure 
that this fuse block did not leak because the fuses it contains were 
connected directly to the main bus. Leakage of salt water into this 
block would .drain electrical recovery power. Other fuse blocks did leak 
salt water, but it is of little consequence since the sequential busses 
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to which they were connected were not armed when the spacecraft was in 
the water. 
5.1.8 Spacecraft Propulsion Systems 
5.1.8.1 Orbital attitude and maneuver systems.-
5.1.8.1.1 Preflight: Propellant servicing of the orbital attitude 
maneuver system (OAMS) occurred on May 3 and 4, 1965. The loaded fuel 
and oxidizer quantities were 164.5 and 245.9 pounds, respectively. A 
helium pressurant loading of 3155 psi at 85° F was accomplished on 
May 25, 1965. At approximately T-15 minutes the OAMS was activated, and 
all attitude thrusters were static fired to confirm system operation. 
5.1.8.1.2 Performance: All measured pressures and temperatures 
examined were satisfactory throughout the flight. Also, satisfactory 
system performance was reported by the flight crew. However, postflight 
examination of the flight data indicated that the performance of one of 
the aft-firing thrusters was variable during the course of the mission. 
This apparent anomaly is discussed in subsequent paragraphs. 
Tables 4-IV and 4-v list the maneuver thrust chamber assembly (TCA) 
duty cycles during the first revolution. This usage, plus system tests 
during revolutions 45 and 62 and the retromaneuver, constitutes the total 
maneuver TCA activity during the flight. 
5.1.8.1.3 Propellant utilization: In the first revolution, ap-
proximately 140 pounds of propellant were consumed while attempting 
station keeping with the launch vehicle's second stage. During the 
period between the first revolution and the OAMS retroburn, 57 pounds 
of propellant were consumed. The retromaneuver consumed 110 pounds, 
and subsequently 5 pounds were utilized. Twenty-five pounds of usable 
propellant, exclusive of gaging system inaccuracy contingencies, were 
computed to have remained within the system at equipment adapter sepa-
ration. The remaining propellant was unusable, either entrapped within 
the system or in the form of excessive oxidizer loaded for system re-
quirements. (The mixture ratio of the maneuver TCA's was a nominal 
1.6, whereas the attitude TeA's mixture ratio was a nominal 0.7, thus 
using considerably less oxidizer per pound of fuel.) 
5.1.8.1.4 Aft TCA anomaly: Calculation of the aft-firing thruster 
acceleration during station keeping, using DAB accelerometer pulse counts 
and thruster-on times as plotted in figure 5.1-18, shows that the accel-
eration dropped approximately 50 percent at 01:04:00 g.e.t. and indicates 
that one aft-firing TCA was inoperative. 
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The aft-firing TeA's (9 and 10) functioned normally until 
00:55:55 g.e.t. Pitch-up TeA's 1 and 2 fired as required to compensate 
for the pitch-down unbalance torque of approximately 16 ft-lb caused by 
the center-of-gravity offset and thruster misalinements. At 
01:04:29 g.e.t. TeA's 9 and 10 were commanded, but a pitch-up unbalance 
torque of approximately 5 ft-lb above the control limits was detected 
using the pitch-rate gyro signal. This indicates that the OAMS attitude 
thrust levels were at the low end of the perceptible tolerance range. 
Pitch-down TeA's 1 and 2 fired throughout the forward-thrust maneuver 
indicating a large pitch-up unbalance torque. Maximum torques from the 
pitch-down TeA's (1 and 2) and the aft-firing TeA (10) are calculated 
to be -334 and +340 ft-lb, respectively. This difference of +6 ft-lb 
agrees well with +5 ft-lb seen in the pitch-rate signal and implies that 
TeA 9 did not fire. This condition existed for the next 12 forward-
thrust maneuvers but appeared to change during the 13th firing at 
01:13:37 g.e.t., and during subsequent forward maneuvers when the un-
balance conditions decreased slightly. An explanation for this slight 
change in thrust is that propellant utilized during this phase of the 
mission shifted the center of gravity sufficiently to change the balance 
between the control and disturbance torques. No evidenee of this mal-
function of TeA 9 could be detected during the preretrofire OAMS maneuver 
during which the control system functioned normally. 
The effect of the TeA 9 apparent failure is presented in figure 4-8. 
When TeA 9 apparently failed, the spacecraft axial acceleration wasre-
duced and a pitch-up moment was introduced by the remaining aft-firing 
complementing thruster TeA 10. Since the attitude control was in the 
rate-command mode during this period, the reacting thrusters were acti-
vated to null the pitching moment. However, a force of 58 pounds, 
normal to the spacecraft X-axis, was introduced by the attitude thrusters. 
Because the spacecraft was oriented in a generally nose-down and rolled 
attitude during the thrusting period, the most significant effect was on 
6Vy (up-down, spacecraft axial direction), with the ReS coupling effect 
appearing on 6VZ (right-left, out-of-plane direction). From 
01:04:29 g.e.t., the time at which TeA 9 apparently malfunctioned, until 
the end of thrusting at 01:26:45 g.e.t., a 6Vy of 54.4 ft/sec was added 
in the down direction as opposed to an expected 6Vy of 87.5 ft/sec ob-
tained by using the available thruster on-off times. During the same 
period, a 6VZ of 7.5 ft/sec was added as opposed to an expected 6VZ of 
10 ft/sec in the opposite direction. In both cases, the differences 
are shown to be diverging, starting with the aft-firing thrust at 
01:04:29 g.e.t. 
Thus the flight crew experienced a relative in-plane line-of- sight 
6V of 33 ft/sec less than expected and relative out-of-plane 6V of 
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7.5 ft/sec during station-keeping period, complicating the task. 
lVI's had been used during the period of thrusting, an indication 
thruster malfunction would have been given to the flight crew. 
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During the OAME retromaneuver, the thrust of the aft TCA's using 
the predelivery acceptance test data and spacecraft OAME propellant 
temperatures and pressures measured in flight was determined to be 
95 pounds for TCA's 9 and lO. In section 4.3.l it is stated that an 
average thrust of 98 pounds was determined to be necessary to fit the 
OAME preretro translation maneuver to the actual trajectory and known 
landing point. This indicates that not only were both aft-firing 
thrusters operating, but they were producing thrust in excess of that 
expected. In order for the TCA's to have produced this thrust along the 
spacecraft Z-axis, a regulated pressure of 319 psia would have had to 
exist instead of the indicated 303 psia. Although this error is within 
the overall accuracy of the instrumentation, it is not considered likely 
to have occurred. A small gradual shift of +6 psi in regulated pressure 
was noted throughout the mission from the initial revolution. This 
shift increased the regulated pressure to 306 ± 2 psia. 
This type of anomaly, in which TCA operation varied from little or 
no thrust to excess thrust, has never been encountered in the extensive 
ground test program for these TCA's. Such a malfunction can only be 
attributed to interrupted propellant flow. 
The most likely cause of interrupted propellant flow is that of 
failure to apply voltage across one or both propellant valves. Con-
sidering the design of the OAMS and analyzing the telemetered discrete 
data taken in flight leads to the conclusion that this could only have 
been a break in the continuous positive power source to the valves or 
an open wire in the circuitry to the negative spacecraft power source. 
In the Gemini system, ACME switches the negative side of all four aft-
thruster valves (two in each thruster) at a common point, and because 
one aft thruster fired during this period, 'ACME can be eliminated as a 
source of this problem. Divided wiring in the adapter from the common 
switched point to each thruster cannot be eliminated as a source of the 
problem but since the adapter was separated and destroyed during reentry, 
it cannot be checked. The power wiring (positive) and circuit breakers 
in the reentry vehicle were checked after the flight and intermittent 
operation could not be induced or detected. However, power could have 
been inadvertently interrupted by an open circuit breaker. Although 
some circuit breakers were inadvertently operated by the crew during 
the mission, and this could explain the apparent malfunction, no data 
were taken on circuit-breaker operation; therefore, this possibility 
cannot be checked. 
Incomplete valve actuation, contamination, or oxidizer flow-decay 
are other possible causes which might have decreased the TCA propellant 
UNCLASSIFIED 
5-32 UNCLASSIFIED 
flow. Partial valve actuation has never been encountered in ground 
testing. Contamination in the calibration orifice is not a very likely 
cause since the thrust subsequently returned to normal and remained 
satisfactory during the 160-second preretrofire maneuver. However, the 
possibility that any contamination later flushed through an orifice 
cannot be discounted. Similar arguments apply to contamination within 
the injector. Oxidizer flow decay has been experienced in tests con-
ducted by the manufacturer. However, environments to which the space-
craft systems were exposed at this time in the mission were not the same 
as those required to produce decay at the vendor. Propellant line or 
valve freeze-up would halt flow to the chamber, but would not likely 
occur in the first revolution of the flight. 
From the information and data available to the Mission Evaluation 
Team, it therefore appears impossible at this time to explain or re-
solve the apparently anom:tlous behavior of this system. 
5.1.8.1.5 System tests: During revolution 45, TCA 8 was turned 
off, and an alternating yaw-roll maneuver was executed for an elapsed 
time of 26 seconds. The crew reported no difficulty with holding 
attitude during this maneuver. 
The remaining maneuver TCA activity, exclusive of the first and 
last revolutions, occurred during revolution 44 in support of an horizon 
sensor check. For this check the forward TCAl s were burned for 1.1 sec-
onds. 
5.1.8.2 Reentry control system.-
5.1.8.2.1 Preactivation: Fuel servicing of the A and B rings was 
completed May 3, 1965, with respective loadings of 15.86 and 16.0 pounds. 
Final oxidizer servicing of 20.2 and 20.26 pounds in the A and Brings, 
respectively, was completed on May 21, 1965. Both source pressure tanks 
were serviced with 3080 psig at 7sP F on May 25, 1965. 
Operationally, this mission differed from previous ones in-that 
neither system was activated until required for reentry during the last 
revolution. System temperatures and pressures monitored throughout the 
mission were satisfactory. The TCA solenoids did cool sufficiently to 
trip the heater thermostats at an elapsed time of about 63 hours 40 min-
utes. The temperature stayed within the thermostat limits of 4oPto 
50P F for approximately 1 hour. 
5.1.8.2.2 Performance: Activation of the reentry control system 
(RCS) A and B rings was accomplished by the crew between 96:34:00 g.e.t. 
and 96:35:00 g.e.t. During system checkout~ all measured performance 
parameters appeared normal. However, the crew noted, during pitch-up 
test firings in the rate command mode, that a yaw-right thruster was 
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also firing, which indicated that at least one pitch-up thruster was 
not firing and the resultant yaw-roll coupling was being corrected. 
Because the crew thought they observed this irregularity on both rings 
A and B but could not detect it in direct control mode, it was assumed 
that all TCAls were operating satisfactorily. The detection and effect 
on spacecraft control of the TCA nonoperative condition is discussed in 
sections 5,.1.5.3.2 and 5.1.5.3.4. Results of the failure analysis con-
ducted are discussed in section 5.1.8.2.3 which also presents preflight 
RCS verification tests. 
Even with one TCA inoperative, the RCS fulfilled basic mission re-
quirements. Final alinement of the spacecraft for retrofiring was 
achieved and held during all four retrorocket firings. TCA duty cycles, 
computed over 10-second time intervals, varied from 10 percent to a 
maximum of 45 percent during retrofire. Propellant depletion appears to 
have occurred unexpectedly sometime during or immediately after deploy-
ment of the drogue parachute. During deservicing, it was not possible 
to remove propellant from any of the four RCS tanks. Figure 5.1-13 
presents a history of propellant consumed during reentry. The overall 
error of these computations is estimated to be a maximum of ±3 pounds. 
The curve points out a significant demand prior to equipment sec-
tion separation. Use of the OAME for attitude control during this time 
would have saved a total of 10 pounds, or 16 percent, of the RCS pro-
pellant. This quantity is commensurate with the TCA activity. For 
attitude control during retrofire approximately 1.6 pounds were utilized. 
Examination of consumption rates derived from this curve shows that the 
yaw left TCAls fired almost continuously over the 130-second interval 
between 97:48:14 g.e.t. and 97:50:22 g.e.t. Summation of TCA discreets 
indicated approximately 110 seconds of TCA burn time in this interval. 
This time and nominal TCA propellant flow rates were used to calculate 
propellant consumption. This results in a close correlation with pro-
pellant quantity depletion calculations made by using measured tank 
pressures and temperatures. 
The precise time of depletion is difficult to establish because of 
inherent inaccuracies in the gaging system computations. At least some 
propellant was available during drogue parachute deployment because the 
crew reported hearing TCAl s fire and tail off immediately after the 
motor-operated shut-off valves were closed at approximately 20 000 feet. 
5.1.8.2.3 Pitch TCA failure: The results of a failure analysis 
conducted have revealed an open circuit in a connector between the 
attitude control and maneuver electronics (ACME) and the TCA 5 solenoid. 
The cause of the failure has been established as a broken wire in a 
connector. Subsequent postflight valve simultaneity and flow checks 
have verified proper operation of all TCAl s of both rings. Final sys-
tems checks prior to launch verified continuity of the circuits involved, 
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During a prelaunch test, the ACME-TCA electrical connection was inter-
rupted for TCA simultaneity checks. No discrepancies were reported 
with either ring; however, because of the location in this circuit of 
the connector that failed, none should have been encountered in this 
test. The connection was reestablished and verified during a later 
prelaunch test. In this test, all TCA solenoid valves were actuated 
by using the spacecraft hand controller. Oxidizer-valve and fuel-valve 
actuations were individually verified by sup~lying gaseous nitrogen to 
the fuel side during one phase of testin~~o-the oxidizer side during 
another phase. All TCA valves operated ~tisfactorily, and no electri-
cal connections were opened subsequent to this test. The above testing 
provided a satisfactory end-to-end functional verification check of the 
attitude control, electrical, and propulsion system9(involved in the 
subsequent flight failure. 
5.1.8.3 Retrograde rocket system.- At 97:40:00.7 g.e.t. ignition 
of retrorocket number 1 occurred, followed by the remaining motors in 
the normal firing sequence. Motor total burn times appeared nominal 
for the case temperatures encountered. One motor case temperature was 
measured, and it stabilized at approximately 4jP F after 27 revolutions. 
The actual imparted spacecraft velocity decrement of 333.5 ft/sec com-
pares well with the preflight estimate of 336.3 ft/sec. 
5.1.9 Pyrotechnic System 
On the basis of the successful mission and all available data con-
cerning events related to it, it may be deduced that the pyrotechnic 
system performed all required functions in a satisfactory manner. 
Because they have not yet been fully qualified for missions of 
longer than 4-days duration, a postflight evaluation of the ejection 
seat ballute deploy-release and the drogue mortar aneroid mechanisms 
was conducted. All four of these devices functioned within design 
limits. The test results are listed in the following table: 
EOt<t FIBEtqTIAt:= 
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Arming Design firing Firing altitude, 
Nomenclature force, altitude, ft 
Ib ft Test Test Test 
1 2 3 
Right-hand drogue aneroid 55 5700 ± 600 5100 5375 5350 
Left-hand drogue aneroid 58 5700 ± 600 5750 6000 5950 
Right-hand ballute aneroid 55 7500 ± 700 8250 7375 8000 
Left-hand ballute aneroid 53 7500 ± 700 7000 6975 6875 I 
When the aneroid mechanisms were disassembled, corrosion was found 
on the blocking arms. This corrosion was a result of inadequate pro-
tection and can result in failure of the automatic feature of the aneroid. 
During postflight removal of the mild detonating fuse (MDF) inter-
connect from the MDF manifold assembly on the right-hand ejection seat, 
the end of the interconnect was found to be loose. Visual inspection 
of the part did not indicate any damage. The MDF interconnect is being 
examined in an attempt to determine the cause and will be subsequently 
fired to determine if any performance degradation occurred. 
The right-hand hatch actuator rod was galled and was dispositioned 
for failure analysis. 
Simultaneously with retroadapter separation, the horizon sensors 
were jettisoned. The horizon sensor head was sighted by the pilot 
through the command pilot's window immediately following the jettison 
sequence. He reported this sighting at the time on the voice tape and 
identified the object as the "pump package." Subsequently, during a 
crew consultation the object was positively identified by the pilot as 
the horizon sensor head. During the GT-3 misSion, the pilot reported 
this same sighting to have occurred at the same relative mission time 
(immediately after retroadapter separation). The GT-3 pilot's descrip-
tion of the object fits the horizon sensor head more accurately than 
the pump package. 
5.1.10 Crew Station Furnishings and Equipment 
5.1.10.1 Crew station design and layout.- The overall design of 
the crew station was satisfactory for the Gemini IV mission. The prin-
cipal new requirements for the crew station in this mission were 
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concerned with extravehicular egress and ingress, stowage of a large 
quantity of onboard equipment, and long-duration habitability. The 
flight crew accomplished these requirements successfully; however, they 
encountered the anomalies discussed in the following paragraphs. 
5.1.10.1.1 Extravehicular egress and ingress: The crew station 
and the equipment provided for the extravehicular activity (EVA) were 
entirely adequate for the steps leading to the pilot1s egress from the 
spacecraft. There were no anomalies encountered during the important 
preparatory phases of this operation. After the EVA, which is described 
in detail in section 7.1.2, the pilot had considerable difficulty in 
closing the hatch. This problem is covered in section 5.1.1. All other 
operations relating to the ingress such as removal of mounting fittings 
and keeping the hatch area clear of the umbilical, the lanyards and 
other equipment during hatch closure were satisfactorily accomplished. 
5.1.10.1.2 Stowage utilization: During the 4-day mission, the 
EVA and the large number of experiments dictated that all available 
stowage volume in the crew station be utilized. (See table 3-111 and 
figure 3-15 for the launch stowage configuration.) It was planned to 
discard the EVA equipment early in the flight and to stow all wet waste 
in the right-aft stowage container, all loose equipment except photo-
graphic film in the left-aft container, and all film packs in the center 
container for reentry. This plan was carried out, except that the ~ 
bilical bag was retained because the crew elected not to jettison the 
EVA equipment in orbit. This large bag with the umbilical and other 
miscellaneous items was stowed in the pilot1s foot well in orbit and 
during reentry. The flight crew indicated that the stowage concept using 
pouches attached to stowage lanyards with removable fasteners was a satis-
factory design for the aft stowage boxes. The pilot also was able to 
use the side food box extension for orbital stowage. Dry trash was either 
stowed there or in the dry storage bags attached by velcro to the walls 
in the foot wells. 
In orbit, nearly all the loose items were taken out of the boxes 
and attached to the walls with velcro. For this reason, SUbstantial 
preparation time was required prior to reentry to stow all this equip-
ment. No difficulty was encountered except with the umbilical bag. 
5.1.10.1.3 Long duration habitability: The mission results indi-
cate that the crew station was habitable for 4 days without significant 
adverse effects on the flight crew. During the first part of the mission, 
the cabin epvironment prevented the flight crew from sleeping adequately. 
There were traces of ammonia fumes in the cockpit during the first day, 
possibly caused by the absorbent lining on the cabin walls. The pilot 
had trouble sleeping because he was uncomfortably warm. The communica-
tion volume could not be turned low enough to eliminate all sound in the 
earphones. The noise of the attitude thrusters kept the flight crew 
from sleeping during the orbital attitude and maneuver system (OAMS) 
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operation. The noise and pressure change associated with venting cabin 
pressure through the cabin vent valve was disturbing to the flight crew 
when they were asleep. 
All of these problems were corrected by changes in equipment utili-
zation or changes in procedures. The ammonia fumes apparently decreased 
in intensity. The flight crew operated both suit compressors together 
while the pilot was asleep to increase suit cooling. The pilot also 
kept his visor open while asleep. The communications noise was elimin-
ated by disconnecting the space suit communications harness at the neck 
ring on the sleeping crew member. Each crew member attempted to minimize 
attitude thruster usage and cabin vent valve operation while the other 
crew member was asleep. These changes in equipment utilization coupled 
with flight-plan variations enabled the flight crew to sleep and operate 
satisfactorily for the remainder of the mission. 
5.1.10.1.4 Crew furnishings: The ejection seats were not used in 
this mission except for support and restraint for the flight crew. The 
flight crew had no comfort problems during the prelaunch hold for 1 hour 
15 minutes after flight crew ingress. After insertion into orbit, the 
pilot had great difficulty installing the drogue parachute mortar safety 
pins on the right seat. This difficulty was caused by the poor visibil-
ity and access to the pins, the small size of the pins, and the internal 
design of the mechanism in which the safety pins were inserted. A simi-
lar difficulty was encountered when the same safety pins were to be in-
stalled after landing. The flight crew also reported that the hoses 
from the seat to the space suit were not long enough for complete mo-
bility within the cabin. This length was apparently a problem only when 
the pilot was attempting to install the drogue parachute safety pins. 
5.1.10.1.5 Cabin lighting: The flight crew reported that the cabin 
lighting was satisfactory for the instrument panels, acceptable for the 
circuit-breaker panels, and poor for the water-management panel. The 
utility lights were not bright enough to be useful even with the clear 
lenses .. Consequently, there was no satisfactory means of illuminating 
the water tank between the seats. 
The flight crew also reported that when the sun was shining into 
the window on either side of the spacecraft, the pilot on that s~de was 
not able to see the instruments readily. This condition was noticed on 
launch as well as in orbit. The extra bright center light was not bright 
enough to counteract the effect of the sunlight. 
5.1.10.1.6 Parachute suspension single-point release: The problem 
encountered in the GT-3 mission in which the command pilot broke his 
visor on the window frame at single point release was satisfactorily re-
solved for the Gemini IV mission. The pilots held their arms in front 
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of their heads at the time of bridle release. No impact with the window 
frame or other adverse effect occurred. 
5.l.l0.2 Controls and displays.-
5.l.l0.2.l Flight controls: The attitude and the maneuver hand 
controls operated satisfactorily throughout the flight. 
5.l.l0.2.2 Non-flight controls: The range of volume control of 
the communications system was inadequate. It was impossible to turn 
the volume all the way down; and for launch, it was necessary for the 
command pilot to use nearly full volume. In the absence of a control 
to turn off the audio inputs to the space suit headsets, the flight 
crew disconnected their headsets when they wanted to sleep. 
The controls for the voice tape recorder were reported by the 
flight crew to be inadequate. The location of the recorder on-off con-
trol on the voice control center (VCC) audio-mode-selector switches pre-
cluded use of the recorder when both crew members were set to transmit 
normally to the ground. Conversely, if either audio s~lector was set 
to record, the crew member on that side of the spacecraft was unable to 
transmit to the ground. 
5.l.l0.2.3 Displays: All displays in the crew station functioned 
normally during the mission. The command pilot reported that the decals 
on the face of the launch vehicle propellant tank pressure indicators 
were difficult to read. The parallax associated with the overlay decals 
on the face was objectionable, and the decals tended to cover the needles 
at the lower end of the meter scales. 
The flight-plan roller display on the center instrument panel was 
not used as intended during the mission. The flight crew indicated that 
it did not provide any useful information, particularly in view of the 
change in flight plan soon after launch. All flight-plan information 
was obtained from the flight-data books and cards or from the flight 
director in the case of changes. 
The readability of the right-hand G.m.t. clock was reported as un-
satisfactory as on the previous flight. Conversely, the readability of 
the new left-hand G.m.t. clock was reported as good. 
The flight crew stated that the lack of a legible elapsed time in-
dicator to read mission elapsed time continuously through the mission 
was a serious shortcoming., Throughout the mission, there was constant 
confusion between G.m.t. and g.e.t. All preflight planning data pro-
vided to the flight crew were, by necessity" based on elapsed time. The 
lack of an elapsed time indicator and the poor readability of the G.m.t. 
clock required the crew to use wrist watches to keep track of both g.e.t. 
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and G.m.t. As a result there were six clocks used in the spacecraft, 
in addition to the event timer and the time reference system which is 
not displayed to the crew. 
There was no display in the cockpit to indicate the amount of 
drinking water remaining in the adapter supply nor was this information 
relayed to the flight controllers. Consequently, there was no means of 
keeping track of water consumption, other than by counting swallows. 
The poor illumination of the cabin water tank contributed to the problem. 
The altimeter indicated -100 feet at landing impact. This error 
was attributed to the fact that the altimeter was not reset for the sea-
level barometric pressure in the recovery area. 
The warning light on the voice tape recorder was difficult to see 
because of its location outboard of the pilot's right arm rest. This 
particular area was used occasionally for temporary stowage of loose 
equipment which covered the light. When the pilot was asleep, this 
light was frequently blocked from the command pilot's view. As a re-
sult, the crew frequently failed to realize when a voice tape cartridge 
was expended. 
5.1.10.3 Space suits and accessories.-
5.1.10.3.1 Basic space suit: The basic G4C space suit gave ex-
cellent performance during the normal and EVA phases of the mission. 
The flight crew reported that the space suits were free from pressure 
pOints, except that length between the knee and the heel of the pilot's 
suit was slightly short, and the command pilot's helmet innerliner rubbed 
the sides of his head. The remaining comfort aspects were satisfactory. 
The mobility of the flight crew in their suits was adequate in both the 
unpressurized and the pressurized condition. 
Postflight inspection of the two suits showed leakage values to be 
well within normal limits. This shows that there were no meteoroid im-
pacts of sufficient energy to affect the suit integrity. Additional 
tests for detecting meteoroid damage, if any, will be conducted in an 
attempt to map the impact zones and determine penetration depths. 
Some corrosion of the main zippers was noted in the crotch area of 
both suits after the flight. This corrosion is attributed to exposure 
to urine. There was no effect on the structural integrity of the zippers. 
The rubberized fabric wrist dams were used extensively throughout 
the flight to maintain arm ventilation with the gloves removed. These 
wrist dams were satisfactory for this purpose, and no difficulties were 
experienced in using them. 
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The finger-tip lights on the command pilot's suit were unsatisfac-
tory. Several of the lights were damaged, one light on the right hand 
burned out during the mission, and the switch on the left hand was in-
termittent. The pilot had newer finger-tip lights which incorporated a 
protective cover on each bulb. These lights worked well throughout the 
flight. The pilot's finger-tip lights were relocated to the vicinity of 
the first finger joint prior to the flight in an attempt to protect the 
lights from damage. This position caused discomfort on the finger jOints; 
therefore, the preferred position for these lights is between the finger 
tip and the first joint and proper protection must be provided. 
The blood-pressure port in the command pilot's suit would not re-
tain the blood-pressure bulb properly throughout the flight. Inspection 
after the flight revealed that the retention ring within the port was 
worn and deformed. Postflight testing also confirmed the inflight 
problem. The plugs for the blood-pressure ports on both suits were re-
moved prior to flight because of concern over trapped pressure inside 
the cuffs during EVA. This omission did not compromise the suit integ-
rity since the blood-pressure cuff was sealed inside the suit. In ad-
dition, the suits were ~ualified for sudden decompression with the plugs 
removed. 
Both pilots scratched their helmet visors extensively during the 
flight. This was partly due to the susceptibility of the plexiglass 
visor to scratching, as well as to rough edges in the spacecraft. 
5.1.10.3.2 EVA accessories: The addition of the extravehicular 
cover layer worn by the pilot necessarily caused his mobility to be 
somewhat less than the command pilot's. When the pilot removed the EVA 
cover layer sleeves, his comfort and arm mobility were improved. 
The pilot also reported that he was uncomfortably warm throughout 
the mission. Since the command pilot was comfortable and both space 
suits fit well, the EVA cover layer, more strenuous activities, and dif-
ferences in individual responses to environment probably contributed to 
making the pilot too warm. Checks of the pressure drop in both puits 
had been made shortly before the mission and were found to be essentially 
identical. 
The overvisors were difficult to raise and lower, and the sun visor 
occasionally slipped to the back of the helmet and rode against the 
headrest. The use of two overvisors added to the bulk of the helmet and 
complicated the visor operation. The overvisors were discarded in orbit 
at the time of ingress from EVA. 
The two-piece thermal gloves having zippers in the hand pieces were 
removed and donned readily over the pressurized suit gloves. The pilot 
removed the thermal gloves when manipulating thenatch, the umbilical 
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guide, the external camera on its mount, and the maneuvering unit. At 
no time during the EVA did the pilot find it necessary to hold on to the 
external surface 9f the spacecraft for more than a few seconds. He did 
not notice any indication of extreme surface temperatures, either hot 
or cold. The thermal gloves were satisfactory; however, the need for 
these gloves is under study. 
5.1.10.3.3 Miscellaneous accessories: The microdot connectors 
used to connect the electrical and communication cables to the space 
suit were superior to the connectors previously used. The alinement 
marks on the connectors were not clearly visible. 
The visor cover was useful in covering the eyes of the crew members 
when they were trying to sleep; however, the visor cover used on this 
mission was not sufficiently opaque. 
5.1.10.4 Extravehicular equipment.-
5.1.10.4.1 Ventilation control module (VCM): Stowage and opera-
tion of the VCM for the extravehicular excursion were satisfactory. The 
pilot was able to unstow and attach the VCM without difficulty. While 
attached to the space suit, the VCM maintained the suit outlet pressure 
at 4.2 psia in the vacuum environment. The flow rate of 8.2 lb/hr was 
adequate for all normal EVA tasks at low work level. This flow rate 
did not keep the pilot cool during peak work levels, such as those which 
occurred while mounting the external camera, and during ingress. The 
command pilot observed that the pilot was perspiring profusely during 
and after EVA ingress. 
The VCM restraint straps were satisfactory for holding the VCM in 
place on the pilot's chest during EVA. During hatch operation, the VCM 
straps were easily detached to permit moving the VCM out of the way of 
the hatch handle. 
5.1.10.4.2 EVA umbilical: Removal from stowage and use of the 
umbilical during EVA were satisfactory. No problems were encountered 
in attaching the umbilical to the spacecraft or to the space suit con-
nections. The design of the umbilical stowage bag was satisfactory, 
except that the bag and the strings were occasionally in the pilot's way. 
The umbilical was sufficiently flexible so that no torque or other un-
desirable force was imposed on the extravehicular pilot. Communications 
and bioinstrumentation were adequate using the umbilical. During ingress, 
the crew was able to pull the umbilical back into the cabin without diffi-
culty. Subsequent stowage in the umbilical bag was satisfactory except 
that the crew was unable to stow the umbilical and bag in the aft stow-
age container. 
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5.l.l0.4.3 Umbilical guide: The umbilical guide was difficult to 
install on the hatch sill because the operation required the pilot to 
manipulate a small pip pin. After several attempts, the pilot was suc-
cessful in mounting the guide. During the remainder of the EVA, it re-
mained in place and retained the umbilical satisfactorily. During 
ingress, the pilot removed the guide and discarded it in orbit. 
The pilot reported that having the umbilical attached to the guide 
on the hatch sill made it difficult for him to maintain a position in 
front of the spacecraft when controlling himself with the umbilical. 
The lack of an additional umbilical attachment on the nose of the space-
craft allowed the pilot to swing back to the adapter section occasionally. 
This situation was aggravated by the lack of handholds on any surface of 
the spacecraft except the open hatch. 
5.l.l0.4.4 Maneuvering unit: The hand-held maneuvering unit pro-
'Tided the pilot with an effective means of controlling his position and 
attitude while outside the spacecraft. Because of the limited duration 
of the propellant gas supply, the pilot was able to maneuver only about 
4 minutes. During this time, he used the maneuvering unit for trans-
lation and stopping, for pitch and yaw maneuvers, and for stabilizing 
his attitude. He had no apparent difficulties in using the unit during 
the evaluation period. The 2-pound thrust level gave satisfactory con-
trol response when using the unit in the pulse mode. 
The 35-mm camera mounted on the forward end of the maneuvering 
unit was difficult to operate because of its location. The position 
of the camera made it difficult to aim. In addition, the added bulk of 
the maneuvering unit made it more difficult to handle the camera. 
5.l.l0.4.5 Hatch-closing lanyard: The hatch-closing lanyard was 
satisfactory for stowage and for installation prior to EVA egress. When 
the hatch was opened, the lanyard limited the initial hatch opening 
travel properly. During ingress and hatch closure, the flight crew were 
required to subject this device to loads which they considered high com-
pared with those imposed in training exercises. 
5.l.l0.5 Pilots' operational equivment.-
5.l.l0.5.l Still camera: The 70-mm still camera was used to ob-
tain excellent photographs of the pilot during EVA from inside the 
spacecraft. One of the later 70-mm film packages for this camera failed 
to take up film properly. On this film package, only lO out of 60 pic-
tures were usable. 
5.l.l0.5.2 Sequence camera (l6-mm); The l6-mm camera mounted ex-
ternal to the spacecraft during EVA functioned normally for the duration 
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of the film magazine. The pictures taken with this camera using a 5-mm 
wide-angle (160°) lens gave excellent coverage of the pilot's initial 
EVA. 
The other 16-mm camera was intermittent during the EVA and occa-
sionally thereafter. Postflight investigation failed to identify the 
exact cause of the problem; however, a switch failure is suspected. 
Replacement of the switch and the switch actuator is planned before the 
camera is reused. 
One 16-mm film pack had a slipping clutch, and no pictures were 
obtained from this pack. 
5.1.10.5.3 Photo event indicator: The photo' event indicator mal-
functioned fre~uently when it was being used with the 70-mm still camera. 
It is believed that the cable fitting on the camera was too tight and 
interfered with the shutter operation. 
5.1.10.5.4 Lightweight headset: Both crew members reported that 
the lightweight headset was unsatisfactory because of improper fit and 
resulting continuous need for adjustment. 
5.1.10.5.5 Optical sight: The light intensity of the optical 
sight was found to be inade~uate against a cloud background. The ground-
tracking exercises on this mission demonstrated the need to be able to 
see the reticle against any earth or cloud background for tracking 
continuity. 
5.1.10.5.6 Flight data books: The flight data books tended to 
come apart with use. The snap rings holding the pages together came 
unfastened several times. The pages also tended to tear loose from the 
rings because they were made from lightweight paper. 
5.1.10.6 Pilots' personal e~uipment.-
5.1.10.6.1 Food: Thirty-one of the thirty-two meals carried on 
the spacecraft were consumed by the flight crew. They reported that the 
rehydratable and the bite-size food items were palatable and provided a 
varied diet. The flight crew considered the food to be one of the most 
important parts of the flight. 
Eleven out of seventy rehydratable food bags leaked around the 
valves in the bags. Most of the bags that leaked contained orange drink. 
This leakage was unsatisfactory, although the crew managed to consume 
the contents of these bags in spite of the leaks. 
Toast was included in several of the meals. The records revealed 
that the vendor had made the toast from the wrong type of bread. The 
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toast was tested before the flight and found to be susceptible to crum-
bling, but the flight food had been packed. The flight crew was briefed 
before the flight to avoid the toast if there were any indication of 
crumbling; therefore, the crew did not open the toast. The only other 
items which crumbled were the peanut bars. 
Very few meats were included in the menu because of previous prob-
lems of leakage with meat items. The crew commented that the bacon bites 
were exceptionally tasty and indicated that the inclusion of more meat 
items was desirable. 
5.l.l0.6.2 Drinking water dispenser: The water dispenser operated 
satisfactorily at the first of the flight, but later, the manually op-
erated plunger valve stuck open. The flight crew had to pull the handle 
back to close the valve. This problem has been noted in several other 
spacecraft recently, and it is attributed to bending of the probe of the 
dispenser which caused the plunger to bind. The cause of bent probes 
is being investigated at this time. 
The water dispenser hose was reported to have been deteriorated and 
susceptible to kinking. These discrepancies are also being investigated. 
5.l.l0. 6.3 Urine coJ_lection device (UCD): 
by the crew inside their suits during the launch 
EVA. The UCD's were then removed from the suits 
urine transport system without incident. 
The UCD's were worn 
phase and until after 
and dumped through the 
5.l.l0.6.4 Urine transport system: The urine system was used 
approximately l4 times. Noticeable urine spillage occurred during these 
periods of use, although the crew controlled this spillage effectively 
by means of the hygiene towels and tissue. No free urine was allowed to 
remain in the cabin. 
The urine spillage was caused by inade~uate sealing at the entrance 
to the urine receiver. The problems with sealing relate to individual 
procedures as well as inherent design limitations. Sufficient ~nforma­
tion was gained from this flight to identify the problem clearly. A 
design investigation is being initiated to improve the sealing at the 
receiver entrance. 
5.l.l0.6.5 Defecation device: The defecation bags were used 
effectively by the crew on six occasions during the flight. Although 
they described the operation as difficult, both pilots were able to 
accomplish defecation without contaminating the suits, underwear, or 
~pacecraft. The germicide was added to the bags without difficulty and 
the subse~uent sealing and stowage were satisfactory. 
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The one-sided paper provided with the defecation bags was unsatis-
factory. The crew used the hygiene tissues in preference to the paper 
provided. 
5.l.l0.6.6 Personal hygiene iteIDB: The wet pads packed with the 
food were very useful for hygiene purposes. The two large hygiene 
towels were used primarily to control urine spillage. The tissues were 
found to b~ very useful for utility as well as hygiene purposes. The 
tissue dispenser zippers failed early iri the flight; however, the dis-
penser design was otherwise good. In the postflight debriefing, the 
flight crew indicated that their 4-day growth of beard caused no signif-
icant discomfort. There was no indication of any need for a shaver. 
5.l.l0.6.7 Oral hygiene items: The oral hygiene chewing gum was 
used infre~uently. One tooth brush was lost the first day, and the other 
was not used. The low utilization of these iteIDB did not have any no-
ticeable effect on the crew. 
5.l.l0.6.S CO2 sensing tapes: The CO2 sensing tapes were carried 
in flight but were not used. 
5.l.l0.6.9 Humidity sensor: The flight crew was provided with a 
battery-powered electronic hand-held humidity sensor for determining 
dry-bulb, wet-bulb, and wall temperatures within the spacecraft cabin. 
This device was utilized approximately every four revolutions during 
flight and approximately 30 minutes after each helmet or glove removal 
or visor opening. Relative humidity levels, as measured by this device, 
were approximately 62 percent throughout the flight. Cabin dry-bulb 
temperatures were recorded between 70° F and 7sP F and wet-bulb tempera-
tures were recorded between 5cP F and 5sP F throughout the mission. 
5.l.l0.6.l0 Survival e~uipment: The only survival components 
utilized were the lifevests which were inflated by each crew member 
before recovery by helicopter. Both sets of vests inflated satisfac-
torily, although they were not used for flotation during the recovery 
phase. 
5.l.l0.7 Bioinstrumentation system.-
5.l.l0.7.l System description: The medical monitoring instrumen-
tation flown on the Gemini IV mission consisted of a flight safety in-
strumentation package for each pilot, two experiment M-4 (phonocardio-
gram) instrumentation units, two blood-pressure reprogramer adapter 
interface electronics units, and two biomedical magnetic tape recorders. 
The flight safety package consisted of an oral temperature measuring 
system, blood-pressure measuring system, respiration rate and pattern 
device, and two electrocardiogram systeIDB. The package was identical 
for each pilot. 
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5.l.l0.7.2 Data retrieved: All of the measurements were trans-
mitted on a real-time basis. The electrocardiograms, respiration, and 
phonocardiogram measurements were continuous; the oral temperature and 
blood pressure, by nature of the method of measurements, were inter-
mittent according to flight plan or by request of the medical monitors. 
Two channels of electrocardiogram and one of respiration were 
measured on the pilot during the extravehicular activity (EVA). Other 
measurements, described in the previous paragraph, were interrupted 
while the EVA umbilical was in use. 
Blood pressure was recorded by the pilot during reentry and by both 
flight crew members after landing by inserting a blood-pressure repro-
gramer adapter in series with the electric umbilical of the space suit. 
The two biomedical recorders ran on a preprogramed basis and re-
corded electrocardiogram, respiration, and phonocardiogram data on a 
redundant basis with real-time transmission on the PCM telemetry. When 
the blood-pressure reprogramer was used, blood-pressure measurements in-
stead of phonocardiogram were recorded. 
5.l.l0.7.3 System operation: The command pilot reported difficulty 
in taking the blood-pressure measurement. The problem involved the 
mating of the blood-pressure bulb with the suit fitting, as described in 
paragraph 5.l.l0.3.l. 
After the biomedical tape recorders were removed from the space-
craft, the tapes were removed and inspected. The tape on recorder no. 2 
was intact, and the excess was wound manually on the takeup reel. The 
tape from recorder no. l was wrinkled on about 20 percent of the circum-
ference. Some of this tape was manually unwound and inspected, and the 
wrinkled area appeared to extend into the entire tape. The excess tape 
was then manually wound on the takeup reel. During this operation, it 
was noticed that the takeup reel was bent. Upon receipt of the reels 
from both recorders, a test was made using the bent reel in recorder 
no. l. The tape was run through the transport for 3 days and removed. 
Upon inspection of the tape, it was again found wrinkled, but only on 
about lO percent of the circumference. Also, at the end of the 3-day 
test, it was noticed that the transport had begun to squeak quite loudly. 
The two possible reasons for the wrinkled tape are: (l) the bent take-
up reel, or (2) the takeup reel was not properly installed. 
The tapes from the biomedical recorders have been analyzed by view-
ing the various channels on an oscilloscope. By this method, it has been 
determined that each parameter has been recorded on its assigned channel. 
The blood-pressure measurements made by using the blood-pressure re-
programer were successful. The recorded data are now being converted to 
strip chart recordings. 
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5.l.l0.7.4 Postflight inspection: Inspection of the biomedical 
equipment has shown no anomalies other than in the pilot's harness and 
signal conditioners. These two items were damaged during removal. The 
command pilot's equipment was removed without damage and returned in 
good condition. 
5.l.l0.7.5 Summary: High-quality bioinstrumentation data were 
received in real time. The recorded data are now being reduced. 
5.l.ll Landing System 
The parachute landing system functioned as designed. All system 
events occurred within established tolerances and in the proper order 
as commanded by the crew. Figure 5.l-l9 illustrates the major sequences 
with respect to ground elapsed time (g.e.t.) and pressure altitude as 
they occurred in flight. 
On this flight, the drogue parachute was deployed at an altitude 
of 40 000 feet instead of the normal altitude of 50 000 feet. This 
delay contributed to the subsequent performance of the spacecraft while 
on the drogue. In addition, there is evidence that the RCS propellant 
was depleted unexpectedly during the latter stages of reentry and pos-
sibly prior to the spacecraft's reaching an altitude of 60 000 feet (see 
section 5.l.8). If this was the case, the RCS was not able to maintain 
stability during this period. As a result, the oscillations in pitch 
and yaw increased in magnitude from 50 000 feet down to 40 000 feet and 
continued to increase during the l6 seconds that the drogue parachute 
was in the reefed condition. Previous tests have shown that the reefed 
drogue parachute will prevent the spacecraft from tumbling, but will 
permit oscillations as high as ±40o to occur. Telemetry data indicate 
oscillations of ±25° in yaw at 40 000 feet, followed by a data loss 
during the critical reefed drogue period. Increased oscillations dur-
ing this time are probable and were reported as severe by the flight 
crew. Following the disreef of the drogue parachute at approximately 
3l 500 feet, the oscillations damped quickly and remained at low magni-
tudes for the remainder of the descent. 
Spacecraft 4 was subjected to another unusual condition at the time 
of drogue parachute deployment. The spacecraft was rolling at a rate 
of approximately 60 deg/sec when drogue parachute deployment was com-
manded. Subsequent to the deployment, this roll rate decreased until, 
at drogue parachute jettison, the rate was approximately 23 deg/sec. 
This condition appeared to have no detrimental effect on the overall 
system performance. 
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5.1.12 Postlanding and Recovery Systems 
Recovery photographs indicate that the UHF descent and recovery 
antennas, the recovery flashing light, and the sea dye marker satis-
factorily deployed during the descent and landing phases of the mission. 
Shortly after landing, the crew successfully extended the HF antenna and 
later retracted it just prior to egress. The recovery hoist loop failed 
to deploy when the main parachute was jettisoned, but was later deployed 
manually by the recovery team. An investigation of this anomaly revealed 
that physical interference between the recovery-hoist-loop door and the 
phenolic filler in the parachute-bridIe-stowage trough prevented the door 
from deploying. In three tests, a load of 64, 58, and 63 pounds, re-
spectively, was re~uired in addition to the spring force to open the door. 
Action has been initiated to inspect future spacecraft for the proper 
clearance of the recovery-hoist-loop door and preclude a recurrence of 
this anomaly. The operation and effectiveness of the recovery aids are 
covered in the communications and recovery-operations portions of this 
report. 
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TABLE 5.1-1. - GEMllH IV TEMPERATURE :rnSTRUMENTATIOrf 
Parameter Description Location Instrumentation 
range, of 
PB05 Rand R section outer skin Z217, R03.2, BY 70 to 1900 
PC03 RCS section outer skin z189, R03.2, BY 70 to 1900 
pc04 RCS section outer skin z189, lx, T03.0 70 to 1900 
PD03 Cabin section outer skin Zl16, ROO.O, BY 70 to 1900 
PD04 Cabin section outer skin z163.4, ROO.O, BY 70 to 1900 
PD06 Cabin section outer skin Z131, ROO.O, BY 70 to 1900 
PD07 Cabin section outer skin Z135.9, Lx, T01.5 b -459 to 85 
PD08 Cabin section outer skin Z133.4, R02.6, TY b -459 to 85 
PEll Heat_shield ablation B.L., ROO.O, T39.0 -55 to 1055 
material at bondline 
PE12 Heat_shield ablation B.L., ROO.O, B29.3 -55 to 1055 
material at bondline 
~eference junction (MA24) ranged from 85° F during launch and 
revolutions 1, 2, and 3 to 70° F during later revolutions. 
bEffective range. 
Accuracy, 
of 
±37 
±37 
±37 
±37 
±37 
±37 
±25 
±25 
±20 
±20 
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TABLE 5.1-II.- REAL-TIME DATA RECEIVED BY TEL II 
Total data received Total losses Usable data, 
Revolution Duration, Total master Master Percent percent 
sec frames frames 
Launch 427 17 217 236 1.37 98.63 
1 410 16 400 200 1. 22 98.78 
2 429 17 164 177 1. 03 98·97 
3 466 18 632 293 1. 57 98.43 
4 352 14 076 212 1. 51 98.49 
14 377 15 088 116 0·77 99·23 
19 237 9 484 484 5.10 94·90 
44 412 16 476 343 2.08 97·92 
48 402 16 092 387 2.41 97·59 
59 428 17 120 722 4.22 95.78 
60 415 16 608 463 2·79 97·21 
61 394 15 760 32 0.20 99.80 
Preblackout 
62 7 280 80 a28.58 a71. 42 
Postblackout 
62 50 2 000 35 a17.40 a82 . 60 
aThese losses include intermittent reception associated with entering and leaving 
blackout. 
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TABLE 5.1-111.- DELAYED TIME DATA FROM SELECTED STATIONS 
Total data received Total losses 
Station Revolutions Duration, Prime Prime Percent hr:min:sec subframes subframes 
Tel II 1, 2, 14, 28:15:54 1 017 542 814 0.08 
15,16, 17, 
18, 29, 30, 
31, 32, 44, 
45, 46, 47, 
48, 59, 60, 
61 
Texas 3, 19, 34, 06:30: 03 234 037 125 0.05 
49 
Hawaii 7, 21, 22, 09:27:38 340 580 875 0.26 
36, 37, 51, 
52 
Antigua 27, 42, 51 04:13:02 151 825 46 0.03 
Onboard Last plus 01:34:07 56 474 879 1.56 
recorder reentry 
Total 50:00:45 1 800 459 2739 0.15 
Usable 
data, 
percent 
99·92 
99·95 
99.74 
99·97 
98.44 
99.85 
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Ground elapsed time 
-
sec 
Planned Actual 
10.16 10.10 
20.48 20.40 
23.04 22.95 
88.32 88.21 
104.96 104.67 
105.00 105. 00 
119.04 118.66 
145.00 145. 00 
162.56 I 162.07 
335.82 1 333.75 
----- --- ---
TABLE 5.1-IV. - GUIDANCE AND CONTROL SUMMARY CHART 
Component 
Event Horizon ACME Computer IMU sensor 
Roll program start 1GS backup Ascent Free Search (primary) 
Roll program end 1GS backup Ascent Free Search (primary) 
No. 1 pitch rate start 1GS backup Ascent Free Search (primary) 
No. 2 pitch rate start 1GS backup Ascent Free Search (primary) 
No. 1 gain change 1GS backup Ascent Free Search (primary) 
No. 1 1GS update 1GS backup Ascent Free Search (primary) 
No. 3 pitcb rate start 1GS backup Ascent Free Search (primary) 
No. 2 1GS update 1GS backup Ascent Free Search (primary) 
Termination of pitch 1GS backup Ascent Free Search (primary) 
program 
SECO 1GS backup Ascent Free Search (primary) 
--
-
-- ------
~--.--.----.--, 
Remarks 
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Ground elapsed time, 
hr:min:sec 
Planned Act1ml 
00:05:561 00:06:05 
00:08:46 
00:13:33 
04:23:00 
05:40:00 
TABLE 5 . I-IV . - GUillANCE AND CON'IROL SUMMARY CHART - Continued 
Event 
Separation 
Station keeping 
ACME 
Direct 
Direct 
pulse, 
rate 
command 
Platform alinementl Pulse 
EVA Pulse 
IGS "off" Pulse 
Component 
Computer IMU 
Ascent 
Catch up 
Catch up 
Off 
Free 
Free, 
orbit 
rate 
SEF 
Orbit 
rate 
Off 
Horizon 
sensor 
Search 
Search 
Search 
Remarks 
OAMS maneuver TCA 14 was fired for 1.4 sec 
prior to separation to damp GLV rates. 
The initial and final rates were: Pitch, 
+0.05 to -0.05 deg/secj yaw, 0.37 to 
0.01 deg/secj roll, 0.45 to 0.18 deg/sec. 
The separation attitudes were: pitch, 
_4°; yaw, 2.5°; and roll, 89°, The aft 
TCA's 9 and 10 were on for 4.9 sec to pro-
vide the separation velocity. The dis-
turbance torQues from these TCA's were 
small, producing accelerations in pitch, 
yaw, and roll of -0.24, -0.2, and 
2 +0.14 deg/sec 
A temporary failure is indicated in TCA 9 
at 64 minutes after lift-off. This was 
established by the decrease in accelera-
tion from the aft pair and the effect on 
the pitch TCA's. The maximum acceleration 
with the pitch TCA's on was +0.06 deg/sec2 
The calculated pitch acceleration from 
TCA 10 is +4.18 deg/sec2 while that from 
pitch TCA's is -4.12 deg/sec2. 
The platform was alined for 6 min 29 sec. 
A good alinement was achieved due to the 
small initial errors. 
Primary I Maximum attitude accelerations induced by 
the extravehicular activity were approx-
imately 0.3 deg/sec2. 
Off 
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Ground elapsed time, 
hr:min: sec 
Planned Actual 
67: 34: 00 167: 33: 00 
Ei8:17:17 
68:38:00 168:41:00 
68:59:00168:59:26 
69:06:00169: 06:00 
69:42:00 169:43:20 
TABLE 5.1-IV.- GUIDANCE AND CONTROL SUMMARY CHART - Continued 
Event 
1GS power up 
Platform 
alinement 
Horizon sensor 
sunset check 
Horizon sensor 
moon check 
Apollo night yaw 
orientation 
Horizon sensor 
thruster plume 
check 
ACME 
., Pulse 
Pulse 
Pulse, 
direct 
Pulse, 
direct 
Pulse, 
direct 
Rate 
command 
Component 
Remarks 
Computer IMU Horizon 
sensor 
Prelaunch 
Prelaunch 
Freel 
cage, 
SEF, 
orbit 
rate 
SEF 
Primary 1GS powered up and indicated normal oper-
ation. 
Primary I Alined for 16 min 48 sec. Approximately 
6° yaw error remained at end. 
Prelaunch I Orbit I Primary I The sun was swept three times. Loss of 
rate track occurred once at 68:41:51 g.e.t. 
The attitudes in pitch, yaw, and roll 
were 178°, _10°, and 182°, respectively. 
The yaw rate was -2.25 deg/sec. The 
actual loss of track lasted 11 sec, while 
the sensor ignore light remained on pro-
perly for 18 sec. 
Prelaunch I Oribit I Primary I The moon was swept through the field of 
rate view four times. No loss of track 
occurred. 
Prelaunch I Orbit I Primary I The pilot visually oriented the spacecraft 
rate within a few degrees of the horizontal 
plane within the 2 min 20 sec stated in the 
pilot report. 
Prelaunch Orbit 
rate 
Primary 1 The forward maneuver engines were fired 
for 1 sec. During this time the horizon 
sensor did not lose track. The spacecraft 
attitudes in pitch, yaw, and roll were 
_10°, 86°, and +8°, respectively. 
\)l 
I 
\)l 
+" 
c 
Z 
() 
r--
» 
C/) 
C/) 
"'T1 
-m 
o 
TABLE 5.1-IV. - GUIDANCE AND CONTROL SUMMARY CHART - Concluded 
Ground elapsed time, Component 
hr:min:sec Event Horizon Remarks ACME Computer IMU Planned Actual sensor 
69: 43100 69:45:40 ' Horizon sensor ' Pulse Prelaunch Orbit Primary 'IThe horizon sensor lost track at the 
track check rate follOWing spacecraft attitudes: 
Test Pitch, Yaw, Roll, ~ ~ ~ 
Positive pitch +29 0 -8 
Negative pitch 
-29 2 2 
Positive roll 0 -2 +35 
Negative roll -6 +1 -32 
C In general, the spacecraft rate was C 0.5 deg/sec throughout and the sensor Z output saturated at 19°. Z () 69:58:00 70: 05: 00 Attitude thruster Direct Prelaunch Orbit Primary Disturbance torques generated by the sim- () 
....... failure check rate ulated failure were shown to be controllable. 
....... 
» 96:52:54 Platform Pulse SEF Primary Alined for 33 min 14 sec. No errors noted. » (f) alinement (f) 
(f) 
97:04:00 96:35:40 RCS checkout Rate Orbit Primary Body accelerations during this test estab-
(f) 
" 
command, rate lished the failure of RCS ring B thruster 5. 
" - direct -m m 
0 97:28:02 97:28:02 OAMS retrofire Rate Orbit Locked The maneuver lasted for 160.6 sec. Both 0 command rate on aft-firing TCA's were again functioning 
(primary) properly. The disturbance accelerations 
in pitch, yaw, and roll were -0.38, -0.17, 
and +0.27 deg/sec2, respectively. 
97: 31: 10 Platform I Pulse I SEF I Primary I Alined for 6 min 18 sec. No errors noted. 
alinement 
97:40:02 197:40:01 Retrofire Rate Free Locked 
command on 
(primary) 
97:42:31 400 000 feet Rate Free Jetti-
command soned I \Jl 
I 
97:50:58 I 97:50:53 I Drogue paraohute Rate I Free Jetti- \Jl \Jl deployment command soned 
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TABLE 5.1-V. - GUIDANCE ERROR AT SECO 
Position, :f't Velocity, ft/sec 
. . . 
X Y Z X Y Z 
IMU error 150 -500 500 -4 -6 15 
Navigation error 50 -100 -200 
-3 +1 0 
Total guidance error 200 -600 300 -7 -5 15 
UNCLASSIFIED 
TABLE 5.1-VI. - SUMMARY OF ASCENT GUIDANCE SYSTEM ERRORS 
(This analysis is preliminary and assumes zero tracking errors) 
Accelerometer Accelerometer Accelerometer Accelerometer 
scale factor, quadratic initialization Gyro biasa , misalinement, ppm g/ppm nonlinearity, error, sec ppm/g ft/sec 
Platform coordinates X Y Z X Y Z X Y Z X Y Z X Y Z 
Hand fit -141 -10 -18 
-37 -69 +59 (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) -33 
"-
Error coefficient (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) 33. 2 (b) 45.2 .64 -.27 (b) (b) (b) -15 
recovery program 
Specification 
values 360 300 300 ·5 60 
~alues computed from free-flight data. 
bNo significant errors attributed in the quantity and process indicated. 
Gyro 
mass unbalance 
along input 
axis, 
deg/nr/g 
X Y Z 
-.04 -.29 . .45 
(b) -.243 .44 
·5 
---
Gyro 
mass unbalance 
along spin 
axis, 
deg/hr/g 
X Y Z 
.17 -.29 -·5 
(b) (b) (b) 
·5 
I 
VI 
I 
VI 
--J 
TABLE 5.1-VII.- PRELIMINARY ORBIT INJECTION PARAMETERS AT SECO +20 SECONDS 
Inertial Inertial Inertial velocity components System velocity, flight-path (computer coordinates), ft/sec 
ft/sec angle, deg X Y Z 
Nominal 25 757 0.000233 25 359 4507 34 
IGS 25 738 .058 25 347 4470 -24 
STL preliminary BET 25 746 .043 25 353 4478 -36 
STL MISTRAM 10 K 25 746 .043 25 353 4478 -36 
i STL MISTRAM 100 K I 25 746 I .04 25 352 I 4477 I -36 
I 1 I 
STL GE Mod III 25 745 .049 25 353 4475 -36 
Goddard GE Mod III 25 743 .09 -- -- --
MISTRAM (IP) 25 749 .06 -- -- --
Reconstructed from 25 743 .07 -- -- --
Bermuda first 
orbital pass 
-1 
" 
\Jl 
I 
\Jl 
CD 
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TABLE 5.1-VIII.- ANGULAR ACCELERATIONS DURING THE RCS SYSTEM TEST 
Angular acceleration, deg/sec 2 Ring TCA 
Pitch Roll Yaw 
B 5, 6 +2.1 -0.8 +0.02 
A 5, 6 +3·9 + .13 0 
B 1, 2 
-3·7 - .16 + .03 
A 1, 2 -3·6 - .18 0 
A, B 5, 6 +5.3 - .65 - .45 
TABLE 5.1-Dc' - HORIZON SENSOR TRACK CHECK DATA 
Starting attitude, Unlock point, Lock point, 
deg Maneuver deg deg 
Yaw Roll Pitch 'I'M Pilot 'I'M Pilot 
data data data data 
0 0 0 Pitch-up 33 33 29 30 
Pitch-down 29 28 26 22 
Roll-CW 33 40 21 35 
Roll-CCW 32 29 27 27 
0 10 0 Pitch-up 43 40 48 35 
Pitch-down 31 28 22 21 
0 0 10 Roll-CW 37 40 37 30 
Roll-CCW 37 30 30 28 
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TABLE 5. I-X. - SEQUENTIAL EVENTS 
Telemetry Event Time, g.e.t. parameter hr:min: sec 
(a) Spacecraft shape charge ignition 00:06:04.8 
(a) Spacecraft separation (sensor) 00:06:05.4 
ADOI Adapter shape charge ignition 97:39:14.2 
AD02 Adapter separation (sensor) Not received 
ADO 6 Manual retrofire Not received 
AD08 Retrorocket no. 3 fire 97:40:06.2 
AD09 Retrorocket no. 2 fire 97:40:11.4 
ADIO Retrorocket no. 4 fire 97:40:17.2 
AE13 Parachute jettison Not received 
aFrom Kennedy Space Center real-time 150 channel event recorder. 
TABLE 5. I-XI. - BLOWN FUSISTORS 
Fuse block Fuse number Application identification 
F-AF 5-119 Drogue parachute guillotine 
F-AG 5-122 Drogue parachute guillotine 
F-C 4-14 ~etro wiring 
Pyro switch H-l 
F-G 4-23 Adapter equipment wiring 
Pyro switch F-l 
F-Q 5-48 Parachute jettison (forward 2-2) 
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Figure 5.1-1. - Cabin section shingle temperatures during reentry. 
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Figure 5.1-19. - Gemini TIl: landing system performance. 
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5.2 GEMINI LAUNCH VEHICLE PERFORMANCE 
The performance of the Gemini launch vehicle was satisfactory in 
all respects. Two problems occurred in supporting faciiities. The 
erector failed to lower on command, causing the only hold in the count-
down, and the stage I fuel-vent topping-line umbilical disconnect failed 
to release properly. Alth01.1gh not a problem, but a matter of concern, 
was the large positive margin in payload as compared with preflight 
predictions. 
5. 2. 1 Airframe 
Gemini IV flight data indicate that airframe loading was well with-
in the launch-vehicle structural capability and, except for the acoustic 
environment, the flight environment was within predicted limits. 
5.2.1.1 longitUdinal oscillation.- Well-defined envelopes of lopgi-
tudinal oscillation reached a peak amplitude at LO+121 seconds of ±0.20g 
(filtered data) at the spacecraft-launCh-vehicle interface with a re-
sponse frequency of 11 cps. 
5.2.1.2 Vibration environment.- Vibration environment on the radio 
guidance system (RGS) equipment was 2.1g ,well below the qualification 
rrns 
level of 14.3g . 
rms 
5.2.1.3 Acoustic environment.- Sound pressure measurements indi-
cate an overall level of 143.7 dB at compartment 2 as compared with 
151 dB allowed and an overall level of 167 dB at compartment 1 as com-
pared with 154 dB allowed. This excess is not considered critical since 
there is no equipment in compartment 1 and the vibration level in com-
partment 2 is well below qualification levels. 
5.2.1.4 Structural loads.- Ground winds were approximately 6 mph 
during the countdown of Gemini IV, resulting in a combined static and 
dynamic bending ~oment of less than 2 percent of the vehicle bending 
capability. Structural loads shown in table 5.2-I are considered peak 
loads experienced by the launch vehicle and were computed for the pre-
BECO condition. 
The response of stage II fuel slosh during stage II flight was 
approximately double the magnitude experienced on previous flights. 
However, the equivalent axial load estimated for this response is only 
400 pounds at station 276 and is not considered critical. 
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5.2.1.5 Post-SECO pulse.- Post-SECO pulses, similar to those ob-
served on GT-l and GT-2, occurred at 3.14 and 10.83 seconds after SECO. 
These disturbances are evident on actuator deflection, rate gyros, and 
accelerometer data. 
5.2.2 Propulsion 
The performance of the stage I and II propulsion systems was 
satisfactory. 
5.2.2.1 Stage I engine performance.- Table 5.2-11 provides a com-
parison of preflight predicted and postflight reconstructed propulsion 
system operation and indicates excellent agreement. The largest disper-
sion was in engine mixture ratio (-1.34 percent). This decrease in mix-
ture ratio (MR) resulted principally from colder propellant temperatures 
and fuel pump inlet pressures which were higher than expected. The minor 
shift in MR resulted in a fuel depletion shutdown with approximately 
620 pounds of useful oxidizer remaining. Predicted mean outage was 
567 pounds. The start transients of both subassemblies (SAl and SA2) 
were of the predicted form and well within the range of Titan II expe-
rience. Shutdown transients were normal for a fuel exhaustion shutdown 
with chamber pressures of 115 psia and 105 psia for SAl and SA2, respec-
tively, at stage II ignition. 
5.2.2.2 Stage II engine performance.- Table 5.2-111 provides a 
comparison of preflight predicted and postflight reconstructed propul-
sion system operation and indicates good agreement. The stage II start 
transient exhibited a "false start" during the initial chamber pressure 
rise. This is the first time it has been noted in flight although it 
has occurred occasionally in ground tests. This "false start II lengthened 
the transient slightly but had no apparent effect on step or overshoot 
pressures which were 520 and 890 psia, respectively. Steady-state per-
formance was nominal with the exception of a decrease in gas generator 
oxidizer injector pressure and turbine inlet temperature (Tt .) at 
l 
LO+313 seconds. This occurrence is presently being investigated. As 
in the GT-3 misSion, the shutdown sequence utilized both the redundant 
engine shutdown and pressure sequencing valve override relay. The 
shape of the shutdown transient was almost identical to that of GT-3. 
The postflight calculated shutdown total impulse of Gemini IV was 
37 400 pound-seconds as compared with the 39 300 ± 7000 pound-seconds 
predicted. 
5.2.2.3 Propellant and autogenous system performance.- The fol-
lowing table provides data on requested and loaded propellant weights 
for stages I and II; 
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Stage I Stage II 
Component Requested, Actual, Requested, Actual, 
lb lb lb lb 
Fuel 89 732 89 752 22 043 22 043 
Oxidizer 172 084 172 094 38 517 38 517 
The following table gives predicted and actual inflight propellant 
temperatures and indicates that inflight temperatures were lower than 
predicted. 
Stage I Stage II 
Component Predicted, Actual, Predicted, Actual, 
of of of of 
Fuel 49.0 43.5 45.0 42.8 
Oxidizer 51. 7 45.8 51.2 46.5 
The general form of the inflight propellant temperature curve 
closely followed the predicted, but was displaced by the differences 
shown in the foregoing table. 
A comparison of predicted and actual tank pressures indicates good 
agreement; however, an analysis of the stage II fuel autogenous data 
shows the pressurant orifice inlet temperature to be slightly high with 
a corresponding reduction in pressure. The temperature exceeded the 
predicted values by 40° F at 91FS2 -5 seconds. This minor anomaly is 
under investigation. 
5.2.2.4 Performance margin.- At the Flight Safety Review the per-
formance margin was predicted to be a negative 51 pounds, based on a 
launch at the beginning of the window. Real-time calculations performed 
during the launch countdown indicated this margin to be -35 pounds at 
lift-off. The performance margin is defined as the difference between 
the weight the GLV could insert into orbit in the presence of -30 per-
formance dispersions and the actual spacecraft weight. Postflight cal-
CUlations indicate an achieved payload capability 270 pounds greater 
than the predicted nominal. 
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The following table shows the comparison between the predicted nominal 
payload and the achieved capability. 
Predicted nominal Achieved payload Difference, Ib 
payload, Iba capabili ty, Ib 
8472 8742 270 
aFor beginning of launch window. 
5.2.3 Flight Control System 
The flight control system operated in the primary mode and functioned 
satisfactorily. A revised pitch program was utilized on Gemini IV to com-
pensate for high BECO altitudes on previous Gemini flights. .The flight 
control system errors indicate a three-axis reference system (TARS) pitch 
program which was 1.76 percent low (combined rate and time) and a TARS 
gyro down-drift of 0.07° at BECO. 
5.2.3.1 Stage r flight.- Ignition and lift-off transients were nor-
mal. Maximum actuator travel and rate gyro disturbance are listed in 
table 5.2-IV. The lift-off roll transient produced a rate of 0.77 deg/sec 
clockwise and was damped out within 1.5 seconds. At LO+2.1 seconds, the 
roll rate gyros indicated a vehicle disturbance that produced a counter-
clockwise rate of 0.6 deg/sec. Vehicle displacement was 0.16°. This 
disturbance was damped out and corrected in 1.6 seconds. Also, a slight 
disturbance was noticed in the pitch and yaw axis. This disturbance was 
the result of abnormal release of the 2DFVT umbilical disconnect (see 
section 5.2.10). 
The roll and pitch programs were properly executed; respective rates 
and times are presented in table 5.2-V. All TARS-initiated discretes 
were initiated at their nominal times. Attitude errors were developed 
in response to wind disturbances and for the pitch and roll programs. 
The maximum vehicle attitude errors and-rates are listed in table 5.2-Vr. 
Excellent correlation existed between the primary system and the 
secondary system up to maximum dynamic pressure (q max). The differences 
noted thereafter were caused primarily by axis cross-coupling effects, 
gyro drifts, and both inertial guidance system (rGs) and programer errors. 
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Staging was normal. The peak staging transients were as follows: 
Axis Rate, deg/sec Displacement, deg 
Pitch 
-0.99 +0.43 
Yaw +0.77 +1.2 
Roll 
-2.58 -1.26 
5.2.3.2 Stage II flight.- Radio guidance system (RGS) pitch and 
yaw steering was initiated at LO+168.5 seconds and proper response was 
observed. The fuel-oxidizer slosh disturbance had maximum rates of less 
than 0.25 deg/sec between LO+200 seconds and LO+320 seconds and damped 
out toward the end of flight. 
The differences b~ween primary and secondary attitude errors are 
shown in figures 5.1-~(a) to (c). The differences reflect the two dif-
ferent methods of determining steering commands in pitch and yaw only. 
The inertial guidance system (IGS) does not account for the effects on 
the gimbal angles of vehicle perturbations such as center-of-gravity 
shift and roll engine misalinement. Further discussion of the comparisor 
between the primary and secondary systems is contained in section 5.1.5. 
5.2.3.3 Post-SECO and separation rates.- The rates experienced at 
SECO resulted from the tail-off of the sustainer and roll nozzle thrust 
and the axial cross-coupling effects of the vehicle center of gravity 
and the roll thrust vector being offset from the vehicle centerline. 
The rates for the 31.5-second flight period from SECO to separation 
are shown in figures 5.2-1(a) to (c). At L0+361.3 and 362.1 seconds, 
the spacecraft orbital attitude and maneuver system (OAMS) thrusters were 
fired in the vehicle pitch plane, which resulted in a slight change in 
rate. The maximum rates are listed in table 5.2-VII. 
A disturbance was introduced to the second stage at spacecraft sep-
aration when the center of gravity shifted. Remaining rates, as shown 
in figures 5.2-1(a) to (c), resulted from the center-of-gravity shift 
and residual thrusts of the second-stage engine and roll nozzle. 
5.2.3.4 GLV tumble rates.- Telemetry data from Bermuda indicate 
the GLV second stage continued to oscillate slowly in a cork-screw motion. 
Examination of the C-band radars while skin tracking the second stage 
reveals tumbling rates in the order of 25.4 deg/sec after the first 
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revolution. Vehicle tumbling rates as recorded at skin-tracking sites 
are shown in table 5.2-VIII. 
5.2.4 Hydraulic System 
The hydraulic system operated satisfactorily. During start-up of 
the stage I system, the hydraulic pressure dropped to 2315 psia before 
recovery. This compares with a value of 2596 psia on GT-3. Recovery 
was prompt, indicating proper engine-driven pump compensator response. 
The launch-vehicle hydraulic system performance is shown in table 5.2-IX. 
5.2.4.1 Stage I primary system.- The output of the stage I electric 
motor pump was automatically switched from the secondary system to the 
primary system 110 seconds before engine ignition, permitting a primary 
system verification. A comparison of the stage I primary hydraulic pres-
sures obtained during the launch of GT-l, GT-2, GT-3, and Gemini IV is 
shown in figure 5.2-2. 
5.2.4.2 Stage I secondary system.- The secondary system was checked 
using the electric motor pump in the period from T-180 to T-110 seconds. 
Comparison of the stage I secondary hydraulic pressures obtained during 
the launch of GT-l, GT-2, GT-3, and Gemini IV is shown in figure 5.2-3. 
5.2.4.3 Stage II system.- Prelaunch checkout of the system was ac-
complished in the period from T-4 to T-3 minutes using the stage II 
electric motor pump. The hydraulic pressure peaked at 3690 psia within 
2.0 seconds after engine ignition. A steady-state pressure of 3000 psia 
was reached within 8 seconds after engine ignition, decreasing to 
2870 psia at SECD. 
5.2.5 Guidance System 
The vehicle was guided by the primary Mod III radio guidance system 
(RGS) which performed satisfactorily throughout the countdown and flight. 
5.2.5.1 Programed guidance.- The programed guidance for the first 
162.07 seconds after lift-off consisted of sequenced events as shown in 
table 5.2-X. 
As discussed in section 4.0, a slightly lofted first-stage trajec-
tory was flown. The errors at BECO (see table 5.2-X) were 75 ft/sec 
low in velocity, 6426.0 feet high in altitude, and 1.53° high in flight-
path angle. 
5.2.5.2 . Closed-loop guidance.- The guidance system acquired the 
pulse beacon of the launch vehicle, tracked in the monopulse automatic 
EO~4FIQi~~TIAl 5-91 
mode, and was locked-on continuously from lift-off to LO+395.3 seconds. 
At this time, track went into a period of intermittent lock until loss 
of signal (LOS) at Lo+410.0 seconds (76.25 seconds after SECO). The 
average received signal strength at the central station during second-
stage operation was satisfactory. Rate lock was continuous, except for 
a momentary interruption at staging, from LO+43.6 seconds to LO+397.8 sec-
onds (64.05 seconds after SECO). 
Normal steering commands were issued, as planned, by the airborne 
decoder at LO+168.50 seconds. At this time, an initial 10-percent pitch-
down steering command (0.2 deg/sec) was given for 0.5 second, followed 
by a 100-percent pitch-down steering command (2.0 deg/sec) for 7.58 sec-
onds. The steering gradually returned to relatively small and varying 
pitch-down commands of 2.5 to 10.0 percent until SECO-2.5 seconds, at 
which time transmission of commands were terminated as planned. Yaw 
steering started at LO+168.50 seconds. The yaw commands were of very 
small magnitude, with the commands over the closed-loop portion of 
flight amounting to positive and negative rates of from 0.02 to 
0.04 deg/sec (1 to 2 percent). 
SECO occurred at LO+333.754 seconds which was 2.07 seconds earlier 
than planned, and at an elevation angle of 7.0° as compared with a 
planned elevation of 6.~. The auxiliary sustainer engine cut-off (ASCO) 
signal was sent at LO+333.837 seconds via the range safety command 
transmitter. 
The resultant SECO+20 second conditions were well within 3cr limits. 
The flight-path angle was 0.065°, the velocity was 25 743 ft/sec, and 
the altitude was 531 793 feet. Table 5.2-X shows that the flight-path 
angle was 0.066° high, the velocity was 13 ft/sec low, and the altitude 
was 696 feet high. Since tail-off was near nominal (see table 5.2-X), 
insertion errors were directly attributable to shutdown at SECO. Most 
of the error was due to the noise in the guidance data. At the end of 
tail-off, tumbling rates were -0.17 deg/sec yaw-right, and 0.18 deg/sec 
roll-clockwise. 
The computing system, in'conjunction with the RGS track, rate, and 
airborne systems, completed all prelaunch and launch operations in a 
normal and satisfactory manner. The inertial guidance system (IGS) up-
dates were sent from the computer and verified by the buffer as follows: 
Update sent, Update verified, 
time from lift-off, time from lift-off, Value, ft/sec 
sec sec 
100.0 105.01 358.25 
140.0 145.01 254.50 
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These transmission times include the 5-second delay required by the 
spacecraft inertial guidance system and the digital command system veri-
fication by telemetry. 
In figures 5.2-4 and 5.2-5, the velocity and flight-path angle are 
shown in the regions of SECO and tail-off. The launch-vehicle radio gui- '. 
dance system data and the range safety computer (IP 3600) data (MISTRAM I) 
are shown to illustrate the quality of the post-SECO data used for the 
orbital determination. 
The redundant orbit determinations were quite adequate despite the 
Houston real-time computing complex buffer pool overflow. This caused 
partial loss of real-time data to the computer which resulted in slightly 
degraded real-time computations. The problem is currently being investi-
gated. 
5.2.6 Electrical System 
The electrical system operated normally throughout both the first-
and second-stage flight. No anomalies were noted in any of the electrical 
parameters. The current and voltage characteristics of both the accessory 
power supply (APS) and instrumentation power supply (IPS) dc busses were 
nominal. An average of 29 volts appeared on the IPS bus for a nominal 
load of 35 amperes during first-stage flight and 32.5 amperes during 
second-stage flight. Variation of load reflected the sequence of events 
at the proper times. The ArS bus measured 29.8 volts for a load of 
22.5 amperes and 19 amperes during stage I and stage II flight, respec-
tively. An added fluctuating load due to the cycling TARS heaters caused 
the current to peak at 30 amperes. The ac power and the instrumentation 
power sources and supplies were nominal. 
Two Gemini target docking adapter flashing lights were mounted 1800 
apart between the tanks on the second stage. Each light was powered by 
a squib-type battery. The lights were activated at SECO. 
5.2.7 Instrumentation System 
5.2.7.1 Ground.- All ground measurements performed as expected. 
Parameter assignments were 51 landline measurements on chart recorders, 
16 measurements on magnetic tape, and 41 airborne (PCM) real-time meas-
urements on chart recorders. The umbilical separation sequence, as 
monitored on ground instrumentation equipment, occurred as planned and 
was complete in 0.785 second .. 
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5.2.7.2 Airborne.- There were 230 measurements programed for 
Gemini IV and data ac~uisition was 100 percent for the flight. Pre-
launch real-time telemetry monitor of the stage I (primary) pitch-rate 
gyro indicated a malfunctioned gyro, but review of the flight-control 
test set chart recorded verified proper gyro performance. The malfunc-
tion indication through the telemetry system was not considered factual, 
and no hold in the launch count was initiated. The apparent malfunction 
is considered attributable to a high resistance contact in the system 
between the signal-conditioner emitter follower and the input to the PCM 
encoder. This has been duplicated in laboratory tests. The erroneous 
indication corrected itself at T-3 seconds and remained valid throughout 
the flight. Data loss during the RF blackout at staging lasted for 
330 milliseconds. 
There was no indication of erratic tracking from Telemetry Building 
(Tel II) at Cape Kenhedy Missile Annex during the ascent phase of 
Gemini IV, as there was during the flights of GT-2 and GT-3. 
5.2.8 Malfunction Detection System 
Performance of the malfunction detection system (MDS) during pre-
flight checkout and flight was satisfactory. Flight data indicated that 
all MDS hardware functioned properly. MDS parameters are shown in 
table 5.2-XI. 
5.2.8.1 Engine MDS.- The malfunction detection thrust chamber 
pressure switch (MDTCPS) actuation times have been evaluated. The 
stage I engine subassembly 1 and subassembly 2 (SAl and SA2) switches 
actuated at 550 psia and 580 pSia, respectively. The stage II mal-
function detection fuel injector pressure switch (MDFJPS) pressure 
cannot be determined, because there is no analog telemetry channel 
of injector pressure. Switch actuation times and corresponding pres-
sures were as follows: 
Actuation time Pressure, Switch Condition from lift-off, 
sec 
psia 
Subassembly 1 MDTCPS Make -2.39 550 
Break +152.40 545 
Subassembly 2 MDTCPS Make -2.34 580 
Break +152·38 530 
Subassembly 3 MDFJPS Make +153.11 
Break +333.91 
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5.2.8.2 .Airframe MDS.- The MDS rate switch package (RSP) performed 
properlY throughout the flight. No vehicle overrates occurred from lift-
off through spacecraft separation. The tank pressure transducers per-
formed satisfactorilY throughout countdown and flight. 
5.2.9 Range Safety and Ordnance 
The performance of all range safety and ordnance items was satis-
factory. 
5.2.9.1 Flight termination system.- Review of flight data indicated 
both receivers displayed unusuallY low signal strength at approximatelY 
10+316 seconds, Telemetry data show that from LO+315.538 seconds to 
10+316.289 seconds the input signal strength to each receiver was less 
than the 2-microvolt specification sensitivity of the receiver. The 
":emini spacecraft command receivers do not shaw this loss of signal 
strength. Review of the ground transmitter operation disclosed no dis-
crepancies which could account for this loss of signal strength. It is 
therefore concluded that this phenomenon is due to the pattern charac-
teristics of the command antenna configuration of the Gemini launch ve-
hicle. The data available indicate that a command could have been de-
layed for approximatelY 1 second as a result of this occurrence. 
The following ~ommand facilities were used: 
Time, sec Facility 
LO to LO+65 Cape 600-w transmitter and single helix antenna 
LO+65 to 10+113 Cape 10-kW transmitter and quad helix antenna 
LO+113 to LO+430 GBI 10-kV transmitter and ESCO steerable antenna 
The ESCO st9;:rable antenna at Grand Bahama Island (GBI) was driven 
by the Cape fro~·tO+50 seconds. The GBI FPS-16 radar steered the antenna 
from 10+50 secorias to LO+430 seconds. A range change in the radar at 
LO+295 seconds caused a slew of short duration and low magnitude. 
5.2.9.2 Range safety tracking system.- Missile Trajectory Measure-
ment (MISTRAM) System I·was used as the primary source for impact pre die-
tion (IF) and provided accurate information through insertion. These 
data were selected for input to the IF for a total of 261.6 seconds. 
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Prior to lift-off, an unlock of one receiver at the central site 
occUTred. As a result, no calibrated rate data .could be obtained from 
the west 100 K~eg (P2 ) and it was necessary to use data from the west 
10 K leg (Pl ) throughout the launch. The unlock was due to a faulty 
connector at the central site. During the first 100 seconds after lift-
off, polarization track was intermittent, but track was stable after that 
period until handover to MISTRAM II at 10+381 seconds. Approximately 
274 seconds of MISTRAM I data were reconstructable for postflight use. 
5.2.9.3 Ordnance.- The performance of all ordnance items was 
satisfactory. 
5.2.10 Prelaunch Operations and Aerospace Ground Equipment 
The Gemini IV propellant loading and launch countdown was performed 
incorporating a new split-count procedUTe. The precount (T-660 minutes 
through T-40 minutes) started as scheduled at 2:00 p.m. e.d.t., June 2, 
1965. During this period, flight controls, guidance, MDS, instrumenta-
tion, and spacecraft signals were checked out. The precount tests were 
successfully completed in 3 of the 4 hoUTS scheduled. 
The midcount period from T-15 hoUTs to T-7 hoUTs was established 
with a degree of flexibility for propellant loading and pad preparations. 
In expectation of a warm summer day, propellant loading was started at 
9:00 p.m. e.d.t., following the prechill. Oxidizer loading was completed 
at 10:40 p.m. e.d.t.; both stages indicated well within limits at high-
light. The total loads were completed using the oxidizer flowmeter 
references. Fuel loading started at 11:33 p.m. e.d.t. and was completed 
at 1:09 a.m. e.d.t., June 3, 1965. Stage I fuel loading was successful 
using the flowmeter reference. Stage II fuel loading was temporarily 
halted while a procedUTe was established to by-pass a leaking check valve. 
The stage II fuel indication was 6 pounds below tolerance at high-light; 
the ratio system was employed to complete the load. 
From T-7 hoUTs through T-4 hoUTS, flight controls, guidance, in-
strumentation, and mechanical operations were performed. 
The launch vehicle clock picked up the count at T-240 minutes. From 
this time through ignition, the launch-vehicle and spacecraft clocks were 
synchronized. At T-172 minutes, the oxidizer standpipe auto-bleed charge 
system was initiated. This was the first use of this system on Gemini, 
and the charge was successfully accomplished in 2 minutes. The flight 
disconnect was manually removed. At T-38 minutes neither the blockhouse 
automatic e~uipment nor the complex manual e~uipment could initiate 
erector lowering. Several attempts, using the manual controls, resulted 
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in fail-safe stops. Investigation disclosed an overspeed indication. 
Further investigation of the circuits permitted the formulation of a 
procedure which permitted a safe erector lowering. The lowering problem 
resulted from a wiring error which occurred during troubleshooting after 
wet mock simulated launch (WMSL). After correcting a moisture problem 
in the leg lock-unlock micro-switches, two wires were restored incorrectly. 
As a result, the erector lowering logic was disturbed. The hold time for 
the erector problem was 1 hour 16 minutes. A review of the launch films 
indicates that the stage I fuel-vent topping-line umbilical disconnect 
(2DFVT) did not release as planned. Disconnect occurr.ed by tension in 
the vent-topping line after the vehicle had lifted approximately 27 feet 
off the complex. 
The damage to the complex was minimal and not as extensive as pre-
vious launches. 
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TABLE 5.2 - 1. - ffiE - BEC 0 LOADS 
Launch vehicle station 
Components of load 
276 320* 935 11SS 
Quasi-steady axial, Ib -33 SOO -261 SOO -422 300 -473 000 
Quasi-steady lateral, Ib --- --- --- ---
Dynamic axial, Ib ±l 200 ±S 700 ±7 000 ±5 300 
Dynamic lateral, Ib 
Stage II fuel mode ±600 ±SOO ±500 ±O 
First structural mode ±700 ±l 100 ±l 100 ±300 
Third structural mode ±400 ±400 ±500 ±300 
Stage I engine mode ±SOO ±200 ±3 900 ±2 100 
Total calculated load 
-37 500 -273 000 -435 300 -4S1 000 
~cent of ultimate design load 31.S 7S.0 56.2 64.S 
* Critical station 
UNCLASSIFIED 
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TABLE 5 .2-II. - PRELIMINARY STAGE I ENGINE PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS 
Parameter Preflight Postflight Difference, predicted percent 
Thrusta (engine), lb 
· · · · · 
/. 
· 
44l 400 442 433 0.24 
Thrust (engine, flight average) lb 
· 
465 068 467 870 0.60 
Specific impulse a lb-sec 260.69 36l.47 0.30 , lb · · · · · · 
Specific impulse (flight average) , 
lb-sec 277.8l 278.6l 0.29 lb . . . · · · · · · 
Engine mixture ratio a l.9503 l. 9280 -l.34 
· · · · · · · 
Engine mixture ratio (flight average) . l. 9339 l.9083 -l.32 
Oxidizer flow ratea , lb/sec 
· · · · 
l l2l.06 l u6.04 -0.45 
Oxidizer flow rate (average between 
sensors) , lb/sec 
· · · · · · · · · 
l l05.06 l l03.62 -0.l3 
a lb/sec l l2l.06 l u6.04 -0.45 Fuel flow rate , 
· · · · · · · 
Oxidizer flow rate (average between 
sensors), lb/sec 
· · · · · · · · · · · 
l l05.06 l l03.62 -0.l3 
a lb/sec 574.8l 578.87 Fuel flow rate , 
· · · · · · · · 
+0.7l 
Fuel flow rate (average between 
sensors), lb/sec 
· · · · · · · · · · · 
57l.42 578.30 l.20 
Burn time (87FSl to 87FS2) , sec 
· · · · 
l56.77 l55.67 -0.70 
aStandard inlet conditions 
EO ~~ FIDE~ IIIQJe.. 
CO t<t FIOEt ~ThA..l 5-99 
TABLE 5.2-III.- PRELIMINARY STAGE II ENGINE PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS 
Parameter Preflight Postflight Difference, predicted percent 
Thrusta(engine), Ib 
· · · · · · · · · · 
101 540 102 777 1.22 
Thrust (engine, flight average) , Ib 
· · · · 
101 718 103 103 1.36 
Specific impulse b Ib-sec 310.53 313.07 0.819 , Ib · · · · · · · · 
Specific impulse (flight average) , 
Ib-sec 311.09 313.49 0.77 Ib . . . · · · · · · · · · 
Engine mixture t" b ra lO 
· · · · · · · · · · · 
1.7945 1.7742 -1.15 
Engine mixture ratio (flight average) 
· 
1. 7611 1. 7497 -0.644 
Oxidizer b Ib/sec 210.18 210.14 -0.019 flow rate , 
· · · · · · · · 
Oxidizer flow rate (average between 
sens ors) , Ib/sec 
· · · · · · · · · · 
208.65 209.48 0.40 
Fuel b Ib/sec 117.01 118.44 1.15 flow rate , 
· · · · · · · · · 
Fuel flow rate (average between 
sensors) Ib/sec . 
· · · · · · · · · · · · 
118.48 119.72 1.05 
Burn time (9lFSl to 9lFS2) , sec 
· · · · · · 
182.45 181.32 -0.62 
~ngine thrust and specific impulse are exclusive of roll control nozzle 
thrust and autogenous weight flow 
bStandard inlet conditions 
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TABLE 5.2-IV.- STAGE I IGNITION DISPLACEMENTS AND RATES 
Displacement 
Actuator 
in. sec 
Pitch 11 -0.142 -2.44 
Yaw/roll 21 +0.231 -2.44 
Yaw/roll 31 +0.151 -2.44 
Pitch 41 -0.040 -2.44 
Rate 
Axis 
deg/sec sec 
Pitch (stage I) +9>.19 -0.28 
Yaw (stage I) +0.19 +0.10 
Roll (stage I) +0.58 +0.60 
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TABLE 5.2-V.- PLANNED AND ACTUAL LAUNCH VEHICLE EVENT TIMES AND RATES 
Planned time Actual time Difference, Planned Actual Event from lift-off, from lift-off, rate, rate, 
sec deg/sec deg/sec sec sec 
Roll program start lO.l6 lO.lO -0.06 l.25 l.22 
Roll program end 20.48 20.40 -.08 l.25 l.22 
Pitch program l start 23.04 22.95 -.09 -.709 -.69 
Pitch program lend 88.32 88.2l -.ll -.709 -.69 
Pitch program 2 start 88.32 88.2l - .ll -.5l6 -.50 
Pitch program 2 end ll9.04 ll8.66 -.38 - .5l6 -.50 
Pitch program 3 start ll9.04 ll8.66 -.38 -.235 -.25 
Pitch program 3 end l62,56 l62.07 -.49 -.235 -.25 
--
Difference, 
sec 
-0.03 
-.03 
-.Ol9 
-.Ol9 
-.ol6 
-.0l6 
+.Ol5 
+0.l5 
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TABLE 5.2-VI.- MAXIMUM ATTITUDE ERRORS AND RATES 
Axis Atti tude error, Time from lift-off, deg sec 
Pitch +1.31 108.2 
-0.256 64.0 
Yaw +1.623 74.0 
-0.617 82.1 
Roll +1.101 141.0 
0.0 10.6 
Axis Rates, Time from lift-off, deg/sec sec 
Pitch -1.07 82.6 
+0.38 0.41 
Yaw -0.66 80.1 
+0.56 83.11 
Roll +1.61 10.8 
-0.58 2.36 
UNCLASSIFIED 
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TABLE 5.2-VII.- POST-SECO RATES 
Axis Parameter Rate, deg/sec 
Maximum positive rate at SECO + 5 sec 1.3 
Pitch Maximum negative rate at SECO + 24 sec -0.4 
Rate at spacecraft separation .1 
Maximum positive rate at SECO + 8 sec 0.4 
Yaw Maximum negative rate at SECO + 2 sec -.6 
Rate at spacecraft separation -.1 
Maximum positive rate at SECO + 4 sec 0.5 
Roll Maximum negative rate at SECO + 12 sec -.6 
Rate at spacecraft separation .1 
UNCLASSIFIED 
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TABLE 5. 2-VIII. - GLV TUMBLE RATES 
Station Revolution Period (sec) Rate (deg/sec) 
EGL 1/2 14.2 25.4 
PAFB 1/2 14.2 25.4 
EGL 2/3 13.4 26.9 
PAFB 2/3 13.4 26.9 
EGL 3/4 12.25 29.4 
eRO 18 11.2 32.2 
MILA 30/31 11. 32.7 
MILA 31/32 11. 32.7 
UNCLASSIFIED 
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TABLE 5. 2-IX. - GLV HYDRAULIC SYSTEM PERFORMANCE 
Time Stage I primary Stage I secondary Stage II system 
system system 
Hydraulic pressure 
Electric pump 3070 psia --- ---
Minimum 2310 psia --- ---
Maximum overshoot 3330 psia 3340 3690 
Steady state 2980 psia 3050 3000 
BECO/SECO 2840 psia 2870 2870 
Fluid level 
Ignition 37 percent 34 percent 38 percent 
BECO/SECO 51 percent 43 percent 42 percent 
Fluid temperature 
Ignition 92 F 87 F ---
BECO/SECO 175 F 167 F ---
UNCLASSIFIED 
TABLE 5.2-X. - COMPARISON OF PLANNED AND ACTUAL LAUNCH 
VEHICLE TRAJECTORY PARAMETERS 
Condition Planned Actual Difference I 
i 
BECO I i 
Time from lift-off, sec .. 
· . · · 
· . 
· · 
153.37 152.43 -0.94 
Altitude, ft 
· . 
. . 
· · 
· . 
· 
· . . 
· · 
208 024 214 450 6 426 
Space-fixed velocity, ft/sec 
· · 
· . . 
· · 
9 922 9 847 -75 
Space-fixed flight-path angle, deg 
· 
· . 
· 
18.82 20.35 1.53 
SECO 
Time from lift-off, sec. 
· · · · · · · 
· . 
335.82 333.75 -2.07 
Altitude, ft 
· 
. . . . 
· . · . . 
· · · · · 
530 838 531 202 364 
Space-fixed velocity, ft/sec 
· · 
· . 
· · · 
25 667.9 25 659 -9 
Space-fixed flight-path angle, deg 
· 
· . 
· 
.0088 .089 .080 
Yaw velocity, ft/sec 
· · 
· .. . · . 
· · · · 
6.2 4.5 -1. 7 
SECO + 20 
Time from lift-off, sec. 
· · · · · 
· . 
· 
355.82 353·75 -2.07 
Altitude, ft 
· 
. . . 
· · · · 
· . · . 
· 
· . 
531 097 531 793 696 
Space-fixed velocity, ft/sec 
· 
· . . · . 
· 
25 756 25 743 -13 
Space-fixed flight-path angle, deg 
· · · · 
-.0007 .065 .066 
Yaw velocity, ft/sec 
· · · · · · 
· . · . 
· 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
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TABLE 5. 2-XI. - GEMINI IV MALFUNCTION DETECTION SYSTEM SWITCHOVER PARAMETERS 
Parameter Switchover Maximum or Time from Minimum or 
setting positive lift-off, sec negative 
Stage I primary hydraulics Shuttle spr ing 3320 -2.16 2280 
(1500 psia equiv) 
Stage I secondary hydraulics None 3350 -2.68 2850 
Stage I tandem actuators 
No. 1 subassembly ±4.0 +0.45 +63.4 -0.51 
No.2 subassembly 2 yaw/roll ±4.0 +0.92 +74.2 -0.73 
No. 3 subassembly 1 yaw/roll ±4.0 +0.35 +81.8 -1.20 
No. 4 subassembly 1 pitch ±4.0 +0.43 +80.1 -0.55 
Stage I pitch rate 
(+ = up, - = down) +2.5 deg/ sec 
- 3.0 deg/sec +0.2 deg/sec +0.4 -1.0 deg/sec 
Stage I yaw rate 
(+ = right, - = left) ±2.5 deg/sec +0.5 deg/sec +83.2 -0.7 deg/sec 
Stage I roll rate 
(+.= clockwise, - = counterclockwise) ±20.0 deg/sec +1.7 deg/sec +10.7 -2.9 deg/sec 
Stage II pitch rate 
(+ = up, - = down) HO.O deg/sec +4.0 deg/sec +155.1 -2.1 deg/sec 
Stage II :;aw rate 
(+ = right, ~ = left) HO.O deg/sec +0.8 deg/sec +153.8 -0.2 deg/sec 
Stage II roll rate 
(+ = clockwise, - = counterclockwise) ±20.0 deg/sec +1.5 deg/sec +153.9 -0.3 deg/sec 
------_ .... _-
Time from 
lift-off, sec 
-2.37 
+152.0 
+80.5 
+82.1 
+74.0 
+63.2 
+82.0 
+80.5 
+152.3 
+171 to 176.5 
+155.7 
+155.4 
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5.3 SPACECRAFT-LAUNCH-VEHICLE INTERFACE PERFORMANCE 
The various aspects of the spacecraft-launch-vehicle interface, 
as defined by reference 6, performed within specification limits. The 
performance of the electrical and mechanical interfacing systems was 
derived from the overall performance of the launch vehicle and the 
spacecraft as determined from instrumentation and by observation of the 
crew. 
Mechanical interface inspection before and after the last mating 
5-117 
of the launch vehicle and spacecraft showed the configuration to be as 
specified by the interface drawings. The venting and sealing require-
ments of the spacecraft adapter and the skirt area of the launch vehicle 
were inspected and determined to be in accordance with the specification 
drawings. 
The electrical circuitry on both sides of the interface performed 
nominally as indicated by the malfunction detection system (MDS) per-
formance and the spacecraft inertial guidance system (1GB) steering 
signals. 
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6.0 MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE 
6.l FLIGHT CONTROL 
The Gemini IV mission marked a milestone in flight operations as 
it was the first mission controlled from the Mission Control Center 
(MOC-H) at the Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, Texas. In addition 
to using MOC-H as the prime control center, the Mission Control Center 
at Cape Kennedy (MCC-C) was used to backup MCC-H during the launch phase 
of the mission. Certain critical positions at MCC-C were manned with 
flight controllers to provide the necessary support in the event that 
MCC-H lost the capability to effectively control the launch phase of the 
flight. Operational procedures were developed to take advantage of the 
backup control capability at Cape Kennedy to effect an efficient hand-
over of control, should this have been required. In addition to MCC-C, 
the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) computing and communications pro-
cessing equipment was standing by to backup counterpart functions at 
MCC-H during the entire mission. 
Three shifts of flight controllers were used each day in MCC-H. 
Care was taken in order to effect a smooth handover of control from team 
to team in order to assure continuity between shifts. The three-shift 
operation worked smoothly and proved to be a satisfactory method of pro-
viding continuous ground control and monitoring during the mission. 
This portion of the report was written based on real-time observa-
tions, and may disagree with some of the detailed evaluations in other 
sections of the report that were derived from analysis of postflight 
records. 
6.l.l Premission Operations 
6.l.l.l Premission activities.- The flight control team activities 
in the premission phase consisted of MCC-H support to Launch Complex 19 
and an extensive group of simulations. Support was provided to the pad 
on May l3, 1965, for wet mock simulated launch; on May 24 and 25 for 
final systems test; on May 29 for spacecraft simulated flight; and on 
June 3 for the launch countdown. Both MCC's supported the precount, 
midcount, and terminal countdown for wet mock simulated launch and the 
launch countdown. The pad support provided the flight controllers an 
opportunity to see live spacecraft and launch-vehicle telemetry prior 
to the mission, and allowed them to become familiar with the operational 
characteristics of the systems. In addition, a good checkout of the 
ground systems - spacecraft interface was accomplished during this 
activity. 
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6.1.1.2 Documentation.- The documentation provided for the 
Gemini IV mission was satisfactory except that late changes in the flight 
plan caused numerous updates to be transmitted to the remote sites. 
Seventy-eight instrumentation support instructions (lSI's) were trans-
mitted to the remote sites for this mission. As was expected, revisions 
to the flight plan were made and transmitted in real time, proving the 
ability of the network to respond to flight plan changes on short notice. 
6.1.1.3 MeC Network fli ht control 0 erations.- The network went 
on mission status May 23, 19 5. Subsequent to going on mission status, 
24-hour-per-day communications coverage was provided by flight control 
at MCC-H. On May 26, a biomedical telemetry test and digital command 
system (DCS) loading test were performed with the network. On May 29, 
a DCS test and telemetry data flow test were conducted with Texas, MCC-C, 
and Bermuda. On June 1, the remote sites performed PCM telemetry patch-
ing, data flow, and calibration testing. Also, a DCS loading test was 
conducted using the GSFC computers. 
6.1.1.4 Countdown.- MCC-H picked up the countdown at T-300 minutes 
with active flight controller participation. The MCC-C flight control 
team joined in the countdown at T-240 minutes. At T-300 minutes the 
multiple vehicle address on master digital command system (MDCS) no. 2 
was intermittent in the Bermuda sector. The first DCS load sent to 
Carnarvon, Australia, during the T-260 trajectory run was not valid, 
but a second load was ~ransmitted with no problem. At T-220, the MDCS 
no. 2 was having problems with the Bermuda and Texas sectors. 
At T-189 minutes the time-to-go-to-retrograde (TR) time was updated 
via the DCS using the value of 1:33:05 g.e.t., listed in the official 
countdown procedure. Because of a last minute change, this TR time 
became invalid and had to be corrected by the pilot via the computer 
manual data insertion unit to 1:33:52 g.e.t. 
At T-184 minutes, permission was given to open the oxidizer pre-
valves, and at T-134 minutes the flight crew was directed to proceed 
with ingress as scheduled. At T-65 minutes, Kano, Nigeria; Tananarive, 
Madagascar; and Canton Island were weak on UHF air-to-ground remoting. 
At T-65 minutes, a Mission Rules review was conducted with the network 
including the final changes to the rules. At T-40, the MCC-H System B 
communications processor failed with a 5-minute estimate for repair. 
At T-38 minutes, the crew was instructed to place the evaporator 
switch on the water management panel to the overboard position for the 
laUnch. At T-35 minutes, an estimated 20-minute hold was called because 
the erector would not lower. The hold continued for approximately 
1 hour and 15 minutes. After the-erector was successfully lowered, the 
count proceeded to ignition with no further delays. The MCC-C spacecraft 
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communicator provided the final count and voice communications with the 
crew until lift-off. After lift-off, all communication with the crew 
was conducted by the MCC-H spacecraft communicator. 
6.1.2 Mission Operations Summary 
6.1.2.1 Powered flight.- The T-3 minute IGS update was transmitted 
to the spacecraft and verified by both the ground and the crew. After 
lift-off, stage I thrust was nominal, and the roll and pitch programs 
started on time. The cabin pressure began relieving properly and all 
systems were satisfactory except that the UHF voice reception was diffi-
cult to read. The stage I trajectory was slightly high, but -the addi-
tional altitude was steered out by the radio guidance system in stage II 
flight. Stage II thrust was nominal and both guidance systems were in 
agreement. The IGS updates at 105 and 145 seconds after lift-off were 
received on time. At SECO, the following cut-off conditions were 
achieved, as indicated at MCC-H: 
Data Velocity, Flight-path angle, 
source ft/sec deg 
GE/Burroughs 25 739 +0.04 
IP3600 25 740 +0.05 
The Bermuda high-speed data did not give a good solution at SECO. 
The MCC-C flight dynamics officer also declared a satisfactory insertion, 
as indicated by the GSFC computers. 
6.1.2.2 Orbital.- After SECO, the spacecraft was separated with 
a 5 ft/sec burn. Using the cut-off vectors, the perigee was calculated 
to be 86.9 nautical miles, and the apogee 152.7 nautical miles. The 
crew was reQuested to switch to UHF-2 in order to improve voice communi-
cations. However, UHF-l was tested over the Canary Islands and found 
to be working properly. Over Carnarvon, on the first pass, the space-
craft was given a GO for landing area 3-4. The spacecraft attempted 
closeup station keeping with the second stage of the launch vehicle 
during the first revolution; however, the crew was advised over Guaymas 
to discontinue the rendezvous attempt because the fuel allocated to the 
entire task had been expended. The continuous change in trajectory 
during the first orbit caused the retrofire information to vary with the 
orbit changes. The first estimate of propellant usage during the first 
revolution was 90 pounds, and it was later revised to 115 pounds after 
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replaying the first orbit telemetry tapes. The OAMS propellant quantity 
remaining was continuously computed using an off-line computing facility. 
The accelerometer biases were checked at a number of points during the 
first revolution and over Guaymas during revolution 46. All checks de-
termined this bias to be within the allowable error of .04 pulses/sec. 
The extravehicular activity (EVA) was postponed for one orbit be-
cause the preparations by the crew took longer than anticipated. The 
crew was given permission to proceed with EVA over Hawaii during the 
third revolution, and the pilot was out of the spacecraft as they ap~ 
proached Guaymas. During the continental U.S. pass for the EVA, MCC-H 
was able to monitor telemetry and talk to the crew USing air-to-ground 
remoting. Due to difficulty in closing the hatch, the cabin was not 
decompressed a second time in order to jettison the EVA gear. 
The telemetry transmitter, tape dump, and C-band transponders were 
operated by ground command until shortly before mission termination. 
During revolution 60 over Carnarvon, the C-band transponder was placed 
in the continuous position to allow White Sands to practice tracking 
for reentry. The telemetry was switched to real-time and acquisition 
during the preretro check list for reentry. Tape dumps were accomplished 
once per revolution, and over the continental U.S. When possible. 
During revolution 7, the primary 02 tank pressure was observed to 
be rlSlng. The decision was made to relieve the tank pressure into 
the cabin by selecting 02 high-rate rather than venting the pressure 
overboard through the relief valve. The crew was told to relieve the 
pressure when it increased to values between 940 and 960 psi, which is 
below the tested relief valve actuation pressure (980 psi). Later in 
the mission, it was decided to use the cabin repressurization valve to 
relieve the excess tank pressure because application of 02 high-rate 
caused discomfort to the sleeping crewman. 
The UHF air-to-ground communications were degrading steadily until 
revolution 7 over Hawaii where a radio check was performed. The reentry 
and adapter antennas were used in several spacecraft attitudes, and the 
reentry stub antenna appeared to be the best. This antenna was used 
for essentially the remainder of the mission. Air-to-ground remoting 
through some of the stations was frequently marginal except for remoting 
through Bermuda, which was consistently good. 
During the first 47 revolutions, the spacecraft computer memory 
was read and verified by MCC-H each time a preretro update was trans-
mitted to the spacecraft. The preretro updates were uplinked only for 
the primary go-no-go areas. A command load for a landing area for each 
revolution was transmitted to a selected remote site; however, this 
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load would only be uplinked to the spacecraft in the event of an imminent 
reentry. At the beginning of revolution 48, the spacecraft computer was 
turned on and loaded with the 5l-4 reentry parameters from MeC-H. This 
load was not verified by MCC-H until the next revolution because of 
telemetry dropouts and loss-of-signal (LOS). When the attempt was made 
to turn the computer off on revolution 49, a momentary computer malfunc-
tion light was observed and the computer would not shutdown. Approxi-
mately 45 minutes later over Carnarvon, the power switch was placed to 
IIACME II and the main bus current showed a power drop to the computer IIOFF II 
level. During later orbits, numerous attempts were made to restore all 
or part of the computer to normal operation, but they were not successful. 
In response to a theory that the computer had failed due to low tempera-
ture, the IGS power supply was left on for the remainder of the flight 
in an attempt to bring the temperature back up. 
6.l.2.3 Reentry.- As a result of the spacecraft IGS malfunction, 
which precluded the use of the computer, it was necessary to fly an 
open-loop reentry. The decision was made to fly a zero-lift rolling 
reentry to reduce the probable landing area dispersions. The OAMS ret-
roburn was planned to give a retrograde velocity of l28 ft/sec, and to 
have a duration of 2 minutes 40 seconds. This thrusting was planned to 
be accomplished on the basis of time since the computer was not able to 
drive the incremental velocity indicator (IVI) and provide a 6V in-
dication. 
The Hawaii site gave the spacecraft a time hack for the initiation 
of the OAMS retroburn at a g.e.t. of 97:28~02. The duration of this 
burn was timed by Hawaii to be 2 minutes 4l seconds. A quick look at 
the telemetry recording indicated that the burn duration was 2 min-
utes 40.5 seconds. The spacecraft attitudes held within ~ throughout 
the thrusting. The crew was given a countdown to retrofire over Guaymas 
at a g.e.t. of 97:40:02. The retrofire was initiated automatically, and 
was reported by Guaymas to have occurred l second early. All four 
rockets fired, and the attitudes during retrofire were good at -30.80 
pitch, l8cP yaw, and l.gP roll. The estimated blackout times, estimated 
landing area information, and recovery force information were passed to 
the crew by the Mee spacecraft communicator using air-to-ground remoting 
through Texas. 
Telemetry data were solid throughout reentry, except during black-
out, until an altitude of approximately 25 000 feet. Based on calcula-
tions made using real-time telemetry six pounds of propellant were used 
in each ring prior to retrofire and 4.5 pounds of propellant remained 
in each ring at the end of blackout. All of the ReS propellant was 
drained completely 5 seconds prior to drogue deployment. The suit in-
let temperatures rose to 65° during the reentry, and the crew did not 
use O2 high-rate flow. 
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6. 2 NETWORK PERFORMANCE 
The network for the Gemini IV mission went on mission status 
May 23, 1965. Although numerous e~uipment problems were being experi-
enced at that time, the network was ready to support the mission by 
launch day. There were no major network problems or significant losses 
of network support throughout the entire mission. 
6.2.l MCC and Remote Facilities 
The network configuration for the Gemini/IV mission and the type 
of support re~uired for each station are indicated in table 6-1. Fig-
ure 4-2(a) (in section 4.0) shows the network, and figure 6-l shows 
the locations of various network installations at Cape Kennedy. Air-
craft which provided supplementary support but which were not a part 
of the normal network configuration are listed as follows: 
Number of Type of Type of Location 
aircraft aircraft support 
l C-54 Photographic Launch area 
2 F-4c Photographic Launch area 
l HC-97 Weather Launch area 
l EC-l2l Weather Launch area 
3 C-l30 Telemetry Reentry area 
2 C-l30 Voice Relay Reentry area 
Following a number of interface, local checkout, display, and 
remote-circuit tests, the network countdown began at T-430 minutes on 
June 3, 1965. Computer and data-flow integrated subsystem (CADFISS) 
testing and operational readiness and confidence testing (ORACT) were 
repeated during the mission when sites returned to the network from a 
standby condition. 
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6.2.2 Network Facilities 
Because of the length of the mission, no attempt is made to present 
coverage charts. Instead, performance is reported on a negative basis 
by system and site. In general, nominal and actual performance were 
eQuivalent for this mission. 
6.2.2.1 Remote sites.-
6.2.2.1.1 Telemetry: An exercise was conducted to determine the 
duration of telemetry transmission from the launch vehicle. The exercise 
resulted in reception by the Canary Islands; however, the link on 
244.3 megacycles was not observed during revolution lover Carnarvon or 
Texas, and the exercise was terminated after Texas loss-of-signal (LOS). 
Aeromedical remoting from all stations was of good Quality and was ac-
ceptable to the mission operations control room (MOCR) surgeon. Both 
real-time and delayed telemetry were satisfactory with very infreQuent 
drop-outs or serious loss of signal strength. 
6.2.2.1.2 Radar: No major problems were experienced during the 
countdown. During the first day of the mission, it was discovered that 
the Pretoria and Ascension radars were using identification bits which 
were not compatible with the real-time computer complex (RTCC) program. 
The formats were modified and normal operation was resumed. 
The launch-vehicle second stage was skin-tracked by several radars, 
and an accurate time and location were predicted. The launch-vehicle 
second stage reentered at the beginning of revolution 33 at 15.41~ N. 
latitude and 33.836° W. longitude. Merritt Island Launch Area (MILA), 
Patrick AFB, and Grand Bahama Island held track until the second stage 
broke up. The spacecraft also was freQuently skin-tracked by network 
radars. 
Occasionally, tracking drop-outs occurred because of spacecraft 
attitudes during drifting flight, and some C-band data appeared to de-
teriorate during spacecraft delayed-time telemetry transmission. Some 
of the radar aCQuisition data did not take into account local terrain 
masking, and this caused some minor difficulty in aCQuisition. The 
Canary Islands (CYI) radar data had a position bias which is believed 
to be due to a site location error. 
6.2.2.1.3 ACQuisition aids: Both aCQuisition systems at Carnarvon 
experienced a boresight shift because of multipath problems caused by 
excessive rain water standing in the area. The condition prevailed 
for several hours. 
6.2.2.1.4 Command: Four command sites were disabled during ter-
minal countdown for short periods of time, but support was possible 
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in all cases. Texas was disabled for 5 hours because of a faulty air 
valve which controls the switching of the RF to the antennas. The 
Carnarvon digital command system (DeS) B demodulator malfunctioned and 
was disabled for 35 minutes. This limited the DeS to a single trans-
mission path. Module replacement and realinement of the demodulator 
corrected the problem. 
One of the Coastal Sentry Quebec (CSQ) FRW-2 transmitters developed 
a teflon ring short which disabled one transmission path for 2 hours. 
The MCC-C data routing and error detection (DRED) e~uipment was disabled 
for 14 minutes. The cause was undetermined. During the spacecraft com-
puter loading which occurred during the countdown, the output from one 
master digital command system (MDCS) in the MCC-H was not accepted by 
Cape Kennedy DRED e~uipment. Loading was shifted to the other system, 
and loading was then accomplished. 
Mathematical analysis had indicated that interference was possible 
between the Trinidad radar and the Antigua DeS during simultaneous oper-
ation. However, twenty-seven commands were sent to the spacecraft dur-
ing revolution 34 while the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) 
Trinidad radar was tracking, and all commands were accepted without 
retransmission, indicating that this radar may be used on future Gemini 
missions. 
The CSQ experienced a complete power failure for 7 minutes during 
revolution 20 with the result that DeS command loads were not accepted. 
IGS updates, time-to-go-to retrofire (TR), time-to~go-to e~uipment 
reset (TX)' and maneuver loads were regularly transmitted and verified 
without difficulty. 
6.2.2.1.5 Missile trajectory measurement (MISTRAM) system: MISTRAM 
operation was nominal during the powered flight phase. Valkaria was 
active and Eleuthera passive. Valkaria used the rrshort-legs" data be-
cause of difficulty with the long base line systems. 
6.2.2.2 Computing.- The remote site data processors (RSDP) and 
real-time computer complex (RTCC) performed very well. The MSC off-line 
computers in buildings 30 and 12 were disabled twice during the mission 
for 10 to 15 minutes because of MSC commercial power fading. The first 
instance, which occurred during the terminal count, was caused by 
lightning, and the second, which occurred during reentry, was caused by 
a transformer fault. 
6.2.2.3 Communications.-
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6.2.2.3.1 Ground communications: A break in the Air Force Eastern 
Test Range (AFETR) subcable occurred near San Salvador on May 27, 1965, 
and the cable was not operational again until June 5, 1965. During this 
period, spacecraft communications were provided downrange via commercial 
cable. The wideband (40.8 Kc) telemetry capability could not be used, 
but seven selected telemetry channels were remoted via leased line from 
Antigua to Cape Kennedy. No remote command capability existed from 
Grand Turk Island or Antigua while the cable was out. ACQuisition and 
radar data were provided without interruption. 
Tananarive was plagued with local power outages and anticipated 
propagation problems. Presently programed new on-site power generating 
and communications eQuipment will improve operation at this site. 
The Rose Knot Victor (RKV) communications were marginal because of 
propagation difficulties and HF interference with telemetry. Three 
different communications routes were available to the RKV and CSQ. 
Communication Quality in the MCC-H viewing room was poorer than in 
the mission operations control room (MOCR) or staff support rooms (SSR). 
The cause of this difficulty is believed to have been insufficient time 
for adeQuate checkout, testing, and adjustment of the viewing room 
eQuipment. 
6.2.2.3.2 Air-to-ground: Air-to-ground communications were nominal 
throughout the mission and were degraded only because of ground communi-
cation difficulties. On-site eQuipment problems did not prevent air-to-
ground operation when reQuired. The air-to-ground remote keying failed 
to function properly on a number of occasions. Misalinement of eQuip-
ment, procedural problems, and ground communication difficulties con-
tributed to these malfunctions. 
The scheduled HF testing was accomplished during several revolutions 
under both day and night conditions. Results of these tests are being 
evaluated. 
6.2.2.3.3 FreQuency interference: There were a number of RF inter-
ference reports during the count and flight phases of the mission. Al-
though these instances are potential hazards, no loss of support resulted. 
For a detailed evaluation of the spacecraft communication system's 
portion of the total communication system's performance, see section 5.1.2. 
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6.3 RECOVERY OPERATIONS 
6.3.1 Recovery Force Deployment 
The four categories of planned landing areas designated for the 
Gemini IV mission are defined as follows: 
(a) Primary landing areas (supported by an aircraft carrier and 
located in or near the West Atlantic zone). 
(b) Secondary landing areas (East Atlantic, West Pacific, and 
Mid~Pacific zones, including those areas in the West Atlantic zone not 
supported by the carrier). 
(c) launch site landing area. 
( d ) launch abort landing areas. 
Data concerning the deployment of ships and aircraft in planned landing 
areas are provided in table 6-11. Figure 6-2 shows the deployment of 
ships and aircraft in the launch abort landing areas, Figure 6-3 illus-
trates the four worldwide landing zones and the ship support provided 
for each of the numbered landing areas listed in table 6-11. 
The recovery forces were assigned positions in these areas so that 
any point in a particular area could be reached within specified access 
times. The ship and aircraft access times, which varied for the dif-
ferent areas, were based upon the probability of the spacecraft's land-
ing within a given area and the amount of recovery support provided in 
that area. Access time is defined as the elapsed time between the pre-
liminary establishment of the approximate spacecraft landing point and 
the positioning of the recovery ship alongside the spacecraft, or the 
installation of the flotation collar around the spacecraft by para-
rescuemen deployed by an aircraft. It should be emphasized that access 
time is primarily a planning parameter and is based upon favorable oper-
ating conditions. Weather data in the primary landing area during re-
covery are given in section 12.2. 
Sixteen ships, 57 aircraft, 10 helicopters, and various small 
special vehicles were used £or recovery support in the planned landing 
areas. Thirty-nine aircraft were deployed around the world on strip 
alert to provide contingenc~ recovery support and support in the zones 
described in the preceding paragraphs. 
Department of Defense (DOD) routine operational ships and aircraft 
were used for the recovery support. Special equipment, such as retrieval 
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cranes for use aboard destroyers, airborne UHF electronic receivers, 
and spacecraft flotation collars, was furnished to the DOD by NASA. All 
recovery aircraft were e~uipped with UHF receivers to provide the air-
craft with the capability to "home" on the spacecraft UHF location aids. 
These aircraft carried three-man pararescue teams e~uipped to parachute 
to the spacecraft and flight crew and render assistance. Twin turbine 
helicopters (type SH-3A) were provided on board the carrier to transport 
two three~man swimmer teams, flotation collars, and photographers to the 
spacecraft landing point within the primary landing area. Three fixed-
wing carrier-based aircraft were specially configured for communications 
relay in the primary area. Also available were other carrier-based air-
craft to assist search and rescue aircraft and to transport the "on-scene 
commander" to the spacecraft landing point, planned for 27°29' N., 
73°21' W. 
6.3.2 Location and Retrieval 
The recovery forces were informed of flight progress throughout 
the mission. As the orbital ground tracks shifted, updated possible 
landing points were passed to all forces, and recovery ships altered 
positions accordingly. Early in revolution 62 of the flight, the prime 
recovery ship, cvs-18 (U.S.S. Wasp), was informed that the spacecraft 
retrograde rockets would be fired for a landing in area 63-1, the end-
of-mission area, supported by the U.S.S. Wasp. All recovery forces 
providing support in this area were alerted and assumed their "on-
station ll positions as shown in figure 6-3. 
The recovery forces were informed at 97:41 g.e.t. that retrofire 
was nominal and at 97:45 g.e.t. a calculated spacecraft landing position 
(CALREP) was received by the U.S.S. Wasp. This position, given as 
27°44' N., 74°11' W., was approximately 48 nautical miles uprange from 
the position of the U.S.S. Wasp. Seven minutes later the MCC-H recovery 
control center reaffirmed the calculated landing position with a best 
estimate of the spacecraft landing position (DATUMREP). The U.S.S. Wasp 
radar tracked the spacecraft during reentry at a slant range of 330 nau-
tical miles to landing. Upon receipt of the DATUMREP and evaluation of 
initial radar data, all recovery forces in area 63-1 began moving towards 
the predicted landing position (fig. 6-4). The uprange helicopter re-
ceived a signal from the recovery beacon of the spacecraft while it was 
on the main parachute which indicated the spacecraft would land in the 
vicinity of the reported positions. The first visual sighting of the 
spacecraft was reported by the lion-scene commander" from an S-2E air-
craft to be 27°44' N., 74°14' W., at about 97:56 g.e.t., shortly before 
spacecraft landing. Recovery helicopters with swimmers aboard were 
ordered to the scene and arrived over the spacecraft approximately 14 min-
utes after landing (fig. 6-4). The spacecraft flotation collar was 
attached at 98:16 g.e.t., at which time the crew began their egress. 
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Both crew members egressed through the left hatch and into a raft pro-
vided by the swimmers. The crew members were retrieved from the raft 
and taken aboard the helicopter 34 minutes after landing. The recovery 
helicopter landed aboard the U.S.S. Wasp at 98:53 g.e.t. When the space-
craft was picked up, its position was 2~48.3' N., 74°23.2' W. The 
U.S.S. Wasp was alongside the spacecraft at 100:05 g.e.t. and had the 
spacecraft on the deck 7 minutes later (fig. 6-5). At this time, mem-
bers of the recovery team began an examination of the spacecraft and 
started the postlanding procedures. 
Aircraft pilots over the spacecraft immediately after landing re-
ported sighting the main parachute near the spacecraft; however, the 
parachute sank prior to arrival of the swimmers. The rendezvous and 
recovery (R and R) section and drogue parachute were not sighted. 
6.3.3 Recovery Aids 
6.3.3.1 UHF recovery beacon.- Signals from the spacecraft recovery 
beacon were received by the various aircraft as follows: 
Aircraft Time, g. e. t. , Range, n. mi. Receiver Mode hr:min 
Sinclair 52 97:54 25 spp CW 
(SH-3A) 97:54 25 spp Pulse 
Sinclair 54 97:56 60 SPP CW 
(SH-3A) 97:56 60 spp Pulse 
Inkspot 3 97:55 140 SPP CW 
(HC-97) 97:55 140 spp Pulse 
Sinclair 64 97:58 30 ARA-25 
-
(SH-3A) 
EA.-IF 97:53 35. TN-179 ECM 
-
Inkspot 3, the uprange search and rescue aircraft, acquired the 
beacon signal during parachute descent. The signal was lost shortly 
afterward and was regained only 20 miles from the spacecraft. The 
standby helicopter, Sinclair 57, equipped with a SARAH beacon, also 
reported intermittent signal reception from a range of 40 miles; how-
ever, the remainder of the SARAH equipped aircraft reported consistent 
good signal reception. 
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6.3.3.2 HF transmitter.- The HF antenna was erected and lowered 
by the flight crew prior to egress. The flight crew reported making 
HF transmissions in the blind after landing. At the time of writing, 
HF-DF network results obtained by DOD were described as "poor". All 
recovery forces in the landing area submitted negative reports. 
6.3.3.3 UHF transmitter.- Signals from the spacecraft transmitter 
were received by aircraft as follows: 
Aircraft Time, g. e. t., Range, n. mi. Receiver hr:min 
Sinclair 52 98:01 10 ARA-25 
(SH-3A) 
Inkspot 3 98:14 70 ARA-25 
(HC-97) 
Sinclair 64 97:58 30 ARA-25 
(SH-3A) 
Omnibus 97:52 14 ARC-27 
(S-2E) 
EA.-IF 97:44 Unknown ARC-27 
The 70-mile range reported by Inkspot 3 may have been obtained from 
other aircraft over the spacecraft transmittin& on 296.8 mc. The signal 
receptions by the S-2E and the EA-IF did affo~ DF information. 
6.3.3.4 UHF survival radio (Voice and CW, 243.0 mc).- Not used. 
6.3.3.5 Flashing light.- The spacecraft flashing light erected 
properly upon landing, but the light was not activated by the flight 
crew. 
6.3.3.6 Fluorescent sea marker.- The sea-dye marker diffusion was 
profuse on landing and was easily observable by all recovery aircraft 
in the landing area. The maximum range reported was 15 nautical miles 
from an aircraft at an altitude of 15 000 feet. D,ye was still being 
emitted in small quantities as the spacecraft was brought aboard the 
aircraft carrier approximately 2 hours after landing. 
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6.3.4 Postretrieval Procedures 
The spacecraft postretrieval procedures were performed as specified 
in reference 7. All data, film, and equipment were rushed to Cape 
Kennedy and Houston by special flights from the carrier. In addition 
to regular procedures, the equipment bays and skid well doors were opened 
for cleaning and equipment removal. The bays were flushed with fresh 
water, steamed, and air dried. The following items were removed from 
the spacecraft and washed in distilled water: 
Item Part number Serial number 
Computer 52-87710-7 105 
Auxiliary computer power 
unit (ACPU) 52-87723-13 110 
Inertial guidance system (IGS) 
static power supply 52-87717-67 322 
Gimbal control electronics 52-87717-43 409 
Inertial platform 52-87717-75 101 
Inertial measuring unit (DvIU) 
system electronics 52-87717-77 H8/202 
This equipment was packed in special containers, flown to Patrick APE, 
and delivered to the Gemini Program Office (GPO) representative. Post-
retrieval operations proceeded in a normal orderly manner to completion. 
Visual inspection of the spacecraft disclosed no excessive heating 
effects or physical damage. Other postretrieval observations follow. 
(a) The heat shield was burned evenly with no apparent hot spots. 
(Scarred areas on the heat shield near the hoist loop were caused by 
swimmer equipment. ) 
(b) Both windows contained moisture between the glass layers, 
except for a very small strip around the periphery. Small amounts of a 
film were noted on the external surface of the windows. 
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(c) The h~ist loop door which normally opens when the main para-
chute is jettisoned failed to release even though the release pyrotech-
nics had detonated. The swimmers manually removed the door and returned 
it to recovery personnel aboard ship. 
(d) At no time was there any evidence of propellant leakage. 
(e) The spacecraft interior was exceptionally neat and all equip-
ment was stowed. 
(f) The heat-shield stagnation point appeared to be at about the 
same location as that on spacecraft 2. The spacecraft 4 heat shield was 
gray and black at recovery; whereas, the spacecraft 3 heat shield had a 
very white cast at landing. However, after several days of "drying out", 
the spacecraft 4 heat shield became quite white. 
Prior to performing the postretrieval procedures, it was planned 
not to open the right hatch. Later, it became obvious that the right 
biomedical recorder could not be removed unless the right hatch was 
opened. The hatch was then torqued open requiring 37 in-lb to unlock. 
This hatch was later closed, but not locked, for spacecraft return to 
Cape Kennedy. Upon completion of all procedures, the left hatch was 
closed, requiring 380 in-lb to lock. . 
At 13:15 G.m.t. on June 10, 1965, the third day after recovery, the 
Gemini IV crew departed the U.S.S. Wasp (fig. 6-7), which was docked at 
Mayport Naval Station, and boarded an aircraft to return to Houston. 
The spacecraft was off-loaded from the U.S.S. Wasp at Mayport, at 
14:30 G.m.t., June 10, 1965. 
6.3.5 Spacecraft RCS Deactivation 
After off-loading of the spacecraft at Mayport and before trans-
porting the spacecraft back to Cape Kennedy aboard a C-130 aircraft, 
·th~ spacecraft was transported by dolly to a previously selected, well 
isolated area where the reentry control system (RCS) was deactivated. 
It was desired by Kennedy Space Center safety personnel that the RCS 
be decontaminated of propellants to.a level less than 300 parts-per-
million prior to its arrival at Cape Kennedy and its subsequent trans-
portation through and into populated work areas. 
The landing safing team (1ST) that was flown from Cape Kennedy to 
the Mayport Naval Station consisted of NABA and spacecraft contractor 
engineers and technicians. This team, with the required equipment, was 
responsible for deactivating the RCS according to the approved proce-
dures given in reference 8, modified by Procedural Change Notice Number 1, 
dated June 9, 1965'. 
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Deactivation was begun at 15:30 G.m.t. (fig. 6-8). Normal safety 
procedures were observed throughout the operation. Upon receipt of the 
spacecraft, no indication of toxic vapors from any of the 16 RCS thrust 
chamber assemblies (TCA's) was obtained with a portable propellant vapor 
detector. 
Before the pressurant in each ring was relieved to atmospheric 
pressure, the 1ST obtained pressure readings of this source pressure. 
Source pressure readings of 1150 psig and 1185 psig (ambient dry-bulb 
temperature of 81u F) were obtained from rings A and B, respectively. 
Regulator lock-up pressure readings of 295 psig were obtained for both 
rings. The pressures in each ring were then relieved to atmospheric 
pressure through test point 1. Immediately following the source pres-
surant draining operation, the pressurant upstream of the propellant 
bladders and downstream of the system C-package check valves was re-
lieved through test points 4 and 6 by venting through separate scrubber 
units. 
Following the above operations, nitrogen pressure of 50 psig was 
utilized to force the remaining usable propellants of both rings into 
the proper propellant holding containers. When these steps were accom-
plished, the propellant motorized valves were still in the closed posi-
tion so that propellant loss would be minimized. At no time prior to 
or during the flushing operation did a propellant solenoid valve leak 
vapors or flush fluids such as might occur with a valve stuck partially 
open. All the RCS valves appeared to function normally. 
No problems with any electrical components were encountered during 
this deactivation as were encountered during deactivation of spacecraft 2 
and 3. Following completion of the deactivation, the spacecraft was 
transported to Cape Kennedy by C-130 aircraft, arriving there 12:35 G.m.t., 
June 11, 1965. 
Analysis of liquid samples taken from each propellant system indi-
cated that the oxidizer parts-per-million counts were well within the 
Kennedy Space Center safety limits; therefore, the spacecraft was made 
accessible for immediate postflight analysis. 
The propellant-holding containers were taken to Cape Kennedy for 
weight analysis. Weight analysis of the container contents at Cape 
Kennedy indicated that no propellants were drained from either RCS ring. 
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TABLE 6-1.- GEMINI IV NETWORK CONFIGURATION 
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landing area 
launch site: 
Pad 
land 
Water 
(ejected) 
Water 
(spacecraft) 
launch abort: 
A 
B 
C 
D 
West Atlantic 
(end-of-mission 
area 63-1) 
Primary landing 
area: West 
Atlantic zone 1 
UNCLASSIFIED 
TABLE 6-11.- RECOVERY SUPPORT 
Access time 
Aircraft 
15 min 
3 
3 
3 
1 
1 
hr 
Ship 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
Support 
4 LARC (amphibious vehicle) 
2 boats (40 and 50 feet long) with water 
salvage teams 
1 LCD (large landing craft) with space-
craft retrieval capabilities 
2 LVTR (amphibious vehicle with space-
craft retrieval capabilities) 
3 M-113 (tracked land vehicle) 
4 CH-3C (helicopters) (3 with rescue 
teams) 
2 MSO (mine sweepers with salvage 
capabilities) 
1 ATF (deep water salvage ship) with 
spacecraft retrieval capability 
1 CVS (aircraft carrier) with onboard 
aircraft capabilities 
6 DD (destroyers) 
1 AO (oiler) 
7 aircraft on station (2 HC-97 and 
5 HC-54) 
1 CVS (aircraft carrier) from Area A, 
Station 4 
5 JC-130 (3 telemetry and 2 communications 
relay) 
6 SH-3A helicopters (3 location -
2 swimmer, 1 photo) 
2 S-2E (on-scene commander and backup) 
3 EA-lF (Navy communications relay -
1 primary, 2 backup) 
1 EA-lE (radar search) 
2 HC-97 (search and rescue) 
1 CVS (aircraft carrier) from Area A with 
own aircraft (see end-of-mission area) 
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handing area 
Secondary landing 
areas: 
West A.tlantic 
zone 1 
Mid-Pacific 
zone 4 
East Atlantic 
zone 2 
West Pacific 
zone 3 
Contingency 
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TABLE 6-11.- RECOVERY SUPPORT - Concluded 
Access time, hr 
Aircraft Ship 
5 
5 
5 
5 
18 
6 
6 
6 
6 
Support 
1 DD (destroyer) from Area A, Station 3 
1 DD (destroyer) (Southern zone) 
1 AO (fleet oiler) (Northern zone) 
1 DD (destroyer) from Area C, Station 8 
1 DD (destroyer) (1 from Area D,. 
Station 9, supported special areas 
south of zone) 
1 AO (oiler) from Area B, Station 7 
3 DD (destroyers) (1 DD supported 
special areas south of zone) 
39 aircraft on strip alert at worldwide 
staging bases 
Total (including MSO's) 16 ships, 10 helicopters, 57 aircraft 
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Astronaut James A . McDivitt, Command Pilot . 
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NASA- S-65-6686 
Astronaut Edward H. lNhite, n, Pilot. 
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7.0 FLIGHT CREW 
The flight crew's activities during the mission and a summary of 
their preflight training are presented in section 7.1.1. Section 7.1.2 
is a report by the flight crew of the most important aspects of the 
mission. The aeromedical analysis, divided into preflight, inflight, 
postflight phases, is presented in section 7.2. 
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7.1 FLIGHT CREW PERFORMANCE 
7.1.1 Activities 
The crew activities outlineQ in the flight plan were tailored to 
mission objectives which were ambitious during the early revolutions. 
In order to accomplish extravehicular activity (EVA) and rendezvous 
maneuvers in the vicinity of the launch vehicle, it was necessary to 
plan this activity early in the flight because of the predicted differ-
ential orbital decay rates of the two vehicles. It was decided to 
perform station keeping with the launch vehicle during the first two 
revolutions rather than separate during the first revolution and perform 
visual rendezvous maneuvers during the second revolution concurrent 
with spacecraft systems tests and the EVA preparation. 
The separation and maneuver and subsequent rendezvous maneuver 
were planned after EVA on the third and fourth revolutions, respec-
tively. 
Crew performance is discussed in the following paragraphs and 
crew training summary is included at the end of this section. 
7.1.1.1 Prelaunch.- Prelaunch preparations proceeded smoothly, 
and the crew was ready for ingress at the scheduled time of 
T-IOO minutes. The erector problem and resultant launch delay had no 
noticeable effect on crew readiness. During this period, the crew 
performed all required countdown functions and was waiting for lift-off. 
7.1.1.2 Launch and insertion.- The flight crew verified lift-off 
by calling out that the event timer was ITcounting.1T Powered-flight 
events occurred on schedule and were confirmed by the crew as required. 
The crew was well prepared for launch, and no unexpected events oc-
curred during this phase of the mission. 
7.1.1.3 Station-keeping maneuvers.- The crew members I account of 
the station-keeping maneuvers is contained in section 7.1.2 of this 
report, and a detailed evaluation of the exercise is included in 
section 4.3.1.3. Therefore, the chronology will n6t be repeated here. 
The command pilot did not achieve close-up station keeping with the 
second stage of the launch vehicle, initially as a result of insuffi-
cient translation thrust application to effect a zero relative velocity 
or a closing velocity immediately after separation. The difficulty in 
nulling relative velocity was increased as a result of the earth's 
being viewed as a background rather than the sky. Also, a 3-ft/sec 
retrograde velocity which was not predicted prior to the flight was 
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imparted to the launch vehicle as a result of the separation maneuvers. 
The difficulty in estimating range rate of a tumbling vehicle was an 
additional factor in the difficulty encountered in achieving close-up 
station keeping. In addition, the crew was required to perform thi p 
complex task immediately after insertion before they became accustomed 
to the new environment, and they were also required to aline the plat-
form which diverted their attention from the station-keeping tasks. 
All of these factors contributed to the failure of the close-up a& 1 lin" 
station-keeping exercise. 
The preflight flight plan was essentially followed up to the time 
of terminating the station-keeping phase of the mission. Starting 
with the second revolution, the flight plan was revised because of the 
low fuel status and elimination of launch vehicle rendezvous in con-
junction with EVA. Periodic flight-plan updates were made throughout 
the mission, depending primarily upon the current fuel status. The 
flight plan as revised and accomplished in the mission is presented 'in 
figure 7.1-1. 
7.1.1.4 Extravehicular activity.- The flight crew began preparing 
for the pilot's egress at 01:35:00 g.e.t. The preparation began 
approximately 10 minutes earlier than planned because of the abandonment 
of launch-vehicle rendezvous, and was accomplished with direct refer-
ence to the egress preparation checklist. As the scheduled egress time 
approached during the second revolution, it was apparent to the flight 
crew that sufficient time was not available to perform the necessary 
tasks adequately; therefore, they requested that EVA be delayed until 
the following revolution. 
Spacecraft depressurization and hatch opening were accomplished, 
and the pilot was given permission to exit the spacecraft over Hawaii. 
He left the spacecraft solely by use of the maneuvering gun and 
proceeded forward and slightly up from the spacecraft, maneuvering with 
no difficulty. The pilot used the same maneuvering technique as that 
used in training Simulations, which proved to be very effective. As 
predicted, the pilot had some difficulty in attempting to position 
himself relative to the spacecraft by use of the umbilical alone. The 
umbilical had a tendency to position the pilot over the adapter section 
of th~ spacecraft. 
The pilot had no difficulty in orientation during EVA and maneuver-
ing by using the spacecraft as a reference. The command pilot 
maintained spacecraft orientation using pulse mode while the pilot was 
in sight. The command pilot did not attempt to stabilize the space-
craft while the pilot was out of sight to insure that no thruster 
firing would occur while the pilot was near the thrusters. 
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Excellent photographic coverage was obtained during EVA by use of 
both a 16-mm sequence camera mounted on the adapter assembly by the 
pilot, and the'16-mm sequence camera operated by the command pilot. 
Additional still photographs were obtained by the command pilot with 
the 70-mm still camera. The still photographs with the 35-mm camera 
taken by the pilot were only partially successful because of the inter-
ference of the equipment lanyards and the umbilical. 
The pilot was outside the spacecraft for approximately 22 minutes. 
He began to ingress before loss of signal at Bermuda (BDA) and com-
pleted ingress several minutes later after retrieving the umbilical 
and associated EVA equipment. The flight crew overcame hatch closing 
difficulties by uSing closing techniques practiced during training 
and experience gained in the altitude chamber tests at the spacecraft 
contractor's facility and zero-g flights in the KC-135 aircraft. The 
crew did not reopen the hatch to eject equipment because of the hatch 
closing difficulty. 
7.1.1.5 Crew station housekeeping.- The mission objectives and 
the extended length of the Gemini IV flight required well-defined 
crew coordination together with rigorous crew station housekeeping. 
The assumption of spacecraft control and the changing of the command 
from one crew member to the other in relation to sleep-work cycles 
required considerable briefing and exchange of information to assure 
continuity of the mission and spacecraft status. 
The flight crew were successful in adapting to the work cycle and 
were able to successfully accomplish assigned tasks throughout the 
mission. The flight crew were also able to overcome the problem of 
excessive stowage caused by retention of EVA equipment by using all 
available room in the foot well and systematically relocating items 
as required during flight. 
The sleep periods were unsatisfactory because of the necessary 
changes to the flight plan, and this part of flight planning must be 
given more attention in future long-duration missions. 
7.1.1.6 Operational checks.- Several operational checks and 
procedures were scheduled to be performed beginning in revolution 44 
and ending in revolution 45. Those of importance from the standpoint 
of flight crew operations are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
7.1.1.6.1 Night Apollo yaw orientation check: This operation 
required approximately 2 minutes 35 seconds from the time the rates 
were applied to completion of the check. Approximately 2 minutes 
20 seconds were required for the command pilot to orient the space-
craft from an unusual position with small rates to retrofire attitude 
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with zero rates. The recovery technique used by tbe command pilot was: 
first, find the horizon by going into roll; then pitch-down to deter-
mine direction of motion; roll heads up; and then pitch-up to retrofire 
attitude. Another technique would have been to pitch-down (if not al-
ready in this position) toward the earth to determine yaw, then orient 
directly to retrofire attitude. Final pitch and roll attitudes were 
quite exact; however, yaw attitude was approximately 20° away from that 
desired. The maneuver could have been done in a shorter time, if fuel 
conservation had not been reqUired. 
7.1.1.6.2 Attitude thruster failure check: The attitude thruster 
failure check was nominal. The rates were as expected and control of 
the spacecraft was similar to that which had been programed into the 
Gemini mission simulator. 
7.1.1.6.3 Apollo landmark investigations: Factors influencing 
the accomplishment of the Apollo landmark investigation were weather 
over the landmarks and fuel conservation requirements. The large 
propellant consumption during the first revolution initially limited 
this investigation to free drifting attitudes. Later in the mission, 
the flight crew were given several new landmarks to be investigated 
and spacecraft attitude control was then allowed. The pulse mode of 
control was used for the task with excellent results. The following 
paragraphs summarize the landmark investigations performed and the 
results of each. 
Nile River intersection - This investigation was accomplished by 
the pilot during the free drifting portion of the mission. Identifica-
tion of the photographs of this landmark are not completed. The 
spacecraft ground track was 92 nautical miles from the landmark at the 
closest point. The pilot reported that the landmark was very easy to 
find and that the charts provided were satisfactory for locating this 
type of landmark. 
Agadir, Morocco; Wheelus Air Force Base, Libya; Alexandria, Egypt; 
and Dhahran, Saudi Arabia - These landmarks were given to the crew 
during the mission to test their ability to locate and track a series 
of landmarks appearing sequentially along the ground track. The pilot 
attempted the series and reported that the landmarks were so close to-
gether that there was not enough time between landmarks for necessary 
preparation. Sighting of Agadir, Morocco, was not attempted, and 
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, and Wheelus Air Force Base, Libya, were over-
cast. Alexandria, Egypt, was acquired and photographed. The flight 
crew did not sight the Alexandria airport, although they had seen.it on 
previous revolutions. Positive identification of this landmark has not 
yet been made on the photographs. 
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El Paso, Texas - This landmark was a very difficult one to eval-
uate. The charts were not satisfactory for this type of landmark. The 
lack of water, white sands, or other contrasting colors on the charts 
precluded acquisition of the landmark before the spacecraft was di-
rectly over it. The crew therefore elected to locate and track another 
landmark since they had already used fuel to set up for this task. The 
c'rew tracked and photographed the channel between two sand spits on the 
Gulf of Mexico near Corpus Christi, Texas. This landmark was tracked 
approximately ±300 from the nadir point. The landmark was identified 
as the channel at the north end of Matagorda Club Island just south of 
Port O'Conner, Texas. The tracking was accomplished with excursions of 
1 0 or less using the pulse mode of control. 
Tel Aviv and Haifa, Israel - These landmarks were given to the crew 
during flight. The landmarks at closest approach were within 1° of each 
other. The pilot reported that this landmark was very easy to acquire 
and track. Haifa, Israel, which has more discernible geographic fea-
tures, was located before Tel Aviv, Israel, and therefore tracked. The 
pilot reported seeing a small circular airport at Haifa. The crew 
reported that the onboard charts were satisfactory for this type of 
landmark and provided good contrast since the landmark was near a 
coast line. Photographs of Haifa were obtained. 
Yuma, Arizona - The command pilot reported this landmark difficult 
to locate. The film indicates, however, that a good investigation 
was made. The command pilot first sighted the Salton Sea, then swept 
across and sighted El Centro and U.S. Highway 80, proceeded to the 
Colorado River, and then to Yuma. The airport was located with some 
difficulty and was tracked with less than 1° attitude excursions using 
the 16-mm camera with the 75-mm lens. The command pilot reported that 
the best landmark nearest Yuma was the Salton Sea, approximately 
150 miles away. 
Cairo, Egypt - This landmark had been observed previously by the 
crew prior to performing the investigation. The sequence of landmarks 
used to locate the Cairo International Airport was first to track the 
Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea; the Suez Canal was then located and 
followed to the bottom of the Nile River delta and the airport. Al-
though the tracking was within 1° of accuracy, the airport that was 
tracked does not appear to be the Cairo International Airport. The 
city of Cairo is not discernible on the film. It appears that the 
pilot was tracking the airport located at Bilbeis, approximately 
20 nautical miles northeast of the Cairo airport. Another airport 
appeared at the bottom of the film during tracking and was tentatively 
identified as an airport near Shibin el Qanatir, approximately 11 nau-
tical miles north-northeast of the Cairo airport. Although numerous 
color contrasts are available near this landmark, a lack of this 
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information on the charts could easily have detracted from the desired 
landmark. A very large area of vegetation was seen on the film, which 
was not shown on the charts. 
Basra,Iraq - Basra, Iraq, was reported to be a very easy land-
mark to identify, and the airfield was a very predominant feature. 
Charts were reported as satisfactory for this landmark. The command 
pilot tracked this airfield within 1° of accuracy although the film 
indicates that he actually tracked the Shaibah airfield, located ap-
proximately 12 miles southeast of the intended landmark. Landmark 
information on the onboard maps was not adequate to permit positive 
identification of the Basra airfield. 
Landmark investigation summary - The onboard charts used were 
satisfactory for locating some, but not all, of the landmarks. More 
color contrast and aerial photographs used in conjunction with these 
charts would be helpful. The method of calling up landmark information 
was satisfactory. Surrounding landmark information used for locating 
a specific landmark was satisfactory for most of the targets, but 
could be improved. The reticle light intensity was too dim for day-
time tracking of landmarks. Crew performance was very good. Multiple 
axis tracking using the pulse mode of control was usually performed 
within 10 of attitude accuracy. 
7.1.1.7 Control system and platform alinements.-
7.1.1.7.1 Control system: Operation of the orbital attitude and 
maneuver system (OAMS) during the mission was nominal. Crew perform-
ance and technique in the use of different modes of operation through-
out the orbital phase of the mission were very satisfactory. The 
flight crew used fuel very conservatively while performing experiments 
and operational checks with the pulse or direct modes of control. The 
spacecraft was controlled within a few degrees of intended attitudes 
and provided good results in all attempted operational checks and 
experiments. Landmarks were tracked to within 1° of accuracy using 
the pulse mode of control. 
7.1.1.7.2 Platform alinement: The platform was alined on four 
different occasions during the flight. Alinement accuracies were 
excellent, particularly the first alinement after insertion and the 
final alinement for the end-of-mission OAMS retromaneuver and retrofire. 
A maximum error of 6° in yaw occurred during an alinement on the night-
side of an orbit. This error probably occurred because other flight-
plan activities interfered with the maneuver, and alinement was not 
considered critical for the test involved. This flight established 
quite definitely that a very accurate platform alinement can be 
accomplished (1° of error or less) during either day or night conditions, 
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if the crew concentrates solely on the alinement maneuver. (See sec-
tion 5.1.5.2.2 for details on platform alinement. ) 
7.1.1.8 Retrofire and reentry.- The preparation for the reentry 
phase of the flight began approximately 3 hours before retrofire and re-
quired all of the flight crew's time until this event. This was primar-
ily due to the difficulty in getting all of the equipment stowed. Proper 
equipment stowage was achieved to prevent interference in case of post-
reentry ejection, and all preretrofire checklists were completed. The 
crew accomplished a very good platform alinement considerable in advance 
of retrofire time. 
The OAMS retromaneuver was initiated at 12 minutes prior to retro-
fire and continued for a period of 2 minutes 40 seconds. The command 
pilot held the spacecraft attitudes within 1° throughout this maneuver 
using the rate command control mode. The crew had no indication of the 
actual 6V resulting because the computer was inoperative. (See sec-
tion 4.3 for detailed results of the OAMS retromaneuver. ) 
The command pilot held the spacecraft within ±lo of proper retrofire 
attitude (180° yaw, _30° pitch) throughout the retrofire maneuver using 
the rate command mode and the flight director indicator. Pitch Was main-
tained at near _31° for most of this maneuver, which, in conjunction with 
the 1.3-second time error (see section 5.1.6) resulted in approximately a 
10-mile uprange error. (Section 4.3 gives a complete discussion on land-
ing error. ) 
The crew was instructed to fly a rolling reentry because of the IGS 
malfunction which prevented the computer from being used for navigation. 
It was verified prior to communications blackout that the spacecraft 
would land approximately 50 miles short. 
The reentry proceeded fairly smoothly using reentry rate command. 
The command pilot inserted a 15 deg/sec left roll after which he reported 
that he disengaged the roll rate gyro. (Ed note: The roll rate gyro was 
disengaged 44 seconds prior to setting up the. roll rate.) The roll rate 
gradually increased throughout the reentry, reaching a maximum of 64 deg/ 
sec at drogue parachute deployment. The command pilot made no further 
attempt to control the roll rate; however, the crew had no direct indica-
tion of the buildup in roll. The pilot did note that the upper right 
thruster was firing almost continuously throughout the reentry and cor-
rectly analyzed the thruster failure problem existing in the ReS system. 
(See section 5.1.8 for details on reentry control system operation.) 
Pitch and yaw oscillation rates were fairly low until drogue para-
chute deployment. The crew reported that it appeared that the space-
craft would have remained stable without control inputs. They observed 
the retroadapter burn up during reentry and noted that it remained in a 
stable attitude. 
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The crew were prepared for the single-point release as a result of 
the GT-3 crew experience. Both crew members had their shoulder harness 
locked, hands against the window, and head braced on the arm in prepara-
tion for this event. The crew reported that this operation was satis-
factory. 
7.1.1.9 Recovery.- The recovery operation proceeded quite smoothly. 
The crew were reasonably comfortable for the approximately 20 minutes they 
spent in the spacecraft after landing. All postflight crew functions were 
completed. Exit from the spacecraft and crew retrieval by the helicopter 
were performed without difficulty. Although the recovery operation was 
quite normal, the crew believed they would have been able to perform suc-
cessful egress and recovery under much more severe recovery conditions. 
7.1.1.10 Mission training and training evaluation.- The flight crew 
training was accomplished generally as planned and outlined in refer-
ence 9. Spacecraft familiarity and proficiency were obtained by crew 
participation in spacecraft systems tests and task simulation as de-
scribed in the following paragraphs. 
7.1.1.10.1 Spacecraft tests: Each member of the flight crew spent 
approximately 60 hours in spacecraft 4 during the major systems tests at 
the spacecraft contractor's facility and at Cape Kennedy. 
7.1.1.10.2 Gemini mission simulator: The flight crew started train-
ing in the Gemini mission simulator on November 30, 1964. Each member of 
the prime crew spent approximately 130 hours in the mission simulator, 
and each of the backup crew spent approximately 105 hours. Approximately 
30 hours of this training was accomplished by each member of the prime 
crew and backup crew wearing the Gemini pressure suits. 
7.1.1.10.3 Special and part-task training activities: The flight 
crew completed several training programs to give them experience with as 
many of the space flight conditions as possible. Some of the more impor-
tant training activities are described in the following paragraphs. 
Parachute - Each flight crew member completed several parachute tows 
with attendant release and drop onto land and in the water to prepare them 
for a possible mode I abort simulation. 
Egress training - The flight crew received spacecraft water egress 
practice in the flotation tank at Ellington AFB, Texas, and in the Gulf 
of Mexico using test spacecraft. Training consisted of briefings, films, 
demonstrations on use of egress and survival equipment, and practice in 
"shirt sleeves" as well as with full egress equipment. 
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Centrifuge - The flight crew participated in two Gemini centrifuge 
programs conducted at the Naval Air Development Center, Johnsville, 
Pennsylvania. During these programs, the crew experienced launch and 
reentry acceleration profiles and controlled the spacecraft during 
normal and selected abort simulations. 
Extravehicular activity (EVA) and zero gravity training - The 
flight crew made two trips to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base for 
zero-gravity flight training in the KC-135 aircraft. During these 
training flights, the crew practiced food and waste management, hatch 
opening and closing, and egress and ingress in pressurized Gemini suits. 
The pilot made an additional trip for further EVA training with an EVA 
suit. Familiarization with the EVA environmental control equipment 
was gained in the crew-station mock-up and in altitude-chamber work 
at MSC. Training in the operation of the hatch latching mechanism 
was accomplished during altitude chamber tests, zero-gravity flights, 
and personal inspection of the mechanism. In addition, a special 
briefing was given by systems engineers to the flight crew on the hatch 
latching mechanism design and operation, possible problem areas and 
malfunctions, and corrective actions necessary. Space propulsion 
training was accomplished during five sessions on the MSC frictionless 
platform which also included a simulation of tether line dynamics. 
Engineering simulator at spacecraft contractorfs facility - The 
command pilot developed and practiced visual rendezvous procedures on 
the engineering simulator at the spacecraft contractorfs facility. 
This simulator, which provided a view of the target vehicle with a 
star background, was programed for the last 6 miles of the rendezvous 
maneuver. 
Launch abort training - Each flight crew member partiCipated in 
three launch abort simulation programs on the moving-base simulator. 
This simulator permitted the flight crew to experience some of the 
vibration cues in conjunction with various abort situations and 
definition of optimum abort procedures for a wide variety of launch 
vehicle or spacecraft systems malfunctions. 
Planetarium - The crew made three trips to the Morehead Planetarium, 
Chapel Hill, North Carolina, to review the entire celestial sphere, 
and, in particular, those portions near the orbital track. The primary 
purpose of this training was for backup spacecraft orientation and 
navigation in case of inertial platform or communications failure. 
Briefings - The crew received formal systems briefing of 2 or more 
days each at Houston, Texas; St. Louis, Missourij and Cape Kennedy, 
Florida. Two experiments briefings were conducted at MSC and a short 
experiments review was conducted at Kennedy Space Center. In addition, 
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the crew participated in many informal systems briefings in conjunction 
with various training activities. Flight-plan reviews were conducted 
on a periodic basis throughout their preflight training program. 
7.1.1.10.4 Evaluation of training: The flight-crew performance 
indicated a high level of proficiency in spacecraft systems knowledge, 
spacecraft operation, and accomplishment of planned mission objectives. 
The training received during the preflight period ade~uately prepared 
the flight crew to perform the critical activities associated with 
launch, orbital, and reentry phases. The extension of the EVA and the 
inclusion of the station-keeping exercise and rendezvous maneuvers 
with the second stage of the launch vehicle re~uired the flight crew 
to accomplish additional training shortly before the flight. 
Training for the EVA portion of the mission was ade~uate, and the 
crew was well prepared for this phase of the mission. They were able 
to cope with difficulties encountered with hatch closing as a result 
of thorough training. 
No simulation training was accomplished to prepare the crew for 
the station-keeping exercise. The crews were briefed on the station-
keeping procedure during the last days prior to flight. The resulting 
failure to achieve close-up station keeping indicates that the briefings 
were not an ade~uate substitute for training for this portion of the 
mission. Applicati?n of what was learned during the station-keeping 
exercise should greatly increase the probability of successful rendez-
vous and docking in the next rendezvous mission. 
Although the rendezvous portion of the mission was not attempted, 
training was conducted for the rendezvous with the second stage of 
the launch vehicle using the rendezvous simulator at the spacecraft 
contractor's facility and the translation and docking trainer at MSC. 
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7.1.2 Pilots' Report 
7.1.2.1 Prelaunch.- The prelaunch training and crew participation 
in spacecraft testing progressed smoothly and logically. The medical 
examinations, however, appeared to be out of se~uence. The F-2 day 
examination was a major one, while that on F-IO days was relatively 
minor. The major examination by its very nature causes discomfort and 
could prevent the crew's being ready for flight. In addition, this 
examination is time consuming in a period when time is very critical to 
flight preparation. 
On the morning of the launch, the operations in the crew ~uarters 
and the transfer to the suiting area with the prebreathing e~uipment 
were satisfactory. The suiting and transfer to the oxygen system of 
the suit were accomplished with only minor breaks in the oxygen pre-
breathing. Transfer to the launch pad and ingress were also satisfactory. 
The cockpit procedures before launch went smoothly, except when one of 
the valves on the water management panel had to be repositioned after 
the hatches were closed. For this operation the command pilot had to 
loosen his straps, reposition the valve with the swizzle stick, and then 
resume his launch position in the spacecraft. The only interruption to 
the normal countdown procedure was the 1 hour 15 minute hold caused 
by the malfunctioning erector. This delay did not cause any excessive 
crew discomfort. 
Preflight communications re~uired the volume controls for both 
crew stations to be turned fully up. This caused some concern because 
the flight crew was communicating with a site only a short distance 
away and would shortly be re~uired to use the same system from much 
greater ranges. Throughout the count, and especially during the hold, 
the crew was ade~uately informed of the status. During the last 3 minutes, 
the crew was receiving communications from three sources: the Spacecraft 
Conductor, the Booster Test Conductor, and the Cape Spacecraft Communi-
cator. In addition, two unsyncronized countdowns were conducted between 
T-IO seconds and lift-off. As a result, there was an excessive amount 
of chatter, and the flight crew had difficulty in understanding all three 
communicators. 
The only surprising occurrence in the countdown was the very loud 
noise and extreme vibrations associated with opening the prevalves of 
the launch vehicle. 
7.1.2.2 Powered flight.- The flight crew could hear and feel the 
engines start; and although lift-off was very smooth, they could feel 
it. As the Gemini launch vehicle accelerated, the noise and vibration 
built up smoothly and then stopped abruptly as the vehicle attained 
supersonic speed. The vibrations at maximum dynamic pressure were 
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somewhat greater than expected. Just before BECO, the command pilot 
noticed a very slight low-level longitudinal oscillation (POGO) effect, 
but it was not objectionable; the pilot did not notice the effect. 
Although the sky was cloudless, it provided visual cues to the 
,roll and pitch maneuver of the vehicle. The position of the sun relative 
to the window and moving shadows in the cockpit provided additional cues. 
The clock started at lift-off, and the tank pressure gages changed 
slightly. The roll and pitch programs occurred as expected. The cabin 
vented at 5.5 psi, and the digital command system (DCS) updates were 
received on time. At BECO, which occurred normally and on time, the 
acceleration decreased rapidly but smoothly. Stage I separation, stage II 
ignition, and stage II powered flight were very smooth. The stage II 
fuel pressure remained high, and the oxidizer pressure dropped slowly 
until SECO, as expected. 
During stage I flight, the rates and attitude errors remained very 
small. After BECO, at guidance initiate, the pitch-attitude error went 
full scale and was steered out quickly with very small rates as expected. 
Late in stage II flight, a very small rate oscillation of about 
~ deg/sec appeared on the rate needles. It was obvious that the vehicle 
was not diverging, but the oscillation could be felt slightly. The 
pitch-attitude error needle began to deviate very late in powered flight, 
and at shut-down it was indicating less than 1° pitch-down. The maximum 
acceleration was 7.5g, but it was in no way objectionable. 
7.1.2.3 Insertion.- After SECO, the Gemini launch vehicle rates 
were very low, about ~ deg/sec or less. The command pilot fired two or 
three short bursts with the maneuver thrusters to damp these rates to 
even lower values. The crew could hear the lateral thrusters firing 
during this time. The lVI's counted up at SEC0+20, and at SECO+30 a 
5-second separation maneuver was performed. Although the crew attempted 
to separate straight ahead with no attitude control inputs, the space-
craft felt as if it separated asymmetrically with a rotational velocity. 
As on the GT-3 mission, the flight crew were unable to hear the aft-
firing thrusters during separation. Later, the crew were unable to 
hear these thrusters when the lVI's were indicating definite operation. 
The crew rolled to a heads-up position, and because of the lack of time 
before turnaround, the crew read the lVI's in an arbitrary attitude 
rather than with the pitch-attitude needle nulled. The IVI readings 
were 20 ft/sec forward, 11 ft/sec right, and 5 ft/sec down. As soon as 
the crew was in an upright position, the turnaround began, and the 
fairings were jettisoned. During the turnaround, a great amount of 
debris was visible on all sides of the spacecraft. The insertion check 
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list was started during turnaround and completed shortly thereafter. 
The 2-1 update was received, and the crew was informed that the orbit 
was 87 nautical miles at perigee and 153 nautical miles at apogee. 
7.1.2.4 Orbital phase.-
7.1.2.4.1 Station keeping: After separation and turnaround, the 
launch-vehicle second stage came into view at 200 to 500 feet behind the 
spacecraft and to the left of a line pointing back along the spacecraft 
track. The second stage was clearly visible against the dark sky, and 
the flashing lights were also clearly visible. The engine skirt was 
visible and appeared to be intact. The flight crew pointed the space-
craft at the second stage and thrusted for about 6 seconds. The crew 
did not have time to place the computer in catch-up mode before starting 
to thrust, but managed to place it there after about 2 or 3 seconds of 
thrust. The lVI's then counted up to 3 ft/sec. It appeared that the 
spacecraft and second stage were still separating; therefore, the crew 
thrusted for an additional 4 or 5 seconds. At that time, it appeared 
that the relative velocity was zero, or that the spacecraft was closing 
slightly. The spacecraft was then approximately 600 or 700 feet from 
the launch vehicle, and the crew started to aline the platform. Shortly 
after the crew began the alinement, the launch vehicle started to drop 
down below the spacecraft and finally went out of sight. The crew then 
thrusted down with the top thruster and waited about a minute more in 
the alining attitude. They then pitched down to sight the launch vehicle 
and found that it had dropped much further below than they had expected. 
It was difficult to see the launch vehicle against the earth background. 
The crew quickly returned to the alining attitude and placed the plat-
form in orbit rate. The crew then retrothrusted for about 3 seconds 
and pitched the spacecraft down again to reacquire the launch vehicle, 
which was approximately 1000 feet below the spacecraft. At this point, 
two choices were available: One choice was to retrothrust to a different 
orbit and to attempt a rendezvous; the other was to force the spacecraft 
toward the launch vehicle by using the orbital attitude and maneuver 
system (OAMS) to overcome the relative velocities resulting from the now 
different orbits. Because of the time constraints of the flight plan, 
the brute force method was selected. The launch vehicle stayed below 
the spacecraft at a range of approximately 1200 feet as the spacecraft 
entered darkness. The launch vehicle disappeared in seconds as it entered 
darkness, and the flashing lights became visible. The crew continued to 
thrust both at the launch vehicle and in retrograde with most of the 
thrusting being at the launch vehicle. Just prior to Carnarvon, the crew 
had finally forced the spacecraft to an altitude approximately the same 
as the launch vehicle at a close range. Both flashing lights were inter-
mittently visible throughout the maneuvers, and the distance between 
these lights gave some reference for judging range and range rate. The 
spacecraft was obviously getting close to the launch vehicle, and the 
crew fired a short burst to decrease the closing velocities. At about 
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that time, the launch vehicle tumbling, which had reached a rate of 
40 to 50 deg/sec, caused one of the lights to disappear. After that 
time, the crew was forced to judge range and range rate by the brightness 
of the single visible flashing light. This was extremely difficult to 
do, and the crew did not have a good estimate of range until the launch 
vehicle passed into sunlight. At that time, the launch vehicle was 
approximately 2 miles away, and its outline was visible below the space-
craft. During this daylight phase, the launch vehicle passed over a 
background of water, clouds, and land and was difficult to see at ranges 
greater than 1 mile. In thrusting toward it, the crew found that they 
could not close on it with a reasonable amount of fuel, and the range 
appeared to increase. The crew reported to the flight controllers that 
they could only close on the launch vehicle by a major expenditure of 
fuel; therefore, they recommended abandoning the station-keeping activity. 
Shortly thereafter, the crew was told to abandon the exercise. At that 
time, the launch vehicle was below and ahead of the spacecraft at a 
range of approximately 3 miles. Section 4.3 contains a detailed discus-
sion of the station-keeping exercise. 
7.1.2.4.2 Extravehicular activity: The extravehicular activity 
(EVA) preparations started during the first revolution and continued into 
the second. As the crew approached the end of the checklist and the 
spacecraft neared Carnarvon, they realized that they had been rushing and 
although they could probably begin the EVA on schedule, they believed 
that the best decision was to delay the EVA for one revolution and to 
repeat the preparations more thoroughly. During the third revolution, 
the crew went back through the checklist item for item and completed it 
with about 15 minutes to spare. The permission to begin the EVA was 
given by the Carnarvon station, and the command pilot immediately started 
to depressurize the spacecraft. Depressurization was stopped at 2 psi 
for a final suit integrity check and then continued to a vacuum. The 
pilot opened the spacecraft hatch and mounted the outside 16-mm camera, 
mounted the umbilical guard on the hatch sill, and assembled the maneu-
vering unit and camera. Although these operations were relatively simple, 
they did demonstrate the capability of man in a pressurized suit to work 
effectively outside the spacecraft. These operations took 4 or 5 minutes, 
and shortly thereafter the Hawaii station gave the pilot permission to 
egress from the spacecraft. The pilot then turned on the outside 16-mm 
camera, and left it on until the film was expended. The pilot took 
special care to depart the spacecraft under the sole influence of the 
maneuvering unit. The pilot translated to a point 15 or 16 feet from 
the spacecraft and used the maneuvering unit to stop his motion. He 
spent the next 4 minutes in translating back and forth to the spacecraft 
two times and demonstrating various pitching and yawing maneuvers. The 
capability of using the maneuvering unit to move from one specific point 
to another was clearly demonstrated during this time. The control tech-
nique used with the maneuvering unit was short bursts of pulse mode. 
While the pilot was demonstrating controlled flight with the maneuvering 
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uni t, the command pilot maintained the spacecraft atoti tude fixed using 
the pulse control mode. This was done so that the command pilot would 
know exactly when the thrusters were firing so that no thrusting would 
be done while the pilot was near the thrusters. 
The pilot used the spacecraft as a visual orientation reference. 
The three-dimensional spacecraft provided a satisfactory reference at 
all times and the pilot experienced no disorientation. 
The pilot spent the rest of the time making general observations 
and investigating tether dynamics. The open hatch provided a center of 
operations and a few hand holds. From the beginning, it was obvious 
that the location of the tether attachment was not optimum for opera-
tions in front of the spacecraft. The attachment of the tether to the 
sill of the hatch tended to force the pilot to operate perpendicular 
to the hatch area rather than out in front of the spacecraft as was 
desired. Every time the pilot managed to maneuver to the front of the 
spacecraft, the tether carried him in a large arc up over the top of the 
spacecraft and back into the adapter area. It also became apparent 
that it was difficult for the pilot to push off at an angle from a sur-
face. Not only did the spacecraft tend to pitch down under the force 
when the pilot was pushing off, but the general direction of the pilot's 
motion tended to be perpendicular to the surface. Although control with 
the tether was marginal, it was quite easy to return to the hatch area 
using it. At no time during the EVA activities did the pilot make any 
high velocity contacts with the spacecraft. All contacts were gentle. 
During brief contacts with the spacecraft surfaces, the pilot did not 
notice any extremes of temperature through his gloves. During most of 
the tether operation, the command pilot let the spacecraft drift to pre-
clude firing the thrusters while the pilot was in the close vicinity of 
the thruster nozzles. The pilot made excursions to the full length of 
the tether on numerous occasions. He executed brisk push-offs from the 
spacecraft which resulted in spacecraft rates of up to 2 deg/sec. During 
the operations in a vacuum, both pilots noticed a definite decrease in 
suit temperature but the level was not uncomfortable. Vision through 
the three visors was excellent. The sun visor provided adequate and 
needed protection when the pilot looked into the sun while mounting the 
16-mm camera. From that time on the visor was left down and offered 
no impairment to the remainder of the extravehicular activities. 
The pilot examined the spacecraft and the adapter quite closely. 
The thermal tape and velcro piece placed on the adapter before launch 
were still intact. The adapter separation plane had a good cut, but 
the edges were somewhat rough. 
Once the pilot brushed up against the left window and caused two 
apparent smears on it. From the inside, the smears looked like black 
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paint; and from the outside, they had a smooth mirror-like surface. 
Later, the presence of a film and particles on the window could be 
detected when the sun shone on the window from certain angles. Evi-
dently, the smears were actually areas on the window where the film 
had been brushed off. 
While the pilot was outside the spacecraft, the VOX was constantly 
keying the transmitter and blocking the receiver. When the command 
pilot switched to continuous interphone and push-to-talk, the ground 
was able to give the order to return to the spacecraft. The prepara-
tions that the pilot had made to get ready for the EVA activities had 
to be made in reverse order to return to the spacecraft. He did these 
in a slow and deliberate, orderly fashion. 
The suit was a little bulkier and stiffer than the pilot was 
accustomed to, and he needed a little extra time to get down and into 
the seat. The gain and the drive lever had been placed in the lock 
position; however, the hatch handle was loose and would not exert any 
torque. It was obvious that the normal method of pulling down on the 
canvas strap with the left hand and actuating the hatch handle with the 
right hand would not work. Instead, the gain pawl was actuated in con-
junction with the hatch handle. With the command pilot using the bar 
and lanyard closing device, the pilot and the command pilot were able 
to close the hatch successfully. It is felt that the extensive training 
and briefing on the hatch aided materially in successfully coping with 
this malfunction. Section 5.l.l contains a detailed discussion of this 
problem. 
The following comments are made concerning the equipment used 
during EVA. The sun visor tended to rotate behind the helmet and get 
between the helmet and the head rest. In addition, the dual visor did 
not seem necessary; the sun visor alone would have been adequate. 
There was no tendency for the visor to cloud up. The ventilation con-
trol module operated properly as did the rest of the associated equipment. 
The flow to the suit was adequate, except for two times when the pilot 
tended to overheat; once when he was mounting the l6-mm camera and 
again during the spacecraft ingress. 
7.l.2.4.3 Experiments: The follQwing comments are given on the 
experiments. Section 8.0 contains a detailed discussion of the experi-
ments. 
MSC-l, Electrostatic charge - The electrostatic sensor was turned 
on and off as indicated in the flight plan or as directed by the ground. 
MSC-2 and MSC-3, Proton-electron spectrometer and tri-axis fluxgate 
magnetrometer - The spectrometer-magnetrometer switch was turned on as 
indicated in the flight plan or as directed by the ground. The only 
UNCLASSIFIED 
7-22 UNCLASSIFIED 
problem was a lack of indication of boom extension. Since both experi-
ments depended on this boom extending, it would have been desirable to 
have an indicator which showed proper extension. 
MEC-IO, Two-color Earth's limb photography - Nine and one-half 
runs were made. The event indicator did not properly trip the shutter 
of the camera and had to be removed during the experiment. 
M-3, Flight exerciser - This experiment was conducted as scheduled, 
except that the command pilot felt that he was not getting enough exer-
cise and requested permission to use the exerciser more frequently. The 
medical passes were made expeditiously and interfered very little with 
other spacecraft activities. Both pilots felt that the capacity and 
desire to do strenuous exercise decreased to a certain point and remained 
there for the rest of the flight. The pilots did a great deal of leg-
stretching and back-stretching, combined with tensing of the legs and 
stomach muscles. They probably did this latter exercise much more fre-
quently than they used the exerciser. The outside thin rubber layer of 
the exerciser broke at 6~ hours; however, effectiveness of the unit did 
not decrease. 
M-4, Inflight phonocardiogram - No inflight activities were associ-
ated with this experiment. 
S-5 and s-6, Synoptic terrain and weather photography - This experi-
ment was conducted as scheduled, and a great many interesting and sig-
nificant terrain and weather photographs were obtained. One magazine 
jammed and, as a result, most of the frames in the magazine were lost. 
D-8, Radiation - This experiment was conducted as planned. No 
problems were encountered. 
D-9, Simple navigation with the sextant - The first time the sextant 
was unstowed, the light in the readout dial failed; therefore, the speed 
with which readings could be taken was greatly decreased. The first 
series of runs consisted of making star-to-horizon measurements in the 
daytime. It soon became apparent that making these measurements in the 
daytime was not feasible. In fact, viewing stars in the daytime was 
very difficult except for a few limited positions in which the sun was 
entirely blanked out. The stars could be viewed in both sunset and 
sunrise by blanking out the sun with the spacecraft, but during the day-
time, reflections from the sun made it very difficult to view any stars. 
The stars selected for the night run were ones in which the angle between 
the star and the horizon was so great that it was impossible to measure 
the angle with the sextant through the Gemini window. Therefore, 
other sets of stars were selected, and measurements made more in the 
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vicinity of 20° to 25°. The limitation of 20° to 25° is not only a 
window limitation, but also a limitation effected by the inside geometry 
of the spacecraft. In order to take more effective measurements, the 
pilot removed his helmet, but the limitation of 20° to 25° still applied. 
The horizon during the night was not well defined, and it was difficult 
to take precise measurements to it. Both the clear and the green filter 
provided satisfactory, usable horizons. The blue filter, however, was 
not suitable for nighttime viewing. Because the photo event indicator 
had such a large throw to actuate it, it is not considered to be a 
satisfactory, accurate timing device. The crew decided that star-to-
horizon sextant measurements were not a simple task. 
Apollo sextant - No star-to-stage II measurements were taken 
because the rendezvous was eliminated from the flight plan. It should 
be noted that the same limitations as stated above would apply here 
also. The task of measuring the angle between two stars using the same 
area of the window was accomplished with good repeatability. 
7.1.2.4.4 Operational checks: 
Relative humidity sensor check - Throughout the flight, the dry-bulb 
and wet-bulb temperatures were taken. The relative humidity remained 
close to 62 percent throughout the flight, which was much less than had 
been predicted. No difficulties were encountered in using this sensor. 
A satisfactory wall temperature was not obtained because the walls were 
well covered with the water absorbent padding. 
Apollo landmark identification - It was possible to acquire and 
track prominent landmarks or features. With a few contrasting landmarks 
and a reasonable degree of familiarity with the area, good tracking can 
be obtained from about 20° to 30° before the vertical. Thorough pre-
flight map study and several passes over the area make rapid landmark 
identification possible. Any amount of cloudiness greatly complicates 
the tracking problem and makes landmark identification very difficult. 
Pulse control was found to be very adequate for tracking. The charts 
provided to the crew were not detailed enough for target location; the 
most desirable landmark-identification aids are aerial photographs. 
HF transmission-reception check - These checks were run as scheduled 
with a very low degree of success. 
Orbital navigation check - Only a limited number of orbital naviga-
tion checks were made. On the other hand, considerable orbital naVigation 
was done with the orbital plotter which was very similar to this check. 
Little difficulty was encountered in observing terrain features and 
updating the orbital plot. 
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Apollo yaw orientation check - This test was conducted at night 
since that was considered to be the most difficult time to perform the 
test. The results showed that it was not too difficult to orient the 
spacecraft even at night. Therefore, the day check was omitted to save 
fuel. At night, the best techni~ue was to pitch down immediately to-
ward the earth. By observing the motion of the ground and the clouds, 
it was pos'sible to determine the direction of flight ~uickly and then 
to orient the spacecraft to a retrofire attitude. By using the direct 
mode sparingly to save fuel, the re~uired orientation was reached in 
approximately 2 minutes 20 seconds. The attitude was correct in pitch 
and roll, but 180 off in yaw. If fuel were not a consideration, this 
maneuver could be performed in apprOXimately 1 minute 30 seconds. 
It should be noted that accurate yaw orientation at night, using just 
the stars, is a difficult task. 
One attitude thruster failure check - This task was not difficult 
as long as the roll TeA's in the other axes were available. The rates 
could be damped out, and a desired yaw rate could be established. The 
check compared very closely with that performed in the simulator. 
Horizon sensor track check - This test was performed as scheduled, 
except that the last two runs with pitch and roll were omitted because 
the sensor was checking out very well, and time and fuel were limited. 
The crew did discover that the sensor operating range was considerably 
broader than they had expected. 
Horizon scanner check - The sensor check was run at sunset and 
moonset. During the sunset checks, the sensor ignore light would come 
on as the sun passed through the point directly in front of the sensor. 
The moon did not cause erratic operation in the horizon sensor mode. 
The forward-firing translational thrusters did not affect the operation 
of the sensor, nor did three-axis attitude inputs cause the scanner ig-
nore light to come on. On the whole, the horizon sensor mode was satis-
factory. 
Zodiacal light check - The zodiacal light check was conducted as 
scheduled. 
7.1.2.4.5 Eating, sleeping, and house keeping: Eating was a very 
important part of the flight activities, and the food provided was 
satisfactory. Both pilots became hungry about every 4 or 5 hours and 
would get a completely ~down feeling. As soon as they ate a meal, 
their energy would increase rapidly. The crew felt that they had to 
eat a reasonable amount regularly to function effectively. The bacon 
was so tasty that both pilots think more emphasiS should be placed on 
packaging meats for space flight and particularly smoked meats. Two 
problems were associated with the food: the juice bags tended to leak, 
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and the toast slices and peanut cubes crumbled. Several problems were 
associated with drinking water. It was ~uite easy to crimp the hose 
where it attached to the drinking water gun and shut off the flow of 
water. In addition) the hose appeared to be old and cracked. The 
drinking water gun stuck in the open position and had to be pushed to 
the closed position manually to shut off the flow of water. An ex-
cessive amount of air was mixed with the flow of water. This problem 
was apparent when the food bags were filled) because the bags contained 
approximately one-~uarter air and three-~uarters water and reconstituted 
food. 
Sleeping was a definite problem during the flight. It was impos-
sible to turn the radios completely off without disconnecting the helmet 
~uick-disconnect) which was not an operationally satisfactory solution. 
Eventually) however) the ~uick-disconnect was disconnected during the 
command pilot's and pilot's rest period so that they could get ade~uate 
rest. The sudden noise associated with firing of the attitude thrusters 
was another disturbance during the rest periods. It was agreed that the 
4-hour rest cycles were not satisfactory) and a more satisfactory cycle 
would be a 6-hour sleep period followed at some time later by a 2-hour 
nap. House keeping was a major effort during the flight) and it had to 
be conscientiously carried out. Early in the mission) it became ap-
parent that there was not enough velcro around the spacecraft. The 
storage pouches along the center pedestal were very useful for storing 
the books) maps) and other miscellaneous items and were used continu-
ously. Also) the large dry waste bags mounted on the outer side of the 
foot wells were very useful for storing miscellaneous objects and dry 
trash. All planned storage areas were usable) with the center box and 
side boxes being the most easily accessible. The right and left food 
boxes were accessible) but it took undesirable effort to get articles 
in and out of the boxes. The two rubber-topped refuse boxes were ac-
cessible with even more effort and were used at various times through-
out the flight. The most useful storage area was underneath the co~ 
mand pilot's and pilot's legs. All EVA e~uipment was stored in this 
area throughout the entire flight. In fact) various other items such 
as the sextant) camera) and lenses were also stored in this area from 
time to time. 
The defecation bags were ~uite s~tisfactory and were used on six 
different occasions. It is possible to use just one bag during a de-
fecation and then use the paper to push the feces down into the bag. 
The plastic bag containing the disinfectant was too difficult to break. 
The special one-sided paper was not absorbent enough. The urine col-
lection device was considered marginally acceptable. When a good seal 
in the device was obtained) the urine did not flow properly; and when a 
poor seal was effected) the urine flowed ~uite satisfactorily) but it 
also leaked excessively. 
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7.1.2.4.6 Real-time flight planning: This flight was the first 
experience with real-time flight planning. There were a great number 
of changes to the flight plan, and they were made in an orderly manner. 
The changes required not only the ground, but also the flight crew par-
ticipation to arrive at the best plan at the best time. Despite the 
success of the operation, some problems were encountered. The major 
problem was the use of two time systems - ground elapsed time and G.m.t. 
All flight planning had to be made in elapsed time to be meaningfulj yet 
the official time for the mission was G.m.t. The two systems not only 
complicate the transmission of data in flight planning, but also con-
fuse the reduction of data after the flight. 
The only problem encountered in real-time flight planning was a 
conflict between the MSC-IO experiment and the horizon sensor sunset 
check. Both checks were accomplished satisfactorily, but the time 
interval between them was inadequate. The plan in the flight-plan 
roller was difficult to scan, while the flight plan in the flight book-
let was easily accessible in its entirety. Easy access is necessary for 
proper flight planning. The flight-plan usefulness could be improved 
by changing the scale to 3 hours per card. 
7.1.2.5 Preretrofire and retrofire.- The preparation for retrofire 
began 3 hours prior to the event. All of the equipment was stowed at 
the end of the first 2 hours, leaving both crew members free to concen-
trate on the final mission events. The platform was turned on approxi-
mately 1 hour 45 minutes before retrofire and was alined for approximately 
45 minutes of this time. The preretrofire, TR-36, TR-22, and TR-13 check-
lists were performed on time or ahead of time. The aft-firing transla-
tion thrusters were checked out satisfactorily. While checking ring B 
of the RCS, one thruster seemed to be malfunctioning, but further checks 
indicated that they were all operating properly. A complete discussion 
of this problem is found in section 5.1.8. At TR-12 the OAME retrofire 
was started. It was terminated in exactly 2 minutes ~ 40 seconds. It 
was quite easy to hold the attitudes to within ~o with the rate command 
mode. The TR-5 checklist was performed on time. At TR-l the crew per-
formed the OAME separation, electrical separation, and adapter separa-
tion. Each event was clear and distinct. The adapter separation was 
very loud and disturbed the spacecraft attitudes slightly. At TR-30, 
the crew armed the retrofire squibs and noticed that the event lights 
came on approximately 1 second early, indicating that the time reference 
system was 1 second ahead of the retrofire count. However, the crew 
elected to arm the automatic retrofire function so that both automatic 
and manual retrofire signals would be sent. The retrorockets fired 1 to 
11 seconds early on the time reference system autofire signal. Once again, 2 
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the rate command system provided excellent control, and the attitudes 
were held within +10. The retroadapter was jettisoned at TR+45 seconds 
with a sharp report. The pilot observed the horizon sensor assembly 
through the command pilot's window shortly after the assembly was 
jettisoned. 
7.1.2.6 Reentry and landigg.- After the retroadapter was jettisoned 
the spacecraft was rolled to a heads-down position. At about TR+3 min-
utes 15 seconds, the rolling reentry began. The crew used reentry 
rate command with the roll gyro turned off. The roll gyro was turned 
off so that the hand controller did not have to be held deflected in 
roll for the entire reentry. Shortly thereafter, the retroadapter came 
into view. It was perfectly stable in a small end forward attitude. At 
TR+5 minutes the retroadapter started to burn, and then flames began 
coming up around the sides of the spacecraft. The spacecraft was roll-
ing about its longitudinal axis at the beginning of reentry. As the 
aerodynamics began to take effect, the spacecraft began to roll about 
its trim axis, causing the spacecraft to reenter in a wide spiral. The 
crew were surprised that the nose of the spacecraft followed such a 
large circular path, indicating a large trim angle. The spacecraft was 
very stable during this period. The command pilot occaSionally damped 
pitch and yaw within the rate deadbands of the reentry rate command. 
During this time, the ,command pilot noticed the steady-state yaw rate 
increasing slightly and heard the thrusters begin to fire more often. 
Roll inputs were then made through the attitude controller to decrease 
the roll rate, which, in turn, caused the steady-state yaw rate to de-
crease. Postflight data showed that the roll rate did indeed increase 
throughout the reentry due to a non-firing pitch thruster. A detailed 
discussion of this problem is found in section 5.1.8. This increased 
roll rate cross coupled into yaw and caused the steady-state yaw rate to 
increase to the limit of the deadband. This caused the yaw thrusters 
to fire. During this time, the acceleration level increased to 7~g. 
As the spacecraft passed through an altitude of 100,000 feet, the ac-
celeration level was still at 4g. The spacecraft continued in a stable 
spiral until drogue parachute deployment, when the spacecraft oscillated 
rapidly. The angle between the drogue risers and the spacecraft axis 
had amplitudes up to 400. The control mode was changed from reentry 
rate command to rate command approximately 15 seconds after drogue para-
chute deployment. This was done to dampen the oscillations and to ex-
pend as much fuel as possible before impact and therefore to lessen the 
problem created by propeliant fumes. Approximately 25 seconds after 
drogue parachute deployment, at an altitude of 28,000 feet, the rates be-
gan to dampen out. Shortly after thiS, the ReS propellant valves were 
turned off, and the rate command was left on to drain the fuel from the 
manifolds. 
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The main parachute deployed smoothly with no torn panels. While 
in the single-point attitude, it was possible to see the drogue and 
pilot parachutes drifting down just above the spacecraft. After the 
pilot completed a blood-pressure recording, the spacecraft was oriented 
to the two-point attitude. The crew had been warned about the jolt at 
single-point release, and they had their arms against the window and 
their heads on their arms. Because of this preparation, the resulting 
jolt was not excessive. The local altimeter setting was not furnished 
prior to landing. 
Water landing was somewhat more severe than the crew had expected. 
The spacecraft went under water and rolled to the left. The parachute 
was jettisoned immediately after landing, and the spacecraft immediately 
came to the surface. The inlet snorkel was closed at landing to keep 
out any ReS propellant fumes. 
7.l.2.7 Postlanding.- The crew received excellent treatment on-
board the carrier. The first one-half day was spent undergoing the 
postflight physical. Much of the second day was spent in medical de-
briefing and two tilt-table tests. The technical debriefing was not 
started until the evening of the second day and continued into the 
evening of the third day. Because of the large amount of time re~uired 
for the medical debriefing and testing, an extra day was re~uired to 
complete the technical debriefing. 
7.l.2.8 Systems operation.-
7.l.2.8.l Malfunction detection system: The malfunction detection 
system operated properly throughout the powered flight. It provided the 
command pilot with sufficient information to take the necessary actions 
during this period. There was one inade~uacy of the instrumentation -
the limit decals fixed to the outside of the glass on the tank pressure 
gages. If these decals had been made wide enough to completely obscure 
the limits painted on the gage face, they would have obscured the in-
board needlesj conversely, because the decals were made narrow enough 
to show the inboard needles of the gage, the obsolete limits on the 
gage face showed through. This situation was confusing since the gage 
face limits and the decal limits did not agree. A better marking of 
the launch vehicle MDS tank pressure limits is necessary. 
7.l.2.8.2 Flight control: The prelaunch check of the OAMS system 
was ade~uate, and the actual thruster firing was easily detected from 
within the spacecraft. Pulse, direct, rate command, and horizon scan 
modes were used with the OAMS during the orbital phase of the mission. 
The pulse mode was used more than any of the other modes. It provided 
excellent control, not only for small attitude changes but also for 
ground-tracking tasks which re~uired rather high spacecraft rates and 
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large changes in attitude. It was very economical from the fuel stand-
point, especially when attitude changes were planned and could be started 
well in advance. The direct mode was used sparingly. It provided posi-
tive authority and could accelerate the spacecraft rapidly. It worked 
well for large attitude changes that had to be accomplished quickly. 
The rate command system was only used during the control checks and 
translation thrusting. It provided excellent damping and control during 
these maneuvers. The horizon scan mode was used during almost the en-
tire last day of the flight. It provided a modified attitude hold con-
trol mode. During this 24-hour period some extraneous.pulses were heard 
when the sensor was pointing at the sun at sunset and sunrise. The 
control system actually lost control of the spacecraft only once. 
The OAMS maneuver system was exercised thoroughly during the flight. 
The forward, aft, and lateral firing thrusters were used. Except for a 
short check with pulse and another with direct, rate command was the 
attitude control mode used throughout the translation maneuvers. Pulse 
and direct modes were adequate for short periods of thrusting, but rate 
command was far superior for attitude control during all translation 
thrusting maneuvers. Postflight data showed that one of the aft firing 
thrusters did not operate during a portion of the flight. With rate 
command attitude control, short periods of translation thrust, and using 
a moving out-the-window reference, this failure was not apparent. At 
no time did the crew hear the aft-firing thrusters; however, they could 
faintly hear the lateral- and forward-firing thrusters. 
The RCS control modes used were pulse, direct, rate command, and 
reentry rate command. The RCS was activated approximately l hour prior 
to retrofire. No difficulties were experienced in activating the system. 
Pulse and direct appear to have slightly less authority with one ring, 
and slightly more with two rings than did the comparable OAMS modes. 
RCS rate command had a slightly greater rate deadband than did the OAMS 
mode. The rate command mode provided excellent damping and control 
during retrofire. Reentry rate command with the roll gyro turned off 
was used for reentry. This mode permitted manual damping with the rate 
deadband and automatic damping at the deadband limits except in roll. 
Section 5.l.8 contains a more detailed discussion of the spacecraft 
propulsion systems performance. 
7.l.2.8.3 Inertial guidance system: All of the inertial guidance 
subsystems operated during the flight. The MDIU functioned properly 
at insertion when the pilot requested a read-out of the 6V to be ap-
plied at first apogee to correct perigee. The IVI's read out the inser-
tion parameters at SECO + 20 seconds and were used to count the 6V 
during the station-keeping maneuver. These subsystems operated properly. 
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The inertial measuring unit was used on three occasions during 
the flight: lift-off through ~ revolutions, at the end of the third 
day, and from preretrofire to landing. Approximately 25 minutes were re-
quired for the inertial measuring unit to warm up and start to cage on 
the two occasions that this was done. The attitude malfunction light 
came on and the ball started to cage at the same time. The malfunction 
light was reset immediately. During the alinement, the flight director 
indicator (FDI) needles appeared to function normally. The alined atti-
tude was checked by looking out the window and appeared to be accurate. 
The computer was operated continuously from prelaunch through the 
first two revolutions and intermittently throughout the flight until 
an elapsed time of 75 hours when an IGS system failure led to an al-
teration of the computer memory which prevented future use of the co~ 
puter. The attitude errors were displayed by the FDI's from the co~ 
puter during launch while the computer was in ascent mode. Shortly 
after insertion, the computer was switched to the catch-up mode. It 
appeared to have operated properly as it summed the 6Vapplied during 
the station-keeping maneuver. After the second revolution, the computer 
was switched to prelaunch and then turned off. From this time on the 
computer was powered up only to receive updates from the ground. During 
the 75th hour of elapsed time the computer was powered up for an update. 
After the update, the computer and the IGS power were turned off. When 
the IGS power was turned off, the malfunction light came on, and it was 
noted that the computer running light was still on. The IGS power was 
turned on again and the malfunction light was reset. Several switch 
changes were made. One of these was a mode change with the computer 
power switch off but with the running light on. Telemetry data showed 
that the computer did change modes. Over Tananarive, instructions were 
received from the ground to place the computer power switch to on and to 
turn the ac power switch from IGS to ACME; this action was taken. The 
computer running light stayed on, and the malfunction light came on; 
then they dimmed appreciably and finally went out. Later efforts to 
make the computer operate properly were unsuccessful. 
The DCS light illuminated when updates were sent and appeared to 
operate properly throughout the flight. 
7.1.2.8.4. Propulsion: During the flight, some of the thrusters 
failed to fire. These occurrences are described in detail in sections 
7.1.2.6 and 7.1.2.8.2. 
The OAMS quantity indicator fluctuated very slowly throughout the 
flight. The average magnitude of these fluctuations was 2 percent, and 
the maximum was 4 percent. 
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During orbital flight the RCS heater warning light came on inter-
mittently over a period of 1 hour 45 minutes beginning at an elapsed 
time of approximately 65 hours. Actuating the RCS heaters extinguished 
the light. 
7.1.2.8.5 Electrical systems: The electrical system operated sat-
isfactorily throughout the flight. The voltage reading in the main 
batteries had dropped from 24 volts to slightly more than 22 volts by 
the end of the flight. It was interesting to note that in the minimum 
power configuration for drifting flight, the spacecraft required only 
12 to 13 amperes. The crew received information on the electrical power 
usage from the ground just one time. At that time the crew were told 
that they had a 160 amp-hour margin over preflight calculations. Section 
5.1.7 contains a more detailed discussion of the electrical system per-
formance. 
7.1.2.8.6 Communication: Communications throughout the flight 
were satisfactory except for the first 8 or 9 revolutions. During this 
time there was some difficulty with UHF, but the trouble seemed to be 
eliminated by switching to the reentry antenna. Later in the flight, 
however, the crew switched back to the adapter antenna, and the communi-
cations remained satisfactory. It should be noted that the command 
pilot's intercom volume and UHF had to be on the maximum setting to ob-
tain satisfactory communications. The quality of the interphone and its 
operation was satisfactory throughout the flight. The HF radio did not 
work satisfactorily during any of the scheduled tests; however, it was 
used on a few station passes. The onboard voice tape recorder is un-
satisfactory with respect to its operational capabil~ty: its I-hour 
capability was too short, the light which indicated that all tape had 
been used was not in a position that could be seen, and the switch on 
the voice control panel did not provide satisfactory operation. On 
this flight, the crew had the capability to tape only 15 percent of the 
onboard conversation. The inability to turn the volume off on the HF, 
UHF, and intercom (as mentioned in section 7.1.2.4.5) was a serious de-
ficiency. Section 5.1.2 contains a more detailed discussion of the 
communications systems performance. 
7.1.2.8.7 The environmental control system: On the whole, the 
environmental control system operated satisfactorily. The most inter-
esting point was that the relative humidity stayed at a fairly constant 
62 percent throughout the flight. The cabin temperature remained ap-
proximately 750 F, except for a short period after insertion when it in-
creased to 1000 F. The cabin heat exchanger, in conjunction with the 
cabin fan, brought this temperature down to 800 F in about 20 minutes. 
The suit inlet temperatures stayed at about 520 to 540 F during most of 
the flight. The command pilot was comfortably cool at all times and was 
even a little too cool while he slept, but the pilot was warm through-
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out the entire flight. In fact, when the pilot went to sleep with his 
face-plate closed and the gloves on, he got so uncomfortably warm in 
about 1 hour 15 minutes that his sleep was interrupted. However, he 
discovered that when he slept with the face-plate open and both fans on, 
he did not become uncomfortably warm. 
During launch, the cabin pressure rose to 5.5 psi and then slowly 
decreased to about 4.9 psi. The oxygen vent pressure had been set at 
967 psi, which seemed to be in the operating range of the cryogenic 
oxygen system. As the pressure in the oxygen tank built up, the excess 
oxygen was bled into the cabin to prevent the cryogenic oxygen tank from 
venting. This excess oxygen, combined with the low setting of the cabin 
vent valve, caused numerous cabin ventings. After the cabin vented 
several times, and the pressure dropped 0.3 psi in less than a second, 
the crew decided that they should be fully suited before further cabin 
ventings. Therefore, maintaining an acceptable oxygen tank pressure re-
~uired far too much time and effort. 
During the EVA operations, the manual oxygen heaters were used. 
twice and maintained the pressure satisfactorily. Neither pilot noticed 
any difference between the day and the night cycles in relation to tem-
perature and comfort. Suit pulsing detected early in spacecraft testing 
occurred once during the flight. The configuration at that time was the 
face-plates closed, the recirculation valve closed, and both flow valves 
fully open. Both secondary oxygen bottles maintained their pressure 
throughout the flight. The normal overboard urine dump system operated 
satisfactorily until about 92 hours, when it failed in the middle of 
a dump. The rest of this dump and one more were expelled through the 
water evaporator. 
After an elapsed time of about 6 hours, the pilot noticed a smell 
which he could not identify but which tended to keep him awake. Shortly 
thereafter both crew members noticed a burning sensation in their eyes, 
which increased in severity until approximately 30 hours. At this time, 
the eyes of both crew members were very red. The irritating sensation 
then decreased for the rest of the flight. 
The crew wore the G4c pressure suit. The command pilot wore a 
suit with a standard cover layer. He was comfortable throughout the 
flight, and his mobility was ade~uate. The pilot wore the same type 
suit except with an EVA outer liner. He was warm throughout the flight 
and somewhat restricted in mobility, although his general comfort in the 
suit was satisfactory. Neither pilot had pressure points from the suit, 
but both had pressure points from the helmet. The gloves did not provide 
ade~uate feel. Section 5.1.4 contains a more detailed discussion of 
ECS performance. 
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7.1.2.8.8 Sequential systems: No improper operations were de-
tected in the sequential system. 
7.1.2.8.9 Crew station: The interior spacecraft lighting was 
marginally adequate. The bright white center light helped to make 
rapid instrument reading possible. The front) side) and overhead 
panels were not well lighted but were satisfactory. The water management 
area between the seats was not satisfactorily lighted; the cabin water-
tank level could not be seen with the aUXiliary light or fingertip 
lighting. The auxiliary receptacle light was too dim; it should provide 
a strong) direct beam of light with an adjustable lrlS. The red panel 
lights were very useful and were used extensively during the night 
passes. In some orientations with respect to the sun) the sunlight was 
so bright that the instruments were very difficult to read. 
Inadvertent switch throwing was not as much of a problem as had 
been anticipated. Switches were inadvertently thrown a very few times) 
and conSidering the length of the mission and the few switches that 
were actuated inadvertently) it was not an unsatisfactory situation. 
The flight plan roller in the center instrument panel was not used at 
all during the flight. This device is not easily rolled and presents 
such a limited amount of the flight plan that it was of no use during 
the flight. The Greenwich mean clock on the right-hand side was not 
satisfactory in any respect. The face was difficult to read) the two 
minute hands were confusing) and moveable indices tended to make the 
face even more crowded. The left-hand clock was very easily read) but 
it lost 4 or 5 seconds a day. 
The lightweight headset would not stay on the head during activity 
in the spacecraft. The swizzle stick was used quite extensively; it 
proved to be quite useful in unstowing equipment and turning switches 
on and off. The star-charts were satisfactory. The orbit maps were 
quite easy to use. Although the timing became somewhat inaccurate) the 
maps were easy to update. 
There was no gage to determine water usage or water remaining in 
the spacecraft or adapter section tanks. Such a gage is necessary to 
allow the crew to manage their water consumption adequately. 
The zippers on both of the tissue containers pulled apart below 
the zipper plow. 
The on-off switch on one 
tently throughout the flight. 
operation through the command 
this intermittent operation. 
of the 16-mm cameras operated intermit-
Sections of the filming of the EVA 
pilot's window were lost as a result of 
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The drogue pins were not satisfactory in any respect. The pin was 
small, difficult to handle and hard to reach. The hole cannot be seen 
and it is difficult to insert the pin into the hole. 
Further remarks concerning storage are included in section 
7.1.2.4.5 and section 5·1.10. 
7.1.2.9 Visual observations.- The greatest impression was the 
clarity with which objects could be viewed, especially from directly 
overhead. Roads, canals, oil tanks, boat wakes, and airfields could be 
seen quite clearly. These items were especially easy to view if there 
was a good color contrast between them and their background. The 
lights of cities at night seemed to be very clearly defined. It was 
interesting to note that the moonlight did not obscure the stars as it 
does on earth. The moon appeared just as a bright light, and the stars 
close to it were easy to see. By using known fourth- and fifth-order 
magnitude stars as references, the crew observed stars down to the 
seventh order. It is felt that the coating on the window decreased the 
number and magnitude of stars that could be viewed. At an altitude of 
40,000 feet on a dark night, more stars can be seen than were viewed 
through the spacecraft windows at night. Star viewing in the daylight 
was very difficult because of the reflections from the nose area of 
the spacecraft. A few stars were viewed by orienting the spacecraft 
very carefully, but as an operational procedure, viewing stars from the 
Gemini spacecraft in the daytime is very difficult. At sunset and sun-
rise the stars can be readily seen out one window.. In fact, it was 
possible at this time to see complete darkness and stars out one window 
and bright sunlight out the other. At sunset and sunrise, particles 
from the spacecraft venting became very bright and reflected the sun's 
light as very bright light sources. In fact, one of the most beautiful 
sights of the flight was a urine dump at sunset. The sky would become 
full of tiny, bright light sources. 
The planets seemed to increase in brightness as compared with 
seeing them from the ground. Venus was an especially striking view at 
sunset. What was assumed to be the Southern Lights were observed twice 
during the flight as vertical, parallel lights running in a snaking 
fashion below the spacecraft, and looked somewhat like a curtain of light. 
At one time, the airglow was noted to have a series of vertical lights 
reflected up through it. Also, a bright light source was noted flashing 
in the airglow layer on several occasions. This was not lightning. The 
two-band effect of the airglow was clearly observed. It appeared that 
the bright upper part was about one-third to one-fourth the thickness 
of the lower part. The airglow-layer had an apparent rise as the space-
craft passed from darkness to daylight. As soon as the spacecraft was 
in full daylight, the airglow layer disappeared. 
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The shafting of zodiacal light prior to sunrise was observed on 
two occasions to occur 4 minutes 20 seconds prior to sunrise. It 
seemed to shaft up at an angle slightly to the right of the vertical. 
Shooting stars or meteorites were observed on many occasions con-
siderably below the orbital altitude as they fell and burned up in the 
atmosphere. 
7.1.2.10 Postlanding.- Immediately after landing, the sea dye 
marker could be seen and the parachute was in the water to the left of 
the spacecraft. There were no apparent leaks and the ReS thrusters 
were steaming, but no fuel was observed. An acrid smell was detected 
immediately. The postlanding checklist was accomplished and the re-
~uired blood pressures were recorded. The HF antenna was extended and 
an HF short count was given. The pilot removed his helmet and used the 
lightweight headset. The command pilot elected to leave his helmet on 
to avoid smelling the acrid odor in the spacecraft. An aircraft was 
overhead immediately and the crew was given the option of a 20-minute 
wait for a helicopter or a 1 hour 40 minute wait for spacecraft recovery. 
The crew elected to be picked up by the helicopter and decided to leave 
the spacecraft wearing their suits. The flotation collar was installed 
in about 20 minutes, and the crew was aboard the carrier U.S.S. Wasp 
in about 45 minutes after landing. -
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7.2 AEROMEDICAL 
One of the'prime objectives of the Gemini IV mission was to ob-
serve what physiological effects, if any, a 4-day exposure to the space-
flight environment would have on the flight crew. This was the first 
of three planned incremental increases in exposing man to flights of 
longer duration than that experienced by L. Gordon Cooper during MA-9 
(34 hours). Unique opportunities were afforded to observe the two 
crewmen in pressurized suits while the cabin was at zero pressure for 
a period of approximately 1 hour, and to observe one crewman outside 
the spacecraft for 23 minutes. 
These observations and data are presented by phase of flight, that 
is: preflight-all pertinent background data and activities to lift-
off; inflight--all information and data received by telemetry and voice 
from lift-off to landing; and postflight-information and observations 
from medical examinations and debriefings. Data from the onboard bio-
medical tape recorders are unavailable at this time and will be pre-
sented in a supplemental report. This report will include some 
blood-pressure readings obtained during the reentry, descent, and a 
short period on the water. 
Observations were also made of food and water management, the 
waste-collection system, the work/rest cycle, and general stowage and 
housekeeping. Results of the medical experiments are reported in 
section 8. 
7.2.1 Preflight 
7.2.1.1 Medical histories.- The medical histories from the flight 
crew consist of their service medical records, the record of the com-
prehensive medical examinations conducted at the time of their selec-
tion as astronauts, and the annual medical examinations for fitness for 
flying since that time. In addition, a considerable volume of data was 
collected on both the prime flight crew and backup crew during their 
participation in simulated flights, centrifuge training runs, and 
spacecraft system tests. The latter were conducted both at ground 
level and at simulated altitude in a vacuum chamber. A summary of the 
medical evaluations and the occasions on which baseline data were col-
lected is presented in table 7.2-1. In preparation for this flight, 
the pilot of the prime crew using his extravehicular equipment partici-
pated in an altitude chamber test on May 20, 1965. 
7.2.1.2 Bioinstrumentation.- For this flight, the bioinstrumenta-
tion harness consisted of two leads of electrocardiogram (sternal and 
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axillary), impedance pneumogram, oral temperature using an oral ther-
mistor, and a blood-pressure measuring system. In the M-4 medical 
experiment, a phonocardiogram microphone was placed on the anterior 
chest of the pilot just to the left of the sternum in the fourth inter-
space. This system was used on all those occasions noted in table 
7.2-1. In connection with the tilt-table studies described in the fol-
lowing paragraph, strain gages were used to measure the difference 
which postural change made in the circumference of the calves of the 
prime crew. 
7.2.1.3 Preflight tilt-table studies.- As shown in table 7.2-1, 
two paired tests and one single tilt-table test were conducted on the 
prime crew. Dates for the paired tests were selected so that they 
could be carried out before and after an occasion when the crew members 
would be relatively inactive for a period of 4 hours or more in con-
nection with a Gemini mission simulator exercise. On both occasions, 
the flight crew members were engaged in launch and reentry simulations. 
A relatively new, saddle-type tilt table designed by the Crew Systems 
Division was used for all preflight and postflight tilt-table studies 
as this device had been used in all MSC's bedrest studies. Since there 
were no observed differences in the five preflight tilt-table tests, a 
single but representative preflight tilt record is shown in figure 7.2-1. 
7.2.1.4 Preflight diet.- In view of the intention to decompress 
the cabin and engage in extravehicular activity on this flight, it was 
decided to have the flight crew limit themselves to a low-residue diet 
for 5 days prior to flight. The reasons for this decision were to 
minimize the possibility of abdominal discomfort upon reduction from a 
5.2 psi cabin pressure to a 3.7 to 4.1 psi suit pressure and to obviate 
the necessity for breaking the integrity of the suit in order to dis-
pose of body wastes until after the extravehicular activity (EVA). In 
order to afford the flight crew an opportunity for a subjective evalua-
tion, a trial run on the low-residue diet was conducted from noon on 
May 17, 1965, through noon on May 20, 1965. The preflight diet had no 
apparent effect on the bowel habit of the command pilot. Initially, 
however, the bowel habit of the pilot was increased in frequency. By 
the end of the 5-day period, the pilot's bowel habit had returned to 
normal. The command pilot ate sparingly on flight morning, whereas 
the pilot ate his customary substantial meal. 
7.2.1.5 Preflight medical examination.- An examination was con-
ducted by a flight surgeon on F-9 days on both the prime and backup 
crew members. The command pilot of the prime crew was found to have a 
well localized infected laceration of the plantar surface of his right 
foot at the base of the great toe. In the course of gentle manipula-
tion of the area, the abscess ruptured at the surface and purulent 
material drained out spontaneously. It was evacuated and treated with 
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soaks and an antibiotic ointment. The pilot of the prime crew has had 
a long history of sinus arrhythmia (this is an intermittent irregular-
ity which is physiologically normal) and has occasionally shown P-R 
intervals as high as 0.24 second. Both findings were consistently 
observed on each occasion that biosensors were used in connection with 
the previously mentioned tests. The cardiological findings during 
the course of these examinations were unchanged from what had been 
previously observed. There were no other findings worthy of special 
note in either member of the two crews. The F-2 day examination was 
conducted by the medical evaluation team which included an internist-
cardiologist, ophthalmologist, otolaryngologist, neuropsychiatrist, and 
a flight surgeon. The infected laceration of the command pilot's right 
foot was found to be satisfactorily healed by that time. Hematological 
studies done in connection with the F-9 and F-2 day examinations are 
reported in tables 7.2-II and 7.2-III. The preflight blood-volume 
determination done in connection with the F-2 day examination using the 
radioactive iodinated serum albumin (RISA) technique is reported in 
table 7.2-IV. Both flight crew members were found to be medically fit 
for flight. Similarly, at the brief preflight physical examination 
conducted by the crew flight surgeons on launch morning, both members 
of the prime crew were found to be medically fit for flight. 
7.2.1.6 Miscellaneous preflight activities.- The crew members 
moved into the astronauts' quarters in the Manned Spacecraft Operations 
(MSO) building on the evening of F-IO days. This afforded them the 
necessary privacy for study and preparation, and it minimized inadver-
tent exposure to communicable diseases. Prior to this time, there was 
some anxiety over the possibility of exposure to active cases of mumps 
in the immediate family of crewmen and in the families of close ac-
quaintances. During testing, no abnormal skin or systemic reactions 
were found to be caused by the sensoring agents or the onboard medica-
tions. 
7.2.1.7 Preflight denitrogenation.- Because of the plans for EVA 
early in the flight, it was deemed advisable to have the crew pre-
breathe with 100-percent oxygen on an open-loop system for 2 hours prior 
to flight. This was begun at 5:20 a.m. e.s.t., which was the time of 
departure from the MSO building. A portable gaseous oxygen source and 
an Al3A mask with a regulator were used for this purpose. Open-loop 
pre-breathing was continued during the application of the sensors and 
the suiting process and continued until 7:05 a.m. e.s.t., at which 
time both crewmen used portable ventilators to proceed from the pilot-
ready room to the launch complex. The portable ventilators afforded 
12 minutes of semiopen-loop breathing. An additional 12 minutes of 
semiopen-loop breathing were obtained in the spacecraft after cabin 
purge when the pilots' visors were open. 
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7.2.1.8 Sensoring, suiting, checkout, and suit purge.- Great care 
was exercised in applying the biosensors in order to insure their con-
tinued function for the duration of the flight. Likewise, considerable 
care had to be taken to prevent dislodgement of the blood-pressure cuff 
and microphone when donning the pressure garment. During donning of the 
pressure garment, 100-percent oxygen was flowed at the maximum rate from 
the checkout console to obtain the best possible purge of nitrogen from 
the suit portion below the neck ring. For obvious reasons, particular 
care was taken to allow the suit technicians all the time necessary to 
insure a perfect attachment of the helmet after the suit portion had 
been carefully closed. Three minutes after closing the helmet visors, 
the concentrations of oxygen in the command pilot's and pilot's suits 
were 100 percent and 99.7 percent, respectively. Four minutes later, 
both suits measured 100-percent oxygen. 
7.2.2 Inflight 
The inflight portion of the aeromedical report includes the events 
from lift-off to spacecraft landing, an elapsed time of 97 hours 56 min-
utes. 
7.2.2.1 Physiological measurements.- Physiological measurements 
obtained from the Gemini bioinstrumentation system which is described 
in section 5.1.10, as well as certain environmental parameters, were 
monitored by physicians at the Mission Control Center, Houston (MCC-H), 
and at various remote network tracking sites around the world. Analog 
biomedical data from Cape Kennedy (CNV), Bermuda (BDA), Antigua (ANT), 
Canary Islands (CYI), Carnarvon (CRO), Coastal sentry Quebec (CSQ), 
Hawaii (HAW), Rose Knot Victor (RKV) , Guaymas (GYM), and Texas (TEX) 
were also transmitted to MCC-H by means of vOice/data lines. This 
allowed the MCC surgeon to observe the biomedical data which were 
available to the remote site surgeons either instantaneously or immedi-
ately after a pass. The quality of the analog data received at MCC-H 
was satisfactory for clinical analysis. Electrocardiograms and pneumo-
grams for each crewman were recorded on an onboard biomedical tape 
recorder. The data recorded on the biomedical tape recorder are not 
available for analysis at the time of the publishing of this report. 
7.2.2.1.1 Electrocardiograms: There were no changes in the 
electrocardiogram of either crewman as compared to baseline studies 
made prior to flight. The rates and patterns of the electrocardiograms 
remained within normal and expected limits. The rhythm showed expected 
sinus arrhythmias with some of the previously observed elongated P-R 
intervals in the pilot's ECG. Increases in the heart rate of both crew 
members were present, as expected, during dynamic portions of the flight. 
There were also periods of increased rate associated with various crew 
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activities, such as the food and waste evaluation, the extravehicular 
activity (EVA), control of the spacecraft during maneuvers, and reentry. 
7.2.2.1.2 Respiration: The respiratory rates as measured by the 
impedance pneumograph were lrithin the expected range of normal for this 
crew. During the extravehicular activity, the expected increases in the 
respiratory rates of both crewmen were observed. The pilot's respira-
tory rate increased somewhat more than the command pilot's during this 
period of time; however, the pilot was doing considerably more work than 
the command pilot. The heart and respiration rates are shown in fig-
ure- 7.2-2. 
7.2.2.1.3 Blood pressure: Numerous blood-pressure measurements 
were observed on each crewman. These were associated with planned 
exercise periods (experiment M-3, section 8) which were done four times 
each day by the pilot and two or three times a day by the command 
pilot. The command pilot had difficulty with the blood-pressure bulb 
because of an apparent misfit of the connector at the suit. This mis-
fit was detected early in the flight. (See sec. 5.1.10.) The connector 
functioned satisfactorily in the crew ready room and in the spacecraft 
on the launch complex during normal system checks. Because of his 
persistence and through great effort, however, the command pilot was 
able to pump up his blood-pressure cuff and obtain readable blood-
pressure values. All of the blood-pressure values obtained are believed 
to be valid. Early in the flight, systolic blood-pressure values were 
somewhat higher than preflight normals, but tended to decrease as the 
flight progressed. Values for the total flight can be found in fig-
ure 7.2-3. Prior to reentry, the pilot inserted a blood-pressure repro-
gramer between the biomedical connector and the biomedical cable at 
the suit. This rerouted the blood-pressure signals from the telemetry 
transmitter to the onboard biomedical tape recorder. 
7.2.2.1.4 Oral temperature: The oral temperature of both crew 
members was measured regularly during the medical data passes. No 
abnormal values were seen. 
7.2.2.2 Medical observations.-
7.2.2.2.1 Environment: The environment remained within desirable 
thermal limits, and the relative humidity ranged from 50 percent to 
63 percent throughout the flight. The command pilot was thermally 
comfortable at all times. The pilot continually felt warm while in the 
spacecraft except when both suit fans were on. This is believed to 
be due to the insulating effect of the EVA overgarment. He reported 
that he was coolest and most comfortable during EVA. 
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The only significant medical problem which developed during the 
mission was eye, nose, and throat irritation which was noted after 
approximately 6 hours of flight. These symptoms were minimal on the 
pilot but marked in the command pilot. The dryness and irritation are 
believed to be caused partially by the dry oxygen environment but more 
probably by ammonia outgassing from diammonium phosphate fire retardant 
used on the methylcellulose sponge material on the spacecraft walls. 
The symptoms had subsided considerably after 36 hours of flight. This 
problem is discussed in section 5.1.4. 
7.2.2.2.2 Food and water: A menu of 16 freeze-dehydrated meals 
was provided for each crew member during the flight. They ate all 
but one meal. They reported a noticeable !llift!l in energy level short-
ly after eating. This benefit lasted for about 4 hours, although they 
felt hunger again 2 hours after eating probably as a result of the low 
amount of residue in the foods. The crew had no satisfactory method of 
measuring the drinking water consumed or remaining, and, therefore, 
they deliberately rationed water during the early part of the mission. 
They drank freely during the final day of flight., Such water rationing 
is contrary to accepted practices and would be unnecessary if an accu-
rate measure of fluid intake were available in flight. A summary of the 
approximate caloric and fluid intakes is listed in table 7.2-V. 
7.2.2.2.3 Waste: Waste elimination was carried out with a mini-
mum of difficulty with the exception of urine leakage from the recep-
tacle. Each crew member had three bowel movements during flight, all 
of which were soft. 
7.2.2.2.4 Sleep: The command pilot estimated that he had only 
about 6! hours of good sound sleep during the entire flight. The pilot, 
whose normal habit is to fall asleep readily, slept somewhat more. 
Sleep periods were disturbed by radio communications, the ambient light, 
the sound and feel of the cabin pressure relieving, and the poundings 
felt from the thruster firings. On the advice of the MCC surgeon, an 
attempt was made to lengthen the sleep periods during the second half 
of the flight. This was moderately successful, and, although both 
crewmen were moderately fatigued, they felt prepared to manage the 
reentry. The total number of hours of attempted sleep is listed in 
table 7.2-V. 
7.2.2.2.5 Extravehicular activities: The pilot experienced no 
medical difficulties during EVA. He was oriented at all times. He 
reported no falling sensation as he left the spacecraft and no thermal 
discomfort while outside the spacecraft. The comfort of the pressur-
ized suit was not changed from the ground condition; however, he re-
ported that the muscles in the back of his thighs became cramped while 
he was attempting to pull himself back into the spacecraft. He felt 
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that the attenuation of light by the visors was correct for the bright-
ness levels encountered outside the spacecraft. He reported that his 
VlSlon seemed "clearer" during EVA, but no accurate measurement of 
visual acuity was made. 
7.2.2.2.6 Reentry: The g forces of reentry caused no medical 
difficulty, although both crew members mentioned that their perception 
of the initial, rather low deceleration seemed an order of magnitude 
greater than the actual g loading of the spacecraft. Once the greater 
g loads of reentry began to build, they were felt by the flight crew 
to be of lower magnitude than experienced on the centrifuge. No visual 
disturbances were noted. When the spacecraft assumed the landing atti-
tude, the crewmen were easily able to brace themselves and did not im-
pact with any part of the spacecraft. Throughout the reentry, absolute-
ly no symptoms indicative of hypotension were reported even though the 
crew made no specific effort to prevent symptoms as they felt no need 
to do this as per preflight instructions. 
7.2.3 Postflight 
Postflight medical information was gathered from the time of 
spacecraft landing until approximately 66 hours thereafter. These data 
were primarily obtained by clinical examinations. A verbal medical de-
briefing was conducted, and laboratory examinations of blood, urine, 
and feces were conducted. In addition, a bioinstrumentation system was 
used to record physiological measurements during the tilt procedures. 
Postflight deviations from the normal were limited to the following: 
(1) mild body fluid imbalance and dehydration, (2) moderate crew fatigue, 
and (3) transient, asymptomatic reduction in pulse pressure and ele-
vation in heart rate during the tilt procedure. 
7.2.3.1 Recovery activities.- Medical recovery activities were 
planned before the mission and were modified as dictated by the 
observed medical responses of the crew. 
7.2.3.1.1 Planned recovery procedures: The Gemini IV medical 
activities were similar to those reported for the GT-3 mission, except 
that, because of the medical importance of this mission, the Medi~al 
Evaluation Team was deployed aboard the prime recovery vessel. 
7.2.3.1.2 Narrative: The postflight medical activities of the 
crew are outlined in table 7.2-VI. With the prospect of rapid heli-
copter retrieval, the crew elected to remain in their flight suits and 
were picked up by helicopter using the horsecollar. Shortly after 
landing, the pilot became suddenly but minimally nauseated and vomited 
a small quantity of brownish (color of previously eaten food) fluid. 
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This nausea was very rapid in onset and was entirely relieved by vomit-
ing. No medication was used by either crew member during or after flight. 
Postflight egress through the hatch was relatively easy and the crew 
reported no symptoms when standing, while hanging on the hoist, or 
while standing for 20 seconds in the retrieving helicopter. The physi-
cian aboard the recovery helicopter reported that a brief examination 
revealed no medical abnormalities in the crew. Immediately following 
return to the aircraft carrier, the crew walked below decks to the ship's 
sick bay where the initial postflight medical examinations were per-
formed. At no time during the recovery or postflight phase of the 
mission did the crew report any subjective symptoms indicative of 
hypotension. 
7.2.3.2 Examinations.- A detailed examination was conducted in 
the ship's sick bay as soon as the crew came aboard the recovery 
carrier. The examination protocol is to be found in table 7.2-VII. 
With the exception of fluid and electrolyte changes and tilt-table 
responses, no significant abnormalities were noted during this exami-
nation. Specifically, there was no nosebleed as was erroneously re-
ported in the press. These findings are summarized in tables 7.2-11, 
7.2-111, 7.2-IV, 7.2-VIII, and 7.2-IX. 
The command pilot exhibited a moderate skin reaction to the 
stomaseal tape. He also experienced moderate pruritus at all sensor 
sites for a short period after sensor removal. The pilot demonstrated 
a similar but milder skin reaction at the sensor sites. The crew's 
underwear was nearly saturated with perspiration, and the fabric in 
the genital area was stained because of leakage during urination. An 
analysis of the urine transport system is being conducted as mentioned 
in section 5.1.10. No skin reaction was present at this site. Skin 
turgor was good, and no maceration nor other abnormality was present. 
7.2.3.3 Tilt-table studies.- A tilt-table procedure similar to 
that used on the GT-3 was employed for the Gemini IV mission. Signifi-
cant modifications to the GT-3 tilt-table studies were as follows: 
use of a tilt table with modified saddle instead of the Stokes Litter, 
strain gages around both legs (maximum calf circumference) to sense 
increases in leg circumference, and continuous biomedical recording of 
tilt-table responses (2 channels of ECG, automatic blood pressure in 
place of the auscultatory method, impedance pneumograph, cardiotacho-
meter, and time code generator). Five postflight tilt studies were 
done with each crewman. The first postflight tilt procedure revealed 
significant elevations of heart rate and narrowing of pulse pressure 
in response to a head-up tilt to 70° for 15 minutes. This response 
returned gradually to normal as seen in figure 7.2-1. The crew members' 
individual tilt-table responses were influenced both by a number of 
operational and environmental variable~ and by the tilting process 
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itself. The cardiovascular responses are believed to have occurred 
because of physiologic alterations. Such changes did not in any manner 
compromise the crew's ability to function in the inflight or postflight 
phase of this mission. 
7.2.3.4 Medical debriefing.- A verbal medical debriefing of the 
flight crew was conducted for most of the day after recovery aboard the 
U.S.S. Wasp. Because of the extravehicular activitiEs, the attempted 
rendezvous, and the duration of the flight, many significant items 
were considered during this debriefing. No disorientation, breakoff 
phenomenon, or other untoward effects were noted during the mission. 
Vision and color perception were reported to be normal. The crew 
found it necessary to spend much of their time dealing with the routine 
functions of life, that is, eating, excreting, sleeping, and stowing 
used or soiled items. Details of these inflight functions have been 
discussed in section 7.2.2. 
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TABLE ~.2-I.- PREFLIGHT MEDICAL STUDIES AND ASSOCIATED ACTIVITIES 
Date, 
1965 
March 3 
March 24 
May 13 
May 18 
May 20 
May 25 
May 28 
May 29 
June 1 
June 3 
Activity 
Simulated flight (SST) 
Spacecraft checkout in 
altitude chamber, 
prime crew (SST) 
Wet mock simulated 
launch 
Tilt-table tests 1 and 
2 on prime crew 
Test of ventilation con-
trol module, umbilical 
and maneuvering unit in 
altitude chamber, pilot 
of prime crew 
F-9 day medical examina-
tion by flight surgeon 
Tilt-table tests 
Simulated flight (Cape) 
F-2 day medical examina-
tions by medical evalu-
ation team, tilt-table 
test 5 
Launch morning physical 
examination by flight 
surgeon 
Medical study or support 
Examination before and after tests. 
Biosensors used during test. 
Examination before and after tests. 
Biosensors used during test. 
Examination before test. 
Biosensors used during test. 
Biosensors and strain gages used. 
Examination before and after test. 
Biosensors used during test. 
Complete physical examination. 
Blood drawn for typing and cross matChing. 
Biosensors and strain gages used during 
tests. 
Examination before tests. 
Biosensors used during tests. 
Comprehensive examinations, blood-volume 
studies, complete blood and urine studies. 
Final brief examination. 
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TABLE 7.2-II.- HEMATOLOGY - COMMAND PILOT 
Determination Preflight 
Date, 1965 May 25 June 1 June 7 
T:ilIle, e. s.t. 10:30 a.m. 8:15 a.m. 1:41 p.m. 
White blood cells /mm~ . • . · . · . 9700 7 700 12 000 
Neutrophiles, percent 
· . · .. · . · . 
60 54 78 (+2 bands) 
Lymphocytes, percent. · .. · .. · .. 33 38 19 
Monocytes, percent . · .. · . · . 5 4 0 
Eosinophiles, percent .. · .. 2 3 1 
Basophiles, percent · .. ...... · .. 0 1 0 
Plate let s/mm3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ............ Adequate 374 000 Adequate 
Red blood cells, millions/mm3 ........ 5.3 5.93 6.18 
Hematocrit, percent .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
· . 
46 44.0 41. 0 
Hemoglobin, gm/100 ml · .. · .. · . 14.4 14.5 14 
Blood morphology . . ...................... Normal Normal Normal 
Sodium, mEq/l • • . . . . • . . . . . • . 142 144 143 
Potassium, mEq/l . . • . . . • . • . . . . 4.6 5.4 3.5 
Chloride, mEq/l . • . • . . . ...•.. 105 108 106 
Calcium, mgm percent 
· . · .. · . 
10.5 10.9 10.2 
Phosphorus, mgm/100 ml • . ............ 3.4 3.8 2.9 
Glucose, mgm/100 ml (non-fasting) ........ 92 102 127 
Albumen, gm percent 
· . 
........ 
· . 
4.9 4.9 4.5 
Alpha 1, gm percent 
· . · . · .. 
0.2 0.2 0.2 
Alpha 2, gm percent ........ .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.5 0.5 0.6 
Beta, gm percent .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. · . 0.9 0.9 0.8 
Gamma, gm percent . . · .. .. ........ 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Total protein, gm percent 
· . · .. · . 
7.7 7.7 7.4 
Postflight 
June 7 
9:00 p.m. 
15 000 
64 
29 
6 
1 
0 
Adequate 
5.91 
45.0 
--
Normal 
144 
3·9 
103 
10.6 
3.9 
98 
4.9 
0.2 
0.7 
0.9 
1.3 
8.0 
June 8 
9: 45 p.m. 
10 050 
63 
31 
3 
3 
0 
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
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Determination 
Date, 1965 
Time, e.s.t. 
White blood cells /mm3 . .. 
· . 
Neutrophiles, percent .. 
· . · . 
Lymphocytes, percent. 
Monocytes, percent . 
Eosinophiles, percent 
· . · . 
Basophiles, percent 
Platelets/mm3. 
· . · . 
Red blood cells, millions/mm3 •. 
· . 
Hematocrit, percent 
· . · ... 
Hemoglobin, gm/100 ml . . · . · .. 
Blood morphology . . . . . . 
· . · . · . 
Sodium, mEq/l . . · .. · . · .... 
Potassium, mEq/l . 
· . · . · . 
Chloride, mEq/l .. · .. · . · . 
Calcium, mgms percent · ..... 
Phosphorus, mgm/100 ml ...... 
· . 
Glucose, mgm/100 ml (non-fasting). 
· . 
Albumen, gm percent 
· . · . 
Alpha 1, gm percent .. · .. 
Alpha 2, grn percent · ... · ... 
Beta, gm percent · ... · . · .. 
Gamma, gm percent · . · . · .. 
Total protein, gm percent 
· . · .. 
'------
TABLE 7.2-III.- HEMATOLOGY - PILOT 
Preflight 
May 25 June 1 June 7 
10:40 a.m. 8:2~ a.m. 2: 30 p.m. 
7400 7 850 29 050 
62 49 88 
34 44 10 
3 3 1 
0 3 1 
1 1 0 
Adequate 308 000 Adequate 
5.17 5.14 5.58 
45 43.5 44.0 
15·3 15.5 15.0 
Normal Normal Normal 
140 143 141 
5·2 5·7 4.6 
106 107 106 
10.2 10.9 10.5 
3.8 4.3 5.0 
77 100 146 
4.5 5.0 4.8 
0.1 0.2 0.2 
0.5 0.4 0.8 
0.8 0.7 0.9 
1.1 1.1 1.3 
7.1 7.4 8.0 
Postflight 
June 7 June Ei 
9:30 p.m. 9:30 p.m. 
(approx. ) 
15 150 7350 
74 66 (+1 band) 
16 23 
6 6 
1 3 
0 1 
Adequate --
5.72 --
44.0 42.0 
Normal --
141 --
4.5 --
102 --
10.9 --
4.4 --
87 --
4.6 --
0.2 --
0.5 --
0.7 --
1.3 --
7·3 --
June 13 
9300 
75 
19 
3 
3 
--
Adequate 
4.75 
45.0 
15·9 
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
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TABLE 7·2-IV.- BLOOD VOLUME DETERMINATIONS (1125 ) 
Connnand Pilot 
Preflight Postflight 
June 1, 1965 June 7, 1965 
8:30 a.m. e. s.t. 2:30 p.m. e. s. t. 
Hematocrit, percent. 
· · · · · 
43.0 41. 0 
Blood. volume, cc 
estimated normal 
· · · · · · 
5070 
--
Actual blood. volume, cc • 
· · · 
5198 4820 
Change in blood volume, 
preflight to postflight, cc: 
-378 
Plasma volume, cc 
estimated normal 
· · · · · · 
2890 
--
Actual plasma volume, cc 
· · · 
2962 2844 
Change in plasma volume, 
preflight to postflight, cc: -118 
Pilot 
Preflight Postflight 
June 1, 1965 June 7, 1965 
8:45 a.m. e.s.t. 2:30 p.m. e. s. t. 
Hematocrit, percent 
· · · · · 
44.3 44.0 
Blood. volume, cc 
estimated normal 
· · · · · · 
5270 
--
Actual blood volume, cc • 
· · · 
6969 6059 
Change in blood volume, 
preflight to postflight, cc: -910 
Plasma volume, cc 
estimated normal 
· · · · · · 
2938 
--
Actual plasma volume, cc 
· · · 
3885 3393 
Change in plasma volume, 
preflight to postflight, cc: 
-492 
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Day 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Time, g.e.t. 
T-O to 
T+24 hr 
T+24 to 
T+48 hr 
T+48 to 
T+72 hr 
T+72 to 
T+96 hr 
Totals 
TABLE 7.2-V.- FOOD, WATER, AND SLEEP TABULATION 
IThe times reported for sleep are approximations as reported by the flight] 
Lerew. Included in these times are periods of light sleep and rest. 
Food, cal. Water, cc 
Command "pilot Pilot 
Command 
pilot Pilot Drinking Water Total Drinking Water 
water in food water in food 
944 2454 800 510 1310 720 1050 
1813 1797 405 780 n85 560 660 
2985 1674 900 1500 2400 760 900 
24n 3224 900 790 1690 1000 1200 
8153 9149 3005 3580 6585 3040 3710 
-
---- --- ----- -------
" 
Sleep, hr 
Command 
Total pilot Pilot 
1770 71 2 71 2 
1220 71 2 7 
1660 5 5 
2200 7 s1. 2 
6750 27 28 
-.1 
I 
\Jl 
+ 
c 
Z 
() 
....... 
» 
c.n 
c.n 
""" "-m 
o 
UNCLASSIFIED 7-55 
TABLE 7.2-VI.- POSTFLIGHT EVENTS AND MEDICAL ACTIVITIES 
Date, 1965 
June 7 
June 8 
June 9 
June 10 
Time, e.s.t. 
12:12 p.m. 
12:22 p.m. 
12:39 :p.m. 
12:42 p.m. 
12:50 p.m. 
1:09 p.m. 
1: 41 p.m. 
4:50 p.m. 
6:30 p.m. 
7:02 to 9:45 p.m. 
10.30 p.m. 
8:30 a.m. 
10:00 to 11:50 a.m. 
1:00 to 4:00 p.m. 
7:19 to 9:30 p.m. 
10:00 p.m. 
6:00 a.m. 
2:55 to 4:37 p.m. 
11: 00 p.m. 
5:40 a.m. 
7:15 a.m. 
Activity 
Spacecraft landing, 48 miles from 
U.S. S. Wasp 
Crew decision to remain in suits for 
helicopter pickup. 
Right hatch opened, egress began 
Egress complete, helicopter pickup 
began 
Helicopter pickup complete, departed 
for U. S. S. Wasp 
Arrived aboard U.S.S. Wasp 
Suits doffed, began initial medical 
evaluation 
Completed initial medical evaluation 
First postflight meal (low calcium) 
Second tilt procedure and blood 
specimens 
Sleep 
Awoke; breakfast 
Third tilt procedure; medical 
debriefing 
Medical debriefing 
Fourth tilt procedure 
Sleep 
Awoke; breakfast; technical debrief-
ing 
Fifth tilt procedure 
Sleep 
Awoke; breakfast 
Departed recovery ship 
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TABLE 7.2-VII.- POSTFLIGHT MEDICAL EXAMINATION PROTOCOL 
Duration, Corrnnand pilot, Pilot, Examination 
min Minutes after Minutes after 
arrival in sick bay arrival in sick bay 
a X-ray 30 0 to 30 50 to 80 
Tilt 50 60 to 110 o to 50 
Otolaryngology 30 150 to 180 110 to 140 
Neuropsychiatry 30 30 to 60 80 to 110 
Ophthalmology 30 110 to 140 140 to 170 
Medical 30 180 to 210 180 to 210 
Audiometry 10 140 to 150 170 to 180 
aTime for X-ray includes: chest film (P.A. and left lat.), 
densitometry, blood sample, RISA, ECG, and RISA. 
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TABLE 7.2-VIII.- SUMMARY CLINICAL EVALUATION 
(a) Command pilot 
Preflight Preflight Postflight Postflight 
(lailllch site) (lailllch day) (shipboard) (shipbOard) 
Jillle 1, 1965, Jillle 3, 1965, Jillle 7, 1965, Jillle 7, 1965, 
8:00 to 12:00 4:00 a.m. 3: 00 p.m. 8:00 p.m. 
a.m. e.s.t. e. s. t. e. s.t. e. s. t. 
Body weight, lb . 156 156.5 152 157 
~ 
" 
,,~ ~() - ~~ ~ ~n n ~() /" C Tempera-cure, ora..L, -J!-. • • ';/o.~ ,;/(.U ,;/0.0 ,;/0.0 C 
Z Respirations, Z 
() breaths/min . . . . 16 10 16 20 () 
~ Heart rate, beats/min 72 72 82 86 ~ 
(J) Skin . . • . • Healed infected Healed infected Moderate reaction No change. Le- (J) 
(J) laceration, laceration, at biosensor sites, sion on right (J) 
right foot. right foot. especially left foot in satis-
." axillary; other- factory condition. ." 
r;; wise clear. r;; 
o r1 __ ~..L._ l\T.-.~ __ " T:1.!..1.. .D.-.~_ ...o'.!_1-..1.. m1-.!~ __ ..1.. __ _ ' ___ ..L. l\T.-. _1..._~ __ ............. .-._..L. 0 
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TABLE 7.2-VIII.- SUMMARY CLINICAL EVALUATION - Concluded 
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Preflight Preflight Postflight 
(launch site) (launch day) (shipboard) 
June 1, 1965, June 3, 1965, June 7, 1965, 
8:00 to 12:00 4:00 a.m. 1:03 p.m. 
a.m. e.s.t. e. s. t. e. s. t. 
173 173 1641 2 
98.2 98.6 100.2 
15 12 18 
70 64 96 
Normal; no Normal Minimal reaction at 
lesions. biosensor sites; 
otherwise clear. 
We 11- Fi t for flight. Thirsty, alert, 
conditioned oriented, coopera-
normal man tive, tired. 
-- -- - -
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(shipboard) 
June 7, 1965, 
7:02 p.m. 
e. s. t. 
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99.3 
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drinking water 
freely. 
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Speci~ic gravity 
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acetone, bile . 
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June 1 
8:45 a.m. 
Yellow, clear 
1. 017 
6.4 
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blood cell /hp~, 
rare epithelial 
cells, mucous 
thread 
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TABLE 7.2-IX.- URINALYSES 
(a) Command pilot 
June 7 June 8 
3:50 p.m. 9:30 p.m. 
Straw Amber 
1. 020 1.017 
6.0 6.0 
Negative Negative 
Few amorphous 2 to 3 white 
crystals, blooj cells/hp~, 
1 to 2 white occasional oxy-
blood cells/hp~ late crystals, 
mucous threads 
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June 8 June 9 
5:00 p.m. 7:30 a.m. 
dark amber, Straw, clear 
clear 
1. 020 1. 020 
5.0 5.0 
Negative Negative 
3 to 4 white 1 to 2 white 
blood cells/hp~, blood cells/hp~ 
rare red blood 
cells 
230 538 
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June 10 
noon 
Amber, clear 
1. 020 
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Rare white blood 
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al oxylate 
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TABLE 7.2-IX.- URINALYSES - Concluded 
Preflight 
Date, 1965 June 1 
Time, e.s.t. 9:00 a.m. 
Color, appearance 
·1 Yellow, clear 
I Specific gravity I 1.019 • I 
pH •.•.•.. .1 5.0 
Albumen, sugar, 
acetone, bile .1 Negative 
Microscopic 
·1 o to 1 white blood cell /hpf, 
rare epithelial 
cell. mucous 
threads 
Volume, cc 80 
*One specimen on June 8 discarded 
(b) Pilot 
Postflight* 
June 8 June 8 June 9 June 10 
9:30 a.m. 3: 00 p.m. 7:30 a.m. 3:00 p.m. 
dark amber, amber, clear straw, clear straw, clear 
clear 
1.026 1. 023 1. 028 1.010 
5.0 5.0 5.0 6.0 
Negative Negative 1 Negative Negative 
3 to 4 white 3 to 4 white 1 to 2 white 1 to 2 white 
blood cells/hpf, blood cells/hpf, blood cells/hpf, blood cells/hpf, 
1 to 2 red blood 2 to 3 red blood rare red blood rare red blood 
cells/hpf, occa- cells/hpf, occa- cells/hpf cells/hpf, occa-
sional epithe- sional epithe- sional epithe-
lial cells and lial cells and lial cell 
mucous threads mucous threads 
530 127 640 175 
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110 110 
100 100 100 
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40 40 40 
1 15 0 5 10 
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Elapsed time, min 
(a) Comand pilot. 
Figure 7.2-1. - Tilt table studies. 
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Figure 7.2-1.- Concluded. 
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Figure 7.2-2. - Phys iological measurements 
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Figure 7.2 .. 2. - Physiological measurements 
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8. 0 EXPERIMENTS 
Eleven scientific, medical, technological, and engineering experi-
ments were conducted on the Gemini IV mission to extend man's knowledge 
of space and to develop further the ability to sustain life in the space 
environment. These experiments are listed in table 8-1. Detailed de-
scriptions and additional information concerning the re~uirements and 
responsibilities necessary for the successful accomplishment of these 
experiments are presented in reference 6. Two originally scheduled 
experiments CD-I, Basic Object Photography, and D-6, Surface Photography) 
were deleted from this mission to permit conduct of the extravehicular 
activity. These two experiments will be conducted on a later Gemini 
mission. 
Because of the nature of these experiments, only a preliminary 
evaluation of the experimental results can be presented in this report. 
In most cases, detailed evaluations and conclusions will be published 
in separate documents after all data for each experiment have been 
analyzed. 
UNCLASSIFIED 
8-2 UNCLASSIFIED 
8.1 EXPERIMENT D-8, RADIATION IN SPACECRAFT 
8.1.1 Objective 
The objective of Experiment D-8 was to describe qualitatively and 
quantitatively the absorbed radiation dose rate and total dose that pen-
etrated the cabin of the Gemini 4 spacecraft. This includes determina-
tions of ionizing and penetrating power of various types of radiation 
and their contribution to dose according to profile, type, time, and 
position within the cabin. 
8.1.2 Equipment 
The experimental equipment consisted of the two general types of 
dosimeters described in the following paragraphs. 
8.1.2.1 Active dose rate indicators.- Two tissue-equivalent, 
current-mode ionization chamber instruments were used to measure the 
variation of absorbed dose rate inside the spacecraft cabin as a func-
tion of time. 
8.1.2.2 Passive dosimeters.- Five passive dosimeters were used to 
measure the total radiation dose received at various locations inside 
the cabin. These units were installed in the spacecraft in the approx-
imate locations shawn in figure 8-1. 
8.1. 3 Procedure 
The experiment commenced with the launch of the Gemini IV vehicle. 
At that time, both active instruments began normal operation and con-
tinued to monitor the radiation levels throughout the 4-day mission. 
During five passes through the central region of the South Atlantic 
anomaly, the sensor head of the portable active dosimeter was removed 
from its mount on the right hatch and placed at each of the following 
locations by the pilot for a period of 1 minute: 
(a) Against the chest, the sensor head covered with a glove 
(b) Between the legs in the area of the groin 
(c) Under the left armpit 
(d) In front of the cabin window 
(e) In front of the instrument panel about midway between the 
floor and the ceiling 
(f) On the floor of the spacecraft between the feet 
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This measured the instantaneous radiation dose level as functions 
of position in the cabin and depth in the pilot, using portions of the 
pilot!s body as a shield. The dose-rate level beneath the left hatch 
was obtained as a function of time from the fixed dosimeter and these 
data were used as a baseline from which to compare the measurements 
made by the portable unit. 
The five passive dosimeters measured the total dose received dur-
ing the mission and served two distinct functions: 
(a) One unit was mounted in close proximity to the fixed active 
dosimeter to provide empirical correlations between the actual inte-
grated dose as measured by that unit, and the energy dependent dose 
measured by the passive dosimeter. 
(b) Four units were used to obtain values of integrated dose at 
other locations in the Gemini spacecraft. These areas included lightly 
shielded and heavily shielded positions. 
8.1. 4 Results 
8.1.4.1 Active dose-rate indicators.- The active portion of 
Experiment D-8 is most conveniently discussed in terms of two general 
areas of interest: (1) experimental determination of the dose levels 
obtained outside of the South Atlantic anomaly (table 8-11), and 
(2) measurement of the radiation characteristics during spacecraft pas-
sage through the anomalous region of the inner radiation belt. The 
active dose-rate indicators functioned normally throughout the missionj 
and the five scheduled radiation level surveys within the cabin were 
performed by the pilot during anomaly passes of the spacecraft. 
The principal contribution to the biological dose received by the 
flight crew outside of the South Atlantic anomaly was from cosmic radi-
ation. The average, maximum, and minimum dose levels were measured 
approximately every 3 seconds during each revolution. The maximum and 
minimum dose levels were determined at the lowest or highest readings 
observed during at least a 1.0-minute period for each revolution. The 
average dose rate for all non-anomaly revolutions analyzed was 
0.42 millirad!hour. Assuming a nominal period of 90 minutes for each 
revolution, the total accumulated tissue dose was approximately 13 mil-
lirads for a 20-revolution time span. The average daily radiation level 
received inside the cabin as a result of cosmic radiation was approxi-
mately 10 millirad!day. These radiation levels are very low and consti-
ture a permissible magnitude. During the EVA, the right hatch remained 
open and the movable instrument was exposed to essentially a free-space 
radiation environment during a portion of revolution 3. The radiation 
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levels measured by that instrument during this period did not exceed 
those obtained by the fixed unit, indicating the absence of softer or 
trapped corpuscular radiation in the regions of flight crew egress. 
Data obtained during passage through the South Atlantic anomaly 
for revolutions 7, 36, and 37 were analyzed, and a rapid increase in 
the radiation levels within the Gemini spacecraft was observed. For 
revolution 7, a peak dose level of 363 millirad!hour was obtained for 
the fixed instrument, and a 107 millirad!hour peak level for the mov-
able dosimeter. A dose level of over 300 millirad!hour was obtained 
for approximately 2.5 minutes during this passage through the anomaly. 
Figure 8-2 shows that a higher than normal radiation level existed for 
a period of 12 minutes during this revolution. The anomaly passage 
dose levels for revolution 37 are also shown in figure 8-2. Peak dose 
rates of 281 millirad!hour for the fixed instrument and 45 millirad! 
hour for the movable dosimeter were recorded. The duration of an in-
creased radiation level during this passage was approximately 10 minutes. 
The integrated tissue dose for anomaly passage during revolu-
tions 7, 36, and 37 are presented as follows for both types of active 
dosimeters. 
Revolution Fixed Portable 
number ionization chamber, ionization chamber, 
millirads millirads 
7 34.0 10.0 
36 13.0 4.0 
37 25. 0 4.0 
The lower radiation levels obtained during revolution 36 indicate 
that this passage grazed the anomaly and failed to penetrate as deeply 
into the belt as the other two revolutions. The differences in the 
dose readings between the two types of active units appear to be a re-
sult of increased self-shielding of the movable unit. Because of the 
increased thickness of the stainless steel barrel of the senSing element 
and the greater shielding of the electronics package, there is a con-
siderable reduction in the softer radiation reaching the movable sensing 
element. The fixed sensing element has less shielding and, therefore, 
has a much less restricted view of any omnidirectional radiation entering 
the spacecraft cabin. A conclusive discussion of these differences 
cannot be presented until the cabin radiation survey data for the exper-
iment are available for analysis. 
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8.1.4.2 Passive dosimeters.- All five flight dosimeters and a 
similar ground.control unit were placed in a shielded aluminum con-
tainer immediately after their preparation 5 days prior to launch. The 
flight dosimeters and the ground control unit remained together within 
this shielded container until approximately 26 hours before launch. At 
that time the flight items were installed in their assigned positions 
in the sp~cecraft. During and after spacecraft installation, extremely 
rigid controls were put into effect governing the location of all pos-
sible radiation sources in the launch area. This was re~uired since 
the passive units were capable of detecting radiation doses as low as 
5 millirads which could easily result from exposure to ground radiation 
sources near the launch area. The ground control unit was carried to 
the Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, Texas, where the flight dosim-
eters were returned approximately 11 hours after termination of the 
mission. Therefore, for comparison purposes, the ground control unit 
was separated from the flight units for approximately 135 hours. The 
flight items and ground control unit were placed in the shielded ship-
ping container and returned for evaluation to the Air Force Weapons 
Laboratory, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. 
Each of the pocket ionization chambers and calcium fluoride detect-
ors was checked for absolute accuracy, dose fading, and inherent leakage. 
The rate of fading of both the lithium and calcium fluoride dosimeters 
was considered negligible for the time duration of the mission and cor-
rections for fading were not re~uired. 
The photoluminescent glass dosimeters of the needle type were care-
fully selected and the preflight dose on each needle was "determined and 
recorded. Twelve of these dosimeters were inside the hatch-mounted pas-
sive unit. Analysis of the readings obtained with these dosimeters was 
beneath the threshold of sensitivity. 
The lithium fluoride dosimeters contained in the passive units 
consisted of a small cylindrical teflon container filled with powdered 
lithium fluoride. Lithium fluoride powder containing predominantly 
lithium 6 will respond to ionizing radiation and neutrons, while the 
lithium 7 isotope has effectively zero neutron cross section. The 
difference in readings between these two types was used to determine the 
neutron component within the spacecraft cabin. In order to determine 
the practicality of this approach, thelpassive unit with both types of 
lithium isotopes was exposed to the fission spectrum of a pulsed neutron 
reactor. The data obtained indicated that no measurable neutron dose 
occurred within the limits of experimental error. This result is rea-
sonable since the only neutrons expected in the spacecraft would be 
from secondary interactions resulting from high energy protons and would 
be extremely few in number for this mission. 
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The preliminary results from the passive dosimeters are presented 
in table 8-111. The heavy particle detector and film emulsion packs 
that were on these units are being analyzed and the results are not 
available at the time of publication of this report. 
8.1.5 Conclusions 
Available data indicate Experiment D-8 successfully met the stated 
objective. Both passive and active dosimeter data indicate conclusively 
that no radiation hazard is associated with manned space operations at 
present Gemini altitudes. However, because of the rather high interior 
doses received during passages through the South Atlantic anomaly, it 
is evident that the Gemini spacecraft shielding is inadequate to com-
pletely stop trapped particles in a manner that would reduce the radia-
tion levels to an acceptable magnitude for prolonged operations at higher 
orbital altitudes. The experiment also indicates the inadequacy of 
utilizing single passive elements to provide a true energy independent 
tissue radiation dose measurement when subjected to the complex spectrum 
of ionizing space radiation. The cumulative differences obtained be-
tween the passive and active instruments, and the active instruments 
themselves, indicate a need to extend the active portion of Experi-
ment D-8 to cover depth dose measurements in order to define better the 
softness of the cabin interior radiation. 
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8. 2 EXPERThlENT D- 9, SIMPLE NA. VIGATI ON 
8.2.1 Objective 
The objective of Experiment D-9 was to achieve two basic goals: 
(a) To gather information on the observable phenomenon which could 
be best used for autonomous space navigation (that is, a horizon and 
celestial object examination). 
(b) To gather information on the use of a sextant-type device in 
an earth-orbiting vehicle and to define the man-sextant-vehicle inter-
face problems involved in the use and application of this type of instru-
ment for space navigation and rendezvous. 
8.2.2 Equipment 
The experimental equipment consisted of a first generation hand-
held space sextant which was to be utilized for star-to-horizon, star-
to-launch vehicle, and star-to-star measurements. The sextant contained 
neutral-density, blue-haze, and 5577A filters to accentuate the horizons 
to be investigated during specific sightings. 
8.2.3 Procedure 
The experiment was scheduled to be conducted in two major phases. 
The Apollo portion of the experiment was to evaluate the man-spacecraft 
operational suitability of the space sextant, and to obtain quantitative 
data for accessing the limits of accuracy of the sextant for rendezvous-
type measurements. The Air Force portion of the experiment consisted 
of studies of various star and horizon phenomena and specific star-to-
horizon measurements to obtain data for postflight calculations and ac-
curacy determinations of navigational positions. 
8.2.4 Results 
The actual conduct of these two phases was modified in flight be-
cause of spacecraft maneuver fuel limitations early in the mission, and 
because it was found that the selected stars were not visible on the 
daylight side of the revolutions. These flight-plan modifications elim-
inated the scheduled Apollo star-to-launch vehicle sightings and trans-
ferred all other sextant sightings to the nightside of the orbits. 
Movement of these sightings created other problems since the stars 
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selected for the original star-to-horizon measurements were not all 
time-phased for the nightsides of the orbits and re~uired the flight 
crew to deviate to a real-time type sighting. 
Sextant sightings and observations were conducted by both flight 
crew members. Typical types of sightings are illustrated in figure 8-3. 
The number of sightings taken and other significant preliminary data 
are as follows: 
Air Force sightings (star-to-horizon) • 
Apollo sightings (star-to-star) 
Useful horizons •••••••• •• 2 (natural earth and 
5577 A emission line) 
Air Force ••...••. • • • • • 0 11 
Apollo. • . • • • 
Maximum sighting angle obtained 
Air Force . • . . . . . • 
Apollo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Number of green horizon layers observed . 
Thickness of 5577 A layer • • • • • • . 
Star transit time 
Through green layer 
6 
approximately 30 0 
approximately 21° 
• • • • • 0 •• 2 
approximately 2°40' 
1 492 sec 
First sighting to top of green layer •.•• 3 min 23 sec 
Type of data reqording . • • • • written and voice tape 
Type of sighting timing manual and photo event timer 
The number of sightings obtained for this experiment represent 
approximately one-fourth of the data points originally scheduled. Sta-
tistical evaluation of the star-to-horizon measurements is not currently 
possible because of the limited number of such sightings and loss of 
data from the spacecraft voice tapes. Valuable ~ualitative information 
was obtained on the availability of various observable phenomena: the 
utility of the Gemini spacecraft windows, the thickness of the various 
horizons and their upper boundaries, and the ability of man to make 
celestial sightings from an orbiting spacecraft. 
The sextant performed satisfactorily except for the failure of the 
counter illumination light. This e~uipment malfunction caused no sig-
nificant problems since the flight crew were able to read the counter 
with available cabin lighting. 
8.2.5 Conclusions 
Available data indicate that Experiment D-9 was a ~ualitative suc-
cess. The lack of good statistical data limits the ~uantitative analysis 
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concerning the accuracy of the sextant sightings. Important qualitative 
observations are as follows: 
(a) The launch vehicle was visible in the daylight. This factor, 
in addition to the fact that stars are visible on the day side through 
a shaded window, appears to prove the feasibility of daylight optical 
rendezvous by using a sextant-type instrument. 
(b) The stars were always visible on the night side and the 
launch vehicle lights were easily acquired when within range. 
(c) The basic sextant concept utilized on this mission was proven 
feasible. There is now a requirement for operational flight checks to 
determine overall instrument-man accuracies. 
(d) The utility of the different spacecraft windows apparently 
presented no significant differences in sextant operation. 
(e) The observation of the thicknesses and the number of the var-
ious horizons used for sightings make it possible to determine the best 
horizon-filter combination under particular conditions. 
(f) It is feasible for man to make celestial sightings from an 
orbiting spacecraft. 
An investigation will be conducted to determine the cause of the 
sextant counter illumination light failure. 
It is significant to note that good qualitative data were obtained 
because the flight crew adapted to the day-night change and modified and 
verified the flight plan for this experiment. 
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8.3 E,'XPERD1ENT MSC-l ELECTROSTATIC CHARGE 
8.3.1 Objective 
The objective of Experiment MSC-l was to obtain measurements that 
would define the electrostatic potential of a Gemini spacecraft during 
a typical mission. 
8.3.2 Equipment 
The electrostatic potential meter (EPM) measured the electric field 
terminating on the spacecraft in the immediate vicinity of the sensor 
unit. Electrolytic tank measurements, using a scaled-dawn spacecraft 
model, were made to determine the conversion from the electric field at 
the sensor unit to the actual spacecraft potential. 
8.3.3 Procedure 
The experiment was scheduled to be operated for seven different 
periods throughout the mission. These periods were selected to be co-
incident with the occurrence of one or more of the following conditions: 
(a) Extensive use of the orbital attitude and maneuver system 
(OAMS) 
(b) Spacecraft passing through the South Atlantic magnetic anomaly 
(c) Retrofire 
(d) Periods of good definition of the spacecraft orientation 
8.3.4 Results 
The data were not available in time to be evaluated for this report. 
However, quick-look EPM data were obtained for several operating periods 
and indicate the instrument was operating in the same manner as it did 
during the preflight tests. There was no indication of electrical or 
mechanical failure. 
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8.3.5 Conclusion 
Evaluation of the data will be accomplished as they become available. 
Correlations will be attempted between the spacecraft potential and space-
craft attitude, orientation, day-night cycles, ambient magnetic field, 
spacecraft transmitter operation periods, and OAMS and retrorocket fir-
ings. 
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8.4 EXPERIMENT MSC-2, PRarON-ELECTRON SPECTROMETER 
8.4.1 Objective 
The objective of Experiment MSC-2 was to detect and measure the 
flux and energy of protons of energy 17 < E < 80 Mev and electrons of 
energy 0.5 < E < 4.5 Mev present throughout typical orbits on the 
Gemini IV mission, and especially within the South Atlantic geomagnetic 
anomaly. This anomaly is defined as the region bounded approximately 
by geodetic latitudes 15° S. and 55° S. and geodetic longitudes 30° E. 
and 60° W. 
8.4.2 Equipment 
The proton-electron spectrometer was located in the equipment 
adapter section on a support assembly fixed to the center of the equip-
ment adapter section blast shield door. 
8.4.3 Procedure 
The experiments were activated four times during the mission. At 
each activation, the equipment was required to remain on for three con-
secutive revolutions during which the spacecraft passed through the 
South Atlantic anomaly. 
8.4.4 Results 
Analysis of preliminary data indicates the experimental hardware 
functioned normally. All parameters were within the limits of normal 
operation and responded as anticipated. 
Preliminary examination of data from revolution 7 revealed that the 
proton flux outside the anomaly is extremely low, probably less than 
5/cm2-sec. Likewise, the number of electrons encountered outside the 
anomaly in this revolution was very low. Radioactive thorium was present 
in the spacecraft structure where the spectrometer was located and intro-
duced background into the measurement. This background made the exact 
number difficult to determine, but the flux was probably less than 
2 5/cm -sec. 
Particle intensities within the anomaly were characterized by a 
relatively sharp increase in count rate at approximately 26° S. geodetic 
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latitude and 56 0 W. geodetic longitude, and a further increase was ob-
served at approximately 310 S. geodetic latitude and 40 0 W. geodetic 
longitude. The latter increase was followed by a relatively slow decay 
to background levels at about 300 S. and 90 E. The first increase 
occurred over a period of approximately 1 minute during which the elec-
tron flux increased to approximately 700/cm2-sec. Increase in proton 
flux was discernible but very small. The second increase occurred over 
a period of approximately 2 minutes and resulted in a peak electron flux 
of approximately 3Xl04/cm2_sec and proton intensity of approximately 
50/cm2 -sec. These peak values persisted for approximately 2 minutes, 
after which the proton count rates decreased smoothly over a period of 
approximately 4 minutes to background level. The electron intensity was 
not as sharply peaked as the proton intensity and decreased to back-
ground level over a IEriod of approximately 8 minutes. 
8.4.5 Conclusions 
Due to limited data availability, it is not possible to determine 
what shape the energy spectra of the electrons and protons assume inside 
the anomaly. It is evident, as was expected, that both the proton and 
electron spectra are Quite soft in the energy range measured. 
Based on minimal preliminary data, it can be stated that the exper-
imental eQuipment relayed information on proton and electron fluxes that 
was very close to the values expected. It appears at these altitudes 
that detectable intensities of protons and electrons exist only in the 
anomaly. The preflight arbitrary boundary of the anomaly seems to have 
proved realistic. Fluxes measured inside the region appear to be lower 
than expected, but this cannot be fully verified until additional data 
from the mission are analyzed in detail. 
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8.5 EXPERThlENT MSC-3, TRI-AXIS MAGNETOMETER 
8.5.1 Objective 
The objective of Experiment MSC-3 was to determine the magnitude 
and direction of the geomagnetic field in the South Atlantic geomagnetic 
anomaly and to support Experiment MSC-2, Proton-Electron Spectrometer, 
with magnetic field line orientation with respect to the spectrometer. 
8.5.2 Equipment 
The tri-axis flux gate magnetometer equipment consisted of an elec-
tronics package, a sensor unit mounted on an extendable antenna boom, 
and an interconnecting cable between the two units. 
8.5.3 Procedure 
The sensor was extended on the boom after orbital insertion and re-
mained in the extended position throughout the mission. 
The experiment was activated four times during the mission. At 
each activation, the equipment was required to remain on for three con-
secutive revolutions during which the spacecraft passed through the 
South Atlantic anomaly. 
8.5.4 Results 
Preliminary data obtained from revolution 7 indicate that the exper-
iment equipment operated normally in measuring the magnitude of the geo-
magnetic field while in orbital flight. 
The average field intensity measured during 20 minutes of opera-
ting time between 90° W. to 30° E. longitude and 5° N. to 33° S. lati-
tude was 25 500 gammas. 
The field intensity predicted using McIlwain1s computer codes was 
typically 25 000 gammas for the same geographic region at an altitude 
of 200 kilometers. Ephemeris data for revolution 7 of Gemini IV were 
not available at the time these data were analyzed. It was assumed that 
the orbital altitude was approximately 107 nautical miles (200 kilome-
ters). The direction of the magnetic field lines appears to coincide 
with the magnitude values given for each component vector. 
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8.5.5 Conclusions 
Further analysis and comparison of data from revolution 7 with data 
from other revolutions must be made before final results for this exper-
iment can be determined. 
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8.6 EXPERIMENT MSC-lO, TWO-COLOR EARTH'S LIMB PHarOGRAPHS 
8.6.1 Objectives 
The objective of Experiment MBC-lo was to photograph the earth's 
limb on black and white film with a hand-held camera. The camera maga-
zine had a two-color filter mosaic directly in front of the film, the 
central vertical portions being red-transmitting Wratten no. 92, and the 
side portions blue-transmitting Wratten no. 47B. The purpose of these 
filters was to allow measurement by microdensitometry of the excess ele-
vation of the blue limb over the red. A series of photographs, taken 
with widely differing sun angles, was to indicate whether the high-
altitude blue limb is a reliable sighting feature for use in future 
space-flight guidance and navigation. Earlier results from the Mercury-
Atlas 9 flight indicated the need for these photographs to be taken 
periodically throughout the sun-lit portion of an earth orbit. 
8.6.2 Equipment 
The experiment equipment consisted of a 70-mm camera film magazine, 
modified to include the filter mosaic. This magazine was used with a 
70-mm still camera also required for other experiments. 
8.6.3 Procedure 
The inflight photographic procedure, beginning at the end of the 
night portion of revolution 43, scheduled groups of three photographs 
to be taken in rapid succession at approximately 5-minute intervals 
throughout the succeeding daylight until sunset. 
The photograph negatives of the earth's limb will finally be meas-
ured by microdensitometry, comparing the red and blue limbs by reference 
to an arbitrarily added horizontal line on the edge of the film. Each 
photograph affords two-limb comparison measurements, one on each side of 
the center barrier. The film has marked on its edges two series of step-
wedge densitometric exposures, one red and one blue. 
8.6.4 Results 
The detailed schedule of operation for the experiment was generally 
followed as outlined in the flight plan. The earliest useful photographs 
were obtained soon after sunrise. Preliminary measurements of 6 of the 
24 useful photographs have been made and reduced by quick-look procedures. 
Several typical photographs are shown in figure 8-4. The four upper 
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photographs show intelligible features of the earth's surface and indi-
cate some variety of blue-limb elevation above the red. The barrier in 
the center of each photograph is needed to hold the red gelatin filter 
in place. Photograph 14 was printed before the reference line was added. 
The enlargement of photograph 30 better illustrates the limb differences. 
Results of these preliminary measurements converted to blue limb excess 
elevations are as follows: 
Photograph Blue limb excess 
no. elevation, krn 
12 6.6 
16 6.9 
20 7·7 
24 9·5 
27 8·7 
30 10·5 
The limb elevation data refer to a point approximately one-half of 
the peak radiance of the limb. This conforms to the observing proposed 
procedure for Apollo navigation. The scattering angles increase regu-
larly from the early, low numbered photographs to almost 18er for the 
latest ones taken ne~r sunset. 
8.6.5 Conclusions 
Actual values of the limb radiance will not be available until the 
detailed micro-densitometry calculations have been completed. 
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8. 7 EXPERIMENT S-5, SYNOPrIC TERRAIN PHarOGRAPHY 
8.7.1 Objective 
The objective of Experiment S-5 was to obtain high-quality color 
photographs of terrain features for geological and geographic purposes. 
The following two types of pictures were desired: 
(a) Pictures of well-known areas, such as the United States, 
which could serve as standards for interpretation of lesser known areas. 
(b) Pictures of remote regions, such as the central Sahara, which 
are poorly covered by existing photography. 
8.7.2 Equipment 
The experiment equipment consisted of a 70-mm camera film magazine. 
A total of five magazines loaded with color film was on board the space-
craft, each with a 55-frame capability. The equivalent of one magazine 
was allotted for Experiment S-5. A haze filter was also carried to be 
used at the discretion of the crew. These magazines were used with a 
70-mm still camera also required for other experiments. 
8.7.3 Procedure 
Subject to fuel and power limitations, the crew was instructed to 
use the following procedure for terrain photography: First, United 
States and Mexico; second, Arabian peninsula and eastern Africa; and 
third, North Africa. 
It was stressed to the crew that almost any pictures of the earth's 
surface were valuable, even if the experiment plan could not be followed 
exactly. 
8.7.4 Results 
Despite early fuel restrictions, the planned procedures were fol-
lowed closely, and a large number of excellent color pictures were ob-
tained. Approximately twice as many pictures were obtained as the 
experiment required, and some terrain photographs were obtained from 
each of the five magazines. Some photographic coverage was obtained 
of all desired areas. 
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The most valuable series of photographs was taken systematically 
over the southern United States and Mexico. Complete overlapping cover-
age was secured from Baja California to central Texas, with intermittent 
coverage eastward to the Atlantic Ocean. These pictures are mostly verti-
cally oriented, and the land areas west of central Texas are almost com-
pletely cloud free. 
other pictures were taken on several different revolutions. Fuel 
restrictions apparently prevented proper spacecraft orientation on some 
passes, but nearly all terrain pictures are of high quality and quite 
usable for scientific purposes. A summary of the photographs obtained 
is given in table 8-IV. 
A detailed analysis of the terrain photographs has not been com-
pleted; however, preliminary comments are in order. Color rendition 
is generally excellent, especially in arid regions. Longer wavelengths 
reds, yellows, and browns - are very distinct. The greens of vegetation 
did not register, except as shades of blue. However, many different 
shades of blue in shallow bodies of water, such as the Gulf of California, 
can be observed. 
Ground resolution is remarkably high in view of the short (80-mm) 
focal length camera lens employed. Linear features, such as railroads 
and streets, on the order of 50 feet wide can be easily distinguished. 
For example, Route 54 can be traced into downtown El Paso, Texas, where 
it becomes Dyer Street, and many other streets in the residential dis-
tricts can be delineated. This high ground resolution permits many 
other features to be identified. Open-pit mines in Arizona and oil 
fields in west Texas are very distinct. Figure 8-5 shows a typical 
synoptic terrain photograph of the upper end of the Gulf of California. 
8.7.5 Conclusions 
Experiment S-5 can be classified as a complete success. The photo-
graphs obtained will be of great value for geological studies. In ad-
dition to exhibiting good color rendition and high resolution, they in-
clude a wide variety of geological features. These include Pre-Cambrian 
massifs, Cenozoic volcanic fields, Paleozoic and Mesozoic folded moun-
tains, and a wide variety of aeolian desert features such as seif dunes. 
Detailed study of the many photographs will require extensive analysis 
and evaluation. 
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8.8 EXPERIMENT S-6, SYNOPTIC WEATHER PHOTOGRAPHY 
8.8.1 Objective 
One objective of this experiment was to obtain high-quality color 
photographs of a number of selected clouds and meteorologically inter-
esting weather systems. A second objective of the experiment was to 
obtain photographs of areaS being concurrently viewed.by the TIROS in 
order to aid in interpretation of the high-altitude satellite television 
type photographs. 
8.8.2 Equipment 
The experiment equipment consisted of a 70-mm camera film magazine. 
Five magazines were on board the spacecraft, each with a 55-frame capa-
bility. The equivalent of one magazine was allotted for Experiment s-6. 
These magazines were used with a 70-mm still camera also required for 
other experiments. 
8.8.3 Procedure 
The crew was briefed immediately before launch on the types of 
weather systems existing at that time and those that should be photo-
graphed. During the mission, meteorologists from the U.S. Weather 
Bureau's National Weather Satellite Center used worldwide weather maps 
and TIROS pictures to select specific areas likely to contain various 
weather systems of. interest. When operationally feasible, this infor-
mation was communicated to the flight crew so they could locate and 
photograph these areas. 
8.8.4 Results 
Despite early fuel restrictions which prevented the crew from 
searching for desired cloud formations, over 100 excellent color photo-
graphs were obtained for this experiment. These photographs show cloud 
systems of all types, including such features as cellular cloud patterns, 
sun glint from ocean surfaces, extensive cloud layers in tropical dis-
turbances, lines or "streets" of cumulus clouds over the oceans, and 
well developed thunderstorm areas. Figure 8-6 shows a typical synoptic 
weather photograph taken of Acklins Island in the Bahamas. 
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8.8.5 Conclusions 
Experiment.S-6 can be classified as a complete success. The photo-
graphs obtained will be of great value for meteorological studies. De-
tailed study of the many photographs will require extensive analysis 
and evaluation and this information was not available for this report. 
When all data are available, comparisons will be made among a selection 
of the experiment photographs and corresponding TIROS views. 
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8.9 EXPERIMENT M-3, INFLIGHT EXERCISER 
8.9.1 Objective 
The objective of Experiment M-3 was to assess cardiovascular re-
flex activity in response to a given physical workload (exercise) and 
to ascertain the general capacity of performing physical work under 
space-flight conditions. 
8.9.2 Equipment 
The inflight exerciser consisted of a pair of rubber bungee cords 
attached to a handle on one end and to a nylon strap at the other. A 
stainless steel stop-cable limited the stretch length of the rubber 
bungee cords and fixed the workload. 
8.9.3 Procedure 
The exercise periods were scheduled to consist of one pull per 
second for 30 pulls using the inflight exerciser. The exerciser used 
on the Gemini IV mission required 63 pounds to pull to a full extension 
1 
of 102 inches. Seventeen exercise periods for the pilot and four for 
the command pilot were originally scheduled in the flight plan. The 
standard Gemini bioinstrumentation was used to record cardiovascular 
activity in support of this experiment. 
8.9.4 Results 
Available information indicates the flight crew exercised as 
scheduled. Also, the command pilot requested and received permission 
to perform additional exercise as he desired. At approximately 32 hours 
elapsed time, all type 2 medical data passes (blood pressure-temperature-
no exercise) were upgraded to type 1 (blood pressure-exercise-blood 
pressure) and both pilots were given permission to perform unscheduled 
exercises. From available reports and data, it is estimated that both 
flight crew members exercised approximately the same amount during the 
mission. 
During the 67th hour g.e.t., the pilot reported that the latex 
cover on the exerciser failed. This had no effect on the operation 
of the equipment or the experiment results, and the flight crew members 
UNCLASSIFIED 
UNCLASSIFIED 8-23 
continued to use the exerciser satisfactorily during the remainder of 
the mission. 
Data from the biomedical recorder were not available at the time 
of this report. Mean heart rate and mean blood pressure values from 
preflight test procedures and telemetered type 1 medical data passes 
for both the command pilot and the pilot have been plotted in figure 8-7. 
Preliminary data evaluation indicates little difference between 
heart rate responses to exercise during flight and those obtained during 
preflight tests for both flight crew members. This preliminary evalu-
ation offers no evidence of cardiovascular reflex decrement. 
Although the flight crew demonstrated their ability to perform 
physical work, both commented that they had no real desire to perform 
heavy, strenuous physical exercise. However, they indicated that periodic 
exercise is desirable throughout a long duration mission. 
8.9.5 Conclusions 
Available data indicate Experiment M-3 met the stated objective. 
Specific conclusions that can be made at this time are as follows: 
(a) Exercise periods should be programed in the mission flight 
for both flight crew members during their work (awake) cycle. 
(b) All medical data passes should include an exercise period. 
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,8.10 EXPERIMENT M-4, INFLIGHT PHONOCARDIOGRAM 
8.10.1 Objective 
The objective of Experiment M-4 was to measure the time interval 
between the electrical activation of the heart muscle (myocardium) and 
the onset of the muscular contraction of a man in space. This time 
interval is a measure of the functional status or fatigue-state of the 
muscle. This information will provide some insight into the functional 
cardiac status of flight crew members during prolonged space flight. 
8.10.2 Equipment 
The experiment equipment consisted of one transducer and an a~soci­
ated signal conditioner for each flight crew member. The signal con-
ditioner was the same unit as that used for the operational electro-
cardiogram measurements. The transducer was applied to the chest wall 
on the sternum of each of the flight crew members on the Gemini IV 
mission. All heart sounds detected were transmitted through the harness 
wiring bundle to the biomedical recorder. 
8.10.3 Procedure 
The phonocardiogram signals were to be recorded on the appropriate 
biomedical recorder when it was operating. The data obtained were to 
provide information on the duration of mechanical systole and diastole, 
the duration of the time period between electrical and mechanical systole, 
and the duration of the complete heart cycle. In addition, the phase 
of isometric contraction was measured which included the electrical 
excitation period. From these measurements, an assessment of myocardial 
function will be made, particularly the effectiveness of cardiac con-
tractility under conditions of space flight. 
Selected portions of the data will be recorded at high chart speed 
for detailed analysis. 
8.10.4 Results 
At this time, the ,biomedical tape has not been processed. Post-
flight evaluation of the experimental data cannot be performed until 
the data are available. 
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8.10.5 Conclusions 
Postflight determinations indicate that both phonocardiogram trans-
ducers were still in satisfactory operating condition. Recognizable 
phonoca~diogram data were received at the Cape Kennedy ground station 
during the mission. However, since these data were not yet available 
for analysis, no conclusions can be made in this report. 
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8.11 EXPERIMENT M-6, BONE DEMINERALIZATION 
8.11.1 Objective 
The objective of Experiment M-6 was to investigate the occurrence 
and degree of any bone demineralization resulting from prolonged space 
flights. Bone demineralization has been observed in humans during 
periods of inadequate calcium intake, during periods of immobilization 
such as bed rest, and during other situations involving physical inac-
tivity. 
8.11.2 Equipment 
The equipment used in this experiment was a standard clinical 
X-ray machine, standard 8-inch by 10-inch X-ray films, and calibrated 
dens i tometric wedges. 
8.11.3 Procedure 
X-rays were made on the Gemini IV flight crew at Cape Kennedy, 
Florida, in accordance with the following schedule: (a) launch minus 
10 days,. (b) launch minus 48 hours, and (c) launch minus 220 minutes. 
Precise X-ray densitometric measurements were made of the heel bone 
(os calcis) of the left foot and the terminal bone of the little finger 
(fifth digit) of the left hand. 
Three similar measurements were made after completion of the 
mission according to the following schedule: (a) as soon as possible 
after recovery, (b) approximately 24 to 72 hours after completion of 
the mission and prior to the flight crew's departure from the primary 
recovery vessel, and (c) at the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, 
Texas, approximately 10 days after completion of the Gemini IV mission. 
The data obtained will be compared to determine any bone demineral-
ization that occurred during the mission. 
8. 11. 4 Results 
Comparison between the preflight and postflight X-rays, to the 
extent analyzed, indicates actual X-ray absorbancy changes occurred on 
both the foot (os calcis) and hand (fifth digit) of both flight crew 
members. The changes from the last preflight t~ the first postflight 
X-rays indicate a decrease in absorbancy of 8 to 10 percent for the 
os calcis. This decrease was expected from available bed-rest information. 
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The X-ray absorbancy changes detected in the films of the hand 
require further evaluation, as such changes were not expected and con-
siderably less ground baseline experimental data are available for com-
parison. Exercise performed by the flight crew had some effect on these 
changes. However, this variable can only be considered in a qualitative 
sense. 
The reproducibility of the densiometric analysis of the X-rays of 
the os calcis is excellent (within 2 percent). The data on the X-rays 
of the hand are not complete but there is no reason to believe they 
will not be satisfactory. 
The final postflight X-ray indicates that the observed decrease in 
os calc is absorbancy had not yet returned completely to preflight levels, 
but a gradual return is evident. 
8.11.5 Conclusions 
Available data and current analysis do not permit any conclusions 
to be reached at this time. All scheduled experimental X-rays have 
been completed. The preliminary results indicate the importance of 
continuing postflight observations. It is planned to take another 
X-ray of the Gemini IV flight crew at a later date to determine if 
their absorbancy rate has returned to normal. The results also indi-
cate the importance of continuing these types of observations, espe-
cially for the longer Gemini missions. 
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TABLE 8-I1. - EXPERIMENT D-8, DOSE RATES OF COSMIC RADIATION 
FOR SELECTED REVOLUTIONS OF SPACECRAFT 4 OUTSIDE 
OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC ANOMALY 
Revolution Average dose rate, Maximum observed -Maximum observed 
number millirad/hour dose rate, dose rate, 
millirad/hour millirad/hour 
1 0.65 2.00 0.35 
2 .55 1.80 ·35 
3 .45 ·75 < .10 
14 .40 1. 00 < .10 
15 .40 ·75 .20 
16 .45 .80 .20 
17 ·50 1.00 .20 
18 .45 1.00 .20 
29 .38 .65 .15 
30 ·37 .65 < .10 
31 ·35 .75 < .10 
32 ·35 .75 .20 
44 ·50 .70 < .10 
45 .45 1.00 < .10 
46 .40 .80 .20 
47 ·35 ·90 .11 
48 .40 
·75 < .10 
59 ·38 .75 .11 
60 
·35 .75 .10 
61 
·35 .75 .20 
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TABLE 8-111.- PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT D-8 PASSIVE DOSIMETERS 
Passive dosimeters 
Components Serial no. Serial no. 
lIla 112a 
Lithium fluoride (6) 
unshielded 50 ± 10 
Lithium fluoride (7) 
unshielded 52.5 ± 19·5 
Calcium fluoride 
unshielded 49.4 ± 6.1 
Calcium fluoride 
unshielded 54.7 ± 7.0 47.1 ± 4.1 
Calcium fluoride 
shielded 53.6 ± 5.7 48.9 ± 3.8 
Pocket ionization 
chamber b 73 45 
Toshiba glass 50 ± 15 45 ± 14 
aAll exposure readings are in milliroentgens. 
bNo error estimates available at this time. 
Serial no. 
113a 
44 ± 19 
43 ± 12 
55.3 ± 5.4 
49.0 ± 3.8 
46 
30 ± 9 
Serial no. 
114a 
85 ± 15 
50 ± 14 
57.9 ± 6.5 
55.7 ± 5·1 
55·9 ± 5·9 
54 
Serial no. 
115a 
53 ± 18 
59 ± 14 
49.4 ± 4.7 
48.5 ± 6.1 
46.6 
35 ± 11 
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Film 
identification 
Roll 3, magazine 8 
Roll 4, magazine 9 
Roll 5, magazine 16 
Roll 2, magazine 7 
Roll 1, magazine 6 
TABLE 8-IV.- SUMMARY OF PHOTOGRAPHS OBTAINED FOR EXPERIMENT S-5 
Nwnber of 
terrain photographs 
47 
17 
4 
2 
13 
8 
9 
1 
Areas covered 
Baja California, 
Arizona, New Mexico, 
west and central Texas 
North Africa 
Southeast United States 
Mauritania 
Arabian Peninsula, 
southwest Iran, Egypt, 
Mauritania 
Key West, Fla., and 
Grand Bahama Islands, 
Nile Delta, Arabian 
Peninsula 
Nile River in 
southern EgyptJ 
Saudi Arabia 
Unknown - possibly 
southern Africa 
Remarks 
Systematic vertical photography; high 
percentage of overlap; excellent 
resolution and color 
Intermittent photography; some overlap; 
excellent quality 
Some cloud cover; good resolution 
Richat structures 
Intermittent photography; excellent 
geological detail; part of roll used 
for EVA 
Excellent color rendition of ocean 
areas; most of roll used for cloud 
photography 
Excellent quality; obliques; some 
overlap 
This roll was jammed in magazine; 
damage negligible 
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Figure 8-3. - Experiment 0-9, typical sextant measurements. 
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NASA-S-65-6S12 
3 . 
I. 75 miles (approximate) • 1 
1. Cerro del Pi nacate (volcanic field ) 
2 . SateJlitic volcanos 
3 . Great Sonora desert (sand dunes ) 
4 . Bahia de Adair (bay) 
5. Contact between mesozoic granite (to north) and schist (to south) 
6. Area of mesozoic gneiss cut by north- trending fractures 
7 . Typical Individual volcanos of the Pinacate f ie ld 
8 . Location of Puerto Penasco , Sonora Ctown not vis ible) 
9 . Recent lava flows and volcanos 
Fi gure 8- 5 . - Experiment 5- 5, typical synopic terrain photograph . 
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NASA- S-65-6533 
View of Acklins Island in the Bahamas showing the deep (darker) water as contrasted to the 
lighter (shallower) water of the lagoon. Cumu lus clouds are small over the water and larger 
over the sun-heated island. The light area at the left of the photograph is sunglint 
F igure 8 -6. - Experiment 5-6, typical synoptic weather photograph. 
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Figure 8-7. - Experiment M-3, preliminary evaluation of exercise data. 
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9.0 CONCWSIONS 
The performance of the spacecraft, launch vehicle, flight crew, and 
mission support was satisfactory for the Gemini IV mission. The objec-
tives of ~he mission were met with only two exceptions: The close-up 
station-keeping exercise was not accomplished and consequently rendezvous 
with the launch-vehicle second stage was not attempted; and the controlled 
lifting reentry was not performed as a result of an inertial guidance 
system malfunction. 
The flight contributed significantly to the knowledge concerning 
manned space flight, especially in the areas of long-duration flight, 
crew performance, and extravehicular activity. The Gemini spacecraft 
systems demonstrated the capability to support man on flights of up to 
4 days. 
The following conclusions were obtained from the evaluation of the 
Gemini IV mission. 
1. The Gemini launch vehicle performed very satisfactorily and in-
serted the spacecraft into a nominal orbit. The launch-vehicle achieved-
payload capability, however, was approximately 270 pounds greater than 
the predicted nominal. 
2. The hatch-closure difficulty encountered by the pilot after the 
extravehicular activity resulted primarily from the failure of the hatch 
latching mechanism to operate normally. Although the hatch-closing lan-
yard was effective in pulling the hatch closed, this device was not de-
signed to hold it closed. 
3. Voice communications were not entirely satisfactory during this 
mission. Periods of satisfactory performance indicate that the space-
craft systems operated nominally; however, other problems were evidenced 
in operational procedures and ground station maintenance. In addition, 
the HF radio system ~id not provide an acceptable backup to the UHF 
system. 
4. The crew members suffered irritation and inflammation of the 
tissue of their eyes, nose, and throat from a toxic substance which is 
assumed to have out-gassed from the water absorbent material or its 
additives. 
5. During revolution 48, a malfunction in the inertial guidance 
system precluded normal computer shut-down. As a result of power-down 
attempts, the computer was forced through an uncontrolled voltage decay 
which altered the memory significantly. This memory alteration prevented 
the use of the computer for reentry. 
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6. The reentry was conducted satisfactorilY. The control system 
maintained adequate vehicle stability, and the attitude oscillations 
were controlled through the time of drogue-parachute deployment. 
7. The propulsion system operated satisfactorilY except for one 
thrust chamber assemblY in the orbital attitude and maneuver system 
which apparentlY did not operate for approximatelY 9 minutes during the 
station-keeping exercise, and a thruster in the reentry control system 
which did not operate because of a failure in the electrical control 
circuitry. Neither of these malfunctions had a significant effect on 
the control of the spacecraft. 
8. The crew station and space suits are suitable for orbital mis-
sions of 4 days or longer except for minor changes which are the subject 
of recommendations listed in section 10. 
9. The food was suitable for orbital use. 
containing the rehydratable orange drink and the 
and peanut bars require correction. ExactlY the 
carried on the mission. 
The leaking of the bags 
crumbling of the toast 
right amount of food was 
10. The waste management system performed satisfactorilY. Several 
minor problems are the subject for recommendations which are listed in 
section 10. 
11. In some cases, fullY representative flight-crew operational and 
experimental equipment was not available for practice in the mission 
simulator. As a result, the flight crew could not realize full pre-
flight training in all aspects of the mission. 
12. The flight plan did not provide the crew with adequate time 
for the many tasks which took place during the first revolutions, such 
as station keeping, platform alinement, and preparation for extravehi-
cular activities. 
13. It was demonstrated that extravehicular activity can be con-
ducted as a routine part of manned space flight. The hand-held maneu-
vering unit was proved to be an effective means of controlling the 
pilot's position and attitude in free space. The three-dimensional 
spacecraft provided the pilot with a satisfactory visual reference 
during the extravehicular activity. 
14. The selected point of the tether attachment to the spacecraft 
caused the pilot to translate to the adapter in nearly all attempts to 
maneuver without using the maneuvering unit during extravehicular 
activities. 
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15. Star-to-horizon sightings from the Gemini spacecraft are more 
difficult than had been anticipated. Star viewing in the daytime is a 
difficult task. 
16. With proper map and photograph study before the mission and 
some familiarity with the terrain, rapid landmark identification and good 
landmark tracking can be accomplished. Orbital navigation can be accom-
plished by using map updates provided by the ground, or by observing ter-
rain features and updating the orbital plots from these observations. 
17. The crew had difficulty in sleeping because the audio volume 
to the headset could not be turned off. In addition, the crew were dis-
turbed by ambient light and noises associated with normal spacecraft 
operation. 
18. Real-time flight planning is not difficult and may be employed 
when necessary. 
19. Extravehicular activities and long-duration flights of up to 
4 days have no adverse residual physical effects on man. 
20. Available data indicate that the 11 experiments conducted dur-
ing the mission were successful. 
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10.0 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations are made as a result of evaluating 
the Gemini IV mission. 
1. A reevaluation should be made of the methods used to determine 
accurately the payload capability of the GLV. 
2. Necessary action should be taken to insure that problems with 
the launch vehicle complex such as the erector malfunction and the 
umbilical disconnect do not reoecur. 
3. A scheduled meeting of the appropriate NASA and MAC systems 
engineers with the flight crew should be conducted 1 week prior to 
the flight in order to review crew procedures for system operation as 
well as reduce the possibility of last minute changes. 
4. A study should be made to determine the best points of 
tether attachment to the spacecraft when maneuvering with the tether 
line. 
5. Adequate hand holds should be provided on the outside of the 
spacecraft for extravehicular activity. 
6. The hatch latching mechanism must be modified or redesigned 
to a configuration which will preclude any malfunction of the type 
experienced on the Gemini IV mission before repeating any extravehicular 
activities. 
7. The lanyard connected to the hatch should be strengthened to 
increase its effectiveness during any hatch closing operations in orbit. 
8. Before repeating any extravehicular activities, the hatch 
closing device must be redesigned to act as a satisfactory method for 
holding the door closed in case of a failure in the normal latching 
device. 
9. The hoist loop door should be tested as late as possible in 
the prelaunch preparations to insure its proper operation. 
10. A study should be conducted to determine the necessary changes 
to make the communications system acceptable for manned space flight. 
Emphasis should be given to the poor HF performance. 
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11. An independent and separate on-off control should be provided 
for the voice tape recorder. 
12. The lightweight headset should be replaced with a headset 
which can be worn without discomfort and stay in proper mechanical 
adjustment. 
13. The source of the eye irritation should be identified and 
eliminated. 
14. Modifications should be initiated to improve the reliability 
of the power sequencing of the 1GS and computer. 
15. Reentry should be conducted in reentry rate command mode 
with all rate gyros activated to prevent divergence or undue magnitudes 
of rates. 
16. The proper light pattern should be developed for a rendezvous 
target to provide adequate depth perception at night. 
17. A legible digital display of ground elapsed time in hours, 
minutes, and seconds from zero to 99 hours should be provided for the 
crew. 
18. Mission planning and operations should be conducted using 
ground elapsed time. 
19. The ground personnel should provide more information to the 
flight crew on expendables. 
20. A simplified means of safetying the ejection seat drogue 
mortar should be provided. 
21. A positive means should be established for protecting the 
ejection seat aneroids from corrosion on long missions. 
22. The intensity of the cabin utility lights should be increased. 
23. The cause of the plunger binding in the water dispenser should 
be investigated and the necessary corrective action taken. 
24. The required intensity of the reticle in the optical sight 
should be determined and corrective action taken. 
25. Velcro should be placed on all cabin wall space readily ac-
cessible to the flight crew. 
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26. Consideration should be given to providing a filter to prevent 
the direct sunlight from entering the cabin windows. 
27. The altimeter setting for the recovery area should be deter-
mined and relayed to the flight crew prior to reentry. 
28. A method of improving the readability of the launch vehicle 
tank pressure gages, which arose with the decals, should be implemented. 
29. A drinking water quantity monitoring system should be provided. 
30. The finger-tip lights incorporating protective covers on the 
bulbs should be used on all future Gemini space suits, and should be 
located between the first joint and the finger tip. 
31. Steps should be taken to insure that the blood-pressure port 
and bulb fitting are properly sized to insure a good fit and will oper-
ate correctly for the entire mission. 
32. The space suit overvisors should be redesigned to provide a 
single visor incorporating both visual and physical protection. 
33. The method for holding the overvisor in position should be 
modified to permit raising and lowering the visor with one hand. 
34. The urine receiver should be modified to prevent leakage. 
35. Corrective action should be taken to prevent leakage of re-
hydratable food packages and the crumbling of all bite-size foods. 
36. The food carried on future flights should be in no smaller 
proportion per man per day than on the Gemini IV mission. 
37. More varieties of freeze dehydrated smoked meats should be 
developed. 
38. Effort should be expended to develop an operational exercise 
method. 
39. The mission simulators and trainers should receive increased 
attention to insure that up-to-date flight-type eqUipment is installed 
and that the crew station and stowage provisions are the same as the 
current spacecraft. 
40. Training aids and simulators must duplicate exactly or have 
greater loads than the flight-type equipment for extravehicular activity 
training, and this training should be conducted with suit pressures of 
4.5 psi differential. 
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41. A means should be provided for turning off the audio in 
individual crew member's headsets and reducing the cabin ambient light 
level to aid the crew in getting better sleep. 
42. Rest cycles should be revised to incorporate a 6-hour sleep 
period and a 2-hour nap period. 
43. The comprehensive F-2 d~ and short F-10 day physicals should 
be exchanged. 
44. The Cape spacecraft communicator should be the only person 
talking to the flight crew during the terminal count (T-3 minutes to 
lift-off) • 
45. Stricter measures should be enforced to insure that accidental 
exposure of the crew members to a communicable disease does not occur. 
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12.0 APPENDIX 
12.1 VEHICLE HISTORIES 
12.1.1 Spacecraft Histories 
Spacecraft histories at the contractor facility are shown in fig-
ures 12-1 and 12-2, and at Cape Kennedy in figures 12-3 and 12-4. 
Figures 12-1 and 12-3 are summaries of activities with emphasis on 
spacecraft systems testing and prelaunch preparation. Figures 12-2 
and 12-4 are summaries of significant, concurrent problem areas. 
12.1.2 Gemini Launch Vehicle Histories 
Gemini launch vehicle (GLV) histories at the contractor's facili-
ties in Denver, Colorado, and Baltimore, Maryland, are shown in fig-
ure 12-5. The history of the launch vehicle at Cape Kennedy is shown 
in figure 12-6. Concurrent problem areas and significant manufacturing 
activities are shown with the GLV test and prelaunch preparation ac-
tivities. 
12.2 WEATHER CONDITIONS 
The weather conditions in the launch area were satisfactory for 
all operations on the day of the launch. Visibility was unlimited in 
all directions from the Cape. 
Surface weather observations in the launch area taken at T-5 hours 
were as follows: 
Cloud coverage Clear skies 
Wind direction, deg 060 
Wind velocity, knots 07 
Visibility, miles 10 
Pressure, in. Hg 30.08 
Temperature, of 81 
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Dew point, of • • . • • . . 
Relative humidity, percent 
59 
47 
Weather observations taken aboard the U.S.S. Wasp located 27.44° N., 
74.15° W., at the time of landing are as follows: 
Cloud coverage . . . 5/10 covered, alto cumulus and cirrus 
Wind direction, deg 110 
Wind velocity, knots . 13 
Pressure, in. Hg 30.26 
Temperature, of 81 
Dew point, of 75.8 
Relative humidity, percent . 80 
Sea temperature, OF 79 
Sea state 2 ft with 2- to 4-ft swells 
Table 12-1 presents the launch area atmospheric conditions at 
15:21 G.m.t. (00:05:00 g.e.t.), and table 12-11 provides weather data 
in the vicinity of Cape Kennedy ~e-&f~eeR.t,~. Figures 12-7 
and 12-8 present the launch are~and recovery area wind direction and 
velocity plotted against altitude. 
..;t 0: 1(7 (;.fl1-r(12.::S / : s-o Cj,~:-CJ 
12.3 FLIGHT SAFETY REVIEWS 
The flight readiness of the spacecraft and launch vehicle for the 
Gemini IV mission, as well as the readiness of all supporting elements, 
was determined at the Flight Readiness and Mission Review meetings noted 
in the following paragraphs. 
12.3.1 Flight Readiness Reviews 
12.3.1.1 Spacecraft.- The Flight Readiness Review for spacecraft 4 
was held on May 15, 1965. Three open items required resolution prior 
to the spacecraft being approved for flight. They were: 
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(a) End-to-end test of the HF antenna system prior to final sys-
tems test. 
(b) RCS tank bladder pinching problem wherein the tank discharge 
assembly and tank outlet throat had insufficient clearance. 
(c) Verification of the results of humidity tests on the drogue 
gun and ballute aneroids. 
A complete satisfactory end-to-end test was conducted on the HF 
antenna system, and the system was found to be satisfactory. Also, 
the results of the humidity tests on the aneroid mechanisms were re-
ceived and found to be acceptable. Investigation of the RCS tanks on 
spacecraft 4 concluded that the oxidizer tanks in both the A- and 
B-rings were suspected of having a pinched bladder, so the tanks were 
removed and replaced with ones having the proper clearance. With these 
and other minor system activities completed, the spacecraft was found 
ready for flight. 
12.3.1.2 Extravehicular activity equipment.- A separate Flight 
Readiness Review was held on May 26, 1965, by the review board to con-
sider only the equipment involved with the extravehicular activities 
scheduled for the mission. Discussion concerning the failure of the de-
mand regulator during qualification of the ventilation control module (VCM) 
resulted in removal and X-ray of the demand regulators in the spacecraft 
(as they are identical) to ascertain proper blueprint configuration. The 
spacecraft regulators were found correct, reinstalled in the spacecraft, 
and the system properly retested. All hardware for the extravehicular 
activities was found to be properly qualified and flightworthy. 
12.3.1.3 Launch vehicle.- On May 10, 1965, in Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia, a technical review was held on the status of the Gemini IV 
launch vehicle. Members of the NASA-MSC Flight Readiness Review Board 
were present. The Air Force Space Systems Division, assisted by Aero-
space personnel, compared differences between GLV-3 and GLV-4, reviewed 
the history, the qualification of hardware, and the testing and opera-
tions accomplished on GLV-4. All systems, except for two minor items 
under investigation at that time, were found ready for flight. 
12.3.2 Mission Review 
The Mission Review Board was convened on June 1, 1965. All ele-
ments reviewed their status and were found in readiness to support the 
launch and mission. 
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12.3.3 Flight Safety Review Board 
The Air Force Flight Safety Review Board met on June 2, 1965. 
Final confirmation had been made that the automatic oxidizer standpipe 
charging system was in operational readiness. The charging system is 
used to charge the oxidizer standpipe that reduces longitudinal oscil-
lations (the POGO phenomenon) during first stage flight. 
The results of flowmeter calibrations had been received establish-
ing correlation between the launch vehicle propellant level high-lights 
and the propellant system flowmeter readings. All launch vehicle and 
complex systems were ready, and the launch vehicle was committed to 
flight. 
12.4 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORTS 
Supplemental reports for the Gemini IV mission are listed in 
table 12-111. The format will conform to the external distribution for-
mat of the NASA or contractor organization preparing the report. Each 
report will be identified on the title page as being a Gemini IV sup-
plemental report. Before publication, the supplemental reports will be 
reviewed by the cognizant Mission Evaluation Team (MET) Senior Editor, 
the Chief Editor, and the MET Manager, and will be approved by the 
Gemini Program Manager. 
The same distribution will be made on the supplemental reports as 
that made on the Mission Report. 
12.5 DATA AVAILABILITY 
Tables 12-IV, 12-V, and 12-VI list the mission data which are 
available for evaluation. The trajectory and telemetry data will be on 
file at the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), Computation and Analysis 
Division, Central Metric Data File. The photographic data will be on 
file at the MSC Photographic Division. 
12.6 POSTFLIGHT INSPECTION 
The postflight inspection of the spacecraft 4 reentry assembly was 
conducted in accordance with reference 11 at the John F. Kennedy Space 
Center (KSC) from June 11 to June 25, 1965. The following items of 
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equipment were removed from the spacecraft while on the recovery ship, 
and were dispositioned prior to arrival of the reentry assembly at Cape 
Kennedy. 
Part number. Nomenclature Serial number 
52-87710-7 Computer 105 
52-87717-43 Gimbal control electronics 409 
52-87717-67 Inertial guidance system static 
power supply 322 
52-87717-75 Platform 101 
52-87717-77 Inertial measuring unit system 
electronics H8/202 
52-87723-13 Auxiliary computer power unit 110 
The reentry assembly was received in good condition on June 11, 
1965, without the rendezvous and recovery (R and R) section or the 
parachutes. The following list contains the discrepancies noted dur-
ing the detailed inspection of the reentry assembly. 
(a) The electrical connector to the left-hand mild detonating 
fuse (MDF) detonator at station Z192 had the bayonet pins sheared off 
and was hanging loose from the cartridge. 
(b) A local heating wake in the area of the right-hand adapter 
interconnect fairing similar to the one on spacecraft 2 was noted. 
(c) Hatch sill damage on the right-hand hatch sill consisting of 
a small dent on the lower corner in the area of the hinge was observed. 
(d) Hatch seal and sill damage. was found on the left-hand hatch 
midway between the forward and aft edges on the lower sill next to the 
hinge. The forward sill also was dented in approximately three spots. 
(e) There were smudges on both spacecraft windows. 
(f) The ~ecovery-hoist-loop door did not jettison and was re-
turned as loose equipment with the spacecraft. 
(g) One ejection seat MDF interconnect cap was loose. 
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(h) There was no potting on some of the electrical terminal 
strips in the equipment bays. 
(i) No RCS propellants were returned with the spacecraft. 
(j) The urine dump system was inoperative. 
(k) The cabin temperature control valve was inoperative. 
(1) The right-hand hatch-actuator rod was galled. 
12.6.1 Spacecraft Systems 
12.6.1.1 Structure.- The overall appearance of the spacecraft 
structure was good. The external appearance suggested a heating en-
vironment somewhere between that of spacecraft 2 and spacecraft 3. 
The shingles and blankets exhibited more discoloration than those of 
spacecraft 3, but the discoloration was less than that exhibited on 
spacecraft 2. The heat shield appeared as expected. The stagnation 
point measured 19.4 inches from the centerline, as compared to 24.5 
inches and 10 inches for spacecraft 2 and 3, respectively. This indi-
cates that the angle of attack during reentry was also between that of 
spacecraft 2 and 3. Ten plugs were removed from the heat shield for 
analysis. 
Various tests were run on the hatch, with emphasis on the latch-
ing mechanism, to investigate problems that were reported by the crew. 
Refer to section 5.1.1 for these results. This work was performed 
under spacecraft test request (STR) 4016. The hatch sill and seal 
exhibited some damage. Photographs indicate that this damage occurred 
during ground handling after the flight. 
Residue similar to that noted on the windows of spacecraft 3 was 
again noted. These windows have been removed and are being analyzed 
according to STR 4508. The parts of the suit and EVA equipment that 
came in contact with the window will be examined for particles from the 
windoW according to STR 4017. 
12.6.1.2 Environmental control system.- The external appearance 
of the environmental control system (ECS) bay was gOOd, and no water 
was noted in the cavity. The crew reported the urine dump system 
inoperative after 92 hours. This item is being analyzed according to 
STR 4022, and preliminary results indicate a malfunction of the sole-
noid dump valve. 
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During the postflight inspection it was discovered that the cabin 
temperature control valve was stuck in position; however, the crew 
operated the valve just prior to reentry without any reported diffi-
culty. This finding is under investigation according to· STR 4519. 
Upon investigating a report that the drinking water dispenser 
had kinked, it was found that its surface was crazed. This item is 
being analyzed according to STR's 4002 and 4509. 
The lithium hydroxide canister is being evaluated according_to 
STR 4011, primarily to determine its suitability for longer duration 
missions. 
The cabin humidity sensor is being calibrated according to 
STR 4025 to determine the accuracy of the inflight readings. 
12.6.1.3 Communications system.- The external appearance of all 
the communication equipment located in the equipment bays was good, 
and little evidence of corrosion was exhibited. 
The HF antenna was tested according to STR 4014. The antenna ex-
tended and retracted satisfactorily when it was energized by an external 
power source. No water was found in the antenna case. The case was 
pressurized to 2 psig with an external gaseous nitrogen source, and the 
following flows were measured. 
Antenna configuration 
As spacecraft was returned 
Hydrogel in breather cartridge 
removed (by drilling out enough 
to allow air passage) 
Extended approximately 6 in. 
Retracted and end-plug alined 
Flow rate, cc/min 
0.0 
0.0 
4300 
1700 
The HF transceiver and antenna were removed and dispositioned to the 
spacecraft contractor for further analysis according to STR 4014. 
12.6.1.4 Guidance and control systems.- As a result of the iner-
tial guidance system erGs) malfunction, all removable equipment that 
could be associated with this failure was removed, cleaned aboard ship, 
and dispositioned to the appropriate vendors for failure analysis. Im-
mediately after the arrival of the spacecraft at Cape Kennedy, and prior 
to its drying in the altitude chamber, the computer mode selector switch 
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was tested. Proper circuit continuity was obtained in all positions. 
This work is being accomplished according to STR's 4000, 4006, 4009, 
and 4010. For further discussion and results, see section 5.1.5. 
The attitude control maneuver electronics package is being cleaned 
and evaluated for possible reuse according to STR 4007. 
12.6.1.5 Pyrotechnics.- Pyrotechnic resistance checks were per-
formed on all actuated pyrotechnic cartridges. One cartridge regis-
tered a relatively low resistance, and the remaining cartridges indicated 
essentially open circuits. 
The hatch actuators, rocket catapults, aRd seat pyrotechnic devices 
were removed and sent to the KSC pyrotechnics group for storage. One 
MDF interconnect had a loose end-cap, and was dispositioned for failure 
analysis according to STR 4511 (fig. 12-9). 
The right-hand hatch-actuator rod exhibited galling and was dis-
positioned for failure analysis according to STR 4513. 
The electrical connector to the left-hand MDF detonator at sta-
tion Z192 was hanging loose. The three bayonet pins on the detonator 
had been sheared, allowing the electrical connector to become disen-
gaged (fig. 12-10). 
The postflight visual inspection of the wire-bundle guillotines, 
bridle-release mechanisms, detonators, and other pyrotechnics disclosed 
that all appeared to have functioned normally. 
The ejection seat drogue and ballute aneroids were removed and 
actuation tests conducted according to STR 4000A. 
12.6.1.6 Instrumentation and recording system.- The postflight 
inspection revealed two anomalies in this system. These were associated 
with the voice tape recorder cartridges, and with the wiring from the 
400-cps inverter to the PCM tape recorder. The wiring is being investi-
gated according to STR 4020. Three cartridges did not operate satis-
factorily. On two of the cartridges, failure was evidenced only during 
rewinding after successful playback. The other cartridge was corroded; 
however, when it was removed, cleaned, and placed in a new cartridge, 
it provided good reproduction. The remaining equipment has been, or 
will be, dispositioned according to reference 11 and STR's 4001, 4004, 
and 4005. The equipment will be subjected to further cleaning and test-
ing to determine its acceptability for reuse. 
12.6.1.7 Electrical system.- The main and squib batteries were 
removed, and the discharge was controlled from 20 volts to 20.5 volts 
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according to reference 11. The current leakage due to salt water im-
mersion was checked and recorded in reference 11. The batteries and 
their terminals appeared unaffected by corrosion. 
12.6.1.8 Crew station furnishing and equipment.- The appearance 
of the cabin interior was good. The recovery team reported the cabin 
to be clean and dry, and the equipment to be stowed in an orderly 
fashion. The absorbent material used in the spacecraft cabin appeared 
to be dry. Eight samples have been removed and will be tested ac-
cording to STR's 4013 and 4500. The flight crew equipment has been 
dispositioned according to STR 4002 and 4003A. This equipment is be-
ing assessed for possible reuse. 
The flight crew reported insufficient illumination of the optical 
sight. This sight is being investigated according to STR 4018 by 
the spacecraft contractor. The crew also reported that the left-hand 
G.m.t. clock was not accurate. The clock is being evaluated according 
to STR 4019. 
The center stowage box seals are being examined according to 
STR 4023 to determine if any damage occurred due to stowing and un-
stowing the gear. 
12.6.1.9 Propulsion system.- The RCS thrust chamber assemblies 
(TCA's) appeared normal. STR 4024 was written to investigate a failure 
associated with TCA 5. The failure was determined to be a faulty 
electrical circuit. The problem is still under investigation. 
12.6.1.10 Landing system.- The single-point bridle-release 
mechanism and the main parachute forward and aft bridle-release mechan-
ism appeared to have functioned normally. 
12.6.1.11 Postlanding recovery aids.- The recovery team leader 
reported that the hoist-loop door had failed to open, and that the 
door was removed by a swimmer prior to the recovery of the spacecraft 
by the ship. STR 4517 was written to investigate the problem. In-
vestigation showed that the retaining cable for both the hoist-loop 
door and recovery flashing light door had been severed by the pyro-
technic guillotine as designed. Further investigation revealed that 
the forward edge stiffener on the door had interfered with the edge of 
the phenolic parachute-bridle-trough filler. The door was replaced, 
and a spring scale attached to the door to measure the force required 
to remove the door. Two measurements were taken, and forces of 
58 pounds and 62 pounds were required. 
12.6.1.12 Experiments.- The Experiment D-8 active dosimeters 
were removed from the left-hand and right-hand hatches, and dispositioned 
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to the Air Force experimenter at MSC Houston. 
12.6.2 Continuing Evaluation 
The following is a list of the approved spacecraft test requests 
(STR's) for the postflight evaluation: 
Number 
4000 
rev. A 
4001 
4002 
"..tV. It 
4003 
rev. A 
4004 
w- It 
4006 
4008 
4009 
System 
Landing, escape, 
and recovery 
Communications 
Crew station 
equipment 
Crew station 
equipment 
. Instrumentation 
Instrumentation 
Guidance and 
control 
Guidance and 
control 
Electrical 
Guidance and 
control 
Purpose 
To evaluate ejection seat, drogue, and 
ballute aneroids. 
To return the Gemini IV voice recorder 
and shock absorber to the vendor for 
evaluation and refurbishment. 
To remove flight crew equipment for eval-
uation and assessment for possible reuse. 
To initiate and maintain control and ac-
countability of the crew equipment 
returned to MSC Houston via the courier 
from the recovery ship. 
To remove, clean, and return the instru-
mentation package no. 2 to the vendor for 
evaluation and possible reuse. 
To remove, clean, and return the PCM 
telemetry system to the vendor for eval-
uation and possible reuse. 
To remove, clean, and return the computer 
and ACPU to the vendor for failure analy-
sis. 
To remove, clean, and return the attitude 
and maneuver control electronics package 
to the vendor for evaluation and possible 
reuse. 
To verify spacecraft 4 IGS circuitry. 
To remove, clean, and return the IGS 
static power supply to the vendor for 
failure analysis. 
UNCLASSIFIED 
Number 
4010 
4011 
4012 
rev. A 
4013 
4014 
4016 
4017 
4018 
4019 
4020 
4021 
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System 
Guidance and 
control 
Environmental 
control 
Instrumentation 
Environmental 
control system 
Communications 
Structures 
Crew station 
equipment 
Experiments 
Crew station 
equipment 
Instrumentation 
Structures 
Purpose 
To remove, clean, and return the JMU and 
IMU electronics to the vendor for evalu-
ation tests of the IGS, and possible re-
use. 
To determine the condition of the LiOR 
canister after the mission. 
To return the spacecraft 4 voice recorder 
cartridges to the vendor for evaluation, 
refurbishment, and possible reuse. 
To analyze a sample of the absorbent 
material removed from the cabin wall 
after flight. 
To demonstrate that the HF voice trans-
ceiver and HF whip antenna were not ad-
versely affected by immersion. 
To determine why the flight crew had 
difficulty closing and latching the 
right-hand hatch. 
To determine the chemical constituents 
of the film that was observed to be 
wiped off the left-hand window during 
EVA. 
To investigate and recommend design 
changes necessary to overcome flight 
crew comment that the sight reticle was 
not bright enough during the Gemini IV 
flight. 
To investigate the Gemini IV crew's 
report that the left-hand G.m.t. clock 
was not accurate. 
To investigate the condition of the mylar 
drive belt and inverter wire routing in 
the PCM tape recorder. 
To perform postflight evaluation of the 
heat shield. 
UNCLASSIFIED 
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Number 
4022 
4023 
4024 
4500 
4503 
4508 
4509 
4511 
4512 
4513 
4517 
4519 
UNCLASSIFIED 
pystem 
Environmental 
control 
Crew station 
equipment 
Propulsion 
Environmental 
control system 
Electrical 
structure 
Environmental 
control 
Landing, escape, 
and recovery 
Electrical 
Landing, escape, 
and recovery 
Landing, escape, 
and recovery 
Environmental 
control system 
Purpose 
Failure analysis of the overboard urine 
dump system. 
To evaluate seals to determine the dam-
age incurred during flight as a result of 
putting gear in and taking gear out of 
the center stowage box. 
To investigate possible flight failure 
of the RCS TCA 5. 
To evaluate moisture absorbent material 
used in the cabin. 
To dry spacecraft wiring in preparation 
for failure analysis of IGS malfunction. 
To determine the composition of the res-
idue on windows. 
To investigate a problem reported to have 
occurred during the Gemini IV mission in 
which the command pilot was not able at 
times to get water to flow from drink 
dispenser, and to determine why the tube 
assembly has a crazed surface. 
To evaluate the tip of the MDF inter-
connect on the right-hand seat. 
To obtain the ampere-hours left in the 
batteries for comparison with the load 
analysis prediction. 
To evaluate the reason for the right-
hand hatch actuator galling. 
To determine why the hoist loop door fail-
ed to jettison. 
To determine why the cabin temperature 
control valve which operated satisfac-
torily just prior to reentry was jammed 
after recovery. 
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TABLE 12-1. - LAUNCH AREA. ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS 
AT 15:21 G.m.t., JUNE 3,1965 
Temperature, Pressure, DenSity, Altitude, 
ft of Ib/sq ft slugs/cu ft 
o x 103 80.8 2126.1 2277.9 x 10 -6 
5 60.4 1782.3 1990.3 
10 47.5 1485.1 1704.8 
15 32. 0 1232. 0 1459.1 
20 14.2 1015.2 1248.4 
25 -.2 831. 9 1054.9 
30 -23.3 675.4 902.0 
35 -43.6 542.8 760.1 
40 
-63.9 431.3 635.0 
45 -76.9 339.2 516.4 
50 -90.0 265.2 418.0 
55 -93.1 205.9 327.4 
60 -89.5 159.8 251.5 
65 -79.6 124.9 191.3 
70 -67. 4 98.0 145.5 
75 -56.9 77·5 112.2 
80 
-53· 7 61.6 88.5 
85 -52. 2 49.1 70.1 
90 -42.7 39.3 54.7 
95 -37.8 31.3 43.3 
100 
-35.5 25·3 34.5 
105 -27. 2 20·3 27. 4 
110 -20.9 16.5 21. 7 
J15 ..;18.0 13. 4 17.5 
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TABLE 12-11. - REENTRY WEATHER COND1T10NS~ AB MEASURED 
AT CAPE KENNEDY ON JUNE 7, 1965 
Altitude, Temperature, Pressure, Density, 
ft of Ib/SQ ft slugs/eu ft 
o x 103 76.46 2128.83 2289.94 x 10-6 
5 61.16 1786.94 1987.64 
10 46.22 1490.99 1710.18 
15 30.74 1236.40 1464.73 
20 15.26 1019.20 1248.58 
25 -1.48 834.57 1060.95 
30 -21.46 677.72 901. 27 
35 -43.78 544.89 763.508 
40 -67.18 432.53 642;24 
45 -82.66 339.38 524.46 
50 -95.62 263.78 422.,209 
55 -88.60 204.67 321. 507 
60 -86.08 159·35 248.36 
65 -T? 80 124.89 190.34 
70 I -67.72 98.16 146.10 
75 I -62.32 77.48 113·51 
80 -60.16 61.40 89.45 
85 -60.88 48.66 71. o. 
90 -58.36 38.63 55.88 
95 -43.96 30.70 43.07 
100 -36.58 24.64 33.76 
105 
110 
115 
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TABLE 12-III. - SUPPLEMENTAL REPORTS 
Completion Number I Report title Responsible organization date 
1 GLV Engineering Evaluation I SSD and contractor (Aerospace) August 3, 1965 Report (Gemini IV) 
C 2 Launch Vehicle No. 4 Flight SSD and contractor (Martin) July 18, 1965 
Z Evaluation 
() 
f""""" 3 Manned Space Flight Network Goddard Space Flight Center August 3, 1965 
» Performance for the 
en Gemini IV Mission 
en 4 Gemini IV Spacecraft Inertial Space Technology Laboratories July 18, 1965 
..." Guidance System Evaluation 
-m 
0 5 Gemini IV Spacecraft Guidance International Business Machines July 18, 1965 
System Evaluation Corporation 
6 Analysis of Station Keeping Flight Operations Directorate - I July 18, 1965 
and Rendezvous Exercise M3C 
Text reference 
section and 
remarks 
Section 5.2 
standing 
requirement 
Section 5.2 
standing 
requirement 
Section 6.3 
standing 
requirement 
Section 5.1. 5 
standing 
requirement 
Section 5.1.5 
standing 
requirement 
I Section 4.1 
C 
Z 
() 
f""""" 
» 
en 
en 
..." 
--m 
0 
I-' 
f\) 
I 
I-' 
\Jl 
l2-l6 UNCLASSIFIED 
TABLE 12-IV.- INSTRUMENTATION DATA AVAILABILITY 
Data description 
Paper recordings 
Spacecraft telemetry measurements 
(Revolutions 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 14, 15, 16, 
17, 18, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 42, 43, 
44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 57, 58, 59, 60, 
61, reentry) 
GLV telemetry measurements (launch) 
Telemetry signal-strength recordings 
MCC-H and MCC-C plotboards (Confidential) 
Range safety plotboards (Confidential) 
Radar data (Confidential) 
IP-3600 trajectory data 
MIS TRAM 
Natural coordinate system 
Final reduced 
C-band 
Natural coordinate system 
Final reduced 
Trajectory data processed at MSC and GSFC 
(launch and orbital) 
Voice transcripts (Confidential) 
Air-to-ground and onboard recorder 
Technical debriefing (on recovery ship) 
GLV reduced telemetry data (Confidential) 
Engineering units versus time plots 
Vibration 
Power spectrum density plots 
grms plots 
Acoustical noise spectrum density plots 
(by one-third octave) 
Spacecraft reduced telemetry data 
Engineering units versus time 
Ascent phase 
DCS parameters (Confidential) 
Orbital phase 
Parameter tabulations (statistical) for 
revolutions 1, 3, 14, 16, 18, 30, 32, 
46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 59, 60, 61, and 62 
System parameters excluding G and C for 
revolutions 1, 48, and 49 
Selected G and C parameters for revolu-
tions 1, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 61, 
and 62 (Confidential) 
Reentry phase 
System parameters excluding G and C 
Event tabulations 
Se~uence of event tabulations versus time, 
including thruster firings for ascent, 
reentry, and revolutions 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 
14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 
36, 37, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 58, 
59, 60, 61, and 62 
Special computations 
Ascent phase 
IGS computer word flow tag correction 
(Confidential) 
Special aerodynamic and guidance param-
eter calculations (Confidential) 
IGS computer simulation (Confidential) 
MISTRAM versus IGS velocity comparison 
(Confidential) 
Mod III radar versus IGS velocity com-
parison (Confidential) 
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TABLE 12-IV.- INSTRUMENTATION DATA AVAILABILITY - Concluded 
Data description 
Special comEutations 
-
concluded Experiment MSC-3 special processing for 
revolutions 7, 37, and 51 
Orbit phase D-8 experiment special processing for 
OAMS propellant remalnlng computations revolutions 7, 36, 37, 45, and 51 
for revolutions 1, 2, 3, and 4 Reentry phase 
OAMS thruster activity computations for 
revolutions 1, 2, 3, 1+, 61, and 62 Lift-to-drag ratio and angle-of-attack 
RCS thruster activity computations for calculations 
revolution 62 RCS propellant remaining computations 
Experiment MSC-l special processing for RCS thruster activity computations 
revolutions 1, 2, 30, and 62 Heat transfer rates 
Experiment MSC-2 special processing for 
revolutions 7, 37, and 51 
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TABLE 12-V. - SUMMARY OF PHOTOGRAPHIC DATA AVAILABILITY 
Mission phase 
Launch and prelaunch 
Recovery 
Swimmer deployment and installation of collar 
Egress of flight crew 
Aircraft carrier 
Loading of spacecraft and arrival of flight crew 
Inspection of spacecraft 
Mayport, Florida 
General activities 
RCS deactivation 
Cape Kennedy postflight inspection 
Exterior views of spacecraft 
Detail inspection views 
Onboard spacecraft 
ExtravehidUlar operation 
Experiment S-5, Synoptic Terrain Photography 
Experiment S-6, Synoptic Terrain Photography 
Experiment MSC-10, Two-Color Earth's Limb 
Photographs 
Apollo Landmark Experiment 
Miscellaneous genera~ purpose photography 
Number of still Motion picture 
photographs film, footage 
88 18 100 
373 
111 
400 
82 
15 
30 
22 
76 
29 
125 
107 
28 
35 
108 
900 
1 500 
600 
1 500 
500 
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TABLE J2-VI. - LAUNCH PHASE ENGINEERING SEQUENTIAL CAMERA DATA AVAILABILITY 
Sequential film I Camera 
coverage item I Type I Size Lens Speed, Location Presentation frames/sec 
1. 2-31 Tracking 
I 16-mm 40 in. 96 Cape Kennedy Spacecraft centered in frame 1. 2-32 from lift-off to loss of 
vehicle 
1. 2-27 Fixed 16-mm 40-mm 400 Complex 19 Spacecraft upper and lower 
1. 2-28 umbilical plugs showing 
disconnect 
C 1. 2-12 Fixed 16-mm 100-mm 200 Complex 19 Spacecraft centered in bottom C 1. 2-13 of frame Z 
1. 2-32 16-mm 40 in. 96 Cape Kennedy Spacecraft centered in frame Z () Tracking from lift-off to loss of () 
r- vehicle r-
» 1. 2-7 Fixed 16-mm 15-mm 24 Complex 19 Fuel-storage tanks to show » en 1. 2-8 possible leakage or spillage en en in the area en 
-n 1. 2-4 Fixed 16-mm 15-mm 24 Complex 19 General surveillance of space 
-n 
- 1. 2-5 15-mm vehicle, launcher, and 
-m 1. 2-6 25-mm launcher stand m 0 1. 2-1 Fixed 16-mm 15-mm 24 Complex 19 Space vehicle, launcher, and 0 
1. 2-2 15-mm launcher stand centered in 
1. 2":3 25-mm frame; cameras remotely 
operated by Test Conductor 
in case of an emergency 
1. 2-20 Fixed 16-mm 10-mm 400 Complex 19 3DiE and 3D2E umbilical plugs 
1. 2-22 Fixed 16-mm 10-mm 400 Complex 19 lDOVT umbilical plug 
1. 2-23 Fixed 16-mm 10-mm 400 Complex 19 3B1E and associated umbilical 
plugs 
1. 2-24 Fixed 16-mm 10-mm 400 I Complex 19 2BlE and associated umbilical I-' plugs f\) 
I 
I-' 
\0 
Sequential film I 
coverage item I 
1. 2-25 
1. 2-29 
e 1. 2-14 
Z 1. 2-15 
() 
I"" 1. 2-18 
» 1. 2-19 
(/) 1. 2-16 (/) 1. 2-17 
" 
1. 2-9 
- 1. 2-10 m 1. 2·-11 
0 
1. 2-33 
1. 2-34 
" 
TABLE 12-VI.- LAUNCH PHASE ENGINEERING SEQUENTIAL CAMERA DATA AVAILABILITY - Continued 
Camera 
Type I Size Lens Speed, Location Presentation frames/sec 
Fixed 16-mm 10-mm 400 Complex 19 Cable cutters 
Fixed 16-mm 152-mm 400 Complex 19 Umbilical booms 3 and 4 to 
show umbilical and lanyard 
action following umbilical 
release. 
Fixed 16-mm 15-mm 400 Complex 19 Lower portion of space vehicle 
152-mm and A-frames to observe ex-
plosive bolt action and 
space vehicle first motion. 
Fixed 16-mm 10-mm 400 Complex 19 Engine bells centered laterally. 
Fixed 16-mm 10-mm 400 Complex 19 Engine area. 
Fixed 16-mm 25-mm 400 Complex 19 Space vehicle centered in 
frame to show movement and 
vibration at launch. 
Tracking 16-mm 20 in. 64 Cape Kennedy Track from lift-off to loss 
of vehicle with space vehicle 
centered in frame throughout 
track. 
Tracking 16-mm 40 in. 64 I Cape Kennedy Track from lift-off to loss of 
vehicle with space vehicle 
centered in frame throughout 
track; if any components fall 
from the vehicle during 
powered flight, track the 
falling debris. 
f-' 
I\) 
I 
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o 
e 
Z 
() 
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» 
(/) 
(/) 
" -m 
0 
Sequential film 
coverage item 
1. 2-35 
1. 2-36 
1.2-37 
C 1. 2-38 
Z 1. 2-39 () 
r"'" 1. 2-40 
» 
V'J 
c.n 
'"T1 
-m 
0 1.2-41 
1. 2-42 
TABLE 12-VI.- LAUNCH PHASE ENGINEERING SEQUENTIAL CAMERA DATA AVAILABILITY - Concluded 
Camera 
Ty:pe Size Lens Speed, Location Presentation frames/sec 
Tracking 35-mm 120 in. 64 Cape Kennedy jTraCk from first acquisition to 
Tracking 80 in. 64 loss of vehicle; engine 
section centered until I/F 
ratio allows full space ve-
hicle to be centered 
Tracking 70-mm 180 in. 30 False Cape Track from first acquisition 
(IGOR) to loss of vehicle; engine 
Tracking 70-mm 360 in. 32 Cocoa Beach section centered in frame 
(ROTI) until I/F ratio allows full 
Tracking 35-mm 360 in. 32 Patrick Air space vehicle to be centered 
(IGOR) Force Base to show staging if event is 
Tracking 70-mm 500 in. 20 Melbourne Beach recordable 
(ROTI) 
Tracking 16-mm 24 in. 180 Cape Kennedy Airborne photographic coverage 
(airborne) 35-mm 32 in. 80 Area of the launch sequence from 
specially configured aircraft 
for surveillance during the 
maximum aerodynamic pressure 
region 
Tracking 500-mm Patrick Air Track first acquisition to loss 
(BX-7 Force Base of vehicle to provide high 
Image En- altitude video coverage for 
hancement transmission to MCC-Cape 
System) 
Fixed 16-mm 25-mm 400 I Cape Kennedy 13D10C and 3D20C umbilicals 
centered horizontally in top 
third of frame to show dis-
connect and clearness 
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Equipment installation, module tests 
manufacturing and complex preparations 
Reentry/adapter mating operations 
Simulated flight 
n 11I11 n 
Clean up and move to altitude chamber' 
I ~ ~ IIUIII"~"IIIDII II:! I Prepare for altitude chamber II ~IIIII~ 11111.m IIIIIH III : I : Altitude chamber 
Figure 12-1.- Spacecraft 4,test history at contractor facility. Apr 65 
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NASA-S-65-5983 
Complex preparation and val idation 
s made tor the tOllowing reasons: 
acements and retest due to over-
surization of secondary coolant loop Manufacturing up-date, additional instrumen; tation parameters, new urine disposal 
system, installation of new demand reg-
ulator, new window installation, wire 
I 
fai I ed vi brati on test at vendor 
lation of H-15 IMU platform 
bundle shrapnel protection, coolant system 
modifications (spacecraft 3A tests), OAMS 
fuel tank replaced (qualification failure at open s !;'j I I II [;J I II 
stallation of redesigned PCM programmer 
vendo 
J. /:1 
';1 
. I"" IIIII ,Cj 111111:;cll"~,,,acement of magnetoml 
1111:31111 ill.:. w...... .:::t III I (;:;l •.• : II II I J:;.l II I II 12l .. ;' I II II ill.'. "I". Reinstallation of IMU platform with different slip ring wired for use 
II:: I~·: ll: lli~ lllll~; 11111f::JjllllhlIlIlIUIIIII. :~ '.; .:. :: • Rep acement of event timer ;: ~: ;,;; .: <, I t;:;J I I I I I f!:!l I I I I I t;:;:t I I I I I " I I I I Io...LI :~ .~ ; IMU platform removed for slip ring failure analysis ..... m. 1 j I I I ill I I I I I E3 I I I I I E3 I I I I I ru j I I I I ill I I I I I lli 
Spacecraft 2 flight IMU platform installed for altitude chamber and phasing tests 
~ I I I I I W I I I J I L:!J 1 I 1 I I I::llil 1 I ru I I I I I ~ I I I I I m I r I I I ~ I I I II ill 1.1 I I J 0 I 
Hand controller removed for repot, retest (failed humidity and salt fog tests 
~.: IIIII ~:;~ /1 I I I E3 I I I I I.ID j I I I I ill I I I I I I':;) I I I I I ill I I I I I t:::l I I I I I m I I I I I lli II :~ >' Trouble snoot and fix maneuver hand controfler (probrems experienced at :. ; I111 Will II E3 I I I II ill I I I I I ill I I I I I ill I I I I I ill I I I II ill I I II I I>l III I I"'" III 
back to vendor for low temperature start tests and integration wit~ fl 
Figure 12-2. - Spacecraft 4 significant problem areas at contractor facility. 
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NASA-S-65-5985 
Pyrotechnic build up and temporary seat installation 
Electrical interface integrated validation (EIIV) and joint G and C 
Install adapter batteries -
flight seats and stowage evaluation 
Service and pre-count 
Final count and launch 
4 11 18 25 9 16 23 
Apr 65 May 65 Jun 65 
Figure 12-3. - Spacecraft 4 test history at Cape Kennedy. 
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NASA-S-65-5984 
Installation of additional heaters on oxidizer I ines (spacecraft 3A tests) 
Installation of inertial measuring unit (IMU) fl ight unit 
Installation of reworked DC/DC converter (GT-3 failure) 
Hand controller problem - simulated flight (switch - yaw right - contact bounce) 
~ Special gyro platform test (GT-3 problem) i~ Hand controller rework - switch contact bounce I: ... :.·.· ... .. ~. ~ Wiring .. C ..... hange to horizon scanners completed (additional instrumentation) / I ~ I I ~~I I I I I I - Rework thermal curtain for MSC experiment 
lation of replacement pyrogen in one retro 
Cabin hcrtch' wincio~s 'purg'ed ~ith ~r~o~ g~ (GT :3' p;obl 
I I TAdditi~n 'of'w~te-;;bs'orbe~t ~ater~s ~o 'ca'bi~ ~al b';'~ I I I , , 1"'"'1 , , , , , EO:> I , I I I •... 
acement of ACE package with new unit having attitude hand controller contact bounce 
R~;o~al' of' R'a~d R= RCS ~e~tI~ns"for X-'Ra'y ~f fla~ge/bl~dder' ciea~~;:;;;s ~ 
r J , I I r:t:':'J r I J I I 57'~~ I f 1 I I r;v.:J I 1 I , I ~ I 
lacement of RCS oxidizer tanks with new ones (precautionary measure) [] , , I I , [] I I I I ~to~ge: eyal:u~ti~n (GT ~3 :pr.ob.lem) 
Modification of HF whip antenna to eliminate leakage (GT-3 probl 
I ...•.... · ....... ........ · .... R •.• ~ •.•.•..•...•...••• p ... la~e~e~t 'of '0 A.M ... ' S 'TCA i a~d :;ri/ic~ti~n 'of' in~rity .. " [/1 II [} I I I I Final stowage eva~u.~tion .<~.> Installation of new modified HF transmitter \ ....... .S~ac~cra~t ~e~a.te~ t~pl.ac.e ~n~ a.da~r ~at.te~y 
Scanner fairing ejection cartridge changed to dual bridge wire pyro configuration 
, , I rI I I I II~s~atio~ ~f ~te~1 b;~e~h in 'pilot' p£l~chLt~ m~rtar E" J . I ~ I I I I I J7;~~'" I I I J I r::J: 1 I J , 
CO? cannister replaced (water soaked due to procedural error during servi 
Figure 12-4.- Spacecraft 4 significant problem areas at Cape Kennedy. 
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NASA-S-65-6006 
V((ff"(((({U/f?(f((f4(L((",f((f4Y(((({((/,II H or i zo nta I as sem b I y and te st 
Jul 21 
Jul24 
Sep 4 
Oct 23 
Oct 23 
- Tank spl ice complete 
Dye penetrant te sts 
Radiographic inspection 
Weld eddy current checks 
Hydrostatic 
Chemical cleaning 
Hel ium checks 
Nitrogen purge 
Dew poi nt checks 
Feb 24 - Tank roll-out inspection 
Feb 26 - Customer certification 
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Figure 12-5. - GLV 4 history at Denver and Baltimore. 
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Figure 12-6. - GLV-4 history at Cape Kennedy. 
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NASA-S-65-6676 
Figure 12-9. - Faulty escape system MDF interconnect. 
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Figure 12-10 - Sheared connector to Rand R separation igniter. 
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